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ABSTRACT 
 
The objectives of this thesis are twofold: firstly, demonstrate that the string of 
contradictions stretching across substantive and procedural corporate criminal 
law may be avoided if courts refer to an appropriate mechanism of imputation; 
and secondly, show how such an appropriate mechanism of imputation may 
be determined.  This study adopts a three-step process to achieve these 
objectives. The first step involves elaborating on the lack of coherence and 
integrity in the imputation of acts and intents (or causal relationships) to 
corporations caused by a disjunction of rules invoked by courts. The second 
step involves establishing parameters by which mechanisms of imputation 
may be evaluated. The third step involves evaluating a number of samples by 
reference to the established parameters. Five mechanisms of imputation 
applicable in the United Kingdom and in some jurisdictions that trace their 
legal heritage to the United Kingdom are evaluated. 
  
In the conclusion, it is submitted that although none of the mechanisms 
evaluated may be deemed to be the appropriate mechanism, the aggregation 
doctrine is the least inappropriate. This is because although it requires some 
modification, it can best be aligned with propositions of how the criminal 
liability of corporations may be established on a coherent and consistent 
basis. The propositions that are put forward include the use of the doctrine of 
innocent agency to establish a corporation’s guilt in instances where no guilty 
agent may be identified; and the use of the principle of accessorial liability to 
establish a corporation’s guilt in instances where a guilty agent may be 
identified. The aggregation doctrine as modified in this study will enable the 
prosecutor to establish a corporation’s guilt as advised above if measurable 
values are given to the ‘innocent’ acts of agents and if emphasis is placed on 
how the corporation reacted to the discursive dilemma that arose in the 
decision-making process that preceded the performance of the relevant 
activity. This will provide evidence to the effect that the aggregated act 
represents the corporation’s subjective position.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There is some degree of consensus that a corporation1 is a distinct person 
and criminal liability may be imposed upon it for offences committed qua 
corporation.2 Nonetheless, this logic has not always guided courts in the 
United Kingdom. They have imposed criminal liability on corporations due to 
the entreaty of the equity or spirit of the relevant statute or to further public 
interests and this seriously compromises efforts at assembling related rules of 
corporate criminal liability within a rational whole. The first thing a researcher 
notes while going through cases in corporate criminal law is a sequence of 
contradictions and lack of integrity. Some commentators contend that this is 
because corporate criminal liability evolved around the notion of individualism3 
and without a cogent theoretical base.4 However, the contention that criminal 
law principles were established only with individuals in mind may hardly be 
justified. Mestre5 and Valeur6 have shown that criminal sanctions were 
imposed on collective entities as far back as the Roman era and Schlegel7 
asserts that corporations have violated criminal law standards since their 
inception.8 Also, if it is accepted that the criminal law has always targeted 
                                                 
1 The term ‘corporation’ is used in this thesis as a synonym of ‘company.’ Both forms of 
associations have a common origin (See Hickson and Turner, 2005: 3) and have been used 
interchangeably to refer to business undertakings that have attributes such as legal 
personality, limited liability and perpetuity. See also Png, 2001: 4. However, Gower (1956: 
1371-1372) intimated that many American legislators prefer the term ‘corporation’ while 
British legislators often use ‘company.’ See also Nicholls (2005: 6-7) on the use of both terms 
(as well as “body corporate”) for a single taxon by Canadian legislators. 
2 See Ragozino, 1995: 424 and 441-443; Png, 2001: 1; and Wells, 2001: 3.  
3 See Schlegel, 1990: ix; Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 19; Wells, 2001: 1; and Gobert and 
Punch, 2003: 3 and 46. Some commentators have employed this argument to buttress their 
opposition to the use of the criminal law to regulate the activities of corporations. See Wolf, 
1985; and Khanna, 1995. 
4 See Schlegel, 1990: 5, 14; Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 101; and Wells, 1993: 551.  Cf Png, 
2001: 1. 
5 1899: 34. 
6 1931: 9-10. 
7 1990: ix. 
8 It is generally agreed for example that the principle of vengeance was the earliest source of 
criminal liability. See Holmes, 1938: 39-40; Binavince, 1964: 1-2; and McVisk, 1978: 75. 
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criminal behaviour then all ‘persons’ capable of conducting themselves in 
such manner as to breach criminal law standards may be said to have always 
been the concern of the criminal law.9 Thus, one may contend that the lack of 
coherence and integrity manifested in corporate criminal liability is due to the 
lack of a cogent theoretical base.  
 
However, the search for such base may undermine the practical utility of the 
subject especially where theoretical legal scholarship (as opposed to doctrinal 
analysis) is conceived of as the study of the law from an external standpoint.10 
This is because leaving the door open to the use of external knowledge may 
be as good as opening the floodgate to a plethora of contradictions.11 Hence, 
it may be important to first of all avoid contradiction and incoherence internally 
or within the legal frame before delineating instances where external 
knowledge may be sought.12 
 
This thesis therefore seeks to achieve internal coherence13 and integrity14 in 
the way in which courts impose criminal liability and sanctions on 
corporations. This will in turn delimit instances where external viewpoints may 
be imported into corporate criminal law discourse. Owing to the fact that 
corporations invariably act through the agency of natural persons, it will be 
                                                                                                                                            
However, vengeance does not relate only to actions of individuals since collective actions by 
groups may equally be incited by a collective feeling of vindictiveness. 
9 We may therefore agree with Tur (1987: 123) that there is no general law that applies to 
persons but rather sets of rules governing relationships and determining liabilities. 
10 External here refers to non-legal. This follows from Hart’s (1994: 102-103) distinction 
between external and internal points of view. See also Cheffins’ (1999: 197-198) definition of 
theoretical legal scholarship. See also Green (2005: 565) who contends that a theory of law is 
an explanation of cosmopolitan import. 
11 If judges are allowed to import knowledge from the wide varieties of non-legal categories 
that may have relevance in a case the number of contradictions would certainly increase 
exponentially. 
12 It may be important to avoid instances where judges give regard to ideas “plucked literally 
from the air.” See Harris, 2001: 226.  
13 Coherence here is held to mean that rules and their interpretations by courts are logically 
connected in a rational whole. See MacCormick, 2005: 189, 190 and 206. See also Siems, 
2008: 149. In other words, the assortment of propositions that judges and legislators 
introduce ought to be consistent with each other within a rationale whole, which is the criminal 
law. 
14 Integrity may be understood here to imply that the interpretation of statutes and precedent 
by judges is governed by principles such as fairness and good conscience (see Dworkin, 
1986: 225). However, these principles ought to conform to past standards to such extent that 
“like cases are treated alike” in line with the contentions of Perelman (1963); Hart (1994); and 
Ashworth (2000).  
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submitted that coherence and integrity may be achieved by harmonising the 
disparate ways in which courts impute acts and intents to corporations for the 
purposes of imposing criminal liability and sanctions on the latter. Such 
harmonisation will require establishing common ways of interpreting rules of 
statutes and precedent through a mechanism designed to collate relevant 
rules. It will be shown that each jurisdiction has such a mechanism because it 
is the logical consequence of the endeavour by courts and Parliament to 
ascertain a measure of determining when the act or knowledge of an agent 
will be imputed to the corporation under defined circumstances. Equally, it will 
be shown that each mechanism comprises a number of rules that indicate the 
requisite pattern of attributing acts and intents to corporations for the 
purposes of imposing criminal liability and sanctions on them. As such, where 
courts are guided by an appropriate mechanism the probability of achieving 
coherence and integrity in the way in which criminal liability and sanctions are 
imposed on corporations will be higher.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
 
Early judgements that affirmed the separate personality of corporations15 and 
some early commentators that endorsed the ideal16 did not explain why and 
how corporations ought to be distinct persons in law. This certainly pushed 
other commentators like Thurman17 to contend that the idea was similar to 
that of the divine right of kings in a much earlier day.18 As such, the failure to 
seek justification for rules such as the separate personality of corporations 
has led to much confusion with regard to the nature of the corporate person 
within criminal law discourse. It has nonetheless been posited that any 
theorists attempting to premise their study with an answer to the question of 
what is a corporation would be confronted with an ideological battle at the 
                                                 
15 Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, hereinafter referred to as Salomon; Lee v 
Lee Air’s Farming [1961] AC 12, hereinafter referred to as Lee Air’s Farming. 
16 See Freund, 1897: 52-55; and Maitland, 1900b: 335. 
17 1937: 185. 
18 This is also supported by Brickey (1988: 593) who contends that “just as primitive art and 
artefacts depicted inanimate beasts and gods as creatures possessed of human traits, so did 
common-law courts breathe life into the corporate form.” See also Maitland, 1900a: xxx; 
Dewey, 1926: 655; and Radin, 1932: 643. 
4 
 
onset.19 However, Fisse and Braithwaite make an interesting remark which 
may be deemed to advise the contrary. They state that “[i]f we understood 
how organisations decide to break the law or how they drift into breaking the 
law, we might be able to prescribe legal accountability principles which are 
consonant with organisational realities.”20 Wells21 equally advances that 
questions about the nature of the corporation are indispensable to the 
establishment of corporate fault and deplores the fact that many 
commentators have readily assumed that these questions were settled by the 
recognition of the corporation’s separate personality by courts and 
Parliament.22 Nonetheless, in order to avoid a dogmatic assertion,23 attempts 
at justifying the corporation’s entity status have often focussed on 
distinguishing between individualist (or atomic or reductionist) and collectivist 
(or holistic) perspectives of the corporate entity24 and fiction and realist 
explanations.25 As such, it may be posited that the absence of a theoretical 
base is due to the inability of courts and legislators to make a clear choice 
between these competing theories or to harmonise and standardise them.   
 
This is exemplified by the fact that a corporation was held to be identifiable 
only with senior officers in one case,26 but in another case it was identified 
with a junior employee.27 However, in Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v 
Williams Furniture Ltd and Others,28 the court held that a corporation will not 
be identified with either junior or senior officer where it was the officer’s 
targeted victim. Thus, there is no thread linking different decisions but the fact 
that each judge puts her unique interpretation on the relevant statute or 
precedent. In the first of these three cases, Lord Reid advanced that the 
                                                 
19Hart, 1983: 25-32; and Orts, 1993: 1567 – 1574.  
20 1993: 101. See also, Schlegel, 1990: 14; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 17-18. 
21 2001: 2 and 74-75. 
22 Wells (2001: 75) cites Holdsworth (1944: ix and 70) to this effect. Her view also echoes that 
of French (1984) who argues that corporations are morally competent. See Wells, 2001: 155-
160.  
23 Marmor (2006: 691) notes that the “essence of dogmatism is the refusal to revise one’s 
conclusion in light of contrary evidence.” 
24 See Hessen, 1979: xiv-xviii; Donaldson, 1982: 14-16; French, 1995: 10-13 and 34-35; 
Wells, 2001: 75-78; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 17-18. 
25 See Png, 2001: 6-8; and Laufer, 2004: 48-52.  
26 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, hereinafter referred to as Nattrass. 
27 R v British Steel [1995] 1 WLR 1356, hereinafter referred to as British Steel. 
28 [1979] Ch 250. This case is hereinafter referred to as Belmont. 
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“purpose of this Act must have been to penalise those at fault, not those who 
were in no way to blame.”29 However, even though equally deciding a case on 
a corporation’s criminal liability, Stein LJ in the second case found no difficulty 
in holding that “the decision in [Nattrass] does not provide the answer to the 
problem of construction before us. The answer must be found in the words of 
section 3(1) of the Act of 1974 read in its contextual setting.”30  
 
As such, whether criminal liability may be imposed on a corporation may be 
deemed to be strictly a question of interpretation. This means that the 
prospect of achieving coherence and integrity would be much higher not 
where judges have to consider whether it would be “irrational” to impute acts 
and intents to corporations31 but where their interpretations of the relevant 
statute or precedent is guided not only by uniform rules governing imputation 
but also by uniform rules governing interpretation. In the absence of both sets 
of uniform rules what judges actually do is well illustrated in Lord Hoffmann’s 
dictum in Meridian Global Financial Management Asia Ltd v Securities 
Commission. He posited thus:  
[it] is always a matter of interpretation: given that it was 
intended to apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? 
Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for the 
purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the company? 
One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual 
canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of 
the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy.32  
 
This statement begs the question of whether interpretation is solely a matter 
of the judge’s impulse. Equally, it may be important to determine whether the 
same canons that govern the interpretation of statutory provisions would 
govern the interpretation of the precedent. Generally, it seems each court has 
taken the liberty to formulate its own rules of interpretation in order to justify its 
decision. The result as mentioned above is that it has been remarkably 
difficult to predict court decisions and ascertain objective standards for fair 
outcomes. In the words of MacCormick “if everyone has convictions of her or 
                                                 
29 Nattrass at 174. 
30 British Steel at 1361. 
31 Buckley LJ in Belmont at 262. 
32 [1995] 2 AC 500 at 507. This case is hereinafter referred to as Meridian.  
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his own, who is to say which subjective conviction is better?”33 There is no 
denying that non-legal issues would always influence the contextual 
interpretation by the judge.34 However, a judge may not be said to be entitled 
to curtail or expand legislation in light of her moral leaning.35 Allan argues that 
where a common thread may be identified in different interpretations the idea 
of formulating rules that ought to govern interpretation36 becomes trivial.37 In 
spite of the fact that this may be understood to be a tacit endorsement of 
judicial activism, if it is deemed to be true then it may be said that the 
argument ironically works against judge-made rules of interpretation in areas 
where there is no common thread linking different interpretations in a rational 
manner. As mentioned above, corporate criminal law is marked by such 
incoherence.38 As such, this thesis seeks to achieve internal coherence and 
integrity by limiting the interpretive authority of judges.  
 
This limitation must however take into consideration what Allan deemed 
should be the benchmark for assessing the cogency of judges’ interpretations: 
“the reasons of policy and principle that inspired them.”39 These policies and 
principles constitute the premises of judges’ arguments and narrow their lines 
of reasoning and restrict the scope of their conclusions. Thus, where Coke 
began with the assumption that “ the corporation itself is only in abstracto” and 
                                                 
33 2008a: 150. 
34 Naffine (2003: 361) posits that when judges are required to assign a meaning to the term 
“person” used by a statute they seek to ascertain how Parliament intended to define such 
term and the process of ascertaining Parliament’s intended meaning involves “quasi non-
legal” and metaphysical questions.   
35 Cf Blackstone (1765-1769); and Allan, 2004: 710. Opponents to limitations of the judge’s 
interpretive authority adhere to the doctrine of the equity of the statute that was inspired by 
Plowden’s commentaries on Eyston v Studd (1574) 75 ER 688 (hereinafter referred to as 
Eyston) that were in turn inspired by Aristotle’s doctrine of valid inference. Plowden’s 
commentaries are discussed succinctly by Behrens (1999). 
36 What Hart (1994: 100-110) called “rules of recognition.” 
37 The common thread thus justifies the objectivity of the judges’ moral values. See Allan, 
2004: 709-711. He seeks to justify Blackstone’s (1765-1769) claim that judges have a moral 
duty to either eliminate a “mischief” created by the statute or provide a “remedy” where it may 
be just and reasonable to do so.  
38 It may be advanced that the claim that judges are entitled to modify statutes while 
interpreting them may be deemed to be a rule requiring judges to improvise where they deem 
it necessary. Thus, whichever way one looks at it judges may be said to be guided by rules 
governing interpretation although rules that require improvisation favour incoherence and 
inconsistency. However, Dworkin (1986: 225) maintains that questions about whether a judge 
is guided by pre-established rules or invents the law are unhelpful because interpretation is a 
function of the judge’s moral capacity.  
39 2004: 710. This reflects what Dworkin (1986: 225 and 243) describes as “principles about 
justice and fairness and procedural due process.” 
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corporations “have no souls” it is only fair that he concluded that a judge 
cannot interpret a statute as imposing liability on a corporation for treason or 
any offence that is punished by excommunication.40 Equally, where Lord 
Hoffmann premised his dictum on the contention that “[a] company exists 
because there is a rule (usually in a statute) which says that a persona ficta 
shall be deemed to exist” it is fair that he concluded that if the judge 
successfully fits an improvised rule into the legislator’s “intended meaning”41 
to the effect that employee X acted as the corporation, then the corporation 
will be liable for employee X’s action.42 Although sometimes the premise 
adopted by the judge may be true or even axiomatic,43 there is the danger that 
the extent of the corporation’s liability would depend not on what the law says 
a corporation can or cannot do but actually on what the judge thinks the 
corporation can or cannot do. As such, a judge held that the word “person” in 
a statute cannot be understood to mean a corporation where it is impossible 
for the corporation to perform the duty imposed by statute such as voting at 
meetings.44  
 
This furtive advancement toward judicial activism in corporate criminal law 
has not only motivated judges to ordain the enforcement of their feelings 
about the nature of corporations but also to modify the principles of the 
                                                 
40 Sutton’s Hospital Case [1558-1774] All ER 11 at 22. This case is hereinafter referred to as 
Sutton’s Hospital. It must be noted that although this reflected a statement made by Pope 
Innocent IV in 1245 during the first council in Lyon (See Coffee, 1981: 386, n. 2; Lizee, 1995: 
136; and Weismann and Newman, 2007: 419) Coke did not cite any previous authorities to 
support his contention. He cited two cases which approved of the statement that a “corporate 
aggregate” cannot do fealty or swear an oath of loyalty: Duchy of Lancaster Case (1561) 75 
ER 325 (hereinafter referred to as Duchy of Lancaster) and Willion v Berkley (1561) 75 ER 
345. However, a corporation and its members (proprietors) who were assignees to the 
Corporation of Bath had been jointly indicted for failure to repair a bridge. See 3 Chit. Cr. Law 
600 cited by Lord Denman in R v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company 3 QB 224 
(hereinafter referred to as Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co) at 225. As such, Coke’s 
decision was not guided by any legal principle but by his moral leaning.  
41 For discussion on how such “intended meaning” may be ascertained, see Fuller, 1969: 82-
91. 
42 Lord Hoffmann called such improvised judge-made rule “special rule.” See Meridian at 506-
507. 
43 See for example, Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical Society v London & Provincial Supply 
Association (1880) 5 App Cas 857 (hereinafter referred to as Pharmaceutical Society) at 870. 
He posited that “[i]f you could get over the first difficulty of saying that the word ‘person’ here 
may be construed to include an artificial person, a corporation, I should not have the least 
difficulty upon those other grounds which have been suggested.” 
44 See Wills v Tozer (1904) 53 WR 74, hereinafter referred to as Tozer. This position is 
criticised in Chapter 3. 
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criminal law to suit such feelings. As such, at the time when the consensus 
was that corporations could not be held liable for mens rea offences,45 
Channel J in a bid to pursue the policy goal of the relevant statute noted thus: 
[b]y the general principles of the criminal law, if a matter is 
made a criminal offence, it is essential that there should be 
something in the nature of mens rea, and therefore, in 
ordinary cases a corporation cannot be guilty of a criminal 
offence, nor can a master be liable criminally for an offence 
committed by his servant. But there are exceptions to this rule 
in the case of quasi-criminal offences, as they may be termed 
– that is to say, where certain acts are forbidden by law under 
a penalty...and the reason for this is that the legislature has 
thought it so important to prevent the particular act from being 
committed that it absolutely forbids it to be done.46 
 
This decision was later on used by Viscount Reading47 to justify the disregard 
of the requirement of mens rea on the ground that the legislator forbade the 
act absolutely.48 Thus, judges may create makeshift offences (quasi-crimes) 
in order to circumvent the mens rea requirement and avoid giving the 
impression that vicarious criminal liability was imposed. However, even when 
judges eventually decided that corporations could be guilty of mens rea 
offences they still proceeded to alter criminal law principles. They declared 
that they were imposing direct or personal liability but they imposed vicarious 
liability indirectly. Viscount Caldecote was the first in a long line of judges that 
proceeded thence.49 He was inspired by Lord Blackburn’s statement in 
Pharmaceutical Society that was to the effect that although a corporation 
could not obtain competent knowledge independently, it may (“for all 
substantial purposes of protecting the public”) be said to possess competent 
knowledge of something if it has employed competent agents to obtain such 
information.50 Given that the counsel for the respondent company did not 
                                                 
45 For the historical development of corporate criminal law, see Schlegel, 1990: 5-17; Wells, 
2001: 86-99; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 53-68. 
46 Pearks, Gunston and Tee, Ltd v Ward [1902] 2 KB 1 at 11. This case is hereinafter referred 
to as Pearks, Gunston and Tee. 
47 Mousell Bros v London and North Western Rail Co [1916-17] All ER Rep 1101 at 1105. See 
also Atkin J (as he then was) at 1106. This case is hereinafter referred to as Mousell Bros. 
48However, absolute liability implies that the legislator states that neither mens rea nor actus 
reus is required to prove guilt. See Chapter 3 for a brief discussion on absolute liability. 
49 Director of Public Prosecution v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] 1 KB 146. This 
case is hereinafter referred to as Kent and Sussex Contractors. 
50 Pharmaceutical Society at 870. 
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object to this proposition,51 Viscount Caldecote had the leeway for contending 
that: “[a] company is incapable of acting or speaking or even of thinking 
except in so far as its officers have acted, spoken or thought.” He then 
proceeded to impute the liability of two officers to the corporation because 
they were the corporation for this purpose.52 The precedent on the imposition 
of criminal liability on corporations for crimes of intent (excluding corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide) and the invocation of the defence of due 
diligence by a corporation53 was built around this restricted form of vicarious 
liability.54 However, many subsequent decisions have departed from this 
precedent because judges have defined the nature of a corporation in a 
different manner and interpreted the relevant statutes as intending that 
another pattern of imputation be employed.55  
 
The undue focus by Nattrass on the acts and intents of a few individuals has 
also left prosecutors in a difficult position given that in most cases the actus 
reus is the result of the combination of the acts of several agents while the 
mens rea is often reflected in the policies and practices adopted within the 
company. As such, if like cases ought to be treated alike and the accused 
corporate person is treated as any other accused then the case against a 
corporation may become unmanageable. Where a corporation invokes the 
right to silence for example, the few senior officers that could be identified with 
it may not make any statement incriminating it. This is confounded by the fact 
that in most corporate cases these officers are in possession of the bulk of 
documents that may be used to prosecute and convict the corporation. 
However, Parliament has stepped in incuriously. It has given criminal justice 
agencies such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) the power to compel agents to provide incriminating 
statements. The HSE on its part would not use such evidence against the 
                                                 
51 Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd at 149. 
52 Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd at 155. 
53 Nattrass. This case is discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. 
54 The fact that courts do not impute acts and intents of agents to corporations but the 
liabilities of the agents (even though the agents whose liabilities are imputable are fairly 
restricted) is no doubt vicarious liability that is still imposed on the corporation. 
55 Thus, Belmont, Meridian and British Steel do not follow the pattern of imputation affirmed in 
Nattrass.  
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agent although her act may be imputed to the corporation for the purpose of 
imposing criminal liability on it. The legislator has equally provided that 
documentary evidence will be allowed provided that the person that supplied 
the information comprised in the document had or is reasonably expected to 
have had personal knowledge of the material discussed in the document. 
Thus, such information will not be hearsay even if it was supplied by an agent 
that would normally not be identified with the corporation.  
 
Also, given the ambiguity of the corporation’s nature it is difficult to determine 
who or what constitutes its ‘peers’ or ‘fellow citizens’ in order to enforce its 
right to be tried by a jury of its peers. It is uncertain whether other senior 
officers of other corporations or other employees of other corporations may 
constitute such jury. Courts readily use natural persons selected randomly as 
jurors and so there is apparently no difference between a jury of an artificial 
person’s peers and a jury of a natural person’s peers. The ambiguity of the 
corporation’s nature has equally complicated the process of deliberation by a 
court during trial. It is uncertain which sanction would effectively rehabilitate or 
incapacitate or deter the corporate offender and other corporations in similar 
circumstances. The effects of a heavy fine may spill over to employees and 
even the community; the effectiveness of remedial orders and punitive 
injunctions is hinged upon the threat of a fine if the corporate offender fails to 
comply; and suspension and revocation of licence and public censure may 
also have very severe consequences on the community.  
 
In light of the above, it may be said that when judges seek to answer the 
question of how the relevant statute or precedent is intended to apply to a 
corporation they are required to first of all ascertain what a corporation ‘is’ and 
whose act or intent would count as that of the corporation. However, in the 
absence of specific rules guiding the determination of the nature of the 
corporation and providing for the imputation of acts and intents to corporations 
they have arbitrarily invoked principles and policies (fairness and justice) 
which they believe provide ‘rational’ answers. This arbitrary invocation has 
been the source of incoherence and inconsistency and has deprived the 
subject of corporate criminal law of a cogent theoretical base. Thus, it may be 
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important to check the interpretive authority of judges by ascertaining rules 
that would guide the interpretation of relevant statutes and precedent56 and 
also circumscribing the nature of a corporation and delineating a pattern of 
imputing acts and intents to corporations in defined circumstances.  
1.3 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the string of contradictions stretching 
across substantive and procedural corporate criminal law (with regard to the 
question of imputation) may be avoided if courts refer to an appropriate 
mechanism of imputation. The study will be premised on the fact that the 
“messy work product of judges and legislators requires a good deal of tidying 
up, of synthesis, analysis, restatement, and critique.”57 The first phase of the 
thesis will involve identifying and describing the rules providing for the 
imputation of acts and intents to corporations and rules for interpreting and 
explaining the former rules. Both sets of rules will be based on a 
circumscribed idea of the nature of the corporation and the way the criminal 
law ought to be used to regulate corporations in order to limit the activism of 
judges. The second phase will involve prescribing how both sets of rules may 
be collated within a framework and how such framework may enable courts to 
impute acts and intents to corporations on a consistent basis. The framework 
of related rules will be called a mechanism of imputation.  
 
It will therefore be submitted that judges ought to be able to answer the 
question of how a statute is intended to apply to a corporation and whose act 
or knowledge should count as that of the corporation by referring to the 
applicable mechanism of imputation. I will work from the assumption that each 
jurisdiction has an applicable mechanism of imputation and coherence and 
integrity is achievable where a judge’s authority to interpret a statute or 
precedent (providing for imputation) is modulated by the applicable 
                                                 
56 This will restrict the inspiration provided by policies and principles (that are neither legal nor 
relevant) that judges are wont to use as premises. 
57 Posner, 2007: 437. Although Posner contends that such task does not require the 
theoretical depth or ambition that is typical in other academic categories, it must be noted that 
since legal edicts are often equivocal they cannot be organised systematically and explained 
without advancing new theories on an ambitious scale. 
12 
 
mechanism of imputation. This presupposes that a defective mechanism of 
imputation would yield unsatisfactory results such as inconsistent convictions 
and discriminatory application of laws. As such, incoherence and 
inconsistency that mars corporate criminal law in the United Kingdom may be 
blamed on the inadequacy of the applicable mechanism or mechanisms of 
imputation.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACHES 
 
There is an ongoing debate on how legal research ought to be conducted. It is 
centred on the arguments over traditional doctrinal analysis and 
multidisciplinary studies.58 The legal researcher is confronted with a choice 
between both approaches as well as between many non-legal categories that 
may come within the framework of a multidisciplinary study. It has been 
submitted that the objective of the research may serve as a guide to the 
approach adopted.59 Thus, where the objectives are to examine a specific 
legal problem such as the incoherence of the way acts and intents of agents 
are imputed to corporations and to identify common principles that ought to be 
observed by members of the criminal justice system, the doctrinal analyses or 
internal approach may be preferred.60 This approach reflects what has been 
described as the “interpretive legal theory” because it is based on assigning a 
meaning to a nexus of legal propositions when examined from a given 
perspective.61 The propositions are contained in statutes and court 
judgements and may be read together with lawyers’ opinions62 and the 
                                                 
58 See Cheffins, 1999; Cownie, 2004; Cross FB and Emerson, 2006; McCrudden, 2006; and 
Siems, 2008. This may also be said to be related to the debate between “orthodox 
subjectivism” and “moral contextualism” (Norrie, 2002) where morality is deemed to be extra-
legal. 
59 Siems, 2008: 148. 
60 See McCrudden, 2006: 633-635 on the reasons and advantages for adopting this 
approach. See also Cheffins, 1999: 199-200. 
61 See Beever and Rickett, 2005: 320-337. See also Siems, 2008: 149-150. 
62 The question that follows is whether a system can employ legal language that is known 
only to its members? This would mean that the thing described by the law in a peculiar 
system may not be properly understood outside the system. See Hart, 1983: 30; and Orts, 
1993: 1574. 
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meaning of the connection between the propositions may be ascertained by 
referring to these sources.63  
 
This study will therefore involve an analysis of statutes and dicta that ordain 
and explain the imputation of acts and intents of agents to corporations for the 
purposes of imposing criminal liability and sanctions on the latter.  An attempt 
will be made to ascertain whether there is a standard pattern of imputation 
(referred to here as mechanism of imputation) that courts are required to 
apply when entertaining criminal cases where corporations are defenders.  If 
the mechanism is fraught with inconsistencies, alternative mechanisms will be 
considered and the most appropriate mechanism for the United Kingdom will 
be determined inductively.64 Since this approach is hermeneutic the term 
‘appropriate’ will be used to describe a mechanism of imputation that enables 
courts to interpret, explain and apply statutes and precedent in a consistent 
and coherent manner. It will be used interchangeably with ‘effective’ and 
‘valid’ because a mechanism may only enable courts to achieve coherence 
and integrity if it is legally acceptable.65  
 
Although the doctrinal analysis will be restricted to the internal point of view, it 
must be noted that it may ultimately require the examination of some 
normative propositions pertaining to some non-legal categories. This is 
because legal models cannot be said to exist in a moral, social or economic 
vacuum.66 In spite of the fact that the law is deemed to be autonomous the 
impact of other values such as moral, social, economic and political on the 
enactment and construction of legal rules cannot be overlooked.67 Moreover, 
evaluating legal rules by referring solely to legal edicts may create an ‘is-
ought’ problem (or Hume’s guillotine) whereby an ‘ought’ would be derived 
                                                 
63 Ibbetson, 2003: 863-864. 
64 For the course that a researcher may adopt where there is no existing legal rule addressing 
the problem, see Cheffins, 1999: 199. 
65 Cf Marmor (2006: 687, 703) contends that validity and effectiveness are separate concepts. 
66 See Cheffins, 1999: 200; and Ibbetson, 2003: 864. Equally as contended by Duxbury 
(2004: 8) there are issues that require more knowledge than a single discipline can afford. 
See also Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 101; Gobert and Punch, 2003: 40; Abel, 2006: 1; and 
Westen, 2008: 564. 
67 See Wells, 1993: 552-558. 
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solely from an ‘is.’68 In other words, the conclusion and recommendation 
would be a restatement of what ‘is’ and not a prescription of what ‘ought to 
be.’69 However, it must be noted that legal edicts are not linguistically 
simplistic. They sometimes do not even bear their literal meanings70 and may 
be deemed to be normative prescriptions71 or linguistic mechanisms for 
establishing normative premises.72 Thus, it is logical that an ought-proposition 
follows an is-proposition after what obtains (is-proposition) has been 
examined, whether from an internal or external viewpoint (moral, social, 
economic, political or other extraneous categories).73 Nonetheless, even if it is 
accepted that an external perspective is a sine qua non to interpretation, it is 
uncertain the extent to which such perspective may be used to explain and 
interpret legal rules. It has been suggested that this would depend on the 
prevailing consensus among jurists and judges.74 But given that it is equally 
uncertain what the prevailing consensus is, logic would surmise that it should 
depend on the cogency and depth of the fact that is imported. This is a fair 
representation of the status quo where judges and commentators use moral, 
economic, sociological and psychological facts in an unrestrained manner to 
buttress their varying arguments. However, since there is no limit to the 
number of non-legal prescriptions that may be considered, there is a serious 
danger that the legal rule may be swamped and its essence may be diluted75 
or a channel may be cleaved between theoretical prescriptions and practice.76 
In such instance, the objective of identifying common legal principles and 
advising internal members of the criminal justice system on the most 
                                                 
68 See Black, 1964: 165-181; and Finnis, 2003: 134-143. Cf Searle, 1964. 
69 This may be the reason why Atiyah (1987: 133-134) contends that the descriptive British 
legal literature is awkward and myopic. See also Westen’s (2008: 564-565) criticism of Duff’s 
(2007: 5) claim to identify, explain and evaluate implicitly legal norms by reference to other 
legal values. 
70 Cf Hessen, 1979: 22. 
71 That is why judges may repeatedly cite legal rules without necessarily applying them. See 
Siems, 2008: 152. 
72 See generally Samuels, 1987. See also MacCormick, 2008a: 151. Related to this argument 
is the question of whether the law directs activities of corporations in such way that boards 
and directors may not vary it. See Eisenberg, 1989: 1549. 
73 See Atiyah, 1987: 136-140. 
74 See McCrudden, 2006: 635. 
75 Naffine (2003: 357) posits that giving regard to external perspectives represents an “irritant 
to jurists” that wish to ensure the purity of legal concepts. See also McCrudden, 2006: 641. 
76 For other concerns raised by legal practitioners, see especially (Justice) Edwards’ (1992: 
46) frustration that theories wholly divorced from decided cases have been superfluous to his 
consultations. See also Cheffins, 1999: 203-208. 
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appropriate mechanism of imputation to adopt will not be achieved. This is 
because there will be no is-proposition (what obtains in corporate criminal 
law) but only ought-propositions (what ought to obtain).77 It must also be 
noted that non-legal knowledge may not be accepted by public officials or 
used as the basis of a statement in a court of law.78 Thus, it is not advisable to 
consider such knowledge when seeking to describe what the law ‘is’ as the 
description may be otiose to legal practice.79 
 
Nonetheless, it may be said that it is necessary to import knowledge from 
non-legal categories because of their hermeneutic value.80 However, in order 
to avoid submerging the legal reasoning in non-legal scholarship it is 
important that such knowledge is passed through a sieve that determines 
whether it may facilitate the interpretation and explanation of the legal rule 
under consideration or whether it is superfluous. This means that the internal 
approach that will be adopted in this thesis will allow for information from non-
legal categories only in defined circumstances. These circumstances include 
where the non-legal knowledge may be deemed to be pedigreed.81 In other 
words, it is knowledge to which judges have alluded or referred to in their 
obiter dicta. Hence, reference to the external point of view will be limited to 
principles of non-legal categories that may be deduced from the obiter dicta of 
judges.82  
                                                 
77 There is no denying that there are instances where an ‘ought’ may be derived from an ‘is.’ 
This is because it may be posited that the fact that it is accepted that a corporation ‘is’ 
determines what it ‘ought to do.’ See the argument put forward by Rand (1964: 17-18) on how 
to solve the “is-ought” problem. See also O’Neil, 1983: 81-97. However, as will be shown in 
Chapter 2, it cannot be said that a corporation ‘is’ from an objective standpoint since the term 
‘corporation’ is not amenable to any precise definition. Thus, one may not say what a 
corporation ‘ought to do’ based on what a corporation ‘is.’  
78 Even from a purely normative perspective, it is important to consider the background and 
training of judges, juries and lawyers in assimilating technical information that is outside the 
prescriptions of the law. See Sealy, 1984: 53; and Hall, Johnstone and Ridgway, 2004: 87. 
79 That is why it is noted above that an appropriate or effective mechanism should be valid or 
legally acceptable. 
80 See McCrudden, 2006: 636-645. 
81 The limitation of such knowledge to that which may be deduced from pedigreed rules is in 
line with the contention that non-pedigreed rules cannot legitimately direct conduct. See 
Shapiro, 2001: 177-180. 
82 The reference to the obiter dicta is because where judges refer to such principles in their 
rationes decidendi the principles logically become legal principles. However, given that such 
instances are few, it may be necessary to expand juristic scholarship by also considering 
principles derived from obiter dicta as pedigreed. This follows from Finnis’ (2003: 139) 
postulate that “there seems no way of specifying precisely what counts as ‘pedigreed’ 
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This will also be the case with regard to non-legal conceptions that may be 
said to fall within the scope of morality. As such, it may not be said that a 
judge may disregard a statutory provision on the ground that it is absurd or 
immoral based on her subjective moral judgement83 but on the moral and 
social principles that may be deduced from the relevant statute or precedent. 
Given that the term ‘morality’ is subject to much controversy and conflict may 
emanate from different moral views,84 reference to the term here is weighted 
in favour of the fact that such conflict may be resolved by turning to the law for 
a compromise solution.85 Moreover, the law has no obligation and does not 
always recognise the primacy of morality or any metaphysical assertion and 
may even point to a new direction of thought for moral thinking.86 As such, the 
criminal law imposes punishment on an agent for choosing wrongly in spite of 
the agent’s moral right to choose. Thus, an attempt will be made to avoid 
placing emphasis on the equivocal term of morality to the detriment of legal 
prescription.87 Nonetheless, there is no denying that there is a constellation of 
independent ideas (that loosely fit within the frame of morality) that may be 
used to determine whether legal prescriptions truly reflect reality.88 As noted 
above, this is equally the case with economic, sociological, political and 
psychological ideas. However, the task of ascertaining this set of independent 
ideas may be as daunting as seeking to grasp a will-o’-the-wisp and may not 
further the objective of this thesis. That is why this thesis does not examine 
                                                                                                                                            
(‘derived,’ ‘derivable,’ etc.) short of the late Kelsenian amputation of most juristic thought and 
method.” 
83 Cf Blackstone (1765-1769). See also Dworkin, 1986: 225; and Allan, 2004: 685. 
84 Hofler (2001: 922) argues that the idea that there could be moral consensus in a pluralistic 
society is “fanciful” because of the diverseness of societies.  
85 Following Plowden cited above, moral and social principles that may guide the 
interpretation of a statute (equity or spirit) are independent of the wordings of the statute. 
However, since this may be another source of controversy as the independent set of moral 
and social principles is not ascertained, it is submitted here that a morally reprehensible act 
will be one that although not intrinsically immoral is committed by a knowledgeable agent in 
contradiction of the law. Thus, it is morally reprehensible to deliberately violate the law even 
when one believes such law to be immoral. This is because every person about to violate the 
law (even for a good cause or bigger good) knows that she is doing something reprehensible. 
This is illustrated by Vegetius’ statement that “if you want peace prepare for war.” 
86 See Lacey, 2001: 351; and Cane, 2002: 14-15 and 281. Hofler (2001: 922) says that the 
absence of consensus on morality impels courts to apply the law “vigorously.”  However, he 
also notes that the rigorous application of the law is not an end in itself but a means of 
bringing people to reflect on their actions and change. 
87 See Cane, 2002: 2; and Watkins, 2006: 593. 
88 See Feinberg, 1970: 3; and Wallace, 1994: 87-88. 
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the methods of tracking and discovering the set of non-legal ideas but limits 
discussion to pedigreed rules and references. Thus, it will in a first instance 
seek to give a morally neutral descriptive account89 of corporate criminal law 
(is-proposition) and in a second instance prescribe measures to be taken 
(ought-proposition).  
 
It may therefore be said that this thesis favours a positivist approach to legal 
study. Priority will be given to the principle of treating like cases alike even 
where corporations are concerned; the only exception being where treating 
like cases differently may be justified by reference to other principles such as 
fairness and justice.90 However, this does not imply that it may be fair and just 
to disregard the law as result of the judge’s moral apprehension but that it 
may be fair for Parliament or the House of Lords to ordain that the principle of 
equal treatment be disregarded in a given instance. Nonetheless, it must be 
noted that this is not an endorsement of the “separability thesis”91 but of the 
contention that although moral (and other non-legal) considerations are 
important in certain cases they should not be definitive.92 As such, I will only 
attempt to get some important non-legal knowledge into corporate criminal 
law using the same window created by the so-called “inclusivist positivists” to 
get morality into law.93 This may be distinguished from the line of thought 
adopted by the “exclusivist positivists” that exclude any form of non-legal 
contention into legal thought.94 Thus, although discussion in this thesis will not 
be shrouded by a cloak of neutrality95 it is important to note here that the 
endorsement of positivism (and particularly inclusivist positivism) is not based 
on the appraisal of the competing jurisprudential positions but simply to justify 
the restrictive approach (interpretive legal theory) adopted.  
                                                 
89 See MacCormick (2008b: 210-211) for a description of such account. 
90 See Ashworth, 2000: 249-251. 
91 See Coleman (1982) for discussion on the “seperability” thesis. 
92 See Marmor, 2006: 688. 
93 See Green (2005: 571-572) for a brief discussion of the “inclusivist positivist” approach. 
94 See the distinction between “inclusive positivism” and “exclusive positivism” made by Leiter 
(1998) and Marmor (2001). 
95 This is in light with Dworkin’s (1986: 142-143 and 186; 2004: 37) advice to legal 
philosophers. 
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1.5 SOURCES 
 
As mentioned above, a flexible internal approach will be adopted by restricting 
analysis to the legal rules embedded in statutes and precedent (both rationes 
decidendi and obiter dicta). Material for this research will be based on regimes 
in two major jurisdictions within the United Kingdom: England and Scotland. 
Both jurisdictions have a common company law and health and safety and 
business associations are reserved matters under the Scotland Act 1998. 
Equally, although the criminal law is a devolved matter in Scotland and there 
are practical variations between the two legal regimes,96 courts of both 
jurisdictions observe similar rules of corporate criminal law. In fact for a good 
part of last century it was very much doubtful whether Nattrass applied in 
Scotland. In The Reader’s Digest Association Ltd v Pirie97 Lord Justice 
Wheatley (Lord Kissen concurring) advanced that the observations of Lord 
Reid in Nattrass are relevant to determine whether a company had knowledge 
about a right to payment in pursuance to section 2(1) of the Unsolicited Goods 
and Services Act 1971.98 However, the court in Dean v John Menzies 
(Holdings) Ltd ruled that the doctrine in Nattrass was not part of the law of 
Scotland.99 This decision was overruled by subsequent decisions in Purcell 
Meats (Scotland) Ltd v McLeod100 and Transco Plc v HM Advocate (No 2).101 
Although no mention was made of the Belmont exception it may be assumed 
that rule in Nattrass was adopted to the extent to which it applies in England. 
As such, the objective of this thesis is to achieve coherence and integrity by 
determining the appropriate mechanism of imputation for both England and 
Scotland.102 Mechanisms of imputation applicable in these jurisdictions will be 
                                                 
96 See Marshall, 1999. 
97 1973 JC 42. 
98 In this case certain junior employees were aware but had not supplied the information to 
the publishers’ computer. 
99 1981 JC 23. The court also held that a complaint against a corporation alleging shameless 
indecency was incompetent. The dissenting judge, Lord Cameron (at 31) questioned the 
rationale. 
100 1986 SCCR 672. 
101 2004 SCCR 553. This is case is hereinafter referred to as Transco. 
102 Terms such as defender and defendant will be used interchangeably to refer to the 
‘person’ that is accused of breaching the criminal law. Equally, expressions such as ‘aiding 
and abetting,’ ‘encouraging and assisting’ and ‘being art and part’ will be used 
interchangeably to describe secondary liability. 
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evaluated, as well as alternative mechanisms. The alternative mechanisms 
will be considered because they are applicable in jurisdictions that may trace 
their legal heritage to the United Kingdom103 and/or were fashioned by some 
researchers that analysed the applicable mechanisms in the United 
Kingdom.104 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
As noted above, when confronted with the question of how the relevant 
statute or precedent is intended to apply to a corporation judges are required 
to first of all ascertain what a corporation ‘is’105 and whose act or intent would 
count as that of the corporation. However, due to the absence of an 
authoritative reference, judges have relied on value judgements to the extent 
that the accused corporation’s liability seems to depend not on what the law 
says a corporation can or cannot do but on what the judge thinks the 
corporation ought or ought not to be able to do.  
 
As such, in Chapter 2 an attempt will be made to circumscribe the nature of 
the corporation within criminal law discourse. Nonetheless, the urge to begin 
this study with an inceptive description of the term ‘corporation’ is met with the 
fact that legal concepts are generally not amenable to precise definitions.106 
This is compounded by the fact that each word that is used in defining the 
‘corporation’ bears complex meanings within different legal categories.107 
                                                 
103 This is because it may readily be assumed that a mechanism that applies in one of the 
countries that inherited the British common law is more likely to be imported into the legal 
systems of the United Kingdom with minor amendments than a mechanism that applies in a 
purely civil law or European continental law jurisdiction. For some advantages of assessing 
the future of English law by examining legal scholarship in the United States, see Cheffins, 
1999.  
104 This is because such researchers vetted applicable rules in other jurisdictions and 
compared them with those applicable in the United Kingdom and proposed what they judged 
to be the most congruent rules as regards the enforcement of crimes against artificial entities 
such as corporations. 
105 This determines whether the accused artificial entity should be treated in turn as a 
corporation. 
106See Hart, 1983: 47; Nesteruk, 2002: 441; and Lord Hoffmann’s foreword to Pinto and 
Evans, 2003. The second edition (Pinto and Evans, 2008) does not contain Lord Hoffmann’s 
foreword. 
107 Examples include: contract, freedom, public interests, market, managers and employees. 
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However, there are certain features that are recognised as pertaining to 
corporate entities by courts and commentators and these features may 
provide an indication of what a corporation ‘is’ in criminal law. As such, a 
number of ‘pedigreed’ theories (legal and non-legal) explaining the nature or 
essence of corporate entities will be discussed. In other to keep focus on the 
criminal law, the theories will be discussed in light of whether they favour or 
are resistant to the use of the criminal law to regulate the activities of 
corporations. A general concept of the nature of a corporation as an entity in 
esse will then be formulated by abstracting properties from these different 
theories. Equally, the concept of legal personality will be examined and an 
attempt will be made to determine whether the corporation has the features 
that may be said to be representational of legal personality. Finally, an 
attempt will be made to show the relationship between some accounts of 
responsibility and punishment within the criminal law and the concept of the 
corporate person. These accounts will be analysed in respect of the two 
recurrent questions of why a corporation is responsible and why it is 
punished.  
 
With an ascertained meaning of the term ‘corporation’ as used in the criminal 
law (and how it ought to be used) the second problem discussed above of the 
incoherent and inconsistent use of the criminal law to regulate corporate 
behaviour will be addressed. Chapter 3 will discuss the adaptability of the 
criminal law as reflected in the different forms of liability and offences that 
Parliament and courts may impose on corporations. The discussion will centre 
on how the corporation as a legal person and in a system where vicarious 
liability is not applicable may be held personally or secondarily liable. Different 
kinds of offences including strict and absolute liability offences and mens rea 
offences (including corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide) will be 
examined in relation to the sequence in which they have been imposed on 
corporations over the past 400 years. The principles that have been 
developed and used by Parliament and courts to justify the imposition of these 
forms of offences will also be examined. Recommendations will then be made 
about the need to modify the way these forms of liability (and offences) are 
enforced in order to be consistent with how corporate entities function in the 
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eyes of judges and legislators. Due to the difficulty of establishing such reality 
on an objective basis, it will be advised that emphasis be placed on the reality 
of how criminal law courts distinguish between acts and intents particular to 
corporations and those particular to their agents.  As noted above, there is a 
disjunction of rules applied by courts to impose different types of liability. As 
such, it will be submitted that the effectiveness of the criminal law in regulating 
corporations is largely dependent upon the imposition of appropriate forms of 
liability through the coherent use of related rules within mechanisms of 
imputing acts and intents to corporations. 
 
Chapter 4 will show how such mechanisms may be identified and will suggest 
ways in which the mechanisms may be evaluated from a substantive 
perspective. An attempt will be made to expatiate on the notion of “rules of 
attribution” given that commentators and judges have variously contended 
that courts are guided by such rules when imputing acts and intents to 
corporations. Impediments on the consistent imputation of acts and intents to 
corporations due to such terminology will be discussed and it will be submitted 
that in order to avoid confused usage it may be preferable to refer to the use 
of “rules” by Hart. Thus, the primary rule that plays an expressive function 
(stating whose act or intent counts as that of the corporation) and imposes an 
obligation on courts to impute in a given way is the rule found in the relevant 
statute or precedent and this rule ought to be interpreted and implemented via 
the guidance of secondary rules (rules of recognition and rules of 
adjudication) and what Dworkin referred to as legal principles. In other words, 
the secondary rule may enable the court to find the “best” theory or 
unequivocal interpretation of the primary rule. A mechanism of imputation is a 
comprehensive term describing the consistent relation of both rules. 
Parameters for evaluating such mechanisms from a substantive perspective 
or with regard to the discovery stage of the criminal trial will be suggested. 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the applicable mechanisms in the United Kingdom and 
some alternative mechanisms will be evaluated by reference to the 
parameters established in Chapter 4. The objective will be to determine 
whether any single mechanism effectively captures the legal reality of 
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corporate structures and the adaptability of the criminal law in order to serve 
as a template to the criminal justice system. Where no such mechanism is 
identified the most appropriate mechanism will be deemed to be that which 
may be modified to suit other issues that it does not address effectively. Such 
modified mechanism will thus provide the prosecution with an arsenal 
consisting of diverse weapons to deal with the diverse forms of corporate 
entities and corporate offending under justifiable circumstances. 
 
Chapter 7 will be concerned with the evaluation of the mechanisms of 
imputation by reference to the rules of adjudication or rules governing the 
proof and deliberation stages of the criminal trial. As regards the proof stage, 
this Chapter will examine the logical connection between rules of adjudication 
and the mechanisms in light of how prosecutorial decision-making in criminal 
cases (involving corporations) is and ought to be influenced. With regard to 
the deliberation stage, emphasis will be placed on how the mechanisms of 
imputation guide courts and/or criminal justice agencies through the process 
of deciding whether to convict or not and which sanction to impose.  
 
In light of the above, it will be evident that the criminal law ought to be 
enforced in such a way that the rights that are incidental to the recognition of 
the corporation’s personality are respected and there is a logical connection 
between the different ways in which corporations are held criminally liable and 
sanctioned. This will achieve coherence and integrity in the way in which 
courts impute acts and intents to corporations for the purposes of imposing 
criminal liability and penalties on them. Thus, an appropriate mechanism of 
imputation is the linchpin that prevents the concept of corporate criminal 
liability from sliding off the axles of the criminal law. Chapter 8 of this thesis 
will conclude with the presentation of such appropriate mechanism and I will 
make recommendations for further research to consolidate and enhance this 
position.  
 
This thesis discusses the law as ordained and specified in the sources 
available to me as at 30 June 2009.  
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CHAPTER 2 CIRCUMSCRIBING THE NATURE OF THE 
CORPORATION WITHIN CRIMINAL LAW DISCOURSE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first major cause of the incoherent use of the 
criminal law to regulate the behaviour of corporations is the failure to 
elaborate the concept of corporation or company. Thus, there is no clear 
authoritative reference. Section 1 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that a 
company is a company formed and registered under the Act or registered 
under the Companies Act 1985 or the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 
1986 or existed as a company for the purposes of that Act or that Order. 
Section 832(1) of the Income and Corporations Taxes Act 1988 is to the effect 
that a corporation is “any body corporate or unincorporated association but 
does not include a partnership, a local authority or a local authority 
association.” Section 12 of the Fraud Act 2006 reduces the corporation to the 
acts of directors, managers, secretaries or other officers or persons acting in 
such capacities. Also, leading cases in corporate criminal law have indicated 
that a corporation has no metaphysical or material existence1 and there is no 
thing as a corporation as such.2 These references show that it may be close 
to impossible to ascribe a precise meaning to the concept of corporation.3 
However, the recognition of its right to exist as a legal person and capacity to 
affect legal relationships is an indication of the conception of ‘corporation’ by 
Parliament and courts. Hence, this Chapter seeks to give an ostensive 
definition of the term ‘corporation’ by pointing to the role the concept plays 
within criminal law discourse. It will do so by determining whether judges and 
legislators employ the term ‘corporation’ to describe an entity that is in 
                                                 
1 Lord Reid in Nattrass at 170. 
2 Lord Hoffmann in Meridian at 507. 
3 See Stanley Tenant v Stanley [1906] 1 Ch 131 at 134. See also Lord Hoffmann in the 
Foreword to Pinto and Evans (2003). 
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existence and is entitled to legal personality. It will also seek to determine 
whether the corporate entity that exists and is entitled to legal personality may 
also be shown to be criminally responsible and punishable. The objective is to 
establish that if it is assumed that the concepts of existence, legal personality, 
responsibility and punishment may be employed to describe a rational and 
autonomous person then the use of the word ‘corporation’ in relation to these 
concepts may enable one understand what it is and why it ought to be 
amenable to the criminal law on coherent and consistent basis.4 As noted in 
Chapter 1, although the analysis will be restricted to the internal point of view, 
the examination of some normative propositions pertaining to some non-legal 
categories (external point of view) may be required in some instances. For 
purposes of consistency and predictability, it was also noted that such 
important external point of view will be limited to principles of non-legal 
categories that may be deduced from the obiter dicta of criminal law judges. 
 
 
 
2.2 ASCERTAINING THE CORPORATION AS AN ENTITY IN 
ESSE 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Coke advanced that a corporation “rests only in 
intendment and consideration of the law.” He also advanced that corporation 
is a “thing not in esse [but] in apparent expectancy is regarded in law as a 
[person].”5 This statement although categorical was more of a factual 
supposition that he offered as justification for his choice among a set of 
different rival legal principles. As such, it was deployed as a legal fiction.6 The 
idea that corporations are fictitious was also sanctioned by influential 
                                                 
4 This means that corporations may be labelled as members of a criminal class. Cf Hessen, 
1979: xvii – xviii. 
5 Sutton’s Hospital at 22. As noted in Chapter 1, this view reflected that enunciated by Pope 
Innocent IV and was echoed by Blackstone and also Lord Reid in Nattrass and Lord 
Hoffmann in Meridian. 
6 See Smith, 2007: 1441-1442 on some of the reasons why courts offer new legal fictions. 
Thus, the factual supposition offered by Coke enabled him to make a normative choice 
between holding the accused corporation criminally liable or not. 
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commentators such as Savigny7 and Hallis.8 However, it may be argued that 
the idea that a corporation exists falls short of meeting the requirement of 
legal fiction today. This is because unlike in the days of Coke, to say that a 
corporation exists will not be deemed today to be a descriptively inaccurate 
assertion aimed at justifying normative choices.9 Some studies have shown 
(with some degree of persuasion) that a corporation as a collective unit has a 
separate existence from its individual members10 and its existence is therefore 
reality.11 Nonetheless, even if one maintains that a corporation exists only in 
the intendment of the law one may still be held to imply that the law consists 
of a set of experiences that determines how behaviour is governed and since 
a corporation provides input to this set of experiences and is governable, its 
existence is confirmable.12 Thus, it is factual in the legal domain and may 
perform actions and affect relationships and legal systems are left with little 
choice but to recognise the fait accompli.13 As such, it may be contended that 
irrespective of the perspective endorsed a corporation’s existence may not be 
questioned.14 Hence, the gamut of theories explaining the nature of the 
corporation from either the fiction or realist perspective or a combination of 
both are simply geared toward describing different aspects of its existence as 
the proverbial blind men and the elephant.  
 
I will therefore attempt to formulate a general concept of the corporation as an 
entity in esse by abstracting properties from some of these different theories. 
However, since there are more theories than can be discussed here and my 
objective is to circumscribe the concept of corporation within criminal law 
discourse, the standard for selecting the theories discussed below (assuming 
                                                 
7 1884: 176-177, 184. 
8 1930: 11. See also Austin, 1885; and Nesteruk, 2002: 439. See also Chief Justice John 
Marshall in the United States case of Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat 518 (1819) at 
636. 
9 The designation of “fiction” implies that the judge’s choice is guided by something false or 
which the judge thinks to be false. See Smith, 2007: 1441-1442 and 1472-1478.  
10 See the discussion below. 
11 The realist theory of corporations was inspired by Gierke (see  Maitland, 1900a) who was 
categorical about the corporation’s existence. See also Geldart, 1911: 96. 
12 In other words, to say that it is a fiction that has been created by court or Parliament is to 
imply that it exists. See Machen, 1911: 255; and Winfield, 1950: 91. 
13 See Laski, 1916: 404-405. 
14 Wells (2001: 75) even advises that the bifurcation between the fiction and realist 
perspectives is unnecessary. 
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they are all pedigreed principles)15 is whether they favour or eschew the 
regulation of the behaviour of corporations by the state.16   
 
2.2.1 Some prevalent theoretical approaches 
 
The various interweaving and sometimes conflicting approaches adopted by 
different theorists give a somewhat vivid picture of the complexity of the 
corporate entity and no doubt fuel claims about the futility of beginning such 
studies with an attempt to ascertain its meaning.17 As noted in Chapter 1, this 
is compounded by the fact that each word that is used to describe the 
corporation bears complex meanings within different legal systems. Thus, the 
legal enquirer may avoid more ambiguities by limiting her search to the edicts 
of a given legal system.18 However, it is difficult to ascertain what Parliament 
or courts ordain without involving non-legal questions, especially if one seeks 
to assemble different statutes and dicta within a rational whole.19 Hence, the 
objective of discussing these approaches is not to expose their theoretical 
depth, which is increasingly convoluted, but simply to explore the practical 
value that they bring as interlocking pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.20 As mentioned 
above, the focus is on whether a theory favours the regulation of the activities 
of corporations by the state or not and this question may be said to be related 
to that of whether a theory purports that a corporation exists as an expression 
of individual freedoms (opposing regulation) or as an institution created by the 
                                                 
15 They will be deemed to be pedigreed because they are deducible from the obiter dicta of 
the judgments cited above. 
16 However, this must not be taken to imply that if a theory does not favour regulation it would 
be deemed here as less accurate or adequate. Other analyses can and have been made from 
economic or political and legal (especially contractual) perspectives with different conclusions 
about the accuracy and adequacy of the theories. See for example, Nesteruk, 1990: 453; and 
2002: 438- 456. 
17 Paton (1972: 409) says that there have been so many theories that it is possible to arrive at 
any result with any theory.  See also Radin, 1932: 643; Wolff, 1938: 494; and Pound, 1959: 
22. 
18 See the Supreme Court of Canada in Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 SCR 530 at 552-553 on 
the task of the Court as regards philosophical and theological debates and legal questions. 
19 See Finnis, 2003: 134; and Naffine, 2003: 361. 
20 This means that there will be no claim to a solution to the problem of which theory or 
theories are better in absolute terms. Coyle (2006: 278) advises that “the function of lawyers 
lies in 'dealing with' the perennial problems of social life through the exploration of established 
understandings, technical definitions and doctrines, rather than offering solutions to those 
problems in the light of political principles for which wisdom, or especially desirability, is 
claimed.” 
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state and therefore under its control (favouring regulation). Theories 
discussed below are grouped into these two blocks. 
2.2.1.1 The Corporation exists as an expression of individual 
freedoms 
 
The acceptance of membership of a group by natural persons is a voluntary 
act of these persons and the assumption of the corporate form by that group 
is a consensual act by its members.21 Thus, the corporation is a voluntary 
exercise of the freedom of association by a group of persons seeking to 
achieve a common objective, usually making of profits.22 These persons enter 
into an agreement and it is from this agreement that the corporation is born.23 
This view is supported by a number of theories, including the aggregate 
theory and the bracket theory. The aggregate theory lays emphasis on the 
right of individuals to consociate in order to achieve common goals and the 
role of the law of contract to enforce this right.24 The bracket theory equally 
places emphasis on the rights of individuals that have formed an association 
and holds the corporation to be a convenient way of addressing this group of 
persons.25 These theories can all be described as different approaches to the 
“inherence theory” that describes a corporation as the consequence of the 
exercise of individual rights such as the freedom of association and the 
freedom to contract.26 As such, the idea of the corporation as an expression of 
individual freedoms is centred on the right of people to enter into contracts 
and the consequences of exercising such rights. Thus, these theories support 
in different ways the proposition that a corporation exists simply as a nexus of 
contracts. This proposition has generally been explicated from two 
perspectives: legal and economic.27  
 
                                                 
21 See Davis, 1905: 15. This conception rests on principles such as choice, consent and 
contractual authorisation. See also Hessen, 1979: xiii. 
22 Nesteruk, 2002: 440- 441. The objective may also be extended to include the maximisation 
of happiness. See McConvill, 2005. 
23 See Hessen, 1979: xi; and Dine, 2000: 3. 
24 See Bottomley, 1990: 208. 
25 See Pound, 1959: 250. Austin (1885) also advanced that collective entities may be 
described as subjects only by “figment” and for purposes of “brevity of discussion.”  
26 See Hessen, 1979: xiv. 
27 See the distinctions drawn by Dine (2000: 3-17). See also Parkinson, 1995: 75-76. 
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The legal contractual theorists conceive of the corporation as a subject of 
private law emanating from the willingness of its members to take risks and 
employ their skills to further a common purpose.28 The members spell out 
their intentions in the articles of association or company’s constitution which 
constitutes a binding contract between them.  Thus, in Eley v Positive 
Government Life Security Assurance Co, Lord Cairns defined the articles of 
association as “an agreement inter socios” and a “covenant between the 
parties.”29 Section 8(1) of the Companies Act 2006 also defines a 
memorandum of association as a proposal stating that the subscribers would 
like to form a company and have agreed to become members of the 
company.30 As such, tasks beneficial to the society may or may not be part of 
the terms of their agreement and imposing such tasks on the members would 
be tantamount to imposing a burden or tax on them.31 There is therefore little 
need for state intervention given that that the corporation is the natural 
expression of the members’ freedoms and obtains its status independently of 
the state.32 Jensen and Meckling give a clear picture of the theory. They 
advance that a corporation is a legal fiction that embodies the complex 
process by which different goals of individuals are assimilated into a structure 
of contractual relations.33 In other words, it is just a means of connecting the 
different contracts that link members and agents.34 
 
The much vaunted and deplored influence of the school of law and economics 
on the study of corporate law35 has also given much impetus to the treatment 
of the corporation as a nexus of contracts.36 The neo-classical liberal 
economics school that seeks to understand all legal precepts in economic 
terms therefore developed the economic contractual theory. Easterbrook and 
                                                 
28 Dine, 2000: 8. 
29 1876 1 ExD 88. See also Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders’ Association 
Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 881; and Salmon v Quin and Axtens Limited [1909] AC 442. 
30 See also Griffiths (2005: 5) as regards the Companies Act 1985. 
31 Dine, 2000: 7. 
32 See Mark, 1987: 1470. See also Dine, 2000: 4. However, individual freedoms are 
expressed within a framework such as contract law and this framework is built by the state. 
33 1976: 311. 
34 Orts, 1993: 1568. 
35 Especially in the United States, see Cheffins, 1999: 202-208; and McCrudden, 2006: 639-
640. 
36 See Bratton, 1989: 407; and Easterbook and Fischel, 1989: 1416. 
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Fischel describe the corporation as a complex collection of contracts, express 
and implied, by which parties choose the best arrangements for different risks 
and opportunities.37 These contracts constitute the lifeblood of the 
corporation38 and depict a sort of restricted market wherein buyers and sellers 
freely engage in exchange.39 As such, benefits of free enterprise such as 
increased wealth may be obtained40 if the law on corporations is deemed to 
be a substitute for private contract that efficiently saves the costs associated 
with negotiating, drafting and redrafting contracts with the different members 
and employees. 
 
Efficiency is achieved through the separation of ownership and control 
whereby the directors and other senior managers of the corporation are 
agents41 or fiduciaries42 that are accountable to the shareholders who are the 
beneficiaries of the actions of the former.43 The decision of shareholders to 
vest managerial powers in directors who have the requisite skill smacks of a 
rational exercise of freewill that may benefit all the parties and even society 
subsequently.44 As such, the exercise of freedoms by individuals in pursuit of 
private goals eventually benefits society without any state intervention. This 
means that if the corporation causes harm to the community through pollution, 
efficiency would be achieved if the corporation can potentially compensate the 
affected community.45 The role of the law and the state is restricted to 
facilitating the operation of the market46 by delimiting the type of contracts into 
which individuals may enter without regard to possible civil liability or criminal 
                                                 
37 Easterbrook and Fischel, 1989: 1416. See also Easterbrook and Fischel 1991: 12. 
38 See Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 305, 310; and Eugene, 1980: 288. 
39 Cheffins, 1999: 209. See also Cheffins, 1997: 38- 41; and Easterbook and Fischel, 1991: 8- 
22. 
40 Orts, 1993: 1580. 
41 See Black, 1992: 811; and Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311. 
42 O’Connor, 1991: 1189; and Millon, 1991: 223. 
43 See discussion on this separation by Berle and Means, 1968. See also Hill, 2000: 42- 44. 
44 See Butler, 1989: 106-108; Orgus, 1994: 24; Stapledon, 1996: 14; and Cheffins, 1997: 499- 
500. This is in line with the Kaldar-Hicks criteria whereby the beneficiaries of economic 
transactions can potentially compensate those that bear some of the costs and do not benefit 
directly. See generally Ray, 1984; Johansson, 1993; Hausman and McPherson, 1996; and 
Dine, 2000. 
45 This may be contrasted with Pareto efficiency whereby one party is better off but no one is 
worse off. 
46 Hessen, 1979: 32- 33; and Dine, 2000: 10. 
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prosecution.47 Direct state intervention is deemed illegitimate and 
counterproductive due to the inalienability of individual freedoms such as the 
freedom of association and the defects in the enactment and administration of 
legal rules.48  
 
Orts however criticises the contractual approach as a crude description of 
contract law that is quite innocent of the substantive and procedural 
complexities of this branch of law.49 In light of a number of commentators 
including Welch and Turezyn,50 Klein and Coffee51 and Manning and Hanks,52 
Orts discusses a number of notions that the contractual approach equally 
simplifies such as shareholders, stock, bonds, debentures, employees, 
directors and managers.53 The treatment of these notions is superficial 
because they bear different meanings when invoked in legal and economic 
contexts. Equally, even when discussed only within a legal framework, they 
may be supplied not only by contract law but also by laws on employment, 
security, bankruptcy and taxation.54 Moreover, the contractual theorists do not 
provide any clear-cut distinction between “originating” and “operational” 
contracts55 and the preferences of individual members (which are treated 
separately from the broader community in which these members exist) are 
simplified.56 These shortcomings may thus be blamed on the “metaphorical” 
use of the concept of contract.57  
 
As such, it is difficult to substantiate the argument that a corporation exists 
simply as a nexus of contracts. Even if this approach was not liable to such 
debilitating criticisms it would still be important to note that persons who are 
                                                 
47 Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311, footnote n. 14. 
48 Cheffins, 1997: 163. 
49 1993: 1576. 
50 Welch and Turezyn, 1993: 254 -272. See also the 5th edition of 2006 with Saunders. 
51 Klein and Coffee, 1990. See also the 10th edition of 2007.  
52 Manning and Hanks, 1990: 98- 105. 
53 1993: 1576-1577.  
54 See also Eisenberg, 1989: 1487; and Blair, 1995: 16. 
55 The rights and duties that emanate from “operational” contracts are often regulated by 
different legal rules that emanate from different sources and which may in some cases be 
outside the scope of company law. See Bodoleoku, 2002: 412, 418. See also Dine, 2000: 2. 
56 See Nesteruk, 2002:  450. 
57 See Braucher, 1990: 698. See also Clark, 1985: 59-71; and Kornhauser, 1989: 1449. 
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not members of a corporation do not willingly agree to be exempt from the 
effects of its activities.58 This is especially true with regard to persons that 
cannot be compensated by the corporation.59 Thus, the interests of 
stakeholders who are not members or creditors of the corporation must also 
be taken into consideration when determining the nature or essence of the 
concept of corporation.60 A situation must be averted where members may 
simply limit their accountability and liability by structuring their contractual 
relationships strategically.61 Also, the extension of the privilege of legal 
personality to corporations enables the criminal justice system to target the 
corporate person given that it represents the qualities of an entity that can 
breach the law and be sanctioned. Conceiving of the corporate person as an 
array of contracts negates such personification62 and contradicts the 
treatment of corporations as separate persons.63 
 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that members of a corporation limit their 
liability and that of the corporation when drafting the articles of association. 
However, this argument may only be true if it is thought that corporations 
cannot be liable for ultra vires acts.64 Not only is the doctrine of ultra vires 
obsolete but also one cannot contract to avoid criminal liability.65 Moreover, it 
is difficult to see why a third party may enter into a contract with a corporation 
but be required to institute legal proceedings against its members (who were 
                                                 
58 Davis, 1905: 15. 
59 Examples include where the corporation is insolvent and where the consciences of the 
senior managers cannot bring them to make reparations. 
60 Millon (1993: 1388) posits that there is need for a “multifiduciary” mechanism that redefines 
the duties of the corporation’s management in order for them to serve the interests of all 
stakeholders affected by the corporation’s activities. 
61 See Nesteruk, 2002: 451. Van Eeghen (2005: 57) contends that modern liberals have 
hardly examined the issue of legitimacy because if individuals are granted such freedom as to 
pursue their interests without accompanying responsibilities, irresponsible behaviour would be 
encouraged.  Arthur (1940: 247) had also deplored the use of the 1862 incorporation laws in 
Great Britain by individuals “to purchase freedom from responsibility.” See also Aubrey, 1982: 
42; and Frazer, 1998: 129. 
62 Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 310-11. See also Stoljar, 1973: 40; and Bottomley, 1990: 211. 
63 See Blumberg, 1993: 3- 25; and Cheffins, 1999: 209. 
64 It has also been contended that all crimes are ultra vires because a crime cannot logically 
be part of a legally binding contract as no action may arise from such agreement. See Clough 
and Mulhern, 2002: 14. 
65 Even in jurisdictions where plea bargaining is recognised, the defendant does not avoid 
criminal liability but pleads guilty to a lesser charge. 
32 
 
acting as agents) in the event of breach.66 As such, just as corporations may 
themselves enter into and breach contracts, they may transact business 
fraudulently, make fake payments and disregard health and safety legislation. 
There is an independence of thought and action that courts and legislators 
recognise and this cannot be explained only by the logic of a nexus of 
contracts.67 When judges and legislators talk of a ‘corporation,’ they are 
referring to something whose responsibility is even more important than the 
furtherance of its members’ interests.68 The change of emphasis from natural 
persons being responsible for corporate activities to the corporation itself 
gives the corporation some degree of autonomy to act in its own interests.69 
Hence, in the absence of any independent force that may compel 
corporations to act responsibly (in terms of furthering the interests of both 
members and society) state intervention may be important. This means that 
the state and the corporation may associate their activities to achieve socially 
responsible objectives.70 In this light, it may be possible to define the 
corporation by reference to the shared purposes of its members71 and the 
harmonisation of the interests of all stakeholders.72 Thus, it may be posited 
that theories that view the corporation as social institutions enhance the 
                                                 
66 Also, to say a corporation has contractual capacity implies that it has an autonomous 
mental capacity. 
67 This is illustrated by Duchy of Lancaster where it was held that the King as a “body politic” 
could be piloted by a nine year old and thus the latter could sell land while acting within such 
“body politic.” This decision is not absurd when it is deemed to connote the body politic’s 
intentionality and separateness. Thus, French (1995: 34-35) contends that if members 
automate the functioning of a corporation and leave, the automated corporation will continue 
to act rationally. 
68 See Wedderburn, 1985: 16. See however Deakin and Hughes (1997: 4) who posit that the 
diffusion of objectives of members and the corporate entity is both inefficient and irrelevant. 
See also Hessen, 1979: 22.  See also Fischel’s (1982: 1259 and 1273) contention that there 
is a fundamental error in assuming that inanimate objects such as corporations are capable of 
having social and moral obligations. Friedman (1962: 133) also argues that accepting that 
corporations have any responsibility other than to maximise profits for shareholders 
undermines the foundations of a free society. However, Friedman’s argument begs the 
question of what is freedom?  
69 See Teubner, 1988: 139. See also the discussion below on corporate personality and the 
“collectivising” of reason. 
70 However, regulation of activities of private businesses may blur the distinction between 
public and private institutions. See Dine, 2000: 19-20. See also Stone, 1982: 1506. 
71 Pound, 1959: 254; and Baty, 1919: 361- 365. 
72 Stokes, 1986: 177. 
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awareness of corporate person’s responsibility for corporate activities that 
affect non-member constituencies and facilitate regulation by the state.73  
 
2.2.1.2 The corporation exists as a social instrument 
 
Davis sees the grant and protection of rights to individuals or groups as social 
expressions.74 Dahl professes that corporations exist simply because society 
allows them to exist75 and Dine begins her discussion on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the concept of corporation with a claim that understanding 
the concept involves ascertaining its construction as a social phenomenon.76 
Thus, where public sentiment is in favour of restricting or extending the 
powers of corporations the probability that legislation will be to that effect is 
high. The charter granted to the corporation would not be the product of a 
bargain between the members but an expression of the state’s desire to make 
this group of persons more efficient by providing it with a form more 
appropriate for its activities.77 It may therefore be contended that the 
existence of a group of persons as a collective body is founded on an 
obligation, whether implied or express, to perform a social function.78 The 
corporate form and the nexus of relationships79 (whether contractual or 
otherwise) existing between members of a corporation or between the 
corporation and the society constitute a concession by the state.80  
 
However, it may be argued that the grant of corporate status is not a 
concession by the state stricto sensu.81  This is because it is difficult to 
                                                 
73 See however O’Neill’s (1997: 27) contention that there is a “conceptual error of confusing 
the idea of having social responsibilities with having a social conscience.” 
74 1905: 16. 
75 1973: 11. 
76 2000: 1. 
77 See Davis, 1905: 16, 18; and Bottomley, 1990: 203. See also the contention of Nader and 
Green MJ (1973: 80) that the corporate charter is an implied agreement between the state 
and the corporate entity seeking existence. 
78 Davis, 1905: 18. See also Dodd, 1932: 1145; Smith TA, 1999: 214; and Blair, Margaret and 
Stout, 2001: 416-418 
79 McConvill, 2005: 35-36. 
80 Concession here is held to mean some benefit or privilege accorded by the state in 
exchange for some services rendered or to be rendered to the state. See Hessen, 1979: 28. 
81 Dine, 2000: 17. 
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contend that the grant of a charter or the registration of a corporation is 
analogous to what Maitland describes as the state blowing “the breath of a 
fictitious life” into the “nostrils” of the corporation.82 Thus, the conception of the 
corporation as essentially a creature not of its members but of the state 
reflects the absolutist feudal system where the Crown was deemed to have 
omnipotent powers.83 The inalienability of individual freedoms such as the 
freedom to contract and to associate is undeniable and the fact that they are 
inalienable implies that they existed before the state. Hence, the state cannot 
create something that emanates from the exercise of freedoms when such 
emanation naturally precedes it.84  
 
The recognition of a group or its entitlement to certain advantages does not 
entail creating that group.85 Thus, if it is said that the corporation is a fiction 
recognised (and not created) by the state in exchange for the performance of 
social functions then it may be advanced that there is a pre-existing corporate 
form (that can perform functions) to which the state simply gives official 
approval. As such, the registrar of companies is entitled to recognise the 
existence of a group of persons wishing to undertake business activities by 
issuing a certificate of incorporation and can do no more.86 Nonetheless, 
although the law does not create that group it cannot be claimed that the latter 
may act as a ‘corporation’ before its members have been granted authority by 
the duly designated state institution. This means that it is the quality of 
‘corporateness’ that is attached to the group of persons that act as a collective 
body following the registration of that collective body or the grant of a charter 
that enables the group to metamorphose into a ‘corporation.’87 However, the 
quality of ‘corporateness’ may not be said to be tantamount to a ‘corporation’ 
with regard to its origin and function.  
                                                 
82 1900a: xxx. 
83 Carr, 1913: xiv-xv; Thurman, 1937: 185; and Hessen, 1979: 10-11. 
84 van Eeghen (2005: 55) however thinks that corporations were originally seen as agencies 
of the state because legal personality naturally belongs to the state.  
85 See Maitland’s (1900a: xxxviii) comparison of the state’s power to make corporations and 
its power to make marriages. See also Hessen, 1979: 33. 
86 See Stevens and Henn, 1965: 307-312; and Hessen, 1979: 25-26. 
87 According to section 1(1) of the Companies Act 2006 for example, unless a collective body 
is duly registered under this Act or under the previous statutes or registers it may not be held 
to be a company.  
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The recognition of foreign bodies as corporations also buttresses the 
argument that a corporation’s existence does not depend on the state. In the 
United States case of Liverpool and London Life and Fire Insurance Company 
v Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Justice Miller noted that courts may 
consider the power and rights and privileges exercised by collective bodies 
and the capacity in which they are exercised in order to determine whether 
corporate status has been granted by implication to such bodies or not.88 This 
may sometimes be seen as a pragmatic approach impelled by the desire to 
do justice between the parties.89 Such pragmatism is also reflected in the fact 
that courts are required to recognise foreign companies in given instances. 
Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Consolidated 
Version of 2001) provides for the freedom of establishment of both natural 
and artificial persons. Hence, a corporation is capable of moving from the 
jurisdiction in which it was incorporated to another jurisdiction without losing 
its status as corporation. This is similar to the approach adopted by English 
courts to recognise foreign incorporated companies90 and shows that the idea 
that a corporation is essentially a concession by the state is very much open 
to debate.91 Thus, in cases of foreign incorporated companies, in the absence 
of international comity,92 courts may decide the question of their recognition 
by looking at certain attributes that substantiate the entity status of 
corporations.93 Such attributes may include separate personality, limited 
liability and perpetuity, which are often conferred by law to corporations as 
                                                 
88 77 US 10 Wallace 566 (1870). See also Sutton’s Hospital at 30. 
89 See Townsend, 2006: 593. 
90 See Scrutton LJ in Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v Goukassov [1923] 
2 KB 682 at 691. This case is hereinafter referred to as Goukassov. See also Rammeloo, 
2001. 
91 See also Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] BCC 745 where the European Court of 
Justice held that the Hungarian rules (reflecting the “real seat theory”) that allow companies to 
transfer their headquarters only within the country was in contradiction with articles 43 and 48 
of the European Community Treaty. The judge advanced (at 759) that “it is impossible, in my 
view, to argue on the basis of the current state of Community law that Member States enjoy 
an absolute freedom to determine the ‘life and death’ of companies constituted under their 
domestic law, irrespective of the consequences for the freedom of establishment. Otherwise, 
Member States would have carte blanche to impose a ‘death sentence’ on a company 
constituted under its laws just because it had decided to exercise the freedom of 
establishment.” 
92 See Scrutton LJ in Goukassov at 691. 
93 See Drucker, 1968: 42. 
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“privileges”94 or “powers”95 or as a “legal convenience.”96 Accordingly, the 
entity status of the corporation may also have been acquired by contractual 
agreement or any other means.97 The important thing is that the state 
recognises the corporate form that has been created by the actions of its 
members.  
 
In light of the above, it may be posited that the communitarian and concession 
theories are to the effect that incorporation is what the state barters in 
exchange for social services98 or the furtherance of public interests or those of 
all ‘stakeholders.’ However, this is not of much help because concepts such 
as stakeholders and public interest are equivocal.99 They may mean a variety 
of things including the respect of individual freedoms to associate or contract. 
Even if they are said to imply that consideration must be given to the 
wellbeing of the community, contractual theorists may still argue that 
individuals may contract to pursue a broad range of interests including those 
of other stakeholders such as consumers, employees, creditors and debtors 
and eventually contribute to the amelioration of communal values.100 
However, Deakin and Hughes warn that if the social function of corporations 
should involve serving a wide variety of interests including those of all 
consumers, as well as the environment, there is a risk that the function itself 
would become diffused and less relevant.101 Nonetheless, a concise definition 
of the social function would always exclude things such as environmental 
pollution and the marketing of defective and potentially harmful products. In 
such cases, corporations would be required to make separate cost-benefit 
                                                 
94 Nader, Green MJ and Seligman, 1976: 63. 
95 Orts, 1993: 1578, footnote n. 49. 
96 Berle and Means, 1968: 120, footnote n. 2. 
97 See Paton, 1972: 409. See also Hessen, 1979: 15 – 22. 
98 This means that the legislator conceives of a corporation as an instrument for promoting 
social wellbeing and ordains that the state must recognise any group that is structured to 
perform such functions as a corporation. Thus, a group is structured to perform such functions 
if it meets the requirements set out in the Companies Act 2006. 
99 Hessen, 1979: 27. 
100 See McConvill J, 2005: 35-36, 44. See the reference to the Kaldor-Hicks criteria and 
Pareto efficiency above. 
101 1997: 4. See also, Braithwaite and Ayres, 1992: 23. It is also true that if the interests of 
shareholders are not prioritised the corporation may become a major target for a take-over 
bid. See Malkiel, 1972: 4; and van Eeghen, 2005: 64. 
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tests based on actual and not potential compensation of those affected.102 
Given that it may be close to impossible to achieve Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto 
efficiency in all of such cases, the state may have to intervene to ensure that 
beneficiaries actually compensate those that bear the costs of the activities of 
the corporation. Nonetheless, the registration of such corporation bespeaks 
the state’s recognition of the fact that it has a right to exist as well as the 
capacity to perform the incidental social function. 
 
2.2.1  Abstracting from the theoretical approaches 
 
As mentioned above, these theories represent different perspectives of the 
reality of the corporate entity. Hence, drawing a conclusion solely from any 
single set of related theories would be tantamount to establishing the relative 
truth. Contractual theories describe the corporation as a voluntary enterprise 
founded on individual rights and freedoms. Thus, a corporation exists 
independently of the state as a fabrication of private individuals to further their 
interests or as a linguistic tool for identifying the group of natural persons that 
have entered into related contracts. This means that when the state 
recognises this group by the name (corporation) chosen by the contractual 
parties it buys into the fiction. However, a corporation is more than just a 
reflection of the exercise of basic rights or a nexus of contracts. The 
communitarian and concession theories talk of persons that do not enter into 
any contract with any of the members of the corporation but are affected by 
the activities of the corporation. As such, the state will not recognise any 
group as a corporation unless it is satisfied that members of the group have 
taken the interests of all stakeholders into consideration. Nonetheless, the 
recognition of the corporate form is not always the state’s prerogative as this 
can be imposed upon it by rules of international law or courts may even grant 
such status in accordance with some accepted norms.103 Moreover, given that 
what the state demands in exchange for official approval (the promotion of 
                                                 
102 See Farrow, 1998: 27, 183-188. 
103 The idea that the corporate form is a concession by the state therefore leaves courts 
confronted with unincorporated associations or foreign corporations in the position of the King 
and Queen of hearts before the Cheshire cat. 
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social welfare) is quite ambiguous and may even overlap with the interests of 
shareholders, it may be said that the state simply recognises the corporate 
form when the group fulfils certain variable requirements in the circumstances. 
 
As such, a definition of the concept of corporation ought to reflect the 
contention that it rests in the contemplation of the law although it does not rest 
solely there given that it may also exist outside the law under consideration.104 
This implies that one may not provide an ostensive definition of the term 
‘corporation’ by pointing solely to legal rules since in some cases the relevant 
legal rules may conflict with each other. However, what is certain is that legal 
rules tell us what corporations may or may not do. As such, even if everybody 
within a legal system would not readily understand what it means when a 
judge or legislator talks of a ‘corporation,’ they are likely to understand what 
the judge or legislator means when she says a ‘corporation’ may or may not 
perform an action in a given instance. This means that it may be possible to 
define the term ‘corporation’ in each given instance with regard to say the 
different legal rights and duties recognised in the European, Scottish and 
English jurisdictions, as well as the way in which these rights and duties have 
been enforced. Nonetheless, this thesis will not attempt to define the 
‘corporation’ in the context of all the rights and duties of these legal systems 
because such attempt will not be adequately informed on the complex 
theories and usages of these systems. That notwithstanding, a definition may 
be attempted within the context of corporate criminal liability, that is, the 
criminal context in which the corporation is essentially related.  
 
A common feature of both sets of theories discussed above is that 
corporations may by themselves perform certain activities, whether it is to 
enter into contracts or perform some social function. To a certain extent these 
theories may be said to reflect the notion of the corporation’s distinct identity. 
Equally, the Criminal Law Act 1827, the Interpretation Act 1899 and section 
                                                 
104 The European Court of Justice is cited above as stating that a state does not have the 
absolute freedom to decide on the life and death of corporations. However, it may be argued 
that international law is still considered the law and this case was more about the precedence 
of fundamental rights enshrined in the European Community Treaty than about the 
precedence of the normative institutions. In such instance one may talk of an internal conflict 
between legal norms. See Westen, 2008: 564. 
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48 of the European Community Treaty affirm this distinct identity to the effect 
that a corporation may be said to be a body vested with legal personality and 
upon whom the state may impose obligations. However, this notion is 
furtherer from the contractual theories because the boundaries of the 
agreements between the members are not recognised by the state and 
criminal liability may be imposed in circumstances where the courts believe 
that the corporation (as an autonomous entity) may have perpetrated an 
offence or failed to perform a duty. On the other hand, to say that a 
corporation may not violate the law because it is a concession by the state is 
a weak argument. Nonetheless, the conclusion that may be drawn from the 
discussion above is that when a judge or legislator talks of the imposition of 
criminal liability on a corporation, she is referring to two things, viz. the 
imposition of criminal liability on an entity that exists simplicter (whether as the 
embodiment of several related contracts or the state’s concession); and the 
imposition of criminal liability on an entity that exists as a legal person with the 
capacity to perform actions and affect relationships. However, it is uncertain 
whether issues of expediency impelled Parliament and courts to grant and 
recognise the corporation’s existence as legal person105 or the decision was 
based on conviction. 
 
2.3 ASCERTAINING THE CORPORATE ENTITY IN ESSE AS A 
LEGAL PERSON 
 
The discussion here is based not on the motivations of earlier and present 
courts and legislators to recognise the concept of corporate personality but on 
whether this is justified. Given that the objective is to determine what the law 
‘is’ (as regards the meaning of the term ‘corporation’), I will seek to determine 
                                                 
105 For example, ecclesiastical courts used to excommunicate corporations until the practice 
was abrogated by Pope Innocent IV in 1245. See Lizee, 1995: 136; and Coffee, 1981: 386, 
footnote n. 2. Thus, prior to the abrogation, corporations were treated as distinct legal persons 
and Weismann and Newman (2007: 419, footnote n. 14) although providing no evidence 
surmise that there could have been an economic motivation to stop this practice given that 
the assets of the excommunicated corporation were moved out of the jurisdiction of the 
Church. Thus, Pope Innocent IV’s espousal of the fiction theory may have been guided by 
economic expediency and not principle. 
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whether there is an adequate definition or definitions of the term ‘legal 
personality’ and whether the corporation can fit into such definition or 
definitions, thereby justifying the postulate of courts that a corporation ‘is’ a 
legal person. However, the term ‘legal personality’ is sinuous and 
controversial and this may be attributed to the fact that some commentators 
tend to borrow the literary meaning of the term ‘person’ for legal use.106 This 
reinforces Hohfeld’s statement that some jurists often make metaphorical use 
of terms that were not intended for use in connection with legal relations.107 
Thus, cognisant of the term’s philosophical depth, I will employ an ordered but 
simplified analysis proposed by Naffine that identifies three ways in which the 
term ‘legal person’ is used in connection with legal relations. The approaches 
include: firstly, defining a legal person as the subject of rights and other legal 
relations; secondly, the inclusion of non-legal moral essence in defining legal 
personality because a legal person is a reasonable creature in rerum natura; 
and thirdly, the conception of the legal person as a rational and competent 
moral agent.  
 
2.3.1  The subject of rights and other legal relations 
 
Proponents of this approach eschew metaphysical presuppositions because 
they believe that moral, political and social characters do not in any way 
constitute the requirements for legal personality108 and there are no “natural 
substrates” that may be identified as a common feature of legal persons.109 
The law therefore recognises certain entities as legal persons simply because 
they have a capacity to bear rights and the recognition of such capacity 
conveys the practical benefit of fashioning legal relationships in the law’s 
                                                 
106 Poole (1996: 38) for example says that the term ‘person’ designates what humans are or 
ought to be by reference to the most significant aspects of their existence. However, it is 
unclear whether the literary meaning of ‘person’ is synonymous to human being since 
etymologically the term was used to describe a mask worn by actors. 
107 1923: 31. 
108 Naffine, 2003: 351. See also the Canadian case of Tremblay v Daigle at 660 where it was 
held that where the Court is called upon to decide on the question of whether a foetus is a 
legal person “metaphysical arguments may be relevant but they are not the primary focus of 
inquiry.” 
109 See Nekam, 1938. 
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logical system.110 Legal personality may therefore be deemed to be a basic 
unit of a mathematical equation that simplifies calculations.111 Thus, where 
judges or legislators talk of a legal person they may be said to be referring to 
any entity that is a subject of rights or other legal relations.112 This means that 
an entity is a legal person simply because the law extends that privilege to 
it.113 As such, there is a great assortment of entities that can become legal 
persons ranging from animals, the environment, idols, partnerships, cultural 
organisations and cartels.114 Thus, in legal parlance there is no natural person 
and no artificial person per se but only legal persons.115  
 
One may however question the rationale of this approach given that it may be 
held to imply that the term legal person may mean anything.116 This is 
because if any entity can become a legal person due to the enjoyment of a 
single right provided by a law, where such entity is out of the set of relations 
created by that law under consideration it loses its legal personality and “there 
is no more left than the smile of the Cheshire Cat after the cat had 
disappeared.”117 In other words, a person would be said to exist in law only to 
the extent that she has rights and duties, apart from which such person has 
no legal existence whatsoever;118 and in order to know whether an entity is a 
legal person or not courts simply have to look at the provisions of the law 
under consideration.119 Nonetheless, it may be argued that this merely 
conveys the reality of how the term is used in the practice of many legal 
systems.120 As such, there are cases where courts have recognised the legal 
                                                 
110 See Derham, 1958: 1 and 5. 
111 In this case we would talk of the simplification of legal calculations. See Lawson, 1957: 
915. 
112 See Lawson, 1957: 915. 
113 Naffine, 2003: 351. 
114 As noted above, Tur (1987: 123) lends support to this approach by stating that one cannot 
talk of a general law of persons but of sets of rules governing relationships and establishing 
liabilities. See also Naffine, 2003: 351. 
115 Smith B (1928: 283 and 293) thus advanced that legal persons are abstractions of legal 
science in the same vein as title, possession and duty. Cf Maitland, 1900b: 335. 
116 This approach is described by Naffine (2003: 351) as “an empty bracket, capable of being 
filled and refilled in any way.” 
117 Smith B, 1928: 294 cited in Naffine, 2003: 353. 
118 See Kelsen, 1945: 93. 
119 Tur, 1987: 121-122. 
120 In the words of Hart (1983: 25, footnote n. 17) it may be said that this approach “conveys 
the formal availability of the [empty] slot to anyone” in any given legal system. See also 
Naffine, 2003: 355. 
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personality of corporations121 and cases where they have disregarded this 
attribute in corporate bodies.122 The same may be said of fully developed 
human beings, foetuses, dead persons, cartels and even animals. However, 
this does not discount the fact that mountains would be legal persons, as well 
as dolphins, trees and rivers due to the existence of large numbers of legal 
rights and relations. 
 
As such, Naffine thinks that it will not be possible for proponents of this 
approach to enforce strict linguistic vigilance in order to ensure that 
commentators do not blend legal and non-legal attributes.123 This is because 
the capacity to bear a right or be subject to legal relations does not only 
invoke the need to give empirical content to the entity but also presupposes a 
being that is real and concrete and can perform an action.124 In this light, a 
number of commentators have simply concluded that legal persons are only 
human beings because they are the only real and concrete entities that can 
perform actions in a rational manner. 
 
2.3.2 A reasonable creature in rerum natura 
It has been argued that each individual acquires a set of rights and duties at 
birth and loses them at death and these rights and duties constitute the 
privilege of legal personality. Thus, such privilege can only be enjoyed by 
human beings because they are reasonable creatures in rerum natura125 or in 
being.126 Reasonable creatures in rerum natura fulfil certain biological and 
metaphysical requirements127 that convey the status of legal personality to 
them. They are reasonable because they have a naturally endowed ability to 
                                                 
121 See Salomon. 
122 See Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935; Agrotexim Hellas SA and Others v 
Greece (1996) 21 EHRR 250; and Belgium v Spain ICJ Rep (1970) 3. 
123 2003: 355. Cf Hohfeld, 1923: 27. 
124 Naffine, 2003: 355. 
125 See Coke, Co. Inst., Pt. III, ch.7, at 50. There is no connection between this conception 
and the term as used by Lucretius in his poem defending the Epicurean philosophy, De rerum 
natura. 
126 See also Waller, 1987: 37. 
127 See Kester, 1994: 1607. As noted in Chapter 1, Naffine (2003: 357) warns that giving 
regard to contributions from non-legal commentators such as Kester represents an “irritant to 
jurists” that wish to ensure the legal purity of legal concepts. 
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choose128 and since rights and duties involve rational choices, they are the 
only ones that can acquire such status.129 This approach therefore uses the 
terms ‘human’ and ‘person’ as synonyms,130 something which Kelsen decries 
as misguided.131  
 
It must however be noted that this approach is not fundamentally opposed to 
that discussed above. It agrees with the fact that a legal person is an entity 
that has the capacity to bear rights. However, it contends that if such capacity 
is analysed critically (both scientifically and metaphysically) the logical 
conclusion would be that only human beings have the capacity to bear rights 
and thus only human beings can be legal persons. This approach is therefore 
not derailed by the blending of legal and non-legal quantities. As noted by 
Finnis, juristic knowledge must be informed by both metaphysical and natural 
truths about persons that are supposed be served by the law.132 This no doubt 
fuels the temptation of judges to look beyond the provisions of statutes and 
legal practice and seek answers from non-legal subjects. However, as noted 
in Chapter 1, the fact that there is no limit to the scope and depth of non-legal 
knowledge that a judge may import, such process may legitimise value 
judgments at the expense of the letter of the law. Also, there is no steadfast 
metaphysical and scientific truth about any entity133 and there is even an 
ongoing debate about what it means to be ‘human.’134  
 
                                                 
128 Ducor (1996: 200) in the same vein sees the human being as the “paradigmatic subject of 
rights.” See also Kinley, 1998: 4; and Kramer, 2001: 29 and 36. 
129 See Fitzgerald, 1966: 298. However, the measure of reasonableness is controversial 
because it may be extended to include decisions that would otherwise be unreasonable but 
are made because they are voluntary and do not cause harm or encroach upon the freedom 
of others. See also Feinberg, 1986: 67. 
130 See McHugh, 1992: 445; and Naffine, 2003: 358. 
131 1945: 94. 
132 2000: 13. 
133 Such truth is often influenced by cultural ideas. See Naffine, 2003: 360-361. 
134 See Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 All ER 936 on the personality of 
foetuses. See also the New Zealand case of Baby P (An Unborn Child) [1995] NZFLR 577. 
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Moreover, if the capacity to bear rights involves the ability to choose, then it 
may be said that the subject of rights is an autonomous individual.135 
However, not all humans are separate and distinct136 and many do not 
possess individualism.137 Equally, there are non-human entities that 
demonstrate the qualities of separateness and individualism138 and may be 
held to be more deserving of legal personality if autonomy and 
reasonableness were the cardinal features. Nonetheless, this approach may 
be summarised as postulating that the only quality needed to qualify for legal 
personality is existence as a human being.139 Thus, it would be to no avail that 
a non-human entity is autonomous or reasonable or intelligent. If such entity is 
not a human being it does not qualify.140 This shows that this approach is 
dogmatic and lacks a rational underpinning141 and it is important that focus 
should shift to another approach. 
 
2.3.3  A rational and competent moral agent 
 
A third approach conceives of legal personality as a privilege that is conferred 
to rational and competent entities only.142 A legal person is thus an entity that 
has the ability to perform an action in a rational manner.143 Empirical content 
may be ascribed to such a person because of both moral and legal reasons. 
Morally, the person is an individual that can make decisions and execute them 
                                                 
135 Autonomy in this sense may be described as separate, distinct and possessing 
individualism. See Naffine, 2003: 360. 
136 See the case of conjoined twins in Re A (Children) Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation 
[2004] 4 All ER 961. 
137 For example, foetuses and mentally unbalanced persons. 
138 See the discussion below on rational and autonomous corporate persons. 
139 See Naffine, 2003: 361. 
140 As shown above, the reasons for attributing legal personality to human beings only are 
quite contentious and so it may be held that there is no cogent justification for this stance, 
whether from a legal or scientific perspective. 
141 See Naffine, 2003: 361. Courts have therefore extended the protection of traditional 
human rights under the ECHR to corporations and other private business undertakings. See 
the cases of Pudas v Sweden (1998) 10 EHRR 30; Autronic AG v Switzerland (1990) 12 
EHRR; and Demuth v Switzerland (2001) 31 EHRR 772. See also Emberland, 2006: 17. 
142 Naffine, 2003: 362. 
143 Smith, 1928: 287. It is however questionable whether mere legal competence is sufficient 
for an entity to qualify as a legal person following this argument. 
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independently.144 Legally, the person has a right to make decisions and 
execute them.145 Proponents of this approach therefore espouse an idea that 
proponents of the previous approaches failed to adopt. Entities that are not 
rational to the extent that that they can judge their behaviour from both moral 
and legal perspectives are excluded.146 However, it is uncertain what amount 
of rationality would suffice and what measure is used. Harris says that legal 
persons should have the requisite cognition to sustain biographical life147 and 
Naffine contends that the legal person ought to have the ability to mentally 
perceive the nature of her situation and assume the responsibilities for her 
actions.148 This means that not only are non-living organisms excluded but 
equally entities that have invariably been defined as ‘humans’ such as 
foetuses, very young children and the mentally unbalanced may be 
excluded.149 In this light, Naffine contends that individuation and physical 
integrity are prerequisites for claiming and enforcing rights and these qualities 
best describe the adult human.150 However, it is uncertain why the adult 
human’s occasional infirmity and dependence is ignored. Thus, this approach 
may be described as an alluring but illusory attempt at categorically excluding 
entities other than humans from the broad expanse of legal personality. The 
end result is another dogmatic declaration that humans are the paradigmatic 
subject of rights.  
 
2.3.4 Abstracting from the legal personality theories 
 
The corporation may rightly be held to be a legal person if regard is given to 
the approaches discussed above. Following the first approach (the subject of 
rights and other legal relations), it may be said that a corporation enjoys the 
status of legal personality because it is entitled to rights and has duties in 
                                                 
144 See Wolgast, 1992: 65. In this thesis, this may be understood to mean the decision to 
breach the law. 
145 Moore (1984: 48) however thinks that both perspectives are basically the same. 
146 See Moore, 1984: 66; and Naffine, 2003: 363. 
147 2001: 235-236. 
148 2003: 364. 
149 See Moore, 1984: 65. This is in light with the “Will Theory” that is to the effect that each 
right holder must be a competent and rational agent that can enforce her rights. See Kramer, 
1998: 62; and Steiner, 1998: 262. 
150 2003: 364 and 365. 
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respect of a broad range of rules under both substantive and adjectival law.151 
Thus, if legal personality is an abstraction that exists only in the intendment of 
the law we may simply refer to the law under consideration to determine 
whether a corporation is a subject of rights and thus a legal person. As such, 
we may refer to the laws of England and Scotland, as well as European law 
and deduce that the corporation in these systems has been treated as a 
subject of legal relations.152 However, as noted above, this approach opens a 
floodgate to the ingress of entities that can claim the privilege of legal 
personality and may thus be seen an “empty bracket” in which any entity may 
be inserted.  
 
Thus, if it is not appropriate to simply define a legal person as the subject of 
legal relations, it is worth mentioning that the corporation equally fits (to a 
certain extent) the second definition, that is, a reasonable creature in rerum 
natura. The corporation fits the requirement of “reasonable” in this definition, 
except where the approach is summarised by the categorical claim that only 
humans can be reasonable and natural and thus legal persons. However, it 
must also be noted that proponents of this conception of legal personality 
vehemently oppose the extension of any form of personality to corporate 
entities on the ground that it would be tantamount to imputing judgments, 
intentions, beliefs, emotions and attitudes to a social group; something which 
proponents of the bracket and aggregate theories (discussed above) believe 
is metaphorically a summative way of attributing these “predicates” to the 
individuals in the social group.153 Nonetheless, although it is true that when 
people blame Shell or British Petroleum for environmental pollution or 
supporting human rights abuses they are indirectly blaming the managers of 
these companies,154 it cannot be said that when people say that Shell or 
British Petroleum supports human rights violations by the Nigerian or 
Burmese government they are indirectly saying that all the senior managers 
or all shareholders of Shell or British Petroleum support these human rights 
                                                 
151 This is supported by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian at 506. 
152 Solomon. See also Uberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement 
GmbH (NCC) C-208/00 ECJ 2002. 
153 See also Kerlin, 1997: 1436-1437. 
154 Cf Gobert and Punch, 2003: 49. Nonetheless, blaming the corporation (corporate liability) 
does not in any way negate the individual liability of directors and managers. 
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violations.155 Thus, a corporation is not synonymous to the sum of its 
individual members and may have different objectives and judgements that 
are reasonable in their own right. 156 
 
As regards the third approach relating a legal person to a rational and 
competent entity, it may be said that the requirements of rationality and 
competence invoke so many things that it is difficult to ascertain what 
measure is used to establish these facts. Nonetheless, it may be argued that 
the legal person described in this approach is one that consistently acts 
intentionally and in a rationally permissible manner.157 Pettit158 set out to 
justify the claim that collective bodies are psychologically autonomous by 
employing what he termed the “discursive dilemma”159 to show how a group 
identity and rationality emerges in collectivising reason within an organisation. 
As such, although collective bodies come in different shapes and sizes they 
deserve to be recognised as intentional subjects.160 The discursive dilemma 
describes in general terms a number of possibilities that are available to 
decision makers within a group in a situation where there are more than two 
members and more than one premise.161 In a situation where collective 
bodies are required to make decisions, they do so either by reference to a 
“conjunction of premises” or a “disjunction of premises.” A “conjunction of 
premises” arises where premises concur such as whether to adopt a 
procedure to make a decision involving two steps, while a disjunction of 
                                                 
155 The animosity directed towards managers of hedge funds in the present economic crisis is 
largely down to the media coverage focused on the supposedly horrific acts of the managers. 
However, the animosity does not extend to junior managers and operational employees 
although they are also part of the organisations. 
156 See Gold and Sugden, 2007. See also Bratman’s (1999) discussion on “shared intention” 
and the criticism of “singularism” by Pettit (1992).  
157 However, a problem with such understanding is that the focus is often on the properties of 
the mind rather than on the mental processes by which intentions are formed. See Gold and 
Sugden, 2007. 
158 1992: 167-193. 
159 This is a variation of the doctrinal paradox first identified by Kornhauser and Sager. See 
Kornhauser and Sager, 1986: 82-117; and Kornhauser and Sager, 1993: 1-59. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
160 Pettit, 1992: 173. See also Rock, 2005: 3 and 25. 
161 Pettit, 1992: 170. It must be noted that it is assumed that people in other social groups 
would often reach decisions on “an incompletely theorized basis.” Pettit’s (1992: 178-179) 
analysis thus suits only “purposive groups” such as corporations. Thus, legal personality is 
only necessary for corporate bodies because as posited by Rock (2005: 23-24) “the 
corporation (much more than the partnership) has the institutional capacity to constrain the 
discursive dilemma.”  
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premises is a negation of a conjunction such as whether the procedure would 
not involve one of such steps.162 In both instances, the group may make a 
decision in two distinct ways. It may adopt a “conclusion-centred procedure” 
where the votes of members in respect of the conclusion are aggregated and 
the majority view on the conclusion determines the decision or it may adopt a 
“premise-centred procedure” where the votes of members in respect of 
individual premises are aggregated and the majority view on each premise 
determines whether or not the premise is collectively endorsed.163 Pettit also 
identifies three less obvious ways in which possibilities available to decision 
makers within a group can be generalised, viz. social generalisation, 
diachronic generalisation and modus tollens generalisation.164 It must be 
noted that the decision-making procedures identified by Kornhauser and 
Sager and Pettit are in no way exhaustive. There are several other 
possibilities available to decision makers within a group in a situation where 
there are more than two members and more than one premise.165  
 
What these commentators have sought to show is that there is a group 
identity or personality that emerges that is different from the identities of 
individuals that constitute that group.166 Thus, the majority of members may 
decide to adopt a certain course of action in an instance where there is no 
                                                 
162 See Pettit, 1992: 168-170. 
163 See the examples of the court panel of three judges having to make decisions in a tort 
case and on a retrial in Kornhauser and Sager, 1993: 11 and 40. See also the example given 
by Rock (2005: 9) on a decision in the firm to expand into specialty chemicals. 
164 Social generalisation occurs where the collective body is required to decide on an issue 
that is essentially related to other issues such as where a company owned by employees has 
to decide whether to forfeit a pay-rise and use the money saved to improve upon safety at the 
workplace.  The diachronic generalisation occurs where the collective body is confronted by a 
choice between deciding on a new issue based on previous decisions taken collectively and 
deciding on the new issue in a manner that is inconsistent with previous decisions. The 
modus tellens generalisation occurs where the collective body is faced with a choice between 
ignoring the majority view on the conclusion and let the majority view on the premises dictate 
the decision (modus ponens) and ignoring the majority view on one of the premises and let 
the view on the other premises and the conclusion dictate the decision. See Pettit, 1992: 170-
175. 
165 The procedure for adoption of a decision in this particular situation may even be a lot more 
complex than demonstrated by these commentators. The complexity of the procedure for the 
adoption of one procedure for making decisions over another is for example not discussed. 
166 The group can therefore be a subject of rights and other legal relations of which the 
members of that group are not privy in their individual capacities. See Foss v Harbottle (1843) 
2 Hare 461. See also the case of Agrotexim Hellas SA and Others v Greece. 
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consensus among them.167 The group manifests collective rationality (and 
disregards responsiveness to individual members) by imposing the discipline 
of reason at a collective level in order to maintain coherence and credibility.168 
Therefore, a member may very well be happy with a conclusion adopted but 
not with the procedure employed to arrive at that conclusion given that each 
member votes for a particular course of action for reasons related to her own 
interests or judgments.169 This implies that members of a group run the risk of 
endorsing a decision that a majority or even all of them individually reject and 
this is what Pettit calls “collectivising reason.”170 As such, if regard is given to 
the process in which reason is formed or the decision-making pathology, one 
may find similarities between purposive social groups such as corporate 
bodies and purposive natural persons.171 In the words of Gold and Sugden 
“[w]hen an agent deliberates about what she ought to do, the result of her 
reasoning is an intention. An intention is interposed between reasoning and 
action, so it is natural to treat intentions that result from team reasoning as 
collective intentions.”172 
 
This means that whether legal personality is a legal mask that is worn to play 
a designated role in the legal system (such as enforcing certain rights) or 
power conferred to certain rational and moral creatures to facilitate their 
enforcement of rights or the process of holding them accountable, the 
corporation fits every definition of legal personality to a reasonable extent. It 
can individuate and enforce rights, as well as be autonomous and “sufficiently 
rational” to adjust its actions in accordance with legal and moral norms.173  
There is in fact nothing that comes between the corporation and legal 
                                                 
167 Pettit, 1992: 172. See the distinction between collective intentions and mutually-consistent 
individual actions (often described as “nash equilibrium” behaviour) drawn by Gold and 
Sugden, 2007. 
168 Pettit, 1992: 174; and Rock, 2005: 6. 
169 Pettit, 1992: 173. 
170 It is the natural response of groups under pressure when confronted with the discursive 
dilemma. See Pettit, 1992: 175- 176; and Rock, 2005: 11. 
171 Rock (2005: 24) contends that “corporations are a paradigmatic example” of what Pettit 
refers to as “groups with a mind of their own.” 
172 2007: 111. See also the analysis of collective intentionality by Tuomela and Miller, 1988: 
375. However, they have been criticised by Searle (1990: 404) for proposing a “primitive” 
notion with a “distinct phenomenology” that includes cases where there is no collective 
intentionality.  
173 In fact some commentators have even gone further by stating that humans to a certain 
degree acquire their personality from the corporation and not the reverse. See Scruton, 1989. 
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personality. This reflects the common feature shared by the theoretical 
approaches on the nature of corporation discussed above: a corporation may 
by itself perform an action, whether it is to enter into contracts or carry out 
some social activity. As such, the corporation may be deemed to be a medium 
through which different groups of people including shareholders, managers 
and employees exercise individual rights such as the freedom of association 
and the freedom to contract, contribute “essential” resources174 and learn to 
become part of the community.175 However, the medium is not given empirical 
content by the exercise of these rights or the contribution of resources but by 
the members’ collectivisation of their efforts.176 As such, a corporation has no 
definite shape or purpose and does not represent a specific set of attributes. It 
is an amorphous entity that exists somewhere between the abstract and the 
concrete, the imaginary and the perceived, the Cheshire cat and the 
proverbial elephant. Its form changes according to the circumstances and 
may be described accurately as any changeable entity (existing in the legal 
world) that is recognised either by the legislator or the court as a corporation 
because of its independence (collectivisation) of thought and action.  
 
Nonetheless, this definition does not tell us what the term corporation actually 
means within criminal law discourse. This is because despite its separate 
existence and independence of thought and action, a corporation may not 
necessarily be a responsible agent in the criminal law and deserving of 
punishment. Children under the age of eight and even some animals exist 
separately and may to a certain extent be said to exercise rational thought 
and perform actions177 although the criminal law cannot be used to regulate 
                                                 
174 See Blair and Stout, 1999: 275. 
175 See generally Fort, 2001. 
176 This explains why recognising corporations by looking solely at essential features such as 
corporate personality or limited liability may be controversial. Maitland for example advanced 
that the operation of a trust whereby property is managed by trustees for the benefit of other 
individuals can be used to describe the corporate form. However, other commentators have 
disagreed on the ground that any definition that follows the consideration of the nature of 
trusts cannot apply to “profit-oriented” business corporations.  Also, the process or processes 
of identifying the essential attributes may be as dauntingly complex as they are important 
given that each attribute has to be discussed in great detail in order to understand the 
reasons that found its choice. See Maitland, 1911: 279 and 321. See also Goebel, 1946: 389; 
Hessen, 1979: 9; and Davis, 1905: 10. 
177 As shown above there is no steadfast degree of rationality that is required to make an 
entity a person. 
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their behaviour. In the words of Robinson,178 these children lack “exculpatory 
defences,” and in line with Duff,179 they cannot be “answerable” or 
accountable.180 This means that a corporation may be a person with regard to 
other legal categories but not as regards the criminal law.181 As such, it is 
important to consider what is required by criminal law courts to recognise a 
thing or an entity as a ‘person’ in order to establish whether a corporation 
equally fulfils this requirement. As noted in Chapter 1, the criminal law is 
concerned only with ‘persons’ capable of conducting themselves in such 
manner as to breach criminal law standards. Thus, criminal law courts will 
recognise as ‘persons’ only entities that are responsible and punishable. 
 
2.4 ASCERTAINING THE CORPORATE ENTITY IN ESSE AS 
A RESPONSIBLE LEGAL PERSON 
 
In the first three sections, I have sought to define the term ‘corporation’ by 
abstracting properties of rival theories on the essence of a corporation and 
legal personality. As mentioned above, an assemblage of these different 
properties depicts something close to the reality of the corporate person in law 
although not particularly in criminal law. Given that this thesis examines the 
corporate criminal liability system in the United Kingdom it is important to 
determine what the term ‘corporation’ actually means in criminal law. I will do 
this by showing the relationship between some accounts of responsibility and 
punishment within the criminal law and the concept of the corporate person. I 
will employ the same approach of limiting the discussion to descriptive and 
analytical theorising centred on both legal edicts and some ‘pedigreed’ non-
legal prescriptions.182  
                                                 
178 1997: 71-81. 
179 2007: 206. 
180 See also Westen, 2008: 565-566. 
181 In the French jurisdiction, prior to the Code Pénal of 1992, the corporation was recognised 
as a legal person (or personne morale) although it was generally not amenable to the criminal 
law. The German position is also similar where only administrative sanctions can be imposed 
on corporations. This shows internal incoherence within the system. 
182 It must be noted that the choice of an account of responsibility, as well as a perspective on 
who deserves to be punished, has also heavily influenced the development of corporate 
criminal liability. See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 44 and 46. 
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2.4.1 Who should be responsible? 
 
Responsibility in criminal law may be said to be founded on two postulates. 
The first concerns the maxim actus non facit reum nisi men sit rea.183 This 
maxim lays stress on the criminal law components of mens rea, actus reus, 
knowledge, causing injury and fault in order to determine whether the accused 
may be said to be responsible for the commission of the offence184 and thus 
liable.185 Hence, the court may impose criminal liability on a subject if her 
responsibility is established by showing that she performed the physical act 
with a guilty mind and lacks an exonerating excuse.186 This approach can 
readily be observed in criminal law monographs and statutes in the United 
Kingdom.187 The second postulate on which criminal responsibility is based is 
to the effect that an act does not make a person criminal unless the law so 
provides. This places emphasis on the actions of the accused and the 
wordings of the relevant precedent or statute (including the equity or spirit of 
the dictum or statute). 
  
These two postulates also represent two ways in which criminal liability may 
be ascribed to persons, viz. attributing liability to the morally blameworthy 
person and attributing liability to a person in accordance with the objective of 
a statute. These patterns of ascription may be said to represent the 
deontological and teleological rationales in criminal law theory. The 
deontological rationale describes legal and moral precepts of responsibility as 
deserts or warrants and constraints on the criminal justice system and the 
teleological rationale conceives of responsibility as representing a mechanism 
                                                 
183 This may be translated roughly as an act does not make a person criminal unless the mind 
is guilty. Lacey (2001: 352) however questions the grammatical correctness of this maxim. 
184 Lacey, 2001: 350-351. 
185 Responsibility is understood here to mean the defendant’s obligation and the province or 
the extent of her actions. As such, liability may be said to refer to the defendant’s lack of 
justification or excuse for her actions. See Duff, 2007: 39. This implies that liability is 
responsibility coupled with a lack of an appropriate defence. See Westen, 2008: 565-566. 
However, where the offence charged is absolute then liability and responsibility may be 
treated as synonyms. 
186 See Dresser, 1993: 41, 85; and Todarello, 2002-2003: 853. 
187 See for example, draft Codes by the English Law Commissions No 413, 1985 (Codification 
of the Criminal Law); and Law Commission No 177, 1989 (A Criminal Code for England and 
Wales). See also the draft Code for Scotland in Clive, Ferguson, Gane and Smith (2003). 
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devised to meet a target defined by the law.188 It may therefore be posited that 
courts (and even commentators) elect for a particular way in which the 
criminal law distributes liability based on their understanding of 
responsibility189 and such understanding is based on a set of ideas held to 
constitute morality or the objective of a statute or common law practice.190 
Given that the criminal law may be theorised in several ways including the 
philosophical, sociological, psychological and historical, the notion of 
responsibility (moral and legal) may be addressed from multiple perspectives. 
However, the objective of these different analyses would almost always be to 
determine whether liability may be imposed on a morally acceptable 
ground.191 In other words, they seek to establish whether liability may be 
imposed only where the accused is shown to be responsible or both 
responsible and culpable. 
 
Nonetheless, in corporate liability literature not much emphasis has been 
placed on the personal (non-derivative) responsibility and culpability of the 
accused corporation. This may be blamed on three things. Firstly, crimes that 
occur in relation to corporate activities have historically been treated as lesser 
crimes or illegal activities that do not warrant a strict observance of traditional 
standards of proof of intent.192 Secondly, given that corporations were 
deemed to be legal fictions or entities existing only in the intendment of the 
law, courts for many centuries imposed criminal liability on corporations only 
                                                 
188 Both perspectives also represent what have been termed constraint-driven enforcement 
and objective or target-driven enforcement. See generally Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990; 
Schlegel, 1990; Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993; and Wells, 2001.  
189 See Nobles and Schiff, 2006: 207.  
190 Examining responsibility and deriving its meaning from both legal and moral precepts does 
not necessarily take exception to the argument put forward by some commentators such as 
Hart (1983: 25) and Orts (1993: 1574) that legal concepts can only be defined and 
understood within the confinement of an established legal practice. See however Lacey, 
2001: 358. 
191 As noted in Chapter 1, standards that are legally acceptable overlap with standards that 
are morally acceptable because it is morally unacceptable to disregard the law. 
192 It has for example been noted that Sutherland introduced the concept of “white-collar 
crime” to distinguish between traditional crimes such as theft and murder from activities within 
the corporate world that happen to breach criminal law standards. See Schlegel, 1990: 3. A 
number of cases were discussed above where the courts declined to require the prosecution 
to show proof of intent and held the corporate defendants liable for what they termed “quasi-
crimes.” 
54 
 
where proof of guilt was not deemed as important as policy objectives.193 
Thirdly, the difficulty of finding an appropriate mechanism for the attribution of 
responsibility (acts and intents or causal relationship) to the corporate entity 
pushed some commentators to conclude that the most effective way of 
holding corporations criminally liable was to simply disregard the notion of 
responsibility and any rules or mechanisms incidental thereto and treat 
corporations as de facto blameworthy agents.194 However, with the increase 
of systematic studies of the behaviour of the corporation and the attribution of 
empirical content to its entity status, courts have felt the need to impose 
liability directly on corporations as responsible195 or culpability-bearing 
agents.196 Nonetheless, despite the failure of earlier courts to address direct 
or non-derivative responsibility, it may not be claimed that the subject of 
corporate criminal liability did not constitute a legitimate branch of the criminal 
law. This is because responsibility simply binds the accused to the relevant 
course of action and the prosecution may do so by either showing that the 
accused entertained and performed the requisite mens rea and actus reus or 
she simply performed an act prohibited by the law or failed to perform one 
required by the law. As such, a corporation may be deemed to be a 
responsible agent in criminal law if it can be shown to breach the law in one or 
both of these ways, representing the deontological and teleological patterns of 
ascription. 
 
                                                 
193 This is also the reason why corporations are held vicariously liable in some jurisdictions. 
See for example New York Central and Hudson River Railroad v United States 212 US 481 
(1909), hereinafter referred to as New York Central. 
194 Sullivan, 1995: 283. Such an approach would no doubt fuel arguments about the lack of 
theoretical foundation of corporate criminal liability and its legitimacy as a branch of the 
criminal law. 
195 Although some commentators cited in Chapter 4 suggested that the identification doctrine 
was inspired by the organ theory and German Law, there is little evidence to substantiate this 
claim. The judges that first imposed liability on corporations for crimes of intent in 1944 did not 
allude to any empirical studies. Only Stable J in R v ICR Haulage [1944] 1 KB 551 
(hereinafter referred to as ICR Haulage) at 556 suggested that the courts’ attitude had 
“undergone a process of development” making it likely that in 1944 Finlay J’s decision in R v 
Cory Bros [1927] 1 KB 810 (hereinafter referred to as Cory Bros) acquitting a corporation of 
manslaughter, could have been otherwise. 
196 The conflict between consequentialist (including utilitarian) values and retributive values 
becomes apparent when the notion of responsibility is examined. See Schlegel, 1990: 75-90. 
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2.4.1.1 The deontological perspective: responsibility based on 
moral agency 
 
The function of the criminal law has been described as restricted to punishing 
only persons who have committed a morally reprehensible action and are 
deserving of blame.197 This means that only persons that appreciated or ought 
to have appreciated the moral content of their actions may be criminally 
liable.198 This position is generally related to methodological individualism and 
individual justice199 and viewed from a ‘person-centred’ standpoint whereby 
the criminal justice system is constrained to treat a person faced with a choice 
in a particular manner.200 It is also related to what Norrie describes as the 
“Kantian model of justice” whereby a person free from the exigencies of her 
surrounding environment chooses to commit a morally reprehensible act. It is 
not important to explain the person’s choice of action by reference to social 
factors201 and when questions of criminal liability are addressed in court the 
number of excuses available to the person is limited only to those that 
concern her state of mind.  
 
This perspective of responsibility has always been confronted with questions 
about the source and definition of moral agency. It has been posited that 
moral agency may be discovered through careful reasoning on the relation 
between the agent and her conduct (irrespective of social values or the 
interests of the wider community).202 This is because moral agents are 
endowed with the capacity to recognise the rightness and wrongness of 
conduct.203 Thus, courts have to look at the judgement made by an agent in 
                                                 
197 See Schlegel, 1990: 75; Moore, 1997: 33 and 35; Norrie, 1999: 111; and Duff, 2005: 356. 
198 See Nobles and Schiff, 2006: 208. 
199 This is to the effect that the rights of the individual should not be unduly sacrificed in favour 
of the interest of community. See Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 54; Schlegel, 1990: 75; Fisse 
and Braithwaite, 1993: 17-19; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 44. 
200 See generally Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 26-31.  
201 See Norrie, 2000: 47-49. See also the review article by Sullivan (2002). 
202 See Watkins’ (2006: 601-604) discussion on the “Ledger View” where the agent’s 
responsibility is deemed to be a function of her moral conduct and not necessarily the 
expectations of other members of her community. 
203 See Lacey, 2001:  353; Cane, 2002: 4 and 23; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 46-50. 
However, this would be a good example of a materialistic fallacy if the concepts of rightness 
and wrongness are not understood here to relate to legality and illegality. 
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order to impose liability for the conduct chosen.204 It may therefore be said 
that the rules of responsibility and liability are enacted in light of the agent’s 
right to choose and the operation of defences such as undue influence, 
automatism and insanity constitute a constraint on the criminal justice system 
to refrain from ascribing responsibility under circumstances where the agent 
was not autonomous and could not have exercised her free will to choose 
otherwise. These defences thus provide the affected agent with a warrant to 
non-culpability.205  
 
With regard to the question of moral blameworthiness, two major ideas are 
recurrent in the literature of responsibility and morality which are of particular 
interest to the corporate entity. Firstly, a morally responsible agent is 
essentially a human being;206 and secondly, the mental element relevant to 
convict is subjective, that is, it must be established that the moral agent in the 
dock intentionally carried out the blameworthy act in such manner that it could 
be said that she was certain or ought to have been certain of the outcome.207 
Before testing these ideas on the corporate person it is important to look at 
the second pattern of ascription employed in criminal law which can be 
described as teleological.  
 
                                                 
204 This means that courts are constrained to impose liability on agents that exercise poor 
judgement. Such constraints may be called deserts. See Schlegel, 1990: 66-67; and 
Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 29-30.   
205 These are the “exculpatory defences” discussed by Robinson (1997) and Duff (2007). 
206 Hayek, 1949: 6. See also Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 19-24; Lacey, 2001: 357; and 
Cane, 2002: 4, 23. 
207 Norrie (2000: 1) describes this approach as “orthodox subjectivism.” Horder, (1997: 95) on 
his part contends that this approach was the orthodox custom in the 20th century. See also 
Norrie, 1999: 532; Simester, 1999: 17; Lacey, 2001: 350; and Sullivan, 2002: 749. See also 
the cases of R v Scartlett [1993] Crim LR 288; and B v DPP [2000] 1 All ER 833. However, 
the orthodox custom has not always been observed by courts and Parliament. 
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2.4.1.2 The teleological perspective: responsibility based on social 
interest  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, social conflict may emanate from discordant moral 
views and such conflict may sometimes be resolved by turning to the law for a 
compromise solution. Given that the law (when compared to morality) 
imposes more effective sanctions and attends to diverse social and cultural 
complexities in real life,208 relying solely on notions such as ‘freewill’ and 
‘moral blameworthiness’ would be tantamount to using them as articles of 
faith.209 This may result in the disregard of certain rights that conflict with 
those of the accused such as the right of the victim and the right of society to 
security. Hence, the deontological perspective pays little attention to other 
types of offences that do not necessarily require proof of moral 
blameworthiness or subjective intent. These include absolute and strict liability 
offences.210 As such, all offences existing within each jurisdiction cannot be 
brought together and measured with regard to an independent set of moral 
ideas and may sometimes be better understood when discussed within a 
teleological or consequentialist frame whereby regard is given to the functions 
they play and the objectives they are required to meet.211 Thus, there are 
values212 that the criminal justice system seeks to promote and in so doing 
targets an agent to whom responsibility is ascribed. The agent is therefore 
liable because this promises the best of consequences.213  
 
It is however important to note that the teleological facet of the criminal law 
hardly enjoys consensus among commentators. Leonard for example 
contends that this approach is simply unjust as the defendant is used as a 
“means to an end.”214 Hippard on his part contends that any form of criminal 
                                                 
208 See Watkins, 2006: 596. 
209 Sullivan, 2002: 753. 
210 See Cane, 2002: 105-110.  
211 See Cane, 2002: 56-60; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 47. 
212 In this case social (utilitarian) values such as the happiness of most members of the 
society. 
213 See Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 31-32; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 47. 
214 2003: 692 and 697. He however notes that mens rea is not always an essential 
component of an offence. For criticisms of similar approaches, see Horder, 1997. 
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liability without fault is oxymoronic and unconstitutional.215 Nonetheless, this 
approach of responsibility is concerned with the dynamics of the interaction 
between the agent, the victim and the society at large because this interaction 
defines the function of the criminal justice system. Thus, there are instances 
where the interests of the society may determine an agent’s “prospective 
responsibilities.”216 To hold a person responsible in such instances would 
imply that she has breached her “prospective” duty by causing harm to the 
community or to a neighbour that is the beneficiary of the prospective duty.217 
There are two recurrent ideas under this approach which are of particular 
interest to the corporate entity. Firstly, a person is held responsible due to 
society’s perception of the importance of holding her responsible for her 
action.218 Secondly, the ascription of responsibility should be based on an 
objective test. This means that responsibility relates not to the intention or 
mental disposition of the accused but to the risk inherent in the activity that 
she carried out.219  
 
2.4.1.3 Ascertaining the responsible corporate person 
 
Two perspectives of responsibility have been discussed. They are based on 
different sets of rationale that are sometimes contradictory given that one 
approach advocates for holding only the morally blameworthy agent 
responsible while the other advocates for holding agents responsible when a 
designated objective will be achieved irrespective of whether she is morally 
blameworthy or not. Both perspectives are important and it is submitted here 
that neither of them should be presented as the criminal justice system’s only 
concern.220 Just as in the case with defining the corporation as an entity in 
                                                 
215 1973: 1040. 
216 Cane, 2002: 36. See also discussion on the “Practice View” by Strawson, 1974, where the 
agent’s responsibility is held to be a function of expectations within her community. See also 
Watkins, 2006: 601-604. 
217 The fact that the duty-holder did not intend the consequences of her action is immaterial. 
See Cane, 2002: 55-56. 
218 See for example Wells’ (1993: 551) claim that corporate criminal liability represents 
“cultural attitudes” toward technological ventures. See also Miers, 1983. 
219 See Wells, 1988: 797; and 1993: 553. 
220 This thesis therefore endorses the dual view of Braithwaite and Pettit (1990) that includes 
both the retributive and the consequentialist or utilitarian perspectives. 
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esse and as a legal person, the advocacy for a “grand theory” or a unitary and 
cosmopolitan view of responsibility is ill-conceived due to the fact the 
operation of such criminal law concepts cannot be captured in a single set of 
principles.221  
 
Hence, as regards the deontological approach, a corporation may be shown 
to have entertained the blameworthy motive via an established mechanism of 
attributing the knowledge and intents of agents (or causal relationship) to the 
corporation.222 In other words, such mechanism will be based on the fact that 
a corporation (through its agents) is capable of cognition and may be morally 
blameworthy. This means that the corporation’s liability will not be established 
by evidence showing that one of its agents was responsible but showing that 
the corporation itself was responsible.223 As such, the individuals that make 
up a corporation could be innocent agents and yet the corporation is guilty. As 
noted above, some researchers such as Kornhauser, Sager, Pettit and Rock 
have shown how collective groups such as corporations act with a specific 
intent. Thus, they can be moral persons or intelligent machines that distinctly 
manifest reason, bear intentions and carry out positive actions. In such 
instances the criminal justice system is constrained to hold corporations liable 
given that the intent manifested corresponds to the mens rea of the offence 
charged.224  
 
The corporation may equally be said to be a responsible subject in criminal 
law theory from a teleological perspective. In fact, corporate liability has 
historically developed along the lines of target or objective-driven 
enforcement.225 Judges have readily turned to the existing criminal legislation, 
as well as values and doctrines established through precedent in order to 
determine whether these relate to the values of the wider society to which the 
                                                 
221 See Duff, 2005: 356. 
222 See Schlegel, 1990: 75-90; and Sullivan, 1995: 283. 
223 See Wells, 2001: Chapter 8, especially the specific references made to the metaphysics of 
corporations developed by French, 1984; and Dan-Cohen, 1986. See also Schlegel, 1990: 
78-79; and Sullivan, 1995: 283. 
224 Sullivan, 1995: 283. 
225 See the historical development of corporate criminal liability in Schlegel, 1990; Wells, 
2001; and Gobert and Punch, 2003. 
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criminal justice system appeals for legitimacy.226 Thus, a corporation has 
been held liable for obstructing a road and causing harm through pollution 
even though no subjective test showed that its board of directors or senior 
management actually intended or foresaw that their activities may result in 
harm to members of the community.227 This is because the values of the 
wider society as well as the statutes creating the offences dictate that society 
must be protected from harm resulting from public works and such values 
would be defeated if liability is not imposed on the corporation.228 
 
However, it must be noted that terms such as ‘goal of the statute’ and ‘social 
interest’ are as equivocal as ‘moral blameworthiness’ and ‘freewill’ and it is 
uncertain what measure is used to determine how statutory provisions relate 
to the values of the wider society. Public perception of responsibility may 
influence the imposition of liability on agents on the ground that the public 
thinks the agent’s act is morally blameworthy.229 This has been the case with 
corporate defendants. Before the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise and 
the Southall train crash for example, there was more tolerance for “accidents” 
and “chance” disasters directly related to corporate activities although they 
registered scores of deaths.230 The deaths were seen as tragic and 
unfortunate.231 Wells232 also talks of the then British Prime Minister describing 
a deranged gunman shooting and killing 16 people as a tragic crime and the 
capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise and the fire at the King’s Cross 
                                                 
226 See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 54. This demonstrates the influence of social and cultural 
forces on the development of the criminal law.  See Wells, 1993: 551-556. 
227 R v The Great North of England Railway Company (1846) 115 ER 1294. This case is 
hereinafter referred to as The Great North of England Railway Co. 
228 However, this does not imply that judges are required to disregard important words in a 
statutory provision in order to enforce what they deem to be the equity of the statute. See 
Chapters 1 and 4. See also the recommendation by the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
(1980) on the need to circumscribe the mental element for manslaughter. 
229 This shows that morality, a deontological instrument, may sometimes play an important 
role in the teleological construction of legal concepts. 
230 Carson (1982: 30) suggests that economic rationality might have played a role in the 
tolerance towards corporate crime. See also Taylor, 1983: 10. 
231 Box (1983: 26) intimates that the number of deaths from occupational hazards is seven 
times higher than those of homicide. See also the gory figures presented by Hair (1971: 5-
24); and Beattie (1986: 86) cited in Wells, 1988: 788. Thus, when viewed as risks, corporate 
activities that had a high propensity of resulting in injury or death seemed to preoccupy the 
public far less than routine violent crime by humans. See also the survey conducted by 
Prescott-Clarke (1982: 13) that showed that 51 percent of people surveyed were concerned 
by road and traffic accidents compared to 8 percent by crime and violence. 
232 1988: 791, citing The Guardian, August 21, 1987. 
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Station as accidents. As such, it is only after scathing media reports placing 
blame for financial scandals at the door of the practices and policies of Enron, 
WorldCom and Arthur Andersen and showing that better management would 
have avoided the disasters that communities’ perception of responsibility of 
corporations began to change. Under pressure, the British Parliament has 
seemingly reacted by enacting the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA) and creating an offence targeting corporations 
which requires only an objective test. 
 
Nonetheless, in light of the above, it may be advanced that a corporation may 
be shown to be criminally responsible on both deontological and teleological 
bases. This is because although amorphous and incorporeal it can distinctly 
manifest reason, bear intentions and carry out positive actions. Although such 
reason, intentions and actions may overlap with those of an individual agent 
they are often the products of collectivisation and are therefore motivated by 
the corporation’s independent interests. The discussion above is therefore 
consonant with the contention that a corporation is a changeable entity 
(existing in the legal world) that is recognised by the legislator or court as a 
corporation because of its independence of thought and action. What this 
definition tells us is that a corporation is capable of using its agents or 
encouraging and assisting them in the commission of offences and may be 
responsible either directly (non-derivatively) or an accessory. However, this 
description is not complete because an entity may be all of these and yet 
criminal liability is not imposed upon it owing to the fact that it cannot be 
punished. In other words, there is no criminal sanction that may deter or 
rehabilitate or incapacitate the entity.233 As such, ascertaining the essence of 
a corporation within criminal law discourse also involves determining whether 
the corporate person is amenable to criminal sanction. 
 
                                                 
233 For example, although Coke (Sutton’s Hospital) conceived of a corporation as existing in 
the intendment of the law and capable of performing a few acts, he held that it could not be 
prosecuted and convicted for offences such as treason because it could neither be 
excommunicated nor executed. 
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2.4.2 Who can be punished? 
 
The discussion below adopts the same methodology employed to analyse the 
use of responsibility in criminal law theory. Hence, the question of punishment 
will be addressed from the deontological and teleological perspectives. 
Deontological theories conform to the notion of constraint-driven enforcement 
discussed in the previous subsection and submit to the assertion that moral 
blameworthiness is the purpose of punishment. This reflects the criminal law 
goal of retribution and just deserts. As such, deontological or retributive 
theories are geared towards the redistribution or a just distribution of the 
varied burdens and benefits in society according to moral criteria.234 They 
constitute a system of blame that empowers society to respond to crime by 
imposing something unpleasant on the wrongdoer235 that will provide her with 
moral reasons not to indulge in a similar act.236 Thus, the wrongdoer should 
have the capacity to appreciate the social disapproval communicated through 
the sanction. However, it is uncertain whether the imposition of a criminal 
sanction on the offender solely because her act deserves to be punished 
would in theory preclude other persons from committing the same offence.237 
Thus, although the reasons for imposing criminal sanction on a person include 
the person’s moral blameworthiness and the need for society to make a moral 
statement,238 it would be otiose to impose a sanction that does not deter the 
wrongdoer and others from indulging in the same offence.239 As such, where 
criminal sanctions are imposed to punish blameworthiness there is a 
concomitant objective to reduce the incidence of the offender or other persons 
committing the same offence.240 This means that the theory of retribution may 
                                                 
234 Braithwaite and Fisse, 1993: 45. 
235 Irrespective of whether the person displays feelings of regret or not. See Byam, 1982: 583; 
and Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 45. 
236 See Kant, 1965: 101-107; Packer, 1968: 9; Ezorsky, 1972: 102-34; LaFave and Scot, 
1972: 5; Byam, 1982: 583; Murphy J, 1985: 158; Lacey, 1988: 22-24; Fisse and Braithwaite, 
1993: 45, 128; Wells, 2001: 19; and Todarello, 2002-2003: 854. 
237 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 44. 
238 See Wells, 2001: 14, 15, 19. 
239 This is because the moral statement would be deemed unheeded. 
240 And also minimise human suffering, a goal influenced by the ‘harm principle.’ See Wells, 
2001: 14, 15. 
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to a certain extent serve the utilitarian goals of deterrence and rehabilitation241 
and shows that both accounts are not always mutually exclusive and 
sometimes overlap.242 However, from a purely deontological perspective a 
judge is constrained to impose a sanction where the accused is morally 
blameworthy or does not have an exculpatory defence and utilitarian goals 
are nonessential. 
 
On the other hand, teleological or consequentialist theories243 concord with 
the notions of target-driven and objective-driven enforcement and support the 
statement that the criminal law should punish the wrongdoer in order to meet 
the social objectives of security and crime reduction. Proponents of 
teleological theories see punishment as more than a vengeful act perpetrated 
by society244 and believe that it must be defined in consequentialist terms. 
Some of the consequentialist objectives in this regard include deterrence, 
rehabilitation and incapacitation.245 Deterrence seen through a teleological 
lens is distinguishable from deterrence discussed under retribution in that it 
does not seek to attribute blame or make a moral statement but simply 
dissuade the criminal offender (specific deterrence) and other potential 
offenders in similar situations (general deterrence).246 There is some 
uncertainty as regards the extent to which a form of punishment effectively 
deters offenders and thus, the idea of imposing sanctions on persons merely 
for the purpose of deterring them may be said to actually favour despotism. 
However, it may be argued that this line of reasoning is ineluctable where 
society is constrained to deter a particular criminal offender due to a high 
                                                 
241 This type of deterrence is often referred to as “weak” or “negative retributivism.” It is to the 
effect that the fact that a person is deserving of punishment is not sufficient justification to 
punish her lest there is a utilitarian goal to be achieved. See Hart, 1968: 77; Fisse and 
Braithwaite, 1993: 46; and Wells, 2001: 19. 
242 These accounts may also be said to reflect Duff’s (2007) contention that a person is 
punishable because she is responsible and does not have an exculpatory excuse. As such, 
the defender that has an exculpatory defence is not blameworthy and does not need to be 
deterred or rehabilitated. 
243 They may also be referred to as instrumental or symbolic and relate more effectively to the 
“harm principle.” See Wells, 2001: 14. 
244 Gibbs, 1975: 82-83. See also Lacey, 1988: 96; Wells, 2001: 18; and Todarello, 2002-2003: 
854. 
245 See Packer, 1968: 11; Note, Harvard, 1979: 1231-1243; and Byam, 1982: 583. 
246 Todarello, 2002-2003: 854. As such, if no moral statement is made but the objective is 
achieved, the sanction is justifiable. 
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propensity of the latter to perform an injurious action.247 As regards 
rehabilitation, it may be said to be geared toward educating and training the 
target criminal offender so that she may reintegrate into society after serving 
the penalty as a law-abiding citizen. The objective is equally to reduce the 
number of criminals.248 This may also be said to be the objective of 
incapacitation although it is thought that incapacitation is achieved by simply 
removing the offender from society249 and protecting the public from the 
danger posed by the offender.250 This means that the incapacitation should be 
proportionate to the crime committed.251  
 
From the above, it may be advanced that there is no cosmopolitan theory of 
punishment. Both deontological and teleological perspectives discussed 
above present credible opportunities for the criminal justice system to reduce 
crime. They are not mutually exclusive252 and have serious loopholes that in 
certain circumstances undermine the objective of the criminal law. They can 
however be said to represent a holistic view of the purpose of punishment in 
criminal law theory. A person may be punished if she is morally blameworthy 
and/or if socially desirable objectives may be achieved. Thus, on the one 
hand it is fair to impose punishment for past acts and on the other hand it is 
                                                 
247 This is another example of where both retributive and consequentialist rationales overlap. 
The criminal statute that places such constraint on society may be said to have a retributive 
as well as a consequentialist objective and such statutes include those that provide for the 
proof of intent of the accused. 
248 See Gibbs, 1975: 72; and Todarello, 2002-2003: 854. It has nonetheless been invariably 
described as an unrealistic goal (see Blecker, 1990: 1149) and a totalitarian regime that 
seeks to rearrange the mind and thoughts of prisoners through coercion. See Fisse and 
Braithwaite, 2002: 124. These commentators however recommend rehabilitative services for 
offenders who are found to need them and who freely ask for them. 
249 See Zimring and Hawkins, 1973. 
250 This is often described as selective incapacitation. 
251 However, there are few accurate predictions of recidivism and the absence of precise data 
seriously undermines the importance of selective incapacitation. An offender would thus be 
incapacitated for a period based on a decision founded on questionable variables. Moreover, 
if an offender is deemed still dangerous and the period of her incapacitation has to be 
extended this would be tantamount to an infringement upon her right to non-interference 
beyond the maximum sentence prescribed by legislation. Another shortcoming is the lack of 
sufficient fiscal resources to imprison the number of criminals that would be enough to have a 
substantial impact on crime rate. See Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 3 and 125. 
252 Punishment represents a complex structure and claims to a cosmopolitan theory of 
punishment whether with regard to its justification and goals should therefore not be 
encouraged. See Wells, 2001: 20. 
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socially useful to impose punishment for the future.253  The question that this 
section seeks to address is whether it logical to impose criminal sanctions on 
the responsible corporate person and why. It is expected that the answer to 
this question will provide another indication to the essence of the corporate 
person.  
 
2.4.2.1 Ascertaining the essence of corporate person as a 
punishable entity 
 
Some commentators have contended that punishing the corporation 
represents a total disregard of the theoretical foundation of criminal law built 
on the concept of criminal intent and positive action.254 However, it is shown 
above that the argument that corporations have intentions of their own and 
carry out positive rational actions holds water in certain instances. Thus, 
where a corporation intentionally breaches criminal law standards it is just and 
fair to impose criminal sanctions on it.255 The argument here is that if a 
corporation has the capacity to relate to the consequences of its actions and 
decisions then it should equally have the capacity to appreciate the social 
disapproval of its act communicated through the sanction. 
 
In the same vein the imposition of criminal sanctions can effectively deter 
corporations,256 as well as rehabilitate and incapacitate them257 in order to 
achieve the goals of crime reduction and furtherance of social interest. 
Deterrence no doubt enjoys consensus as the main purpose of punishing 
corporations given that even opponents of corporate criminal liability accept 
                                                 
253 Wells, 2001: 19. If it is established that a corporation may be punished the question that 
follows is what is the most appropriate punishment for corporate entities given their artificial 
nature? This question is not addressed below but in Chapter 7 dealing with the applicable 
sanctions in the United Kingdom. 
254 See Spurgeon and Fagan, 1981: 400, 424; and Byam, 1982: 585. 
255 See French, 1995: 160, 166; Note, Harvard, 1979: 1243; and Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 
45. 
256 See Wells, 2001: 13-14. 
257 Cf Byam, 1982: 586. The thought that fines are the only applicable sanctions with regard 
to corporate defenders may have influenced Byam’s conclusion that corporations may only be 
deterred. 
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that corporations may be deterred by criminal sanctions,258 although they also 
claim that there is unfortunately no standard to determine whether a sanction 
effectively deters corporate defenders.259 Nonetheless, corporations are most 
likely to be deterred by sanctions that may cause considerable economic 
loss260 or by an indictment and prosecution and/or sanction that carry a public 
stigma.261  
 
Rehabilitation has in some instances (when coerced) been deemed to be 
more appropriate to corporate entities than natural persons.262 A remedial 
order may incite a corporation to put in place a compliance programme to 
correct a defective operation in accordance with the order and re-establish its 
reputation. In such instance the corporation may be said to have been 
rehabilitated or reformed. This is also the case where the court thinks it is 
appropriate in the circumstance to order a re-organisation of the managerial 
structure.263 This may be achieved in part through orders disqualifying 
negligent company directors264 and compelling other directors to act 
responsibly and exercise sufficient skill and care with regard to the interests of 
all the company’s stakeholders.265  
 
                                                 
258 See Packer, 1968: 356; and Byam, 1982: 585 and 586. 
259 See Coffee, 1981: 408; and Byam, 1982: 585. This argument has more to do with the 
practicality of sanctions than their legitimacy because the same claim may be made of natural 
persons. See Fisse and Braithwaite, 2002: 148; and Wells, 2001: 19. However, Byam (1982: 
584-585) employs economic efficiency as a standard to specify a deterrent penalty for 
corporations (which he thinks should be civil damages) but his analysis is premised on 
contestable assumptions: a system of enforcement that reduces the incidence of corporate 
crime will cost less to society and will be more efficient and more effective; and corporations 
naturally respond to threats of economic sanctions (irrespective of the likelihood of 
prosecution and conviction). 
260 This is logical for profit-making corporations given that they are driven by the desire to 
maximise profit and might be tempted to commit the crime and include it in their costs if the 
crime will enable them maximise profits or the sanction is not hefty. See Note, Harvard 
(1979): 1365; and Byam, 1982: 587.  
261 See Stone, 1975: 43. 
262 Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 124. 
263 See Chapter 7.  
264 See for example the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, the Insolvency Act 
2000, and the Enterprise Act 2002. 
265 This may be stated as the reason why criminal sanctions should target the responsible 
individuals rather than corporations. However, there are instances where no single director 
may be shown to be at fault. Thus, although targeting the corporation only may not always 
achieve the goals of the criminal law, in many cases involving corporate activities it remains 
the most efficient strategy. See Khanna, 1996: 1496. 
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Comments for and against the theory of incapacitation have been based on 
the assumption that imprisonment and execution are the only penalties that 
can be used to incapacitate an offender. Although these penalties are not 
applicable to the corporate criminal,266 there are a host of other penalties that 
may effectively incapacitate a corporation. When its license privileges are 
withdrawn or the license temporally suspended or the corporation is 
temporally or permanently disqualified from carrying on specific activities, it 
may be said to have been incapacitated. Also, if a corporation is placed under 
judicial supervision whereby it reports its activities and cannot act without prior 
authorisation, such a corporation may be said to have been incapacitated.267  
 
It may therefore be contended that a corporation is not only a responsible 
agent but is equally punishable under certain circumstances.268 It is 
punishable because on the one hand, it has the capacity to relate to the 
consequences of its actions and decisions as well as appreciate the moral 
blemish of the criminal sanction (therefore it does not have an exculpatory 
defence) and on the other hand, it can be deterred, rehabilitated and 
incapacitated. However, given that it invariably acts through natural persons, 
the courts and legislators must devise a means of punishing it only in 
situations where it would react accordingly through such agents.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
I set out to circumscribe the nature of the corporation within criminal law 
discourse and in the course of doing this I established that although courts 
have often asserted the fictitious nature of the corporation they have treated it 
                                                 
266 Nonetheless, it has been suggested that dissolution of the corporation may be imposed as 
a corresponding sentence for execution. See Bouzat and Pinatel, 1970: 312. Such decision 
would however take into consideration the repercussions on the community: loss of jobs and 
revenue and may be the provision of essential services. 
267 Where a corporation without expert staff and the requisite resources obtains a license to 
carry out public operations such as waste disposal or building of a bridge, its license may be 
revoked to prevent it from breaching the criminal law (through misfeasance or nonfeasance) 
and to protect public interest. See Gobert and Punch, 2003. 
268 The question of what forms of punishment achieve the deterrence, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation goals requires an extended empirical study that should examine the effect of 
each sanction on a large number of corporations. 
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as a real entity that bears legal rights and has the capacity to affect 
relationships. This dual view of the corporation is also consonant with a 
number of theories (both legal and non-legal) that describe different facets of 
the corporate reality. Thus, these theories may help in elucidating the features 
by which courts may recognise a corporation. Courts may refrain from 
intervening in the operation of the activities of a corporation because it is an 
expression of fundamental individual freedoms, although such intervention 
may be necessary in some instances because the state recognised the 
existence of the corporation in exchange for the performance of some social 
functions. Hence, a common feature the theories discussed above is that 
corporations may by themselves perform certain activities, whether it is to 
enter into contracts or perform some social function. Nonetheless, when a 
judge or legislator talks of the imposition of criminal liability on a corporation 
she is not simply referring to the imposition of criminal liability on an entity that 
exists simplicter but that exists as a legal person. This is because only legal 
persons may be deemed to have the capacity to perform actions and affect 
relationships. Thus, theories describing the concept of legal personality are 
also important in elucidating the features by which criminal law courts may 
recognise a corporation. After abstracting different properties from some of 
these theories, I submitted that criminal law courts conceive of a corporation 
as an amorphous entity that exists somewhere between the abstract and the 
concrete, the imaginary and the perceived, the Cheshire cat and the 
proverbial elephant.  
 
This implies that there is no substantive element that may be used to define a 
corporation and to distinguish it from other entities. van Eeghen posits that 
legal personality is the distinguishing element.269 However, in some 
jurisdictions such as Scotland, partnerships are legal persons and cannot be 
said to be corporations. Equally, features such as limited liability and 
perpetuity cannot be said to be the distinguishing factors given that a person’s 
liability cannot be limited under the criminal law and the concept of perpetuity 
                                                 
269 Van Eeghen, 2005: 52-53. 
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has no bearing on either criminal responsibility or punishability.270 Thus, given 
its amorphous nature the only defining feature of the corporation may be said 
to be the fact of its recognition as a corporation by the court or legislator. This 
implies that the reason why a court or legislator recognises an entity as a 
corporation is the most cogent indicator to the nature of the corporation, 
although such reason would change in light of the circumstances. However, in 
light of the above, the common reason that gives courts and legislators 
incentive to recognise a collective entity as a corporation is its ability to think 
and act independently and relate to the consequences of such thought and 
action.271 It may then be submitted that the entity recognised by courts and 
legislators as a corporation is logically amenable to the criminal law. However, 
there is no guarantee of optimum results for the criminal justice system. This 
is because the fact that a corporation is capable of committing crime does not 
imply that the criminal law is necessarily structured to deal with a changeable 
entity. Thus, it may also be important to determine whether the criminal law 
has the requisite tools to effectively regulate such entity. 
 
  
                                                 
270 Moreover, there are other means by which limited liability and perpetuity may be acquired 
other than forming a corporation. See Hessen, 1979: 15-22. 
271 Nonetheless, it must be noted that although Rock (2005) is cited above as saying that the 
corporation is the paradigmatic example of what Pettit (1993) calls “purposive groups,” it is 
not the fact of acting autonomously and with a purpose that makes an entity a corporation (as 
other associations of persons may also be deemed to be “purposive groups”) but the fact of 
acting autonomously and with a purpose and being recognised by the court or legislator as a 
corporation. Although the insistence on the fact of the recognition of an entity as a corporation 
(in the circumstances) by a court may be deemed dogmatic, there is hardly any other 
sustainable argument justifying the extension of legal personality to an artificial entity while 
rational animals and plants that may also relate to the consequences of their independent 
actions are not granted such a privilege. Some commentators like French (1995: 56-80) have 
premised their analyses (in favour of granting the privilege to corporations) on the assumption 
that animals and plants cannot be moral agents although the assumption is not justified. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE ADAPTABILITY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW IN DEALING WITH THE CORPORATE PERSON 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 2 it was submitted that a corporation is anything recognised by 
Parliament or courts as a corporation due to its ability to think and act 
independently and relate to the consequences of such thought and action. 
However, it was noted that courts may not be able to convict and sanction 
corporations on a consistent basis if the criminal law lacks the requisite tools 
to deal with such peculiar entities. This means that the criminal law ought to 
be adaptable to such extent that it may be used it to prosecute, convict and 
sanction corporations of different shapes and sizes perpetrating different 
offences in different circumstances. This Chapter looks at the way the 
different forms of liability (and criminal offences) may be modified to suit the 
nature of the corporate entity in circumstances where the crime is shown to 
have been committed qua corporation.1 The discussion below is premised on 
two assumptions. Firstly, the criminal law is an effective means of regulating 
the activities of corporations.2 Secondly, given that a corporation is an 
independent person and vicarious liability is shunned in the criminal law, 
corporations may only be held directly (non-derivatively) or secondarily liable. 
These assumptions will reinforce other propositions from which I will be able 
to draw the conclusion that the coherence and integrity of the criminal law (as 
regards regulating corporations) are directly related to the appropriateness of 
the mechanism of imputation used by the court or prescribed by Parliament.  
 
                                                 
1 Chapter 7 discusses the different forms of punishment that may be imposed on different 
types of corporations for crimes committed qua corporation.  
2 With regard to the justification for the use of the criminal law, see Clarkson, 1996; and Wells, 
2001: Chapter 2. 
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The discussion proceeds with an examination of direct and secondary liability 
of corporations and four different kinds of offences related thereto in the 
sequence in which they have been imposed on corporations over the past 400 
years,3 as well as the principles that have been developed and used by 
Parliament and courts to justify their imposition. I will then seek to determine 
whether these forms of liability and the offences are appropriate to deal with 
the ‘corporation’ as defined in Chapter 2. Finally, I will consider ways in which 
the use of these forms of liability may be adapted to reflect other legal 
principles and enable courts to impute acts and intents (or causal 
relationships) to corporations on a logical and consistent basis.  
 
3.1  DIRECT (NON-DERIVATIVE) LIABILITY  
 
Over the past 400 years, the practice in the United Kingdom has been to hold 
corporations liable for offences perpetrated by guilty agents. Although it is the 
guilt and not the act or knowledge of the agent that is imputed to the 
corporation in order to hold it liable, the latter’s liability is held to be direct and 
not vicarious. The argument is that the guilt of an agent that is identifiable with 
the corporation is the guilt of the corporation. However, the station of the 
agent that is identified with the corporation depends on the interpretation of 
the relevant law by the court and the offence charged.4 I will examine some of 
the offences that are enforced against corporations directly in order to 
determine whether the criminal law is an effective regulatory tool. 
 
                                                 
3 This sequence is determined not by the endorsement of the fact that corporate criminal 
liability did not exist before then (which is contrary to what this thesis propounds) but by the 
difficulty of finding data on corporate criminal liability in the United Kingdom prior to the 17th 
century. 
4 This idea was propounded by Stable J in ICR Haulage but dismissed by Lord Reid in 
Nattrass. However, Lord Reid’s rejection of the idea is unfounded given that where the 
offence charged is an absolute or strict liability offence the corporation may be liable for the 
act of any employee (performed with the scope of employment) that breaches the strict or 
absolute duty. Equally, where the offence charged is corporate manslaughter or corporate 
homicide the corporation may be liable for the act of any employee that breaches the relevant 
duty of care provided it was motivated by the way the collective of senior managers organised 
or managed the corporation’s activities.  
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3.2.1 Strict and absolute liability offences 
 
These are offences that generally do not require proof of intent or knowledge 
and awareness of risk or any form of mens rea.5 Strict liability offences often 
require what may be termed “minimum culpability,”6 where the defendant 
knows or has reasonable cause to know that there is a risk in the activity 
carried out and was in a position to prevent the risk but did not prevent it.7 
Absolute liability offences on the other hand involve the breach of an absolute 
duty or carrying out of a prohibited activity8 and require no standard of 
culpability.9 The rationale for enforcing strict and absolute liability offences 
has been the subject of much debate.10 They may however be said to 
delineate a crime prevention scheme instituted by Parliament because it has 
enough information to believe that modes of carrying out particular activities 
or the activities themselves have serious consequences on public welfare11 
and thus seeks to prohibit these modes or activities by compelling persons in 
control to be vigilant and/or to refrain from using the modes or performing the 
activities.12 The absence of mens rea would not make such persons 
‘innocent,’13 because they held the duties that were breached.14 Hence, 
                                                 
5 See Wells, 2001: 67; Gobert and Punch, 2003: 94; and Simester, 2005: 22. 
6 Gross, 1979: 372; Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 99; and Schlegel, 1990: 87. 
7 Thus, the defendant is not entirely blameless. This has however been described as “formal 
strict liability” as opposed to “substantive strict liability” where the defendant is blameless. See 
Green SP, 2005: 1-20; and Husak, 2005: 81-103. See also Simester, 2005: 21-50. However, 
the idea of “substantive strict liability” reflects absolute liability and will be treated as such in 
this thesis. 
8 See Mousell Bros at 1101. 
9 Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 99. 
10 See generally, Hart, 1968; Singer and Husak, 1999; Ashworth, 1989; and Simester, 2005. 
Wells (2001: 68) notes that it was a response to the growing abuses by entrepreneurs during 
the development of industry in early 19th century Britain. However, she cites Singer (1989: 
339-353) who differs from this view by pointing out that strict liability offences were enforced 
against many minors and drunks at the time. See also Gobert, 1994: 396-397. 
11 Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 100; Gobert and Punch, 2003: 94-95; and Leonard, 2003: 696. 
This is consonant with the “harm principle.” See Simester, 2005: 25. 
12 See Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1985] AC 1, hereinafter 
referred to as Gammon. See also Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [1999] 3 All ER 
302. 
13 The term ‘innocent’ is used here to refer to the state of mind and act that do not amount to 
mens rea and actus reus and not necessarily the state of mind and act that are completely 
blameless. This is because a number of employees may be negligent in the way in which they 
carry out their activities although none of their negligent acts amounts to the gross negligence 
required by the law to hold a person liable. These employees are thus innocent although not 
completely blameless. 
14 Cf. Singer and Husak, 1999. 
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although there is uncertainty as regards their state of mind, they failed to be 
vigilant and tolerated or encouraged the breach of their duties.15 As such, 
attaching the stigma of criminal conviction to such failure is not unjust or 
objectionable from a social perspective.16 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
concepts of justice and morality are to a certain extent social constructs. 
Thus, criticisms directed at strict and absolute liability on the ground of 
society’s encroachment on the freedom or personal autonomy of duty-
holders17 may only be justified if such power is used to compel persons to 
perform activities that have no direct connection to public welfare. However, 
the decision to impose strict and absolute liability is made after careful 
consideration by Parliament on the need to prohibit certain acts or omissions 
and the consequences of the accused evading liability (due to the difficulty of 
proving mens rea) on public welfare.18 Thus, there is good reason to impose 
strict and absolute liability without the establishment of blameworthiness. The 
criminal law is not based solely on deontological theorems of constraints and 
just deserts. Utilitarian or consequentialist theorems of punishment also justify 
the use of the criminal law. As such, the defendant is liable if she is shown to 
have performed the prohibited act and unless relevant to the defence of the 
case, the reasons for performing the prohibited act are not important.19  
 
What is important to note here is that if the ideas of strict and absolute liability 
are taken out of the historical context in which they were created, there is no 
reason why they cannot be applied to both natural and artificial persons given 
that the criminal law is concerned with enforcing a strict or absolute duty 
                                                 
15 Parliament may also be said to have intended to wipe out the unjust benefit gained by such 
persons. See Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990: 100; Schlegel, 1990: 87; and Wells, 2001: 70. 
16 See Hart, 1968: 120; Ashworth, 1989: 52; and Simester, 2005: 33-37. 
17 See Simester, 2005: 37-39. 
18 As such, suggesting that it should be a matter for the courts to decide whether societal 
interests should prevail (see Horder 2002: 461) may be deemed to be tantamount to arguing 
that courts should make value judgements and disregard Parliament’s objective if and when 
they deem necessary. 
19 Gobert and Punch, 2003: 94. This should however be distinguished from decisions of 
courts, some of which are cited below, that displace the presumption of mens rea where the 
applicable statute is silent on the issue or simply ignore the express statutory requirement of 
proof of intent and impose liability on the duty-holder in order to avoid defeating the purpose 
of the statute. It is argued below that this is unjustified and relates to judicial activism since 
the intention of the legislator in such situation is to ensure that liability is imposed only on the 
person that entertained the relevant mens rea. 
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irrespective of the nature of the person on whom it is imposed.20 Therefore, it 
may be logical to disapprove of the contention that different standards for 
strict and absolute liability ought to be applied for natural and artificial 
persons.21 This is because the same argument may be used in reverse to 
justify the impossibility of enforcing offences requiring proof of intent against 
artificial persons. Moreover, not all corporations are similarly structured; they 
come in different sizes and shapes and some wield more power and influence 
than others.22 The argument for different standards relates to the idea that 
strict and absolute liability imposed on corporations are not strict and absolute 
liability simpliciter but a form of cost-efficient regulation whereby the burden of 
proof is reversed and placed on the corporation that has the requisite 
knowledge and expertise.23 Nonetheless, as mentioned above, corporations 
do not constitute a homogenous group and enacting laws affecting all 
corporations because of the nature of a category of corporations would be 
highly exceptionable. Thus, it may be submitted that strict and absolute 
liability offences involve the imposition of liability directly on the person that 
owed and breached the duty, whether such person is natural or artificial. 
There is no ground for applying different standards. This position is well 
illustrated by Smith JC:24 
[w]here a statutory duty to do something is imposed upon a 
particular person (here, ‘an employer’) and he does not do it, 
he commits the actus reus of an offence. It may be that he has 
failed to fulfil his duty because his employee or agent has 
failed to carry out his duties properly but this is not a case for 
vicarious liability. If the employer is held liable, it is because 
he, personally, has failed to do what the law requires him to do 
and he is personally, not vicariously, liable. There is no need 
to find someone - in the case of a company, the ‘brains’ and 
not merely the ‘hands’ – for whose act the person with the 
                                                 
20 Nonetheless, a duty cannot be imposed on a person that cannot perform it by virtue of her 
nature. 
21 See Ashworth 1989: 52; and Wells 2001: 68. 
22 Horder (2002: 472-474) for example, posits that imposing strict liability on small businesses 
that have intrinsic value to individuals or small groups of individuals impacts upon their quest 
for personal autonomy. 
23 See Simester, 2005: 27-28. The shift of the onus of proof to the accused in such cases is in 
the opinion of Lord Reid (Nattrass at 170) important because it helps avoid instances where it 
is very difficult for the prosecution to prove mens rea and Parliament does not intend that a 
blameless person be convicted. However, as deplored in Chapter 7, shifting the burden of 
proof to the accused because of the prosecution’s lack of resources is tantamount to 
sacrificing fundamental rights on the altar of expediency. 
24 1995: 655. 
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duty can be held liable. The duty on the company in this case 
was to ‘ensure’ - i.e. to make certain - that persons are not 
exposed to risk. They did not make it certain. It does not 
matter how; they were in breach of their statutory duty and, in 
the absence of any requirement of mens rea, that is the end of 
the matter.25  
 
As such, even though it was generally accepted in the 19th century that 
corporations could not commit acts of treason and felony,26 they were still 
liable where they failed to perform their duties.27 Thus, where a duty was 
imposed upon sellers not to sell any article of food or any drug which was 
different in terms of nature, substance and quality from that requested by the 
customer, a corporation was prosecuted for acting contrary to such 
provision.28 The practice has continued over the centuries and today there are 
hundreds of strict and absolute duties created by statutes that can be 
enforced against corporations. Thus, where the section engineer did not plan 
and supervise the operation properly and this resulted in the death of a worker 
(although provided by a sub-contractor), a corporate employer was held liable 
for violating strict provisions of section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974 (HSWA).29 
 
However, even if it is accepted that strict and absolute liability offences may 
be enforced directly against the corporate duty-holder,30 it has been argued 
that where the legislator uses words such as “use,” “permit,” “wilfully” and 
“knowingly,” evidence of the guilty state of mind of the person on whom the 
                                                 
25Smith JC’s logic could even be taken further by positing that whether the offence is a strict 
liability offence or one requiring proof of mens rea, the corporation’s liability remains direct or 
non-derivative and not vicarious. Cf Gobert, 1994: 396. 
26 In light with Coke’s dictum in Sutton’s Hospital. 
27 See Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co. See also Russell v Men of Devon 100 ER 
359 (1788); R v Corporation of Stanford upon Avon (1811) 14 East 348; R v Steven and Wye 
Railway Co (1819) 2 B & Ald 645; R v Inhabitants of Dorset (1825) 77 ER 1442; and The 
Great North of England Railway Co. 
28 Pearks, Dunston and Tee. See also Chuter v Freeth and Pocock Ltd [1911] 2 KB 832, 
hereinafter referred to as Chuter v Freeth. 
29 British Steel. See also R v Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 826, hereinafter 
referred to as Associated Octel. Also important is R v Great Western Trains Co Ltd [2000] QB 
796 (hereinafter referred to as Great Western Trains) where manslaughter charges against 
the company were dismissed at the preliminary ruling although it pleaded guilty to the HSWA 
charges. 
30 See Lord Denman in The Great North of England Railway Co at 1298. 
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duty is imposed is required.31 Hence, where there is no ascertained way of 
proving the corporation’s state of mind, enforcing such duties would be 
problematic. As such, courts in the 19th and early 20th century generally 
showed reluctance to consider theories of corporate knowledge and mens rea 
and the significance of words such as “wilfully” and “knowingly” was 
conveniently ignored. Avory J in Moses v Midland Railway Co for example 
held that irrespective of the words “every person who causes or knowingly 
permits,” the offence under section 5 of the Salmon Fishery Act 1861 was an 
absolute offence that did not require proof of mens rea.32 This shows that the 
extension of corporate liability to include statutory offences inevitably requires 
evidence of the accused corporation’s knowledge or intent.33 Lord Campbell 
considered this in 1858 and concluded that “there may be great difficulty in 
saying that under certain circumstances express malice may not be imputed 
to and proved against a corporation.”34 
 
The paragraph above notwithstanding, it may be said that strict and absolute 
liability offences constitute a valid way of imposing criminal liability directly on 
corporations. Although these offences have been the subject of scathing 
criticisms, they may be justified on consequentialist grounds given that they 
are imposed only where Parliament seeks to prohibit activities that have 
serious consequences on public welfare. Thus, they may be said to adopt 
what is described in Chapter 2 as the teleological pattern of ascribing liability 
to corporations. The fact that they do not require proof of intent or knowledge 
                                                 
31 It may be said that there is nothing wrong in permitting wilfully or knowingly the disposal of 
waste (in case of pollution) but it is the attendant recklessness or disregard of the 
consequences of permitting wilfully or knowingly such disposal that gives the innocent state of 
mind a criminal character. See Simester, 2005: 25. 
32 (1915) 113 LT 451 at 453. This case is hereinafter referred to as Midland Railway Co. See 
also Lord Esher MR and Bowen LJ in Kirkheaton District Local Board v Ainley, Sons & Co 
(1892) 2 QB 274 with regard to the construction of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876. 
Other interesting decisions include that of Lord Shaw in Leyland Shipping Co v Norwich Union 
Fire Insurance Society [1918] AC 350; Viscount Simon in Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v 
Minister of War Transport, The Coxwold [1942] AC 691; and Lord Diplock in Sweet v Parsley 
[1970] AC 132. Despite the development of theories of corporate mens rea, some courts still 
circumvent statutory requirements in like manner. See Meridian discussed in Chapters 1, 4 
and 8.  
33 Another question that courts need to address is whether such words should be construed 
as implying that all elements of the actus reus should correspond to the mens rea that is 
proved. See Manchester, 2006: 214-222. However, Simester (2005: 22) suggests that it is 
sufficient that at least one “material element” of the actus reus corresponds to the mens rea. 
34 Whitfield v South Eastern Railway Co (1858) 120 ER 451 at 453. 
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and awareness of risk or any form of mens rea implies that courts do not need 
to concern themselves with the metaphysics of the accused corporations.35 
Pre-20th century courts therefore readily held that no other kinds of offences 
could be enforced against corporations.36 However, given the difficulty of 
adequately defining many offences without reference to the mind of the 
accused it was inevitable that courts had to consider the corporation’s state of 
mind and devise mechanisms for dealing with deontological patterns of 
ascription.  
 
3.2.2 Offences with an element of intent or defence of due diligence 
 
The scope of enforcement of statutory offences expanded considerably in the 
19th century following the enactment of the Criminal Law Act 1827 (section 14) 
and the Interpretation Act 1889 (section 2) indicating that the term “person” in 
statutes should be construed as including a corporation unless the contrary 
was stated.37 These statutes were however understood to imply that unless 
the contrary was provided in the applicable provision, a corporation could be 
convicted if it was capable of committing the act prohibited by the 
provision.38As such, courts were confronted with an influx of cases whereby 
statutes imposed duties on persons as owners or occupiers and created 
offences that required evidence of the state of mind of the owners or 
occupiers and such owners or occupiers were corporations. In the 
proceedings, the prosecution had to prove and the courts had to accept that 
                                                 
35 However, many strict liability offences provide for a defence of due diligence and a 
corporation as a defendant may invoke such defence to show that it was compliant with the 
law and the offence was caused by another person. In such cases, courts are required to 
consider questions of the corporation’s mind and body. This is actually the situation that 
pushed the House of Lords to delineate the applicable mechanism of imputation in the United 
Kingdom in Nattrass. 
36 See Lindley, 1863: 34-35; and Khanna, 1996: 1484. 
37 See also section 5 of the Interpretation Act 1987.  
38 See the interpretation of sections 98 and 99 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 
by Viscount Reading CJ in Mousell Bros at 1104-1105. The question of whether the term 
“person” in statutes should include corporations has thus been the subject of much 
controversy both in criminal law and in the law of tort with regard to acts that courts believe 
cannot be performed by corporations or where courts believe that Parliament had no intention 
of extending the application of the statute to corporations. Some criminal cases are cited 
below. With regard to the tort cases, see R v London (North) Industrial Tribunal, ex Parte 
Associated Newspapers [1998] ICR 1212; M v Vincent [1998] ICR 17; and Leicester 
University v A [1999] ICR 701. 
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the accused corporations had a mind and had disposed of it in a certain way. 
It was especially difficult to overlook this element where the objective of the 
statute was to sanction the responsible ‘person’ and the proceedings under 
the applicable section required a measure of proof that had an element of 
mens rea. However, Channell J had this to say: 
By the general principles of the criminal law, if a matter is 
made a criminal offence, it is essential that there should be 
something in the nature of mens rea, and, therefore, in 
ordinary cases a corporation cannot be guilty of a criminal 
offence, nor can a master be liable criminally for an offence 
committed by his servant. But there are exceptions to this rule 
in the case of quasi-criminal offences, as they may be termed 
– that is to say, where certain acts are forbidden, by law under 
a penalty, possibly even under a personal penalty, such as 
imprisonment – at any rate, in default of payment of a fine; 
and the reason for this is that the legislature has thought it so 
important to prevent the particular act from being committed 
that it absolutely forbids it to be done; and if done the offender 
is liable to a penalty whether he had any mens rea or not, and 
whether or not he intended to commit a breach of the law.39  
 
It must be noted that the prevailing conception of corporate criminality at the 
time when Channell J made this statement was still in line with Coke’s 
contention that a corporation could be charged and convicted of criminal 
offences that did not require proof of blameworthiness and were not punished 
by execution or banishment or imprisonment. In light of such conception, 
Channell J therefore postulated that even where the statutory provision 
creating the offence required proof of intent to commit, liability could still be 
imposed on the corporation on the ground of the objective of the legislature.40 
As such, a few years later, Lord Alverstone (Pickford J and Lush J concurring) 
cited Pearks, Gunston and Tee and held that a company was a “person” 
within section 20(6) of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1899 and was liable for 
the offence of giving false warranty in writing to a purchaser in spite of the 
impossibility of proving the intent required to commit the offence.41 Viscount 
Reading in Mousell Bros cited both cases and upheld a magistrate’s decision 
                                                 
39 Pearks, Gunston and Tee at 11. 
40 See also Avory J in Midland Railway Co. However, some courts in the last quarter of the 
20th century still maintained this view. See Lord Scarman in Gammon at 14. Equally, it is not 
too dissimilar from the idea of “special rules” propounded by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian. 
41 Chutter v Freeth at 138. 
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to convict a corporation of the offence charged under section 98 and 99 of the 
Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845.  
 
However, although it was stated in Chapter 2 that decisions prioritising the 
objectives of statutes are sufficiently justified, the teleological enforcement of 
the law may not be said to entail the disregard of certain parts of the statutory 
provisions. Such piecemeal application is no doubt opportunistic, odd and 
whimsical.42 There is no need to seek to distinguish between ordinary crimes 
and what Channell J called “quasi-crimes” on the ground that the statute 
requires proof of a mental element but imputes proof of actus reus only.43 It is 
true that if such distinction could hold there would be no need to satisfy all the 
requirements of a traditional or ordinary crime when prosecuting a corporation 
for a quasi-crime. However, such distinction breeds inconsistency and smacks 
of state tyranny.44 Hence, it is submitted that statutory provisions ought to 
determine the outcome of cases by virtue of the words they use.45 As such, if 
there is a requirement for proof of a mental element the court must give effect 
to such requirement.46 
 
Unfortunately, courts to this day still sometimes use the same artificial 
distinction between acts that are “truly criminal” and acts that are not 
“sufficiently criminal” or what they call “regulatory crime” in order to justify their 
decisions to disregard the proof of mens rea that is required.47 The uncertainty 
seems to stem from the fact that it is sometimes difficult to determine when 
                                                 
42 The argument that the judge has a moral duty to disregard unfair provisions of the statute is 
countered by the assumption stated in Chapter 1 that morality concerns the need to comply 
with the law. Thus, if the statute states that proof of intent is required, the judge’s moral duty 
is to request such proof.  
43 Simester (2005: 23) on his part defines what he calls “quasi-criminal regulations” as 
offences that are non-stigmatic or that do not carry the usual moral blemish of serious crimes. 
See also Stanton-Ife’s (2007: 152-154) discussion on “stigmatic offences” and “non-stigmatic 
offences. 
44 Wells (2001: 8-9) suggests that the spurious distinction may be due to the fact that the work 
carried out by the police in investigating regulatory or quasi-crimes is readily ignored. 
45 Cf Blackstone (1765-1769); and Allan, 2004: 709-711.  
46 In such instance Parliament intends to impose liability only on persons shown to have guilty 
minds. A piecemeal application of the statute would not render the statute effective for its 
declared purpose. See Lord Russell in Coppen v Moore (No 2) (1898) 2 QB 306 at 314; and 
the House of Lords in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824, hereinafter referred to as 
Alphacell. 
47 See Lord Scarman in Gammon at 14; Lord Diplock in Sweet v Parsley at 163; and Dyson 
LJ in R v Muhamad (2003) QB 1031.  
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mens rea would be presumed in a statutory provision and when the provision 
would be interpreted as creating a strict liability offence. Lord Reid in Sweet v 
Parsley ordained that where the statute is silent, mens rea would be 
presumed unless the relevant circumstances show that the legislator intended 
otherwise. Lord Reid may not be said to imply that where the statute provides 
for mens rea the court’s interpretation is left to be dictated by policy 
considerations. Nonetheless, the argument that quasi or regulatory crimes are 
those that attract little or no moral stigma is weak. Although there are offences 
that may be judged (objectively) to involve higher degrees of moral turpitude, 
the determination of such offences and the level of social stigma that attaches 
would depend on the cultural norms and attitudes prevailing within each 
community. Thus, terms such as “stigma” and “moral blemish” are used to 
develop arguments only as a matter of convenience.48 Courts employing 
Channell J’s erstwhile distinction are simply trying too hard to circumvent the 
obstacle of proving the element of mens rea against corporations. His dictum 
was redolent of objective-driven enforcement although the classification of 
offences into traditional criminal offences and quasi-criminal offences was 
without doubt a glib response to a very complex question.49 If the legislator 
only intended to prevent an absolutely prohibited action or inaction then she 
could have simply said so. Equally, if the prohibited act may not be described 
by statute without the use of words that point to a mental element,50 the 
legislator would clearly indicate that proof of mens rea is not required for the 
                                                 
48 See Horder, 2002: 459, footnote n. 4. See also Leonard, 2003: 831. 
49 However, given that the provision that Channell J considered (section 6 of the Sale of Food 
and Drugs Act 1875) clearly provided for the proof of intention, his disregard of this 
requirement even for the purpose of avoiding to frustrate the statute may be said to amount to 
nothing more than a piecemeal application of the statutory provision. Channell J could have 
adopted a similar position to that of the court in Tozer some two years later, which was to the 
effect that the word “person” in a statute cannot be understood to mean a corporation in 
instances where it is impossible for the corporation to perform the duty imposed by statute, 
such as voting at meetings. See also Lord Hoffmann in Meridian at 507. However, Tozer may 
be subject to debate given that a company holding shares in another company may be 
represented by a senior manager at the board meeting of latter company and such senior 
manager may vote in the former company’s name. As such, the solution lies in the way courts 
impute acts and intents (or causal relationships) to corporations given that an effective 
mechanism of imputation should enable courts establish different ways in which a corporation 
may perform the duty imposed. 
50 The use of words such as “false warranty” by themselves indicates promises or 
undertakings that are deliberately deceptive. See Simester (2005: 25, footnote n. 16) on the 
difficulty of defining “theft” without reference to the defendant’s state of mind. 
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establishment of guilt if this is her objective lest the she is creating a vicarious 
criminal liability offence.51 
 
As such, it may be advanced that if the corporate master or owner cannot be 
vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its agents and if criminal statutes are 
not concerned with the action or omission of the agents but with that of the 
corporate master on whom the duty is imposed,52 then direct or non-derivative 
liability is what was contemplated by the statutes that were enforced in the 
cases cited above. The corporation’s direct liability invariably involves proof of 
its intent unless the statute provides otherwise. Thus, in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries direct liability of corporations could hardly blossom into a fully 
developed model for holding corporations criminally liable because of the 
conceptual obstacle of mens rea.53 However, two convenient options were 
available. Parliament and courts could have rigorously restricted the concept 
of corporate criminal liability to strict and absolute liability offences 
(teleological pattern of ascription) or they could have made a pragmatic 
appraisal of the idea of direct or non-derivative liability of corporations in order 
to determine how it ought to be materialised when a statute or the common 
law required proof of a mental element (deontological pattern of ascription). 
As we will see in the next subsection, a judge chose the second option and 
although he was not entertaining a criminal case, his appraisal was marked by 
the parturition of what was to become the bedrock of corporate criminal 
liability in the United Kingdom: the identification doctrine. 
 
3.2.2.1 The use of the identification doctrine  
 
                                                 
51 See Khanna, 1996: 1482, footnote n. 26. However, some of the judges cited above 
vehemently denied that vicarious criminal liability was intended. See for example Channell J 
in Pearks, Gunston and Tee at 11. See also the opinions of Viscount Reading and Atkin J in 
Mousell at 1104-1107. See also Lord Reid in Nattrass at 170. 
52 Stern (1987: 126) intimates that it was due to this difficulty that the concept of accessory 
was created. See also Kadish and Paulsen, 1975: 369-371. 
53 Many offences could not be enforced against corporations because the applicable statutory 
provisions required proof of mens rea and courts were not always willing to circumvent this 
requirement. 
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A ship called Edward Dawson and its cargo were destroyed at sea by fire 
caused by defective boilers. The ship was owned by the appellant, Lennard’s 
Carrying Company Ltd, and its cargo was owned by the respondents. The 
applicable statutory provision was section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894 (now repealed) which provided that the owner of a ship would be 
exculpated if she could show that the loss or damage occurred without her 
actual fault or privity. Given that the owner of Edward Dawson was a 
company, the question that arose was whether it was possible for such 
artificial entity to show that the loss happened without its fault or privity and if 
yes, which mechanism to employ to show this. Viscount Haldane sitting in the 
House of Lords assessed the personal liability of the company on the basis of 
his understanding of the structure and functioning of corporations.54 Thus, in 
his words (Lord Dunedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Parker and Lord Parmoor 
concurring) this is what reflected the reality of a corporation: 
 
[m]y Lords, a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of 
its own any more than it has a body of its own; its active and 
directing will must consequently be sought in the person of 
somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, 
but who is the directing mind and will of the corporation, the 
very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation….the 
fault or privity is the fault or privity of somebody who is not 
merely a servant or agent for whom the company is liable 
upon the footing of respondeat superior, but somebody for 
whom the company is liable because his action is the very 
action of the company itself.55 [No emphasis added] 
 
It may be understood from the statement above that a corporation is a formal 
structure consisting of employees performing specific tasks that have been 
allocated to them by one or many persons who may be termed the 
                                                 
54 As mentioned in Chapter 1, this is the first rung towards addressing the question of how to 
hold corporations criminally liable. Fairly recently, there have been scathing criticisms of the 
applicable mechanisms in the United Kingdom and recommendations have geared toward 
blending principles of legal liability with the realities of contemporary corporate structures. 
However, the attempts made by commentators have hardly provided mechanisms with cogent 
solutions on how the law, both substantive and procedural, is supposed to accommodate the 
corporate theories (especially non-legal). Thus, commentators have been able to point out the 
weaknesses of Viscount Haldane’s mechanism but have fallen short of providing a more 
cogent template indicating how Viscount Haldane ought to have made a diagnosis of 
Lennard’s Carrying Company Ltd’s actions. 
55 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (1915) AC 705 (hereinafter referred 
to as Lennard’s Carrying Co) at 713-714.  
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corporation’s “directing mind and will.” This is related to a mechanistic 
organisation with clearly defined hierarchical levels and little or no discretion 
to front-line employees.56 Holding a corporation with a mechanistic structure 
liable for the wrongful act of the empowered senior manager is justifiable 
since such senior manager is indeed its “directing mind and will”57 or as 
coined by Denning LJ some 40 years later its “brain and nerve centre which 
controls what it does.”58 Viscount Haldane logically rejected vicarious liability 
as the basis for identifying the mind of the corporation given that the onus to 
prove that the loss was not due to the corporation’s fault was on the 
corporation itself and not its agents.59 His use of the words “ego” and “centre 
of personality” shows that he purported to have discovered the part of the 
corporation from which conscious urges and desires arose and which shaped 
its behaviour and personality. However, the contention that agents that 
qualified as the “directing mind and will” are those that may be said to be the 
corporation’s “centre of personality” or “ego” betrays a circularity that 
underscores the main weakness of Viscount Haldane’s model. Thus, his 
understanding of corporate action although grounded in logic was 
demonstrably flawed in the measure of who within the corporate structure was 
to be identified with the corporation and why. He had actually postulated that 
a corporation must be liable only for the fault or privity of those that may be 
considered its “directing mind and will” and they may be considered thus 
because they are its “ego” and “centre of personality.” Unfortunately, this 
                                                 
56 See Chapter 4. 
57 See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 105. 
58 HL Bolton (Engineering) Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 (hereinafter referred 
to as Bolton Engineering) at 172. 
59 This duty reflected the rule of common employment (repealed by section 1(1) of the Law 
Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948) whereby a master was not liable for the injury to a 
worker caused by the negligence of another worker where both workers were in common 
employment. The liability of the master depended on the proof of his own personal 
negligence. See Welsh, 1946: 353. See also Fanton v Denville [1932] 2 KB 309; and Rudd v 
Elder Dempster and Co [1933] 1 KB 566, where it was held that the negligence of the 
“general manager” and “persons having authority from the board of directors” could be 
attributed to companies to hold them liable. In this light, Wells (2001: 96) contends that there 
is “an irony in the origin of criminal liability of corporations [for crimes with an element of intent 
or defence of due diligence] being found in the oppressive and management serving doctrine 
of common employment.” It may thus be advanced that the influence of doctrines such as 
common employment on the development of corporate liability for crimes of intent tells us two 
things: firstly, this branch of the criminal law is based on the concept of direct or personal 
liability; and secondly, “oppressive and management-serving” schemes defined corporate 
structures at the time when the identification doctrine was developed. 
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circularity was to be exacerbated by subsequent interpretations and undue 
restrictions (for purposes of clarity) placed by criminal law courts which 
espoused this model on a later date. In Kent and Sussex Contractors, 
Viscount Caldecote stated that there was no authority to the effect that a 
company could not be criminally liable for the offences with which it was 
charged60 and then intimated that there was an axiomatic connection between 
the acts of the transport manager and the company that employed him. 
Moreover, given that there was ample evidence showing that he was one of 
“the only people who could act or speak or think for [the company]” he could 
be identified with the company to make it criminally liable.  
 
With no information pointing to the contrary, it can safely be assumed that the 
prevailing conception at the time of Viscount Caldecote was still in line with 
the abovementioned contentions by Coke in Sutton’s Hospital, Patteson J in 
Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Col and Channell J in Pearks, Gunston 
and Tee. Hence, a corporation could be criminally liable unless the offence 
charged was treason or perjury or an offence against the person or other 
offence that was only punishable by death or imprisonment. One therefore 
struggles to see anything revolutionary in the decision in Kent and Sussex 
Contractors given that the offence charged was neither treason nor an offence 
against the person and was punishable by fine.61 Viscount Caldecote was 
certainly not in Finlay J’s position in Cory Bros62 and did not consider 
questions about collectivisation of actions. As stated in Chapter 1, Viscount 
Caldecote was inspired by Pharmaceutical Society63 and dealt with the 
theoretical impediment of proving the corporation’s intent by substituting it for 
its criminal agent. Although this may be commendable on the ground that he 
applied the law fully and not selectively, compelling the corporation to 
substitute for its criminal agent does not correspond with the description of the 
                                                 
60 Making use of a false document with intent to deceive and making a statement which was 
known to be false in a material particular contrary to the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 
and the Motor Fuel Rationing (No 3) Order 1941.  
61 Cf. Png, 2001: 14 and 63. 
62 Where the company was charged with an offence under the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 and Finlay J could only identify one previous case where the Court of Common 
Pleas had held that a corporation may be sued in trespass. 
63 It has also been intimated that Viscount Haldane’s seminal remarks in Lennard’s Carrying 
Co also supplied the inspiration. See Gower, 1992: 193; and Wells, 2001: 97. 
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deontological pattern of ascription provided in Chapter 2. This is because it 
was the agent that was morally blameworthy and not the corporation, unless 
the corporation was shown to have assisted or motivated the criminal agent, 
in which case its liability would have been secondary and not direct. 
Nevertheless, Viscount Caldecote stressed that the question of the company’s 
mens rea was irrelevant to the case although he went ahead to hold that the 
company was liable because the only people who could act and speak for it 
had knowingly made a false statement with the intent to deceive.64 As such, 
just like Viscount Haldane, he was equally flawed in the measure of why the 
corporation was responsible and punishable in that given instance. 
 
In Moore v I Bresler Ltd,65 a company was identified with the company 
secretary (who doubled as general manager of the Nottingham branch) and 
the sales manager and convicted for making use of a document which was 
false in a material particular with the intent to deceive contrary to section 35(2) 
of the Finance (No 2) Act 1940. The court endorsed imputation as a valid form 
of locating the corporation’s mind and held that these officers were of 
sufficient station to be identified with the company, not because they were the 
only persons that acted or spoke or thought for the company but because they 
were senior officers acting within the scope of their employment. Even though 
the officers had acted without the knowledge of the board of directors and the 
senior management and had defrauded the company in making sales of 
handbags, the Divisional Court contended that the goods were the property of 
the company intended for sale and the officers were acting as agents of the 
company.66 Due to the fact that the officers were agents of the company 
                                                 
64 He seemed to have implied that the company was vicariously liable for the criminal acts of 
the officers because they were the only ones that could speak and act for it, which is rather 
confusing. 
65 [1944] 2 KBD 515, hereinafter referred to as Bresler. 
66 See the criticisms of this case by Welsh, 1946: 360; and Williams, 1961: 858-859. 
However, Wells (2001: 95-96) contends that their criticisms are not cogent because they are 
based on a restrictive construction of the term “within the scope of employment” and whether 
the officers were of sufficient station to be identified with the company. Based on the 
inordinately broad interpretation of the term “within the scope of employment” by civil courts 
(discussed in Chapter 4), it may be advanced that Wells is right in dismissing these criticisms. 
Equally, based on Nattrass, as regards the officers that can be identified with a corporation, it 
may be said that the company secretary and general sales manager were sufficiently high. 
However, we may find fault in the fact that the court in Bresler identified these officers as 
“agents” of the company and not necessarily as its “directing mind and will” and on this 
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acting within the scope of their authority, their criminal minds and acts were 
imputed to the company to render it liable.  
 
The court did not consider whether section 35(2) of the Finance (No 2) Act 
1940 could be construed as imposing a duty on the company and whether it 
had breached such duty. Equally, the court did not consider the principle in re 
Hampshire Land Co67 (approved by the House of Lords in J C Houghton and 
Co v Nothard, Lowe & Wills Ltd)68 which was to the effect that an agent’s 
dishonesty will not be imputed to the corporation where the latter was the 
target of the dishonest scheme and would be disadvantaged as regards 
enforcing its rights. In fact, these cases latter on provided justification for the 
House of Lords to take exception from Nattrass in Belmont.69 Thus, Bresler 
dealt with the mens rea obstacle by simply ignoring it and holding the 
corporation vicariously liable. It may serve only as a historical reference point 
for commentaries on corporate criminal liability since where the corporation 
was the targeted victim Belmont will apply. However, it is uncertain whether if 
the agent that defrauds the company was the sole agent who acted and 
spoke for the corporation, the court will say the company was not a victim 
because one cannot commit an offence against oneself. This raises questions 
about the cogency of the criminal law courts’ conception of corporation and 
the pattern of ascription adopted. However, what is certain is that courts in the 
United Kingdom impose liability directly on corporations by compelling them to 
substitute for their guilty senior officers. There is little or no distinction 
between this way of holding corporations liable (which ought to be non-
derivative) and vicarious liability except for the restriction of the agents that 
may be identified with the corporations. Nonetheless, there is also much 
uncertainty as regards the requisite station of the guilty senior officer. In The 
Lady Gwendolen,70 the court cited Kent and Sussex Contractors and also held 
                                                                                                                                            
ground, holding the company liable for their acts amounts to vicarious criminal liability. 
Nonetheless, Belmont subsequently provided that where the corporation was the targeted 
victim of its officers, the rule in Nattrass would not apply. 
67 [1896] 2 Ch 743. 
68 [1928] AC 1. 
69 See also Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] QB 624; and Stone & Rolls 
Ltd (in liquidation) v Moore Stephens (a firm) and another [2008] 3 WLR 1146, hereinafter 
referred to as Stone & Rolls. 
70 [1965] 2 All ER 283. 
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that the transport manager was the directing mind of the company and in 
National Coal Board v Gamble,71 the company was identified with a 
weighbridge man.72  
 
The House of Lords sought to provide a frame of reference in Nattrass. It was 
advanced that a branch manager may not be identified with a company that 
owned a chain of several hundred supermarkets across the country. Their 
Lordships construed the applicable provision, section 24(1) of the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968, as placing the onus of proof on the corporation itself to 
show that it had exercised all due diligence and the offence was due to the 
fault of another person or an accident or some other cause beyond its control. 
They then sought to determine what the corporation needed to show in order 
to distinguish itself from the default of its branch manager. In line with 
Viscount Haldane’s decision in Lennard’s Carrying Co, Viscount Caldecote’s 
position in Kent and Sussex Contractors and Lord Denning’s dictum in Bolton 
Engineering they held that the company only needed to show that the guilty 
agent occupied a relatively low position. Although an agent, senior or junior, is 
certainly not the duty-holder in such instance, it is difficult to understand why 
only the state of mind of a senior officer is imputable to the accused 
corporation. Their Lordships may be faulted for failing to seek to understand 
how and why corporations break the law beyond the prescriptions of Viscount 
Haldane, Viscount Caldecote and Lord Denning. In other words, they did not 
employ any means of ascertaining the nature of the corporate entity beyond 
legal precepts. So they ended up endorsing a very restricted form of vicarious 
liability which as will be shown in Chapter 5 is rigidly adapted to mechanistic 
corporate structures.73  
 
Nonetheless, if we take into consideration the facts that where the corporation 
is a victim it is instead Belmont that applies and also that the rule in Nattrass 
does not direct courts on how to draw a line across the corporate structure 
                                                 
71 (1959) 1 QB 11. 
72 See also R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd (1963) 3 WLR 496. However, in John 
Henshall (Quarries) Ltd v Harvey [1965] 2 QB 233, the Court declined to identify a corporation 
with a weighbridge man. 
73 A small window was however left open with the recognition of delegation of managerial 
functions.  
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dividing agents that may be identified with the corporation and those that may 
not, it may be advanced that in the United Kingdom, the deontological pattern 
of ascription is employed for the same purpose as the teleological, viz. to 
impose liability on the corporation under circumstances where the court thinks 
it is fair and just to do so. Whether the corporation was morally blameworthy is 
not as decisive as the judge’s value judgement. This position is buttressed by 
Lord Hoffmann’s dictum in Meridian. He sought to ascertain the legislator’s 
intention with regard to imposing liability directly on the corporate defendant. 
However, in an attempt to break with the rule in Nattrass he also stopped 
short of seeking to understand how and why corporate entities break the law. 
Seated in the Privy Council, he entertained an appeal from the Court of 
Appeal of New Zealand regarding whether an investment management 
company had violated the New Zealand Securities Amendment Act 1988 as a 
result of the failure of its chief investment manger and senior portfolio 
manager to comply with the statutory obligation to give notice of the 
acquisition to the Securities Commission. These two officers had acquired the 
shares without the authority and knowledge of the board of directors and 
managing director. Lord Hoffmann proposed three ways of determining 
whether the company could be said to have committed the offence via the 
agency of these officers. The first involved considering whether the applicable 
statutory provision was intended to apply to corporations. The second 
involved adopting Lord Diplock’s approach (Nattrass) of consulting the 
company’s constitution and memorandum and articles of association.74 He 
however warned that there are situations where neither of these two options 
will yield satisfactory results.75 Thus, he propounded a third step that involved 
looking at the words of the applicable statutory provision and fashioning 
“special rules” of attribution that conformed to the inferred objective of the 
statute.76  
 
                                                 
74 Lord Hoffmann called the rules in these documents the “primary rules of attribution” and 
extended their scope to include principles of company law and to a certain extent agency law. 
The concept of primary rules is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
75 As stated above, in light with Tozer, a convenient but unprincipled way of avoiding the 
intricacy of establishing the corporation’s guilt is to hold that it is impossible for a corporation 
to perform the duty imposed by the applicable statute. 
76 This proposition is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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Lord Hoffmann may be understood to have contended that the effectiveness 
of a statute (as regards regulating corporations) depends entirely on the 
judge’s interpretation. Thus, where a statute provides for corporate liability, it 
is incumbent upon the judge to decide whether it applies to corporations 
(whether they can commit the offence created) and how it would apply 
(fashioning a special rule). This takes us back to the beginning of the 20th 
century where Avory J (Midland Railway Co) held that certain essential words 
of a statute may be ignored and Channell J (Pearks, Gunston and Tee) 
advanced that the court may create new offences (quasi-crimes) for the 
purpose of furthering the legislator’s objective. Thus, judges can ignore clear 
statutory prescriptions and apply what they think is right. This is no doubt the 
recipe for incoherence and inconsistency given that disparate decisions are 
taken by different judges although addressing similar facts. The uncertainties 
discussed above as regards how the identification doctrine applies may 
therefore be explained by this penchant toward judicial activism.  
 
As such, in Meridian, the statute required that both the mens rea and the 
actus reus be proved against the accused. Since the accused was a 
corporation, Lord Hoffmann disregarded the statute by failing to refer to the 
established rule of proving a corporation’s guilt for an offence that is not 
absolute (Kent and Sussex Contractors and Nattrass). Hence, Lord Hoffmann 
may be said to have changed an offence with an element of intent into an 
absolute liability offence since a corporation will almost always be liable if 
what is applied is a special rule that is fashioned to make it liable.77 The above 
notwithstanding, it was later on noted that Lord Hoffmann did not dismiss the 
identification doctrine after all. Rose LJ seated in the Court of Appeal in 
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999)78 pointed out that Lord 
Hoffmann’s speech proceeded on the basis that the identification doctrine 
                                                 
77 Nonetheless, it may be argued that the fashioning of special rules for the circumstances 
implies that the nature of a corporation depends on the circumstances and this is a better 
reflection of the reality of the concept of corporation (as shown in Chapter 2) than the 
identification doctrine. However, since the identification doctrine is the applicable rule for 
determining whether a corporation has acted or not, ignoring the doctrine amounts to acting 
per incuriam. 
78 [2000] 3 All ER 182 CA at 257. This case is hereinafter referred to as Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No 2). 
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remains the applicable mechanism although there are exceptional cases in 
which other mechanisms could be invoked. Thus, Attorney General’s 
Reference (No 2) was arguably not a major obstruction to the development of 
the common law by the courts79 because the interpretation that Rose LJ put 
on Meridian has served as pretext for many courts to deviate from the rule in 
Nattrass and impose liability (in accordance with Meridian) on corporations in 
circumstances that can only be explained by the recourse to the statute’s 
intended meaning.80 The influence of Meridian is strong in recent cases where 
the tradition of citing Nattrass and applying Meridian has been abandoned in 
favour of simply citing and applying Meridian.81 Nonetheless, it remains that 
the identification doctrine as established in Nattrass is the mechanism that 
applies where a corporation is on trial for the commission of an offence, the 
exceptions being where the offence charged is absolute82 or is deemed to be 
corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide created by the CMCHA. The 
offence of corporate homicide (Scotland) or corporate manslaughter (England 
and Wales) was created against a backdrop of calls for a better mechanism of 
imputation. However, there is a worrisome similarity between the mechanism 
of imputation that the CMCHA has introduced to enforce corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide and the identification doctrine.83  
 
3.2.3 Culpable (corporate) homicide and (corporate) manslaughter   
 
The offences of culpable homicide and manslaughter had proved to be a 
quagmire for the identification doctrine. A corporation was charged with 
manslaughter in the 1920s84 and in the early 1930s it was held that 
corporations could be imputed with the personal negligence of the general 
                                                 
79 Cf. Gobert and Punch, 2003: 69. 
80 This was defined as a “pragmatic approach” by Nourse LJ in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings 
Plc [1994] 2 All ER 685, hereinafter referred to as El Ajou. See also Millet J at the first 
instance: El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 at 740. 
81 See Arden LJ in Real Estate Opportunities Ltd v Aberdeen Asset Managers Jersey Ltd and 
others [2007] Bus LR 971 (hereinafter referred to as Real Estate Opportunities) at 986-989. 
82 Given that a corporation’s liability is established by default where an absolute duty has 
been breached by its agent, there is no need to consider questions of imputation. 
83 As noted in Chapter 1, this mechanism was introduced due to calls for more corporate 
accountability following some spectacular acquittals for manslaughter and culpable homicide. 
84 Cory Bros. 
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manager or other person having authority from the board.85 In 1965, although 
Streatfield J acquitted a company on the merits of the case he held that it 
could be indicted for manslaughter.86 In 1986, Maurace J observed that a 
company could be held guilty of manslaughter.87 These remarks concur with 
Bingham LJ’s judgment in R v HM Coroner for East Kent, Ex parte Spooner 
and Others.88 Following Sheen J’s Report on the capsize of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise near Zeebrugge Harbour in 1987 that caused the loss of 192 lives, 
Bingham LJ ruled that the company could be charged with manslaughter but 
stated that the mens rea and actus reus of the offence should not be 
established against all the agents who acted on behalf of the company but 
against only those who were to be identified as the embodiment of the 
company.89 Persuaded by the coroner’s inquest and Sheen J’s report the 
prosecution however brought a case against the company without 
establishing the guilt of any senior officer that could be said to embody the 
company.90 Turner J reiterated the observation made by Bingham LJ that a 
company could be indicted for manslaughter but may only be convicted by the 
imputation of the guilt of an officer of sufficient station to the company. Both 
judges had thus re-emphasised the primacy of the identification doctrine as 
established in Nattrass as the true basis for analysing a corporation’s 
behaviour and establishing its liability for manslaughter.91 
 
As mentioned above, Nattrass requires courts to impose liability on 
corporations only where the prosecution proves the guilt of the directing mind 
of the corporation. Thus, in R v OLL Ltd and Kite, where no distress flares 
were provided and coastguards were not informed of a fatal canoeing trip and 
the prosecution could establish the gross negligence of Peter Kite, the 
managing director of OLL Ltd, his guilt was imputed to the company for the 
                                                 
85 See Fanton v Denville and Rudd v Elder Dempster and Co. See also Wells, 2001: 96. 
86 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (1 February1965, Unreported). 
87 This was however a civil suit: S and Y Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commercial Union 
Assurance Co of Australia Ltd (1986) 82 FLR 130. 
88 (1989) 88 Cr App R 10, hereinafter referred to as HM Coroner for East Kent. 
89 HM Coroner for East Kent at 16. 
90 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App R 72, hereinafter referred to as 
P & O European Ferries. 
91 P & O European Ferries at 81-84. This case together with Attorney-General’s Reference 
(No 2) was the landmark case with regard to the mechanism of holding corporations liable for 
negligent manslaughter.  
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purpose of convicting it of manslaughter.92 In R v Jackson Transport (Osett) 
Ltd, Jackson Transport (Osett) Ltd and its sole director Alan Jackson were 
convicted for the manslaughter of an employee that had neither been 
provided with protective equipment nor trained and had used steam pressure 
to clean a valve in a tanker blocked with toxic substances.93 Equally, in spite 
of the unsuccessful challenge (by judicial review) of the Crown Prosecution 
Service’s decision not to prosecute Fewston Transport Ltd, a heavy goods 
vehicle operator whose vehicle was involved in an incident that resulted in the 
death of five persons, the court intimated that it was nevertheless in the 
interest of the public that companies are prosecuted for manslaughter in such 
instances.94 As such, the prospects for the identification doctrine as a means 
of imputing liability to mechanistic and small and medium-sized corporations 
in manslaughter cases looked bright. Also, following a coroner’s inquest 
verdict of unlawful killing of an unattended disabled woman by a care home, 
Popplewell J observed that if the jury had been properly directed there was a 
possibility that they could have convicted the care home of manslaughter.95 It 
is important to note that the requirements for the common law offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter have evolved over the years. In 1925, the 
position was that the test should be whether the accused showed flagrant 
disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to conduct that 
deserves to be punished.96 However, in 1994 the test had evolved and the 
court was required to determine whether the extent to which the accused 
departed from accepted standards was unreasonable.97  
                                                 
92 [1996] 2 Cr App R 295. This is however not a report of the case but of Kite’s appeal. For 
proceedings instituted by OLL Ltd against the coastguard, see OLL Ltd v Secretary of State 
for Transport [1997] 3 All ER 897. 
93 1996 (Unreported) 18 Health and Safety at Work, November 1999 at 14. 
94 R v Crown Prosecution Service, Ex parte Waterworth [1996] COD 277. 
95 R v HM Coroner for Reading ex parte West Berkshire Housing Consortium Ltd 11 July 
1995 (Unreported) CO/2994/94. This is true because in Stone v Dobinson [1977] QB 354, the 
defendants, natural persons, took Stone’s anorexic sister into their home but isolated her and 
failed to appreciate the seriousness of her situation. They were convicted of manslaughter 
because she died as a result of their gross negligence. As regards the successful use of the 
identification doctrine to convict small and mechanistic structures, see R v English Brothers 
Ltd & Melvyn Hubbard (Northampton Crown Court, 30 July 2001, Unreported); R v Dennis 
Clothier and Sons Ltd (Bristol Crown Court, 23 October 2002, Unreported); R v Teglgaard 
Hardwood (UK) Ltd ( Hull Crown Court, 24 February 2004, Unreported); and R v Alan Mark, 
Nationwide Heating Services Ltd [2004] EWCA Crim 2490. 
96 See R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8, hereinafter referred to as Bateman. 
97 R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, hereinafter referred to as Adomako. Also pertinent is the 
decision in R v Prentice [1993] 4 All ER 935 (hereinafter referred to as Prentice) that a breach 
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It was nevertheless uncertain whether the progressive stance of Adomako 
applied to the corporate defendant.98 What was certain was that a corporation 
could be prosecuted successfully for manslaughter or culpable homicide if the 
evidence showed that officers of the corporation knew (subjective) or ought to 
have known (objective) about a risk of injury to health but failed to address 
it.99Against this background, the Great Western Trains Company was indicted 
on seven counts of manslaughter when seven people died as a result of injury 
sustained in the collision between a High Speed Train and a freight train. The 
company was also indicted on one count (of breach of duty) under section 3 
of the HSWA.100 There was a preliminary ruling on how the prosecution may 
put up its case against the Great Western Trains Company because the 
judge, Scott-Baker J, disagreed with the prosecution on the fact that the 
company was guilty of gross negligent manslaughter based on the failure of 
its management to set up and maintain an acceptable safety system that 
could deal with mistakes such as the driver’s fatal mistake. The prosecution 
was apprehensive because the case against P&O European Ferries (Dover) 
Ltd had been unsuccessful due to the failure to prove that the directors had 
been reckless.101 Nonetheless, given that the House of Lords in Adomako had 
ordained that a person could be convicted for involuntary ‘gross negligence’ 
manslaughter (which did not require proof of subjective intent) on the basis of 
an objective test, there was no need to look for a guilty state of mind among 
the senior officers for the purposes of identification.102 Hence, the 
                                                                                                                                            
of duty amounts to ‘gross negligence’ where there is “indifference to an obvious risk of injury 
to health; actual foresight of the risk coupled with the determination nevertheless to run it; 
appreciation of the risk coupled with an intention to avoid it but also coupled with such a high 
degree of negligence in the attempted avoidance as the jury consider justifies conviction, and 
inattention or failure to advert a serious risk which goes ‘beyond inadvertence’ in respect of an 
obvious and important matter which the defendant's duty demanded he should address.”  
98 This question is an unfortunate consequence of the artificial distinction often made between 
the guilty individual and the guilty company as regards the criminal law’s objectives.  
99 See the optimism expressed by Wells (1999: 11). 
100See the case of Great Western Trains discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
101 However, Turner J (P&O European Ferries at 73) did not consider the subjective and 
objective tests owing to the fact that he was called upon to determine whether a corporation 
could be guilty of manslaughter under English law, how such guilt had to be proved and 
whether the corporate defendant was guilty.   
102 The DPP’s decision to prosecute only the company (Great Western Trains) and a front-line 
employee (the driver) was based on the fact that the director had no knowledge of the train in 
question travelling on that particular date due to the malfunctioning Advance Warning System. 
Thus, given that Adomako had changed the test of establishing negligence from a purely 
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prosecution’s argument was that the company’s guilt could be established by 
showing that it had departed from reasonable standards to such extent as to 
be judged criminal.  
 
Scott-Baker J disagreed. He rightfully pointed out that the test as established 
in Adomako was not entirely objective. However, he regretfully maintained 
that Adomako did not in any way address the circumstances in which a 
corporation may be held liable for manslaughter. Thus, the prosecution was 
required to apply a subjective test to establish that the corporate defendant’s 
guilt. In other words, the prosecution had to prove that the company was 
aware of the particular risk and went ahead to take the risk. This could only be 
established by showing that an individual sufficiently senior to be identified 
with the company knew of the particular risk. Although the learned judge was 
right in requiring that a subjective test was equally necessary, his judgement 
hinged solely upon the satisfaction of the subjective test. He did not in any 
way consider the possibility of proving the company’s guilt via an objective 
test. Likewise the commentators that contend that the criminal law was 
historically an instrument to address the behaviour of natural persons, he 
failed to understand that the House of Lords in Adomako established the way 
in which gross negligence manslaughter may be proved against a defendant 
simpliciter. The question of the nature of the defendant is a different matter 
altogether.  
 
It is however surprising that the counsel for the prosecution referred the 
question whether a defendant can be convicted of gross negligence 
manslaughter in the absence of evidence as to the defendant’s state of mind 
to the Court of Appeal for its opinion103 rather than whether Adomako had any 
place in the law of corporate manslaughter. The Court of Appeal advanced 
that a defendant can be convicted of gross negligence manslaughter in the 
absence of evidence as to the defendant’s state of mind, which could 
                                                                                                                                            
subjective standard (R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341; and R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493) to the 
objective standard (Bateman), the company’s negligence may have been established by 
showing that the fatal crash was caused by the failure of its management to set up and 
maintain a viable safety system.  
103 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2). 
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nonetheless be understood to imply that Adomako governed the law of 
corporate manslaughter. However, the prosecution also referred the question 
whether a non-human defendant could be convicted of gross negligence 
manslaughter in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of an individual 
that is its directing mind.104 As stated earlier, Rose LJ answered in the 
negative and upheld the identification doctrine as the sole basis for holding 
corporations criminally liable. The decision begs the question of why a 
defendant can be convicted of gross negligence manslaughter in the absence 
of evidence as to her state of mind and yet a corporation or non-human 
defendant cannot be convicted of the same offence in the absence of 
evidence its guilty mind (the guilt of the individual that is its directing mind)? In 
other words, if a defendant can be convicted of gross negligence 
manslaughter based on an objective test, why is the corporate defendant’s 
guilt restricted to a subjective test? A possible answer would be that the Court 
of Appeal, in line with Nattrass, deemed that that the identification doctrine 
was the required avenue for analysing the criminal behaviour of corporations. 
Thus, a corporation may only act or think through its senior officer and in 
order to determine whether it had performed the actus reus of an offence, the 
evidence must show that a senior officer had acted recklessly.105 Equally, 
although Adomako does not apply in Scotland, the identification doctrine as 
established in Nattrass was upheld by Scottish High Court of Justiciary in 
Transco about a decade later. However, the High Court of Justiciary sought to 
distinguish between gross negligence manslaughter that applies under 
English law and involuntary culpable homicide as applicable in Scotland in the 
process.106  
 
                                                 
104 The DPP blamed the failure of the manslaughter charges against Great Western Trains 
company on the rigidity of the identification doctrine and this may have influenced his decision 
not to prosecute the Thames for manslaughter when one of its trains went through a red light 
and collided head on with a train belonging to the Great Western Trains in the Paddington 
station at Ladbroke Grove. See Christian, 2001: 343.  
105 However, this line of reasoning is not consonant with Lord Denning’s dictum in Bolton 
Engineering (approved by their Lordships in Nattrass). He had intimated that a corporation 
may also act through low-level employees that represent its “hands” although it may not be 
liable for such actions. As such, in the absence of evidence of the subjective guilt of the 
“directing mind,” a corporation ought to be liable for the negligent acts of the “hands” that 
were tolerated by senior managers where an objective test is applied.  
106 See Chapter 5. 
96 
 
It is nonetheless of no relevance today to consider whether gross negligence 
manslaughter should be established in accordance with the test laid out in 
Adomako or whether the opinions of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General’s 
Reference (No 2) and the High Court of Justiciary in Transco should direct the 
course of establishing the corporation’s guilt in the law of manslaughter or 
culpable homicide. This is because of the enactment of the CMCHA. As 
mentioned above, the prevailing opinion prior to the enactment was that the 
identification doctrine was obsolete. The CMCHA therefore moves away 
(albeit slightly) from the identification doctrine by adopting a mechanism of 
holding corporations liable that may be called the senior management failure 
test. A corporation is guilty of corporate homicide or corporate manslaughter if 
the way its activities are managed or organised by its senior management 
causes a person’s death and is judged to amount to a “gross breach” of a 
relevant duty of care owed by the corporation to the victim.107 The CMCHA 
also departs from Great Western Trains and Attorney-General’s Reference 
(No 2) by adopting an objective test for establishing the “gross breach.” 
Hence, the prosecution is not required to show that someone within the 
corporation had knowledge of the breach and acted in spite of such 
knowledge. The argument of the prosecution that did not sway the opinion of 
the judges in Great Western Trains and Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2) 
is vindicated by section 1(4)(b) which is to the effect that the corporation’s 
“gross breach” will be established by showing that it had departed from 
accepted standards to such extent as to be judged criminal and there is no 
need to prove subjective mens rea.108  
                                                 
107 See section 1(1) and (3). 
108 However, it will be interesting to see the interpretations put on the CMCHA as regards the 
legislator’s true intentions. This is because adopting the objective test of Adomako also 
involves adopting a circular standard that requires juries to decide a legal question (degree of 
negligence) based on their assessment of the facts of the case. See Gardner, 1995: 23. See 
also Law Commission No 237 (1996): paras. 3.8-3.10. This is similar to the circular standard 
for establishing involuntary culpable homicide under Scottish criminal law propounded by Lord 
Justice-Clerk Atchison in Paton v HM Advocate 1936 JC 19 at 22. He said what was required 
was evidence of “gross, or wicked, or criminal negligence, something amounting, or at least 
analogous, to a criminal indifference to consequences.” Although Lord Osborne in Transco 
moved away from this definition, the definitions that he adopted are similar, viz. “total 
disregard of what the consequences of the act in question may be so far as the public are 
concerned” (Quinn v Cunningham 1956 JC 22); and “total indifference to and disregard for the 
safety of the public” (W v HM Advocate 1982 SLT 420). These standards are certainly clearer 
than what is required by Adomako but they are also equivocal given that it is still up to the jury 
to decide what “total” or “utter” indifference is. 
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That notwithstanding, the “gross breach” must have been that of the “senior 
management.” This organ is defined as a collective of persons who manage 
or organise the “whole” or a “substantial” part of the activities in question or 
who play significant roles in directing policy or making decisions about the 
management or organisation of such activities.109 Unfortunately, this 
subsection may be said to be reminiscent of Lord Reid’s description of the 
“directing mind” of a company in Nattrass: the board of directors, the 
managing director and other superior officers that carry out the functions of 
management or officers to whom the board of directors has delegated some 
part of their functions of management and given full discretion to act 
independently of instructions from the board of directors.110 Lord Reid 
contended that this was an exhaustive list of individuals that manage or 
organise the activities and act and speak for the company. The wordings of 
the CMCHA also suggest that such is the case.111 It may therefore be 
advanced that the senior management failure test is a re-statement of the 
identification doctrine as established in Nattrass except for the aggregation of 
the acts of all senior managers and the test of establishing the gross breach 
by the “senior management.” It is an objective test based on how the actions 
of this organ compare with accepted standards in the industry and not the 
subjective recklessness of any individual member of the group.112  
 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the identification doctrine and the senior 
management failure test are the only mechanisms for imputing acts and 
intents to corporations for the purposes of imposing criminal liability and 
sanctions directly on them, the exception being where the offence charged is 
an absolute or strict liability offence. However, these mechanisms were not 
                                                 
109 Section 1(4)(c). 
110 Nattrass at 171. 
111 If the statute had omitted the words “whole” and “substantial” then it could be interpreted in 
light of the decisions of Stable J in ICR Haulage and Nourse LJ in El Ajou that the senior 
management includes the employee or director that had control over the activities that caused 
the death of the victim. This is unfortunately not the case. 
112 It is however unclear whether in construing the term “senior management” only the 
collective actions of the persons that manage or organise the activities of a corporation should 
be taken into consideration or the action of one of such persons may be sufficient to establish 
the corporation’s guilt given that the CMCHA uses and defines only the term “senior 
management” and not “senior manager.” This is discussed further in Chapters 5 and 8. 
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necessarily adopted because they were the most appropriate devices for 
determining a corporation’s criminal intentions and actions (non-derivatively) 
given that their mechanistic basis is not always consonant with the description 
of the concept of corporation in criminal law such as that put forward in 
Chapter 2, viz. an amorphous entity recognised as a corporation because of 
its independence of thought and action. The question of the suitability of the 
identification doctrine for imposing liability on corporations that do not have 
mechanistic systems has been addressed in several forums over the past 
decades and many commentators have concluded that this mechanism is a 
rudimentary legal tool for enforcing crimes against complex corporate 
entities.113 Nonetheless, given that the crux of the problem is the complexity of 
the nature and personality of the accused, criminal justice systems may avoid 
direct (non-derivative) liability and still target the corporation without recourse 
to vicarious liability.114 This may be the case where liability is imposed on a 
corporation for encouraging or assisting its agents to perpetrate the offence 
charged. 
 
3.3 SECONDARY (DERIVATIVE) LIABILITY 
In R v Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd and Robert Millar,115 a lorry driver 
employed by Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd carried heavy loads from 
Scotland to England with a tyre which he knew to be defective and which the 
managing director, Robert Millar, equally knew to be defective. While in 
England the tyre blew out, the driver lost control of the lorry, crashed into a 
motor car coming from the opposite direction and killed an entire family of six 
in the motor car. The Crown Court convicted both Robert Millar (Contractors) 
                                                 
113 The doctrine and the senior management failure test are evaluated in Chapter 5. 
114 An attempt is however made in Chapter 6 to show how vicarious liability may be used to 
target corporations directly. 
115 (1970) 1 All ER 577, hereinafter referred to as Robert Millar. 
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Ltd and Robert Millar for counselling and procuring the driver to cause death 
by driving in a manner dangerous to the public. Also, citing previous 
convictions of natural persons as accessories,116 the Appeal Court held that 
there is an offence of counselling and procuring (involuntary) manslaughter 
and such offence could be enforced against corporations.117 Similarly, in R v 
JF Alford Transport Ltd,118 it was held that a company that knew that its 
drivers were falsifying their tacograph records but omitted to stop or sanction 
them had deliberately done nothing to prevent the illegal activity from being 
repeated and had intended to encourage the repetition.119 The form of liability 
on the corporations in these cases was secondary liability because as 
contended by Fenton Atkinson LJ “[they] are guilty of participating in that 
crime and not of some self-subsisting crime on their own account.”120 As such, 
this form of liability may be used to enforce crimes against corporations in 
instances where the senior officers were not guilty but tolerated or 
encouraged the non-compliant acts of junior employees.  
 
What is important is that the prosecution shows that the guilty agent was 
encouraged by the corporation (senior management) to perpetrate or to 
attempt to perpetrate an offence.121 The corporation may then be said to be 
an accessory to the offence. Its liability is derivative because it aided and 
abetted its agent (the principal offender) to perpetrate the offence charged.122 
Such liability may include (although not synonymous to) inchoate liability 
involving an attempt,123 where the corporation may be guilty for encouraging 
                                                 
116 R v Buck and Buck (1960) 44 Cr App R 213; and R v Creamer [1965] 3 All ER 257. 
117 See Fenton Atkinson LJ Robert Millar at 578-581. See also Gobert and Punch, 2003: 71. 
118 [1997] CLR 745. 
119 The conviction was however quashed on the facts due to the trial judge’s misdirection to 
the jury. 
120 Robert Millar at 580. 
121 See Law Commission No 300 (2006): 4-7; and Law Commission No 305 (2007): para. 
1.32. 
122 See Law Commission No 300 (2006): 1-3; and Law Commission No 305 (2007): paras. 
1.1-1.4. 
123 See section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. See also the common law position in 
Scotland in HM Advocate v Camerons 1911 2 SLT 108; and Docherty v Brown 1996 SLT 355. 
See also section 18 of the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland discussed in Clive, Ferguson, 
Gane and Smith, 2003. 
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its agent to attempt to commit the offence; conspiracy,124 where the 
corporation may be said to have conspired with the agent to perpetrate an 
offence; and incitement,125 where the corporation may be said to have incited 
the agent to engage in criminal acts. As such, rather than seeking to show 
evidence of the corporation’s intent to perpetrate the offence charged, it may 
be easier for the prosecution to show that the corporation simply provided 
inchoate assistance to the agent that perpetrated the offence. In other words, 
the corporation encouraged or incited or conspired with the agent to 
perpetrate the offence.  
 
However, accessorial liability may be another slippery avenue for the 
enforcement of corporate crime. Where the liability imposed is inchoate, the 
corporation’s liability stems from the fact that it is shown to have encouraged 
the perpetration of the offence even if the offence was not committed 
subsequently.126 Equally, where the corporation was unable to control the 
guilty agent, it may nevertheless be said to be guilty because it had committed 
to a joint enterprise with the former.127 It is however uncertain whether 
evidence of the existence of a defective compliance programme or poor 
                                                 
124 Section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. For the common law position in Scotland, see 
Maxwell and Others v HM Advocate 1980 JC 40. See also Clive, Ferguson, Gane and Smith, 
2003: 56-58. 
125 For examples of statutory offences of incitement, see Law Commission No 300 (2006): 4. 
However, incitement is still a common law offence in England and Wales. For the common 
law position in Scotland, see HM Advocate v Tannahill and Neilson 1943 JC 150; and Baxter 
v H.M. Advocate 1998 SLT 414. See also section 19 of the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland 
discussed in Clive, Ferguson, Gane and Smith, 2003. 
126 Law Commission No 305, 2007: para. 1.33. The Law Commission distinguishes between 
inchoate liability and secondary liability by pointing to the question of whether the accessory 
either merely encouraged or assisted the perpetrator. However, it is uncertain whether a fine 
line can be drawn between both concepts of assisting and encouraging especially as different 
words such “counselling,” “abetting,” “aiding,” and “art and part” are used in other instances. 
Given that these words generally overlap in their literary meanings, it may be contended that 
there is truly no distinction between inchoate and secondary liability except for the fact that in 
the first instance the principal offence is not intended. However, the complexity of the 
corporation’s nature confounds the situation because offences are often committed as a result 
of the pursuit of a collective goal with no intent to commit the principal offence. Thus, to say 
that the pursuit of a collective goal provided inchoate assistance would be to imply that a 
corporation ought to be guilty of any offence committed by any of its employees while seeking 
to further the corporation’s interests. 
127 See Simester, 2006: 591-600; and Wilson, 2008: 11. 
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internal disciplinary system would suffice.128 If it is said that a corporation 
provided inchoate assistance to the agent’s attempt to commit the offence this 
would imply that a corporation may be liable if it has a defective compliance 
programme irrespective of the fact that no agent has actually committed an 
offence as a result of such programme.129   
 
It may therefore be advanced that accessorial liability represents a departure 
from the common law rule that a ‘person’ cannot be convicted (where she 
does not owe a duty) as a result of an omission to act130 or for simply standing 
and doing nothing.131 Thus, liability is imposed on the corporation for its failure 
to exercise its entitlement (and not perform its duty) to control others.132 There 
is no doubt that it would be easier for the prosecution to show that a 
corporation’s policies aided, abetted or encouraged a crime or its 
management failed to control or stop the wrongdoing by its agents.133 
However, there is certainly a danger of overcriminalisation.134 Accessorial 
liability would be established even where the accessory did not have specific 
knowledge of the principal’s intention to commit the offence and only had 
knowledge of the possibility of the latter committing an offence.135 Thus, a 
corporation may be liable if it was aware of the possibility of a maverick agent 
violating the law even though the latter would have done so while acting 
                                                 
128 The question here is whether having a defective compliance system may be sufficiently 
blameworthy to found a criminal charge. This is discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6 as 
regards the use of senior management failure test and corporate culture doctrine as 
mechanisms of imputation. 
129 If the corporation argues that there were instructions that forbade the agent from 
performing the wrongful act, the court may say that proof of the principal’s approval of the 
agent’s specific illegal objective is not necessary. See DPP of Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] 
AC 653. 
130 Law Commission No 305 (2007): para. 2.25. 
131 Law Commission No 305, 2007: para. 3.25. This is one of the consequences of the lack of 
distinction between an accessory that encouraged the principal offender and one that 
assisted the principal offender. 
132 See Glazebrook, 2002: 408. However, see the court’s remark in Rubie v Faulkner [1946] 1 
KB 571 that a driving instructor could be secondarily liable for a learner’s dangerous driving. 
133 See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 71-72. 
134 This is a problem with secondary liability in general and not only when corporations are 
concerned. See Wilson, 2008: 13. 
135 See DPP of Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350. 
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outwith the scope of her agreement with the corporation (delegated duties).136  
Gobert and Punch137 have therefore sought to dampen the optimistic view as 
regards the use of accessorial liability. They advance that accessorial liability 
is not the much-sought-after panacea because of the requirement of 
identifying a senior manager (that was aware of the wrongdoing) with the 
corporation.138 Moreover, the act of the junior employee must amount to an 
offence.139 This is because accessorial liability involves procuring the breach 
of the criminal law and not simply the breach of corporate ethics or policies.140 
Also, as mentioned above, a corporation may be held liable for providing 
inchoate assistance141 although the degree of blameworthiness in such 
instance is questionable.142 Nonetheless, given that the CMCHA provides for 
the imposition of liability based on a low level of blameworthiness (poor 
management and organisation of activities), the question of blameworthiness 
will certainly be tested in the implementation of the CMCHA. It must be noted 
that the level of blameworthiness for crimes such as negligence may be low 
because as posited by Lord Lane, “manslaughter ranges in its gravity from the 
borders of murder right down to those of accidental death.” 143 However, as 
regards other crimes of intent such as fraud, murder and theft, it is important 
that conviction should follow a reasonably high level of blameworthiness. 
                                                 
136 See Wilson (2008: 4) on the difficulty of justifying the imposition of liability on the 
accessory in instances where the principal offender’s action was greater than the former may 
be said to have encouraged or tolerated. 
137 2003: 75-77. 
138 In Robert Millar, the managing director was in charge of the day-to-day running of the 
business and was fully aware of the dangerous state of the front offside tyre of the lorry and 
was sentenced to nine months imprisonment. That notwithstanding, any serious senior 
management should have reasonable cause to be aware of the mode of carrying out activities 
used by the junior employees, especially where such mode could have serious consequences 
on the wellbeing of other employees and other members of society. Thus, the senior 
management may be said to have had constructive knowledge in such cases. See Chapter 4 
for discussion on constructive knowledge as a legal principle governing the use of rules of 
attribution.  
139 This is however based on a strict application of the principle governing secondary liability. 
See Law Commission No 305, 2007: paras. 2.8-2.13. 
140 As noted above, the prosecution of large and organic companies for manslaughter was (in 
part) unsuccessful because the prosecution could only adduce evidence of several acts of 
employees that were reproachable but did not amount to the offence charged when 
considered singly. This pushed the prosecution to call for the adoption of the aggregation 
doctrine (discussed in Chapters 6 and 8) adopted by some courts in the United States. 
141 Such as where its policies encourage or tolerate non-compliance by agents. 
142 Where the level of blameworthiness is very low the offence becomes a strict liability 
offence. 
143 R v Walker (1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 474 at 476. 
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The challenge as regards the use of accessorial liability may be summarised 
under two heads: firstly, ascertaining whether a corporation must only be 
shown to assist or encourage the commission of an offence or it may also 
suffice to show that it encouraged a number of negligent acts that 
cumulatively resulted in an offence; and secondly, ascertaining the degree of 
blameworthiness that is required to establish the corporation’s guilt. However, 
given the prevailing uncertainty with regard to the way acts and intents (or 
causal relationships) may be imputed to a corporation in order to hold it liable 
personally, enforcing crimes of intent through accessorial liability may be 
worth the effort. Nonetheless, it would still be necessary to establish whose 
acts and states of mind ought to be imputed to corporations for the purposes 
of showing that they assisted or encouraged their delinquent agents and why. 
In Robert Millar, the act and knowledge of the managing director was imputed 
to the corporation. However, in line with the CMCHA, only the collective acts 
of those that constitute the senior management may be imputed to the 
corporation. As such, irrespective of the form of liability imposed the 
determination of a suitable mechanism of imputation remains paramount. 
 
3.4  CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter considered the adaptability of the criminal law in dealing with a 
peculiar class of criminals: corporate persons. Discussion was premised on 
the assumption that the criminal law is an effective means of regulating the 
activities of corporations. The forms of liability imposed on corporations over 
the past 400 years were analysed briefly and it was noted that given that 
vicarious liability is eschewed in the criminal law of the United Kingdom and a 
corporation is a distinct person, its liability may only be direct (non-derivative) 
or secondary (derivative). As such, although a corporation invariably acts 
through natural persons it ought not to be liable for an offence committed qua 
agent but for one committed qua corporation. This means that criminal liability 
may only be imposed on corporations in two instances. Firstly, where the 
evidence shows that the corporation used its agents as instruments to 
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perpetrate the offence charged; and secondly, where the evidence shows that 
it encouraged or assisted its guilty agent in the performance of the offence 
charged.  
 
In the first instance, although the corporation acts through its agents, its 
liability is direct or non-derivative because it is the offender and perpetrates 
the offence through agents that are innocent. This reflects the doctrine of 
innocent agency144 but may be said to be an extension of this doctrine 
because in many cases the acts of the agents may not amount to an 
offence.145 The corporation will be the offender because the elements of the 
offence may only be established against it given that it controlled the set of 
facts that gave rise to the offence charged.146 Gobert and Punch147 cite the 
study published by Geis148 on a number of anti-trust cases in 1961 in which 
company executives collectively fixed prices not for any personal gains but to 
further the interests of the companies.149 Equally, other studies and reports 
such as Carson’s150 study of the practices and policies in the oil and gas 
industry and the Sheen Report on the sinking of the Herald of Free enterprise 
show that agents may actually collectively breach the law in order to meet 
company objectives or further collective interests. The agents in these cases 
were no doubt innocent agents that the companies used to perpetrate the 
offences charged. 
 
However, it has been argued that to say that a person that did not perform the 
actus reus of an offence such as rape or bigamy was the principal offender 
                                                 
144See Smith K, 1991: 94. This also reflects the defence of “employee necessity” where the 
employee was simply obeying instructions (see Wells, 2001: 165) and “member-
responsibility” of individual agents. See Pettit, 2007. 
145 See however the discussion on the doctrine’s simplicity by the Law Commission No 300 
(2006: 25-26). 
146 See Wilson (2008: 5). See also Wilson (2002: 218-222) on a solution to the problem of 
imposing liability on the accessory for an offence that she did not commit. 
147 2003: 4-5. 
148 1967. 
149 Despite the fact that these agents may be said to have had an ulterior motive of obtaining 
bonuses, the study revealed that their behaviour was acceptable within the industry. 
150 1979. 
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would be a “violent wrench of the English language.”151 Nonetheless, it may 
be countered that to say that a corporation may perform any action or 
entertain any opinion would equally constitute a wrench of the language. The 
objective of this thesis is to achieve coherence and integrity within a given 
legal frame (corporate criminal liability) and not within a literary one. Thus, as 
shown in Chapter 2, from a legal perspective, a corporation may perform 
actions and entertain intentions and may perpetrate any offence. Moreover, 
the corporation’s use of innocent agents is axiomatic. Where for example the 
offence charged is an absolute liability offence, no agent may be held liable 
for the breach of the absolute duty.152 Hence, the underpinning rationale of 
innocent agency is congenial to the criminal law. 
 
However, courts do not have such leeway with regard to imposing liability on 
corporations for crimes of intent (excluding manslaughter and culpable 
homicide). They are required to convict only where the evidence shows that 
the accused entertained the relevant mens rea. Given the nebulousness of 
the concept of ‘corporation,’ some courts have simply held that the offence 
charged cannot be committed by a corporation while others have avoided the 
quandary by interpreting statutory crimes of intent as strict or absolute liability 
offences.153 As shown above, dictates of coherence and integrity require that 
courts or Parliament prescribe an appropriate mechanism of imputation. This 
is because the identification doctrine that ought to have given courts a way 
out of the predicament is itself a very rigid mechanism reflecting only the 
realities of mechanistic corporate structures. It has been heavily criticised in 
different avenues and although some judges employ its modified version 
(Meridian) readily, the rigid rule in Nattrass still applies. Moreover, there is 
always the danger that if the doctrine was modified to enable courts to hold 
                                                 
151 These are the words of Williams (1983: 371) criticising the use of the doctrine of innocent 
agency to hold a person liable for rape as principal offender in an instance where he 
encouraged the perpetrator but did not have sexual intercourse with the victim. 
152 This may also be true of strict liability offences given that the prosecution may only 
establish some “minimum culpability.” 
153 This is not only due to the fact that the language employed in statutes can often be open to 
many interpretations but also due to the deliberate disregard of certain essential words by 
judges. Thus, the history of ascertaining the meaning of statutory provisions by courts has not 
been marked by consistency. Different principles have been invoked ranging from policy 
considerations to semantics in a bid to achieve what the courts believe to be fair in light of the 
applicable statute. 
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corporations liable for the offences of all employees, the unreasonably broad 
nature of the mechanism would be undistinguished from vicarious criminal 
liability. The dire consequences of observing this rigid rule were noted 
especially in manslaughter and culpable homicide cases and Parliament 
introduced the senior management failure test, which as shown above (and in 
Chapter 5), is quite similar to the identification doctrine and may likely produce 
the same results. 
 
It is therefore submitted that it may be pragmatic to consider imposing liability 
on a corporation as accessory in instances where the prosecution may 
identify the guilty agent but may not be able to impute her guilt to the 
corporation (using the applicable mechanisms) because the agent is not of 
sufficient station. Thus, the corporation will still be personally liable but its 
liability would be derivative as it would be based on the fact that it encouraged 
or assisted the principal offender (guilty junior employee) in the commission of 
offence. Equally, this form of liability may be appropriate where the 
prosecution is unable to distinguish between the accessory and the principal 
in a situation where both the corporation and the agent undertook the criminal 
activity together. This is because one of the main reasons for the use of 
accessorial liability is to enable the prosecution to obtain a conviction where it 
is difficult to identify the principal offender in an apparently joint criminal 
venture.154 As such, in cases where the offence was the result of a number of 
devious acts performed by agents seeking to further both personal and 
collective interests the prosecution may consider proving the corporation’s 
guilt by showing that it encouraged or assisted these agents. However, the 
fact that there have been few convictions since Robert Millar shows that the 
option of accessorial liability may be arduous.155 Nevertheless, the problem of 
ascertaining whose acts and intents are imputable to the corporation remains 
since the prosecution would be required to show that the corporation was an 
accessory while acting via certain agents. Given the rigidity of the applicable 
mechanisms of imputation it may be important to devise other mechanisms 
                                                 
154 See Wilson, 2008: 3-4. See also the case of R v Forman and Ford [1988] Crim LR 677. 
155 Accessorial liability may be subject to much controversy as shown in the Reports by the 
Law Commission No 300 (2006); and Law Commission No 305 (2007). 
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that will provide the avenue to impute the acts and intents of certain or all 
agents in defined circumstances for the purpose of showing that one set of 
agents were innocent instruments used by the corporation (another set of 
agents) or that one set of agents (the corporation) aided or encouraged 
another set of agents in the commission of the offence charged. Such 
mechanism would therefore give the criminal law the flexibility to deal with 
corporations of different shapes and sizes committing different offences in 
different circumstances.156 
                                                 
156 As mentioned above, Lord Hoffmann’s contention that judges should be able to fashion 
special rules to address the circumstances before them is not appropriate because it 
predicates the arbitrary interpretation of statutes by judges rather than the use of a single 
flexible mechanism on a consistent basis. Meridian is analysed further in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 GENERATING PARAMETERS FOR 
DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE MECHANISM OF 
IMPUTATION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 2 it was advanced that although a corporation may be accountable 
for its actions or omissions, its existence is manifested in the substance of 
other persons (natural). In Chapter 3 it was established that imposing criminal 
liability on the corporation presupposes that it has either used or assisted one 
or many of such natural persons to perpetrate an offence.1 As such, the 
challenge for the criminal justice system is to consistently distinguish between 
on the one hand, acts that are particular to a corporation (for corporate 
liability) and those that are particular to its agents (for innocent agency) and 
on the other hand, acts that are common to the secondary corporate offender 
(for corporate accessorial liability) and those that are particular to the agent 
who is the principal offender (for individual liability). A convenient way of 
achieving this is by establishing a convention of imputing acts and intents of 
agents2 to corporations under specified circumstances. This convention is 
referred to as a mechanism of imputation and it will be shown that the 
absence or inconsistent use of such mechanism renders the criminal law 
unpredictable and incoherent as regards the imposition of liability on 
corporations. 
                                                 
1 This does not imply that both the corporation and its employee cannot be liable for the same 
offence. Where this happens it should simply be understood as either coincidence or 
conspiracy or incitement. 
2 Although I talk often of the imputation of acts and intents of agents to the corporation, what 
is actually imputed is the causal relationship between the agent’s act or intent and the 
offence. This is because the court is interested in determining whether the corporation caused 
the offence and not whether it performed the act or entertained the intention. That is why it is 
argued in Chapter 3 that a corporation may be the principal offender without necessarily 
performing the actus reus of the offence. Nonetheless, in order to reduce the complexity of 
the discussion, the imputation of acts and intents of agents is interchanged with the 
imputation of causal relationships. 
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This Chapter therefore dwells on the importance of developing such 
mechanisms and suggests ways in which the process may be assessed and 
standardised. Discussion here follows the factual supposition offered in 
Chapter 1 that all criminal jurisdictions have an applicable mechanism of 
imputation that courts and criminal justice agencies employ or ought to 
employ. This Chapter consists of two phases. The first phase will expatiate on 
the notion of “rules of attribution” given that mechanisms have habitually been 
referred to as rules or models or principles of attribution. Emphasis will be 
placed on Lord Hoffmann’s concise description of rules of attribution in 
Meridian and obstacles to their consistent use. It will be submitted that in 
order to avoid a disconnected usage of rules of attribution it may be preferable 
to return to Hart’s conception of primary and secondary rules. In the second 
phase, parameters for evaluating such mechanisms from a substantive 
perspective will be suggested. I will then conclude that the diverse ways in 
which courts may impute acts and intents to corporations for the purpose of 
imposing liability directly or derivatively (secondarily) on them ought to be 
linked to a combination of primary and secondary rules; and an effective link 
is an appropriate mechanism of imputation. 
 
 
4.2 FROM RULE OF ATTRIBUTION TO MECHANISM OF 
IMPUTATION 
Any proposition about a company necessarily involves a 
reference to a set of rules. A company exists because there is 
a rule (usually in a statute) which says that a persona ficta 
shall be deemed to exist and to have certain powers, rights 
and duties of a natural person. But there would be little sense 
in deeming such a persona ficta to exist unless there were 
also rules to tell one what acts were to count as acts of the 
company. It is therefore a necessary part of corporate 
personality that there should be rules by which acts are 
attributed to the company. These may be called ‘the rules of 
attribution.’3 
 
                                                 
3 Lord Hoffmann in Meridian at 506. 
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This statement by Lord Hoffmann highlights the significance of attribution and 
rules that define its processes in corporate personality and liability discourse.4 
It has rightly been influential over the years for it may be lauded for simplifying 
(and making flexible) the conduct of criminal proceedings against 
corporations, a task that was notoriously made arduous by the House of Lords 
in Nattrass. Hence, it is thanks to Lord Hoffmann that it is generally accepted 
today that whenever a court of law talks of a corporation’s act or thought it is 
alluding to a particular way of imputing acts and thoughts (or causal 
relationships) to the corporation.5 However, the gist of his assertion is that 
since a corporation is a fiction created by the law (persona ficta), it is also 
important that the law outlines the aggregate of its interactions with its 
environment. Thus, rules of attribution are devised to serve this purpose. 
Nonetheless, if it is shown that a corporation is an objective reality and not the 
legislator’s creation,6 the contention that the truth of its behaviour (whether 
legal or otherwise) is found only in legal edicts may be questioned. Also, Lord 
Hoffmann distinguished between three types of rules of attribution, namely: 
primary, general and special; and noted that the primary rules emanate from 
the corporation’s constitution or may sometimes be implied by the operation of 
company law, while general rules may be inferred from principles of agency 
and vicarious liability.7 However, if this is understood to imply that there are 
rules governing a corporation’s existence and behaviour outside legal rules 
(such as the corporation’s constitution), then relying solely on legal 
prescriptions for knowledge about the behaviour of corporations may be 
unjustified. Thus, emphasis on the fiction theory and the sovereignty of the 
statute only tugs the subject of corporate criminal liability further into the maze 
of dogma, circularity and material fallacy (‘is-ought’ problem) highlighted in 
Chapter 1. This may be blamed (in part) on the theoretical approach 
employed (strictly doctrinal analysis or internal approach) given that the 
process of attributing acts and intents to corporations is far too complex 
                                                 
4 See Png, 2001: 27. 
5 See Bartlett, 1998: 463; and Hawke, 2000: 54. It may therefore be claimed that the 
conception of rules of attribution is as old as that of corporate personality and liability. 
6 Or at least that the persona ficta stance is highly debatable. The idea that a corporation is 
simply a fiction created by the state reflects the concession theory. This was shown in 
Chapter 2 to be partially true as regards the corporation’s origin and nature. 
7 Meridian at 506-507. 
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(involving other processes that do not necessarily have to satisfy legal rules) 
and mutable to be enshrined in fixed legal rules.  
 
Fixed legal rules may be said to describe the way in which a court is required 
to invest a corporation with a body for the purposes of convicting and 
sanctioning it. This may be a statute or precedent.8 However, given that 
corporations may act (via their agents) in more ways than can possibly be 
envisaged by legislators and judges, the application of these legal rules ought 
to be directed by other legal principles as well as factual considerations or 
explanations of the corporate phenomena. As such, in order to avoid the 
circularity and material fallacy of rationalising legal propositions by appealing 
solely to legal rules, courts are required to look beyond the prescriptions of 
the relevant statutes and precedent (fixed legal rules) and also apply other 
rules and principles9 in order to ascertain the “best interpretation.”10 This 
implies that they ought to appeal to both legal and non-legal considerations of 
what would reasonably justify the imputation of acts and intents to a 
corporation in any given instance; the legal consideration being the rule of 
attribution enshrined in the statute or precedent and the non-legal 
consideration being propositions that judges may deduce from the 
observations (obiter dicta) of previous judges. Thus, the question of how to 
allocate criminal responsibility to corporations is a function of how a court on 
the one hand, interprets the relevant law (with its the rule of attribution) and 
other related legal principles, and on the other hand, appraises the facts of the 
case; the objective being to determine whether the accused corporation acted 
through its agent or whether the latter acted in her individual capacity.11  
 
                                                 
8 The identification doctrine may then be referred to as the rule of attribution in Nattrass and 
the senior management failure test may be referred to as the rule of attribution in the CMCHA. 
Equally, in the United States, vicarious liability may be referred to as the rule of attribution in 
New York Central. 
9 See Hart, 1994: 81 and 260. 
10 See Dworkin, 1986: 337. 
11 This means that irrespective of the dictate of the rule of attribution, a corporation may only 
be held responsible if the facts of the case show that the corporation caused (or induced) the 
act of the agent who ought to be identified with it according to the rule of attribution.  
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As such, a judge may not devise “special” rules of attribution merely to 
achieve the objective of a statute.12 Where the wordings of the statutory 
provision provide for a specific pattern of attribution, the judge is required to 
impute acts and intents to corporations in accordance with such pattern. 
Where no pattern may be deduced from the wordings of the statute, the judge 
must give regard to the pattern prescribed by precedent. Although there may 
be some differences in the ways in which courts would interpret both statute 
and precedent,13 it may be submitted that in both instances the judge would 
have to refer to other legal principles and factual suppositions in order to 
determine whether the prescribed pattern is the right way of distinguishing the 
acts of the corporation from those of its agents.14 Thus, where neither the 
applicable statute nor precedent provides for a pattern of imputing acts and 
intents to corporations, it may be submitted that the judge should simply 
consider other legal rules and principles and factual suppositions. As such, 
Lord Hoffmann’s recommendation that judges fashion “special rules” to deal 
with the cases before them concerned only cases where neither the 
applicable statutory provision nor precedent provided for a pattern of 
attribution. However, it is highly unlikely to find such cases.15 Thus, judges 
                                                 
12 As posited by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian at 507. However, as noted by Dworkin (1986: 
338-339) the judge must seek the best substantive outcome and not the best justification of 
her own convictions about policy and justice. 
13 See Dworkin, 1986: 276-313. 
14 This does not imply that if the judge considers that the prescribed pattern is not the right 
way of attributing acts to the corporation she may part with it and fashion special rules. What 
the judge considers wrong in such instance is not the actual prescription but the interpretation 
put upon it by subsequent courts. Thus, the judge rejects such interpretation and not the 
prescribed pattern. This means that a judge may not for example assert that a statute that 
provides for the imputation of acts of agents performed outside their scope of employment is 
not morally correct. She may however submit that the previous definitions of the scope of 
employment are not accurate as this statute seems to broaden such definition. It may 
therefore be contended that the approach adopted here is similar to that of Raz (1975 and 
1979), Perry (1987) and Hart (1994) whereby precedent may be deemed to be exclusionary 
but not absolute. Thus, we may agree with Schauer (1991:196-206) that it is important for a 
judge to be able to sometimes find recourse in “non-pedigreed” rules in order to find the right 
answer. However, we will disagree with the contention that “pedigreed” rules of precedent 
may be disregarded in certain instances. This is similar to what Lord Hoffmann suggested in 
Meridian and it is suggested here that this will lead to judge-made laws and inconsistency 
given that “non-pedigreed” rules are not legitimate and are largely ambiguous. 
15 This is because criminal law courts within each jurisdiction have a customary way of 
imputing acts and intents to corporations. Such is the pattern prescribed by precedent. Thus, 
in the United Kingdom, the imputation of acts and intents of only senior managers to 
corporations sanctioned by the House of Lords in Nattrass may be said to be the pattern 
prescribed by precedent. 
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that fashion special rules to address the peculiar circumstances before them 
do so through lack of concern for the prescription by precedent.16 
 
It may then be advanced that the process of attributing acts and intents to 
corporations involves interpreting and applying rules embedded in statutes or 
precedent in accordance with related legal rules, principles and factual 
suppositions. This indicates a union between rules that impose obligations on 
courts and rules that specify how the courts ought to fulfil such obligations. 
Following Hart’s17 conception of rules, the first type of rules may be called the 
“primary rules” and the second type of rules may be called the “secondary 
rules.” There is a clear distinction between the use of “primary rule” here and 
the use of the term by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian. It is unfortunate that his 
Lordship did not explain why rules that may be deduced from a company’s 
constitution or the operation of company law may be referred to as “primary 
rules.” If “primary rules” as described by Lord Hoffmann ought to be 
supplemented by the “general rules,”18 then the “primary rules” may be 
deemed to take precedence over the “general rules.” However, it cannot be 
said that the rules in the company’s constitution or articles of association take 
precedence over the principles of agency (general rules). In fact, courts 
enforce strict liability offences against corporations on the basis of the actions 
of agents of the corporations irrespective of what is written in their 
constitutions or may be implied by company law. It is submitted here that for 
heuristic purposes it may be preferable to refer to Hart’s terminology and 
designate the rule that imposes an obligation on courts to impute acts and 
intents to corporation in a particular way as the “primary rule” while the rules 
that enhance the understanding of the primary rule and inform the legislator 
on its shortcomings as “secondary rules.”19 This implies that the primary rule 
                                                 
16 The prescription by precedent is also understood here to imply other legal rules or 
principles that may determine the outcome of the case. In such case the judge would have to 
decide which rule or principle outweighs the other in the circumstances. See Raz, 1972: 832-
834; and Dworkin, 1986: 240-244. 
17 1994: 79-99. 
18 See also Png, 2001: 27. 
19 The secondary rules referred to here are therefore those that constitute what Hart called 
the “rules of recognition” and “rules of adjudication.” This is because the “rules of change” are 
not required to ascertain the validity of the primary rule. However, both conceptions of 
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of attribution is embedded in a statute or precedent while the secondary rules 
are standards established by other legal rules and propositions. These 
propositions represent what Dworkin calls “legal principles” and are important 
because they provide a test for determining the validity of the primary rule by 
content-based and pedigree-based tests.20  However, owing to the fact that 
the secondary rules may not always provide the meaning of an essential word 
used in expressing the primary rule, the judge may be required to consider 
what is acceptable or not in light of the legislator’s intention and other policy 
consideration. It is submitted here that she should apply the “commonsense” 
meaning of such term21 and this may involve having recourse to an “external” 
perspective22 that may include for example knowledge about group or 
corporate behaviour from some non-legal categories.23 Nonetheless, given 
the ambiguity of non-legal perspectives, the process of having recourse to the 
meanings they provide ought to be within a framework built by precedent.24  
 
In Nattrass, Lord Reid ordained that “it must be a question of law whether, 
once the facts have been ascertained, a person in doing particular things is to 
be regarded as the company or merely as the company’s servant or agent.”25 
This implies that the question of law as regards whose act or intent counts as 
that of the corporation is answered by the primary rule of attribution, while the 
question of fact as regards whether the agent’s act that is considered by the 
                                                                                                                                            
“secondary rules” of Hart and Lord Hoffmann favour the discretion of judges to put their 
interpretations on laws. 
20 See the contention by Hart (1994: 259-263) that nothing in his description of the secondary 
rules suggests that content-based tests (such as those implied by Dworkin’s legal principles) 
may not be included. See also Leiter, 2003. Hart then showed how difficult it is to distinguish 
between secondary rules as he saw them and legal principles as described by Dworkin. Thus, 
for the purpose of clarity, I will consider legal principles to be part of secondary rules. 
21 See for example the recommendation of the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions 
Committee in their joint report on the Draft Bill of 2005 (paras. 145 and 153) with regard to 
defining the term “substantial” used in the CMCHA. See also the “commonsense” meaning 
attributed to the term “causation” by Lord Wilberforce and Lord Salmon at Alphacell at 834 
and 847 respectively. 
22 It is described as “external” because it often involves a non-legal view of the legal 
phenomena. See Chapter 1. 
23 See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 15. 
24 This means that the judge may not seek commonsense meanings of the terms “causation” 
and “foreseeability” out of the scope of common sense meanings of these terms delineated by 
the House of Lords in Alphacell. As noted in Chapter 1, specifying instances where judges 
may invoke non-pedigreed and non-legal knowledge augurs well for coherence and 
consistency. 
25 Nattrass at 170. 
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court should be attributed to the corporation in accordance with the primary 
rule is answered by the secondary rules. Hence, Dworkin’s Hercules26 would 
arrive at the right answer (of how to impute acts and intents to corporations) 
by interpreting the primary rule in accordance with the secondary rules. This 
shows that attribution is a complex process that involves examining the 
conclusive legal rule (rule of attribution) and the factual context of the case in 
light of what may be understood as the accepted wisdom (non-conclusive 
principle).27  It may therefore be contended that when one talks of the “rule of 
attribution” one is strictly referring to the primary rule embedded in the statute 
or precedent and not the process of attribution that also involves secondary 
rules. Thus, it may be better to talk of “mechanism” and not “rule” given that 
courts do not simply apply the primary rule of attribution as set out by the 
relevant statute or precedent but they also consider other rules (secondary 
rules) that modify the application of the primary rule.28 As such, although the 
primary rule may take precedence over the secondary rules, it is non-
conclusive and may be outweighed in certain circumstances. This may 
explain why the rule of attribution affirmed in Nattrass was disregarded in 
Belmont as the court in the latter case deemed it unfair that the act of a 
fraudulent senior manager should be imputed to his corporate victim. 
However, it must be noted that within the set of rules, the primary rule is fixed 
in terms of content and pedigree while the secondary rules are only fixed in 
terms of pedigree, since their content may vary according to the facts of the 
case.29 Thus, within each jurisdiction there is a mutable mechanism that 
describes the ascertained processes of imputation involving primary rules 
embedded in statutes or precedent and secondary rules. As will be shown 
below, a defective mechanism is likely to compromise the consistent 
imposition of liability on corporations while an entirely adequate one will 
                                                 
26 The infinitely wise arbiter in the “Law’s Empire.”  
27 This is similar to a court’s deliberation that involves looking at the legal rule and normative 
considerations. See Marmor, 2006: 699. 
28 I will also talk of mechanism of ‘imputation’ and not mechanism of ‘attribution’ in order to 
distinguish both concepts further and avoid any confusion that may arise from using the term 
‘attribution’ when referring to both concepts. 
29 See Hart, 1994: 264-265. As noted above, the secondary rules must equally be “pedigreed” 
in order not to patronise a system of arbitrary judge-made laws. 
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enhance the process. This thesis is focused on the ascertainment of an 
adequate mechanism. 
 
4.2.1 Understanding how the mechanism operates 
 
Where an offence has been committed or a wrong suffered most people 
would say that it is unacceptable not to impose liability on the individual or 
entity that committed the offence or ought to have prevented the offence from 
being committed.30 Principles such as these often guide the customary use of 
legal edicts by officials31 and may provide the framework for normative law.32 
Hence, they may be deemed to justify an enactment or the creation of a 
precedent.33 However, the justification of the use of legal rules in a certain 
manner by normative principles would depend on the judge who is required to 
exercise discretion in invoking the latter, understanding the former and 
establishing a link between both.34 Nonetheless, despite the fact that one 
judge’s evaluation of a law from a given perspective may probably be different 
from that of other judges, there is likely to be consensus on the fact that 
judges are empowered to interpret and modify laws by reference to diverse 
considerations35 and it may be possible to determine whether these laws are 
appropriate or not by referring to a framework of such considerations.36 In 
other words, we may ascertain the effectiveness of a law by referring to the 
elucidation of judges’ moral constructs used in understanding what problems 
                                                 
30 This is further accentuated by the belief that if responsibility is not attributed the harm will 
not be eradicated. See Miller, 2001: 453. 
31 See Marmor, 2006: 686. 
32 See Green, 2005: 567. 
33 See Coleman, 2001. 
34 See Honoré, 2002: 489-495. 
35 See Marmor, 2006: 689-688; and Berger, 2002: 30. The abovementioned contentions of 
Schauer (1991) and Perry (1987) to the effect that precedent is dispensable and those of Raz 
(1979) and Hart (1994) that precedent is exclusionary thus overlap with regard to the judge’s 
discretion to consider non-legal prescriptions. However, they differ on the amount of 
discretion that judges may enjoy. 
36 This does not mean that non-legal considerations are sine qua non for the determination of 
the law. As noted in Chapter 1, there is no intention here to take sides or justify any stance in 
the long-drawn-out battle between positivists and those against positivism as regards the 
correlation between moral constructs and legal validity. What is important here is that given 
the ambiguity of legislative intention and the limits of legal language (which many positivists 
do underscore), it is likely that the law will often be a “prophecy of what the courts will do.” 
See Marmor, 2001: 81-88. 
117 
 
such law is required to solve.37 As such, what is described above as primary 
rules may be deemed to be the “formal reason”38 or “first-order reasons”39 of 
the judgment and what is described as the secondary rules may be deemed 
to be the “substantive reason.”40 By analysing the “substantive reason” of a 
statute or precedent it may also be said that we are seeking to understand the 
law by looking at the interaction of the formal reason with other rules and 
principles, as well the law’s description from an “internal point of view” or by 
those that play the most active role in the practice. Thus, when legislators or 
judges make decisions about the acceptability or not of a way of imputing acts 
and intents to corporations, we are able to better understand their choices by 
referring to the internal point of view.41 Similarly, where the internal point of 
view neither explains nor justifies the use of a primary rule, commonsense 
may dictate that the presiding judge considers the viewpoints expressed by 
some non-legal commentators. These may equally constitute “secondary 
rules” although they ought to be relevant to the case, that is, they ought to 
have been invoked by or discussed as obiter dicta of the precedent.42 
 
It may therefore be posited that an appropriate mechanism of imputation is 
one that enables the judge to examine the “substantive reason” that underpins 
the “secondary rules” (consisting of other legal principles and other judges’ 
“internal point of view” and related theorists’ “external point of view”) in order 
to arrive at the right answer. The mechanism of imputation therefore ought to 
enable the judge to look at the way previous judges understood and applied 
the primary rule and how corporate structures function in practice (secondary 
                                                 
37 It may also be said that the Government often explains laws and the explanations are 
affected by certain norms that are not strictly legal. However, since legislators have largely 
abandoned their casuistic style of yore and only state the general principles or the rule without 
further illustrations on the implementation and intended consequences (see Hunt, 2002: 25), it 
is less likely that such notions may be had from legislators’ enactments and explanatory 
notes. 
38 See Atiyah and Summers, 1987: 2. 
39 Perry, 1989: 944. 
40 Atiyah and Summers, 1987: 5-6. 
41 Marmor, 2006: 701-702. This is in line with the theoretical approach adopted in this thesis: 
the interpretive legal theory or internal approach. 
42 Although obiter dictum is not binding, it is nevertheless persuasive authority and may 
therefore guide other courts on how to enforce certain laws in certain peculiar instances. In 
fact, some obiter dicta may be so persuasive that it is sometimes difficult to say whether they 
were not one of the major premises from which the judge drew her conclusion. See Cross R 
and Harris, 1991: 75-81. 
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rules). In essence, the “internal point of view” reflects what Lord Hoffmann 
described in Meridian as the “special rule of attribution for the particular 
substantive rule” to the extent that each judge is empowered to give an 
explanation of the way the primary rule ought to apply in the case before her. 
As such, Lord Hoffmann understood the applicable section 20 of the New 
Zealand Securities Amendment Act 1988 (primary rule) as prescribing that the 
agent that acquired the interest on behalf of the corporation and with its 
authority may be deemed to have acted as the corporation.43 However, the 
interpretation of the primary rule in Lord Hoffmann’s context was guided 
completely by his moral considerations and not by a “pedigreed” set of 
customary rules (secondary rules) as advanced above. The discretion 
exercised was almost as large as that which only the legislator should 
exercise. As such, Lord Hoffmann’s “special rule” truly reflects only his 
“internal point of view” and for the purposes of consistency and certainty it is 
important that this point of view conforms to other relevant legal principles and 
the outlook of other judges and some related non-legal theories. It is therefore 
submitted that there is need for a framework of such principles and views 
(secondary rules) that would limit a judge’s discretion and guide her 
interpretation of the primary rule. This framework of secondary rules by which 
the primary rule may be ascertained consists of rules of recognition and rules 
of adjudication.44 The content of these rules may be said to vary positively 
with the effectiveness of the mechanism of imputation. This is because the 
larger or more pertinent the content the more relevant information there will be 
at the judge’s disposal to interpret and explain the primary rule in light of the 
facts that she addresses. 
 
Building a framework of secondary rules may however be problematic owing 
to the fact that in seeking to ascertain the “substantive reason” or “internal 
point of view” one must be able to distinguish the rationes decidendi and the 
obiter dicta of applicable precedent.45 This may be too broad and complex for 
                                                 
43 See Meridian at 511. 
44 With regard to how the validity of these rules may be determined, see Hart, 1994: 96-110. 
45 As explained above, although both types of rules ought to be “pedigreed,” the primary rule 
ought to be deduced from the ratio decidendi and the secondary rules from the obiter dictum. 
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analysis46 and may impede the consistent and coherent application of the 
secondary rules that ought to guide the interpretation and implementation of 
each primary rule. In other words, it will be quite challenging to group the 
“internal points of view” of different judges entertaining similar cases in order 
to determine a proposition that justifies the interpretation and implementation 
of primary rules in a particular way.47 However, given the uniqueness of each 
judgment, the actual challenge consists of showing that the explanation of the 
primary rule upon which a particular judgment is based reflects the 
propositions embedded in secondary rules and the trial judge did not interpret 
and apply the primary rule per incuriam.48 Equally, the internal point of view of 
judges is much broader than can be envisaged and the external point of view 
(especially of non-legal commentators) is even broader and more complex 
than can be presented. Moreover, not all public officials (courts and 
enforcement agencies) may accept an external point of view.49 Nonetheless, it 
may be submitted that secondary rules can hardly be delineated with 
mathematical precision and the idea here is to develop a framework by which 
the primary rules embedded in statutes and precedent may be interpreted and 
applied on rational and consistent bases. The link between this framework 
and the diverse ways in which courts may impute acts and intents to 
corporations is what I refer to as the mechanism of imputation. An effective 
mechanism of imputation would enable courts to consistently impute acts and 
intents to corporation in accordance with both primary and secondary rules. 
 
                                                 
46 See Siems, 2008: 149. This is especially the case where the obiter dictum is very 
persuasive. See Cross R and Harris, 1991: 76-77. 
47 See the discussion on consistency and coherence by MacCormick (2005: 189, 190, 206). 
See also Berger, 2002: 30. 
48 The task may be much easier where there is a clear and weighty legal principle that a judge 
may not disregard. An example is the unfairness of imputing the fraudulent act of a senior 
manager to the corporation where it was the former’s targeted victim. See also the United 
States case of Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506 (1889) discussed by Dworkin (1986: 15-20) 
where a boy murdered his grandfather and the Court held that although the victim’s will that 
devolved most of his estate to the murderer did not violate any of the provisions of the 
applicable statute, this law could not take precedence over another legal principle that was to 
the effect that no one may benefit from his own wrong. 
49 The non-acceptance of a non-legal viewpoint by legal officials may hinder the development 
of such a viewpoint into a secondary rule. 
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4.3 PARAMETERS FOR DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE 
MECHANISM 
 
In light of the discussion above, there are two major factors that may delineate 
a mechanism of imputation and determine its efficacy. Firstly, the consonance 
of its primary rule with legal principles that set standards which are essential 
to the determination of the case. Secondly, the consonance of the 
mechanism’s primary rule with patterns of imputation embedded in the 
secondary rules that guide the implementation of the primary rule. As 
mentioned above, the patterns of imputation may be deduced from the 
outlook of judges expressed in the obiter dicta of their judgements and also 
from the factual propositions of non-legal theorists (equally alluded to by 
judges in the obiter dicta of their judgements) where the outlook of judges 
does not provide an adequate explanation. I will now expound on these 
factors and show how a mechanism of imputation may be evaluated by 
reference to them. 
 
4.3.1 The congruity of the mechanism’s primary rule with related legal 
principles 
 
As mentioned above, the legal principles involve standards deduced from the 
operation of related branches of law. As regards corporate criminal liability in 
the United Kingdom, such standards include (although not exclusively) those 
derived from company law, agency law (excluding vicarious liability) and 
criminal law. Standards derived from these branches are used as reference 
points because the branches essentially scaffold the extension of the criminal 
law to corporate entities.  
 
Company law was devised to delineate the interaction of the different persons 
that have agreed to be bound by the internal rules of the corporation, as well 
as between these persons and other stakeholders. Hence, the corporation is 
the focus of company law rules and it is only logical that any judge required to 
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impute the acts and intents of agents to a corporation should weigh the rule 
prescribing such pattern of imputation against the standards of company law. 
Also, due to the fact that a corporation may only form an intention or perform 
an action through the agency of natural persons such judge should equally be 
satisfied that the rule reflects principles of the law of agency. Finally, given 
that what is intended is the imposition of criminal liability and punishment on 
the corporation, it is crucial that the rule conforms to criminal law standards. 
As such, where a mechanism’s primary rule does not concur with principles 
that derive from the operation of these branches of law, the mechanism may 
be deemed unsuitable for enforcing crimes against corporations. However, 
standards set by such principles may not conclusively resolve a case but 
guide the judge through the process of interpreting and applying the primary 
rule. Thus, where a statute provides for the imposition of criminal liability on 
the duty-holder and the corporation happens to be the duty-holder, such 
statute may be understood to imply that the accused corporation will be liable 
if there was an agency relationship between the person whose action 
breached the duty and the corporation. Owing to the fact that several related 
legal principles may be deduced from these branches of law (as well as other 
branches), the parameters for evaluating mechanisms of imputation will be 
limited to some prominent principles, viz. corporate personality (company 
law), scope of employment/maverick agent and constructive knowledge 
(agency law) and proof of mens rea and/or actus reus and the imposition of 
personal liability (criminal law).  
 
4.3.1.1  Congruence with the principle of corporate personality 
 
In Chapter 2, it was established that courts do not necessarily recognise a 
corporation as a result of its incorporation but because it may act and think 
independently (at least in the legal world) and can bear rights and affect 
relationships. Thus, corporate criminal liability is concerned with the 
corporation’s personal liability although such liability is predicated on the 
confluence of several actions and decisions of one or several of its agents. An 
appropriate mechanism of imputation ought to operate in such way as to 
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distinguish acts and intentions that are particular to the corporate person from 
those that are particular to its agents.  
 
4.3.1.2  Consonance with the criminal law rules of culpability and 
responsibility  
 
In Chapter 2, it was shown that the prosecution may use the principles of 
culpability and responsibility to bind the accused corporation to the relevant 
course of action by showing that it entertained and performed the requisite 
mens rea and actus reus or it performed an act prohibited by the law or failed 
to perform one required by the law. Thus, in Chapter 3, it was established that 
liability may be imposed on a corporation directly for strict and absolute 
liability offences that require only breach of a duty and also for offences that 
require proof of both actus reus and mens rea. In both instances, it is 
important to show that the guilty act was that of the corporation or that it was 
responsible. However, in the second instance, it is important to show that the 
negligence or intent to commit the offence (mens rea) was actually that of the 
corporation and not of its agent. In other words, it is important to show that the 
corporation was both culpable and responsible. It was also suggested that this 
may be achieved by showing how a corporation used a number of innocent 
agents to perpetrate the offence (where the agents are innocent) or 
encouraged or assisted the agents that perpetrated the offence. 
 
4.3.1.3  Consonance with principles implied by agency law 
 
An important principle that may guide courts in the interpretation and 
application of the primary rule is that exemplified by the maxim qui facit per 
alium facit per se. This common law maxim may be roughly translated as he 
who acts through another acts himself.  The maxim is fundamental to the law 
of agency as it operates to hold a principal liable for the acts of the agent 
performed within the scope of the agency. Etymologically, it depicted the 
convergence of the legal personae of both principal and agent creating the 
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impression that the principal actually performed an act through the agent.50 
Hence, although the corporation and its agent are distinct persons there are 
instances where their legal personae may merge to such extent that a 
corporation acting through the agent may be said to act itself.51 This means 
that the judge ought to interpret the primary rule of attribution in a statute or 
precedent as merging the legal personae of corporation and the agent.52 As 
such, an appropriate mechanism of imputation ought to provide the requisite 
flexibility to the court to weigh the primary rule against the pattern of imputing 
liability to the principal in agency law.53 The court may refer to such pattern by 
considering a number of questions including whether the agent was a 
maverick that acted outwith her scope of employment and whether the 
corporation could be said to have had constructive knowledge of the agent’s 
action. We will now see how the judge may address these questions. 
 
4.3.1.3.1 The exception of the maverick agent  
In civil law, the agent’s act or knowledge may only be imputed to the principal 
if such act or knowledge is relevant both to the agent’s duties to the principal 
and the principal’s relations with other parties.54 Thus, a principal acts through 
its agent to the extent that the latter’s act alters the former’s legal status within 
the boundaries of the delegation. If the agent’s act falls outside these 
boundaries then the act cannot be imputed to the principal. In criminal law, 
this has hardly been addressed owing to the fact that the concept of scope of 
employment is mostly invoked when determining a principal’s vicarious liability 
and the criminal law eschews this form of liability. However, this concept is 
                                                 
50 See Fuller, 1967: 19. He however describes the maxim as a fiction and believes that it is a 
“superfluous and wasteful intellectual operation” to contrive readers to pretend that the act 
was actually performed by the principal. See also Demott, 2003: 293. 
51 It should nonetheless be noted that even though the agency relationship is invoked in this 
instance the corporation’s liability remains direct and not vicarious. It is however challenging 
drawing a fine line between agency and vicarious liability as they sometimes overlap in both 
their legal and normative applications. It is thus common to find some commentators treating 
both concepts as synonyms. See for example, Lederman, 2000: 652; and Watts, 2001: 309. 
52 However, the delineation of circumstances where the principal will be liable for the agent’s 
act is still subject to debate. See Watts, 2001: 300. 
53 A good example of how judges weighed the primary rule against principles deduced from 
the operation of agency law is El Ajou. See especially Nourse LJ at 698 and Hoffmann LJ (as 
he then was) at 702-705. 
54 Demott, 2003: 293. This may equally be the case in criminal law although in lieu of the 
principal’s relations with other parties we will talk of the principal’s legal obligations. See for 
example, the CMCHA. 
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important to the enforcement of the criminal law against corporations because 
the latter can only act via natural persons acting within the scope of their 
employment or agency. Nonetheless, although the concept encompasses 
conventionalised principles that facilitate imputation to principals, it hides a 
perplexing complexity that may extend the principal’s liability to such great 
lengths that the criminal lawyer could be rendered dizzy.55 It is for example 
uncertain whether the agent must be shown to have furthered the principal’s 
interest or simply performed an act that was in line with the principal’s 
business irrespective of whether the act was beyond the bounds of the 
agent’s specific authority.56 Lord Steyn57 intimated that the English position 
was put into perspective by Salmond.58 The latter had advanced that the act 
was within the scope of the agent’s employment if it was authorised by the 
principal or if it was not, it was a “mode” of performing a task assigned by the 
principal. Thus, the principal may be liable for acts that she did not authorise 
but were “so connected” with acts that she authorised.59  
 
It is difficult to justify the imputation of an unauthorised act to a principal 
especially where the agent neither sought to further the former’s interests nor 
acted in line with her business.60 However, it may be argued that the agent’s 
act was relevant to the principal’s relation with third parties or in the case of 
criminal law, the principal’s legal obligation. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
principal did not intend to achieve anything incidental to this act makes it 
difficult to argue that the principal used the agent to perform the act that is 
then imputed to the former. As noted above, these cases were based on the 
                                                 
55 The term “course/scope of employment” has been widely expanded in civil law over the last 
century to include the employee’s “ostensible authority” (Harvey v Whitehead (1911) 30 NZLR 
795) or the “improper” or “unauthorised or prohibited” modes she used to perform her duties. 
See Canadian Pacific Railway v Lockhart (1942) AC 591, hereinafter referred to as Canadian 
Pacific Railway; Irving and Irving v Post Office [1987] IRLR 289, hereinafter referred to as 
Irving; and Marjowski v Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust [2007] 1 AC 224, hereinafter 
referred as Marjowski. 
56 See Nana, 2008: 253-258. 
57 Lister and Others v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 (hereinafter referred to as Lister) at 
223-224. 
58 Salmond, 1907: 83. See also Heuston and Buckley, 1996: 443. 
59 This position was affirmed by the House of Lords in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam and 
Others [2003] 2 AC 366, hereinafter referred to as Dubai Aluminium. See Lord Nicholls at 
375-379 and Lord Millet at 400. See also Lord Nicholls in Majrowski at 229. 
60 However, see Lord Pearce in Williams v A&W Hemphill Ltd 1986 SC (HL) 31 at 46; and 
Diplock LJ (as he then was) in Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716 at 736-737. 
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employers’ vicarious liability and this concept is not deemed to be derived 
from legal propositions but conceived as an abstraction from the nebulous 
notion of public policy.61 However, owing to the fact that vicarious liability and 
agency are not entirely synonymous, the public policy argument underpinning 
the sort of vicarious liability with no outer limit may be ignored. As such, where 
an employee’s action is out of the boundaries of her agency to such extent 
that the corporate employer cannot be said to have acted through her, the 
court may hardly justify the imputation of her act to the corporation because 
such act breaks the link between the agency relationship and the offence.62 
This is exemplified by the fraud exception to the imputed knowledge rule. The 
fraud exception operates to exculpate the employer from the fraud where the 
agent was defrauding her.63 Nonetheless, it must be noted that this exception 
lacks definite form and cannot always be constituted as an exception to 
imputation because in many cases the agent’s fraudulent act is only part of a 
whole transaction and the principal is willing to reject the fraud but maintain 
the general transaction.64 Equally, criminal law courts find it difficult severing 
the fraudulent act from a whole transaction when imputing such transaction to 
the corporation.65 However, Belmont gives good reason to believe that 
fraudulent acts targeting the corporation would not be imputed to it. This 
implies that only acts that are incidental to the achievement of the objectives 
of corporations as defined in their constitutions are imputable to corporations 
(in accordance with the ultra vires doctrine).66   As such, if a crime perpetrated 
by an agent benefits a corporation whose major objective is to make profit, it 
ought to be held criminally liable for that crime67 on the basis that the crime 
was perpetrated by the agent within the “scope” of her authority.  
 
                                                 
61 The employer has often been vicariously liable because it is “fair” to hold her liable in the 
circumstances. See the Canadian cases of Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45; Jacobi v 
Griffiths (1999)174 DLR (4th) 71 cited by Lord Steyn in Lister at 223-224. See also Chapter 6. 
62 See Lord Chelmsford in Espin v Pemberton (1859) 3 De G & J 547 at 554-555. 
63 This exception was established by Lord Brougham in Kennedy v Green (1834) 3 My & K 
699. See also Re European Bank (1870) LR 5 Ch App 358; and Stoneleigh Finance Ltd v 
Phillips [1965] 2 QB 537.  
64 See Watts, 2001. 
65 See Humphreys J in Bresler at 517.  
66 Ultra vires acts may be defined as acts that are outside the scope of the corporation’s 
powers as defined in its constitution. See Leigh, 1969: 3; and Todarello, 2002-2003: 856. 
67 See Wells, 2001: 135.  
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It follows from the above that the delineation of the principles of maverick 
agent and scope of employment that may be implied by agency law depends 
on the test of whether the agent conferred some advantage or benefit upon 
the corporation.68 In Bresler, although the two officers defrauded the company 
they enabled it to make more money by evading taxes.69 However, in such 
cases it is likely that the corporation benefits in the short-term but ultimately 
suffers a much bigger loss in the long-run following the stigma of prosecution 
and conviction and the burden of sanctions, making it less likely that the 
corporation would benefit from the crime.70 It is uncertain whether courts are 
then required to weigh the corporation’s potential or actual loss against its 
potential or actual gains in order to determine whether it benefited from the 
crime. This would be unfair to the corporate defender that seldom has such 
benefit of hindsight since concealing the offence is sine qua non to the 
fraudulent agent’s enterprise. 
 
A more justifiable stance may be to hold the company liable for formulating 
and implementing policies that encouraged or tolerated the commission of 
crimes.71 In this light, it may be said that the agent did not deviate from her 
scope of authority by using an unauthorised mode to perform her activities 
since such unauthorised mode was motivated by the policies and practices of 
the corporate employer. The agent may then be said to have had an apparent 
authority to use such mode. As noted in Chapter 3, in such instance it may be 
preferable to say that the corporation was an accessory to the offence 
committed by the agent and not that it was the offender. However, if courts 
restricted themselves to policies then corporations would simply instruct their 
employees never to commit any form of crime.72 Nonetheless, where it is 
                                                 
68 See Braithwaite and Pettit, 2003: 13.  
69 However, given that there was no representation from the board of directors or senior 
management endorsing the tax evasion, reliance was placed on the representation of the 
fraudulent officers in such instance. This means that courts would have to rely on “bootstraps” 
agency and corporate culture in order to establish such link.  
70 See Braithwaite and Pettit, 2003: 13. Nevertheless, where crime detection is low and 
punishment is not certain the corporation is more likely to benefit from the short-term benefit 
and less likely to suffer from the long-term harms of prosecution, conviction and sanctioning. 
71 See Braithwaite and Pettit, 2003: 38.  
72 See Wells, 2001: 135; and Note, Harvard, 1979: 1227. That is why corporations cannot 
always rely on the defence of having a compliance programme or that they practised due 
diligence. See Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete [1995] 1 AC 456. 
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shown that the agent acted outwith the scope of her agency and against clear 
instructions and no benefit was conferred upon the corporation, it may still be 
liable if it ought to have been aware of the reasonably high risk of its agents 
breaching the criminal law due to the nature of their tasks. In other words, the 
corporation would be liable because it had constructive knowledge of the 
agents’ acts or propensity to perpetrate wrongful acts and ought to have taken 
steps to prevent the performance of such acts. Its failure to do so may be 
interpreted as tolerating or encouraging the acts.  
 
4.3.1.3.2 The corporation’s constructive knowledge 
The primary rule of attribution embedded in the statute or precedent may be 
interpreted as imputing acts and intents to a corporation on the ground that 
the latter ought to have known of its agent’s intention to perpetrate an offence 
or the possibility of the perpetration of such offence. In the civil law case of 
Compania Maritima San Basilio SA v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting 
Association (Bermuda) Ltd,73 Lord Denning gave a brief narrative description 
of the common law position on the requisite degree of involvement that would 
absolve the principal from her agent’s fault. The old position was that a 
wrongful act perpetrated by an agent within the scope of her authority and 
with the intention of benefiting the employer was imputable to the latter 
irrespective of whether she commanded or had actual knowledge of the act.74 
Lord Denning intimated that subsequently a number of Merchant Shipping 
Acts were passed mitigating the harshness of this position and these 
culminated in the enactment of section 503(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894 which provided that the principal’s liability could be limited by evidence 
showing that her agent had not performed the wrongful act by her “command” 
or with her “privity.”75 He then contended that the word “privity” in these 
statutes may be said to imply that the owner’s liability was dependent on 
                                                 
73 [1977] QB 49 at 67-68. This case is hereinafter referred to as Compania Maritima. 
74 See Morse v Slue (1674) 1 Vent 190; Tuberville v Stampe (1697) 1 Ld Ray 264; and 
Huzzey v Field (1835) 2 CM & R 432. 
75 See also Article 2 of the Convention on the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 
limiting the owner’s liability for loss or damage to property that occurs on board the vessel or 
that is connected with its operation. This Convention may be read together with section 185 of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. Also important is section 186(2) of the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1995 that absolves masters and/or members of the crew from liability for loss or damage 
that arises from acts they performed in the course of their employment. 
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whether she had personal knowledge or ought to have had personal 
knowledge (in which case she turned a “blind eye”). This implies that the 
owner should be liable because a hypothetical reasonable person in her place 
would not have recklessly omitted to make such inquiry.76 Thus, she had 
constructive knowledge of the facts and ought to have taken steps to prevent 
the perpetration of the wrongful act.77 However, the diligence required of the 
defender should not be extraordinary. Hence, the sheriff held that a gulf club 
was not liable where one golfer with a high handicap hastily mis-hit a golf ball 
and injured another golfer.78 
 
That notwithstanding, if this principle is transplanted to the criminal law (in 
terms of the agency relationship between the corporation and the agent) and 
even if evidence of the corporate employer’s knowledge of the likelihood of 
the incident happening will be sufficient to convict, the prosecutor may still 
face an uphill task given that she must convince the court that the corporation 
acquired knowledge or failed to inquire about a fact via certain agents that 
must be identified with it. Lord Denning advanced that it should be a question 
of whether the company’s alter ego had knowledge or ought to have had 
knowledge of the facts.79 The reference to the company’s alter ego is in line 
with the alter ego rule adopted (in part) within the framework of the 
identification doctrine, the applicable mechanism of imputation in the United 
Kingdom, which Lord Denning had sanctioned in an earlier case.80 However, 
as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 8, the identification doctrine is an unduly 
restrictive mechanism and unless the concept of a company’s alter ego is 
extended to include middle-level managers, corporations would escape 
liability by simply delegating the management of criminogenic activities to 
such managers. Nonetheless, it may be contended that irrespective of the 
                                                 
76 This is related to the duty of the principal to investigate. See Lord Hoffmann in El Ajou at 
702-703. See also Baldwin v Casella (1872) LR 7 Exc 325. 
77 See Baden v Société Générale Pour Favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de 
l’Industrie en France [1993] 1 WLR 509 at 575-576. Denning J (as he then was) had equally 
applied a similar test to the effect that the defendant had notice because a reasonable man 
would have perceived the want of authority and the defendant was negligent in failing to do 
so. See Nelson v Larholt [1948] 1 KB 339 at 343. 
78 Lewis v Buckpool Golf Club [1993] SLT 43. 
79 Compania Maritima at 68. 
80 Bolton Engineering. This case is discussed below. 
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meaning that one gives to the term alter ego (only senior managers or both 
senior managers and sufficiently empowered middle-level managers), Lord 
Denning’s contention that a company’s knowledge or negligence is that of its 
alter ego is true. Thus, an effective mechanism of imputation should provide 
for such flexibility as to enable a court to identify a corporate defender with its 
true alter ego in order to determine whether it had constructive knowledge of 
another agent’s intention or propensity to perpetrate the offence.  
 
In light of the discussion above, it may be advanced that the primary rule 
embedded in statutes or precedent often provides for a pattern of attribution in 
ambiguous terms. However, there are other legal principles that may guide a 
judge in finding the “best” theory or unequivocal interpretation of the primary 
rule. Some of these include principles deduced from the operation of criminal 
law, company law and agency law. Thus, where a corporation is charged 
courts ought to ensure that it is treated as a distinct legal person that may be 
personally liable and the actus reus (and mens rea where required) of the 
offence is proved against the corporation and not its agent. Equally, the crime 
(or acts constituting the crime) ought to have been perpetrated by the 
corporation’s agents while acting within the scope of their employment and/or 
the corporation ought to have had constructive knowledge of the possibility of 
that happening. However, it is not in every instance that the act of an agent 
(even though within the scope of her employment) will be imputed to the 
corporation. Thus, there are other rules of recognition that ought to guide the 
court in interpreting the primary rule as regards whose act and intent is 
imputable to the corporation and why.  
 
4.3.2  The congruity of the mechanism’s primary rule with other rules of 
recognition  
 
It is important to note that relying solely on other legal principles may be 
recursive in many instances given that they may not always explain or justify 
the application of a primary rule. This may lead to circularity (and the is-ought 
problem discussed in Chapter 1) whereby courts seek to explain legal 
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concepts by referring to legal rules although the concept represents an 
actuality that transcends information contained in legal edicts. There are for 
example many more forms of corporate structures than judges and legislators 
can ever envisage and their failure to consider extraneous knowledge in 
certain circumstances would surely defeat legal rules fashioned to deal with 
corporations. As mentioned above, the test of validity (and efficacy) of the 
primary rule that involves referring to legal principles is the pedigree-based 
test. However, a content-based test is also important. The latter test as 
defined here differs from Dworkin’s test given that it seeks justify the 
application of the primary rule of attribution from a much narrower perspective 
than Dworkin enunciated.81 This is because, as noted in Chapter 1, the great 
width of morality and non-pedigreed principles increases the likelihood of 
inconsistency (judges invoking all sorts of principles). As such, even the 
content-based test ought to be based on pedigree. This means that although 
judges are not required to appeal to non-legal principles that do not form part 
of the rationes decidendi of the precedent, they may appeal to non-legal 
principles that form part of the persuasive observations made by previous 
courts (obiter dicta). In this light, the content-based test is restricted to the 
outlook (normative conceptions) of judges and non-legal theories on corporate 
behaviour that previous courts discussed or alluded to. These may be said to 
be secondary rules deduced from both internal points of view and external 
points of view. The internal points of view here are deemed to be the 
normative perspectives of other judges while the external points of view 
include the viewpoint of some non-legal categories (referred to by judges). As 
such, a mechanism of imputation may also be evaluated by weighing its 
primary rule against such secondary rules. 
 
4.3.2.1  Rules of recognition deduced from the normative 
perspectives of judges 
 
Given that secondary rules ought to be arranged systematically it is likely that 
the same problem of “open texture” encountered in the interpretation of 
                                                 
81 See Hart, 1994: 263-268. 
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statutes (primary rules) by judges may be encountered in the interpretation of 
secondary rules. There is also a possibility that what the legislator (that 
created the offence that is being enforced) intended may be completely 
different from the proposition implicit in the secondary rules. However, judges 
are required to show that the hermeneutics at the various stages of 
interpreting both the primary rule and secondary rules was meticulous to such 
extent that their decision may be said to reflect the rules in a fair and accurate 
manner. A tool often used in this regard is the metaphor. It helps to reduce the 
complexity of arguments in order to affect ordinary good consciousness82 and 
has been said to have modelled jurisprudence in a furtive manner.83 As such, 
judges use metaphors to provide suitable means of ascertaining the 
normative secondary rules that ought to guide the interpretation and 
explanation of primary rules. This implies that metaphors may provide a 
suitable avenue for identifying a specific category of rules (“secondary rules”) 
since they reflect judges’ outlook on laws providing for or implying the 
imputation of acts and intents to corporations. A number of metaphors have 
played this role in the field of corporate criminal liability and have enhanced 
the consistency of the interpretation and implementation of laws criminalising 
the activities of corporations. They are described here as enforcement-
generated metaphors.84 
 
4.3.2.1 Enforcement-generated metaphors  
A judgment is often made of conjectural statements illustrating a point of law 
(obiter dictum) and the reasoning on which the conclusion is based (ratio 
decidendi). The obiter dictum may therefore involve the specification of a 
number of premises while the ratio decidendi may involve the movement from 
the premises to a conclusion. However, this does not mean that a judge is 
required to infer a conclusion only from the established premises although she 
must provide legal and logical (moral) explanations for the use of these 
                                                 
82 See Lawley and Tompkins, 2005: 4-5. 
83 Berger, 2002: 30. 
84 These are metaphors that are used specifically for the purposes of explaining how 
corporations function and how liability ought to be imposed upon them with regard to such 
modes of functioning. 
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premises85 for the purposes of protecting the law’s integrity and satisfying the 
onlooker that justice has taken its course.86 In order to fulfil this obligation 
judges have often had a predilection for what has been described as the 
“argumentative method and justificatory rhetoric.”87 The rhetoric has often 
been embedded with metaphors especially when the judges are stepping on 
new ground. This is because metaphors confer the apposite message88 and 
enable judges to convey different meanings and distinguish different 
experiences.89  
 
Metaphors are literary devices that suggest similarities between different 
experiences.90 They are more than just a play of words or devices used to 
embellish language because they are indicative of cognition91 and involve the 
features of human consciousness.92 They are often expressed as imaginative 
expressions and comprise several units such as words and objects (which 
may be called “symbols”) that connect the experiences by a pattern that may 
be termed “isomorphism.”93 Given the difficulty of determining the essential 
quality of abstract and intangible concepts, there is a natural tendency to 
define such concepts in terms of metaphors and then act upon them,94 since 
people are more likely to understand the nature of abstract concepts through 
the isomorphic connection between these concepts and the metaphor.95 As 
such, a convenient way of understanding corporations and their actions has 
been to compare them with concrete concepts in order to underscore their 
peculiarity and appeal to a given logic.  
                                                 
85 See Perelman, 1980: 150. 
86 Berger, 2002: 31. This augurs well for certainty and coherence and enables subsequent 
courts of equal or lower standing to apply the decision when confronted by a similar set of 
facts. 
87 Goodrich, 1987: 123. 
88 Berger, 2002: 32. 
89 Perelman, 1980: 156. Thus, where a judge intends to take exception to a particular rule 
(used by a previous judge) providing for the imputation of acts and intents to corporations in a 
particular manner, metaphors may be suitable tools for justifying the taking of exception. 
90 Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 5. 
91 Richards, 1936: 90, 96 and Berger, 2002: 34. 
92 Capara, 1996: 170. 
93 See Lawley and Tompkins, 2005: 6-7. 
94 Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 158. This however means that perceptions and actions are 
restricted to those that may be specified within the realm of the metaphor’s logic. See Lawley 
and Tompkins, 2005: 9. 
95 Patry, 2008: 2. See also Berger, 2002: 34. 
133 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, given that a corporation is deemed by many judges to be an 
abstraction the language they employ to describe its actions or explain their 
decisions is often laced with metaphors.96 A cursory look at judgments 
imposing criminal liability on corporations over the past 400 years therefore 
reveals a substantial number of metaphors employed to explain and justify the 
imputation of acts and intents to corporations in a certain manner or the taking 
of exception from the legally prescribed way of imputing acts and intents to 
corporations. As such, if it is assumed that the majority of these judges sought 
to describe the primary rule of the applicable law and justify their interpretation 
by making reference to metaphors, a close examination of the metaphors may 
enable us to construct a model that is consonant with courts’ outlook of the 
way in which acts and intents ought to be imputed to corporations. Such 
model may then be said to describe the secondary rules that guide the 
interpretation and implementation of primary rules that provide for imputation. 
It may thus be possible for other judges to invoke these secondary rules when 
seeking to determine how to impute acts and intents to a corporation in the 
case before them.97  
 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the first challenge that both civil law and 
criminal law courts grapple with is that of explaining the “abstract” concept of 
a corporation. Some 400 years ago, Fineux advanced that “[a] corporation is 
an aggregation of head and body: not a head by itself, nor a body by itself; 
and it must be consonant to reason, for otherwise it is worth nought.”98 As 
Maitland rightly pointed out, Fineux intended to link the attribute of 
“corporateness” or the abstraction that is characteristic of corporations to that 
of a number of different concrete concepts. He therefore used an isomorphic 
                                                 
96 They contend that it may be easier to understand the abstract legal concept of ‘corporation’ 
through these metaphors. For discussion on the importance of using metaphors in such 
instances see Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 115. 
97 As will be shown below, the result is not simply a model but the “bringing forth” of a “world” 
of corporations through the operation of the judicial system. Lawley and Tompkins (2005: 17-
18, 29-39) describe such mental viewpoint as a “Metaphor Landscape.” This “world” or 
“Metaphor Landscape” is the same legal world described in Chapter 2 in which corporations 
are entities in esse. 
98 14 Hen. VIII f. 3 (Mich. pl. 2) cited in Maitland, 1900a. Fineux sought to dismiss the idea 
that the corporation sole that consisted of just one person qualified as a corporation. 
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pattern consisting of symbols such as “aggregation,” “head” and “body” to 
connect the abstract concept of corporation to the tangible structure of an 
organism in order to appeal to the logic of a system of interdependent units 
that constitute a whole. In the same epoch, Coke endorsed the use of the 
above metaphors on the basis that a corporation is “invisible, immortal and 
rests only in intendment and consideration of the law.” He also asserted that a 
corporation has no “soul” and cannot appear in “person” and then he 
compared it to a “bishop who is elect before he is consecrated” and an “infant 
in his mother’s womb before his birth.”99 The last thing these judges may have 
been accused of was trying to embellish their opinions with metaphors. It is 
obvious that they struggled to underscore the peculiarity of corporations and 
thus appealed to commonsense logic by suggesting similarities between the 
corporation and an organism or a bishop before consecration and a foetus.100 
Nonetheless, the message conveyed was that a corporation corresponds to 
something intangible (an abstract whole) but functions like a living organism. 
 
The most problematic metaphor that has been used to describe a corporation 
is that of “person.”101 In line with section 14 of the Criminal Law Act 1827, 
section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act 1899 ordained thus: 
[i]n the construction of every enactment relating to an offence 
punishable on indictment or on summary conviction, whether 
contained in an Act passed before or after the commencement 
of the Act, the expression “person” shall, unless the contrary 
intention appears, include a body corporate.  
 
In a landmark civil suit a few years earlier Lord Halsbury seated in the House 
of Lords had stated emphatically that “once the company is legally 
incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person with its 
rights and liabilities appropriate to itself”102 Lord MacNaghten acquiesced and 
introduced metaphors of his own. He contended that “[t]he company attains 
maturity on its birth. There is no period of minority - no interval of incapacity. I 
cannot understand how a body corporate thus made “capable” by statute can 
                                                 
99 Sutton’s Hospital at 22. 
100 However, the logic of these metaphors may be questioned since a bishop before 
consecration and a foetus are both in existence although in another form. 
101 See Chapter 2 for discussion on the corporation’s entitlement to legal personality. 
102 Salomon at 30. 
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lose its individuality.”103 Although there is no evidence that Lord MacNaghten 
took Coke’s metaphorical expression into consideration, the use of words 
such as birth, maturity and individuality connotes the actuality of the 
corporation and the need to treat it as a “person” with incidental rights and 
duties.104 These words were thus used as symbols to connect the abstract 
notion of corporation to the less abstract notion of “person”105 in order to 
communicate the essential qualities of a corporation in plain language. 
Drafters of the abovementioned sections of the Criminal Law Act 1827 and 
the Interpretation Act 1899 may also have intended to use the word “person” 
for similar reasons. 
 
The prevailing current of thought still flows toward the recognition of corporate 
personality and the view of such personality as representing a body existing in 
the legal world (contemplation) and analogous to a human body. Although this 
viewpoint is far from comprehensible, it certainly justifies the enjoyment of 
rights by corporations as well as the enforcement of duties against them. 
However, it does not help in ascertaining a course of action for the 
enforcement of crimes against corporations. As noted in Chapter 3, criminal 
law courts initially found niche in the regimes of strict and absolute liability, as 
well as expediently interpreting regulatory laws as providing for such liability. 
But when they were called upon to convict and sanction corporations for 
(clearly defined) crimes of intent or negligence they simply averred that 
corporations could not be criminally liable for such offences. As such, the 
stumbling block was the adduction of relevant evidence showing a 
corporation’s criminal intention or negligence. The analogy with the human 
body soon proved valuable. Judges readily introduced new metaphors or 
expounded those introduced by previous judges to strengthen the 
comparison. In another landmark civil law suit that also subsequently 
influenced criminal law courts, Viscount Haldane decided the case before him 
on the logic of this comparison but noted that a corporation does not really 
                                                 
103 Salomon at 51. See also Lord Davey at 56. 
104 They may have been influenced by the contention that legal personality is predicated on 
humanness. This contention is however shown to be flawed in Chapter 2. 
105 Less abstract because it was considered as being synonymous to individual although 
‘person’ is equally a tortuous concept. 
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have a body of its own but has a “directing mind and will” that is also its “ego” 
and the “centre of its personality.”106 These symbols were used not only to 
connect the abstract corporation to the human “person” but also to facilitate 
the identification of the corporation’s locus of control. Hence, as the mind is 
purportedly responsible for a human being’s thoughts and as the will and ego 
represent a human being’s conscious choices and decisions, there are 
individual agents that embody all these features that typify the corporation. 
 
About three decades later, Viscount Caldecote contended that “[a] company is 
incapable of acting or speaking or even of thinking except in so far as its 
officers have acted, spoken or thought.” As such, in order to hold a 
corporation liable for intent to deceive under the Defence (General) 
Regulations 1939 he concluded that these “officers are the company for this 
purpose.”107  In the following decade, Denning LJ’s (as he then was) 
comparison was aboveboard. He said that: 
[a] company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It 
has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It 
also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance 
with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more 
than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the 
mind or will. Others are directors and mangers who represent 
the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it 
does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind 
of the company.108  
 
This was no doubt a concise explanation of the analogy between the 
corporation and the human body as a means of describing how a corporation 
functions in the eyes of the law and how its liability ought to be proved. In the 
words of Denning LJ this meant that “the fault of the manager will be the 
personal fault of the company.” However, as stated above, the isomorphic 
pattern that connected the abstract corporation to the human body did not 
provide a vivid picture (secondary rules) to such extent that judges could 
consistently identify the natural persons that represented the corporation’s 
“mind or will” in cases where the relevant law imposed criminal liability on the 
                                                 
106 Lennard’s Carrying Co at 713. 
107 Kent and Sussex Contractors at 155. 
108 Bolton Engineering at 172. 
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corporation. As such, different agents at different levels were recognised in 
the abovementioned cases. In the landmark case of Nattrass, the House of 
Lords upheld this comparison and sought to clarify the uncertainty as regards 
the agents that ought to be identified with the corporation. Lord Reid stated 
that: 
There have been attempts to apply Lord Denning’s words to 
all servants of a company whose work is brain work, or who 
exercise some managerial discretion under the direction of 
superior officers of the company. I do not think that Lord 
Denning intended to refer to them. He only referred to those 
who “represent the directing mind and will of the company and 
control what it does.”109 
 
Despite the circularity of this contention, Lord Reid later on narrowed the 
meaning of the metaphors employed by the previous judges and noted that 
agents that constitute the “brain” of the corporation are those that have 
managerial functions with full discretion to act.110 He equally discounted 
Viscount Haldane’s use of the word “ego” or the less abstract concept of alter 
ego. In his opinion, this concept did not give a clear image of what was 
required given that courts ought to seek officers that could be identified with 
the accused corporation and not those that were in some way the 
corporation’s alternate persona.111 Lord Morris on his part complemented Lord 
Reid’s interpretation with another metaphor. He said the company in the case 
before them could not be liable for the acts of the store manager because the 
latter was “a cog in the machine which was devised: it was not left to him to 
devise it.”112 As such, there was a furtive shift from Viscount Haldane’s 
“directing mind and will” or “ego” that represented a corporation’s conscious 
choices and decisions or that typified the set of attributes that characterised a 
corporation in a given instance to a conception of the “directing mind and will” 
(excluding the “ego”) representing not only the choices and decisions but also 
the decision-making process itself. In other words, courts are now required to 
look beyond the set of attributes that characterise the corporation to the 
                                                 
109 Nattrass at 171. 
110 See Chapter 5 for further discussion on Lord Reid’s position. 
111 Some phrases used by Lord Reid however require further explanation. An example is: “the 
directing mind “speaks through the persona of the company” (no emphasis added) at Nattrass 
at 170. 
112 Nattrass at 181. 
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instrumentality that combines these attributes.113 There is no doubt that 
Nattrass was particularly based on surmise and not any evidence of how 
corporations function or ought to function.114 But that notwithstanding, their 
position was and to a certain extent still is what obtains (primary rule) in the 
enforcement of offences in the United Kingdom except where the statutory 
provision provides for another pattern of attribution.  
 
The parochiality of this position has no doubt resulted in the lack of certainty 
and coherence in the way in which laws (primary rules) providing for the 
imputation of acts and intents to corporations ought to be interpreted and 
implemented (secondary rules).115 This may be blamed in part on the 
disregard of the metaphorical nature of the communication of earlier 
judgements (especially Viscount Haldane’s) and the contamination of the 
experiences they described by the introduction of new metaphors.116 
However, given that metaphors are embedded in most sentences made by 
people117 it is difficult to conceive of an express interpretation by one judge 
that would not include many new metaphors.118 The problem seems to stem 
from two things: firstly, the failure to closely examine only those metaphors 
that may be described as enforcement-generated metaphors in order to 
decipher what the judges actually described; and secondly, the introduction of 
new enforcement-generated metaphors. However, given that Nattrass may be 
said to represent the ascriptive primary rule, only a close examination of the 
enforcement-generated metaphors used by their Lordships in Nattrass and 
not those used by earlier judges such as Viscount Haldane and Viscount 
                                                 
113 This means that the “brain” would always remain the “brain” and the hands would always 
be construed as the “hands.” This is no doubt a classic case of anthropomorphism whereas 
the previous courts seemed to have intended to make an analogy and not simply ascribe 
uniquely human features to corporations. This is because the human being’s organs do not 
switch roles to suit the circumstances. In other words, if Viscount Haldane and Denning LJ 
had intended to define the corporate person based on the human anatomy they would have 
directed courts to stick to labels and titles because the brain remains the brain and the hand 
remains the hand whatever the circumstances. 
114 See discussion on the criticisms of this approach in Chapter 5. 
115 See for example Nourse LJ in El Ajou at 695. 
116 The introduction of new metaphors is a major impediment to understanding the experience 
described. See Lawley and Tompkins, 2005: 27. 
117 Lawley and Tompkins, 2005: 11-12. 
118 Even my explanations above do include metaphors that were unintentionally introduced. 
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Caldecote may be important in determining the normative secondary rules.119 
This is because Nattrass is the precedent and other courts are bound by its 
rules. As such, it may be said that the applicable mechanism of imputation in 
the United Kingdom requires courts to impute only the offence committed (in 
part or in whole) by a senior manager with full discretion to a corporation. 
 
However, when the identification doctrine is evaluated by referring to the 
outlook of Nattrass judges it is shown to be a rigid form of anthropomorphism 
that is not appropriate to the enforcement of crimes against all types of 
corporations. Nonetheless, it may be argued that Lord Reid’s dictum was 
based on the premise that a corporation is a legal fiction and acts and intents 
are imputed to it by a fiction. Thus, he stated that “[a] living person has a mind 
which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has hands to 
carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through 
living persons, though not always one or the same person.”120 This means 
that he did not espouse the idea of attributing human traits to a corporation to 
such extent that the agent that is considered a corporation’s “brain” would be 
its “brain” under all circumstances. Instead, he may be understood to imply 
that a corporation can act through different persons and whether an agent is 
identified with the corporation must depend on the circumstances of each 
case although such agent must be sufficiently senior.121  
 
The confusion as regards the flexibility of Nattrass is depicted by Turner J’s 
strict interpretation of Nattrass in P&O European Ferries and the broad 
interpretations by Nourse LJ and Lord Hoffmann in El Ajou and Meridian. Lord 
Hoffmann’s interpretation is particularly important as he advanced that the 
“misunderstanding of the true principle” on which Lennard’s Carrying Co was 
decided had favoured a strict interpretation of Viscount Haldane’s words in all 
                                                 
119 Even though Nattrass does not seem to have complied with the secondary rules that 
derived from previous judgements. See Chapter 5. 
120 Nattrass at 170. 
121 It is then uncertain why Lord Reid took exception to the statement by Stable J in ICR 
Haulage to this effect.  Stern (1987: 134-5) describes Stable J’s position as “pragmatic” but 
however warns that too much discretion should not be given to courts. 
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circumstances.122 That notwithstanding, Lord Hoffmann equally added to the 
confusion of how the primary rule ought to be interpreted by introducing his 
own metaphors. He said “[t]here is in fact no such thing as the company as 
such, no ding an sich, only the applicable rules.”123 He therefore premised his 
dictum on the fiction theory and this may have pushed him to the conclusion 
that Viscount Haldane’s internal point of view was simply about how the rule 
embedded in the relevant statute ought to apply to the accused corporation 
and not about how such corporation’s functioning and nature ought to be 
ascertained by the court.124 However, if courts are required to consider only 
the wordings of the relevant statute, then it is uncertain what they will do 
where such wordings do not provide any pattern for the imputation of acts and 
intents to corporations. As such, there is need for a primary rule that applies in 
all circumstances together with a set of secondary rules (informing judges on 
how corporations are structured and how they function) guiding their 
interpretation and explanation of the primary rule.125 As mentioned above, the 
machinery through which both sets of rules function is the mechanism of 
imputation and it is submitted here that an efficacious mechanism of 
imputation must have a primary rule that reflects the secondary rules. The 
normative perspective of judges presented through metaphors is thus shown 
here to be a good example of secondary rules. 
 
It must however be noted that the picture depicted by the framework of 
metaphors is neither an accurate reflection of how corporations are truly 
structured nor of the outlook of all criminal law judges. It is simply an 
explanation of the primary rule from a normative (moral) perspective 
describing the rule as it is and not necessarily an explanation from an 
                                                 
122 Meridian at 506 and 509-510. The assumption is that both Lennard’s Carrying Co and 
Nattrass established the same rule and the latter (although more important to criminal law 
courts) simply elaborated on the rule established by the former. 
123 Meridian at 507. 
124 Thus, Lord Hoffmann described Denning LJ’s metaphors (cited above) as a form of 
anthropomorphism that diverted attention from the objective that Viscount Haldane sought to 
achieve. See Meridian at 509. 
125 If courts were required to examine the relevant law and fashion “special rules” where 
necessary as contended by Lord Hoffmann, then Viscount Haldane and subsequent judges 
would not have bothered employing the abovementioned enforcement-generated metaphors 
to explain the nature of the corporation and how the relevant law ought to be implemented as 
regards such nature.  
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objective (beyond legal bias) perspective describing the rule as it ought to 
be.126 The framework of metaphors is supposed to help avert the fallacy of 
defining a good or appropriate mechanism on the basis of legal provisions 
although it does so only to a very limited extent. It merely represents some 
established standards of some participants in the criminal justice practice 
(judges) and the fact that the properties of these standards are largely 
undefined leaves much room for uncertainty in the processes by which courts 
may impute acts and intents to corporations. It is thus still uncertain what 
should count as the corporation’s act and mind. One finds little justification 
(from an objective viewpoint) for imputation in a particular way in any given 
instance by referring solely to this outlook of judges. They may be accused to 
have over the years simply deduced an “is” from an “ought” by bringing forth a 
spurious system of proving a corporation’s guilt since they consider the 
corporation to be a legal abstraction. However, if it is accepted that knowledge 
of corporate behaviour stretches well beyond the confines of legal 
categories,127 then it is only logical that recourse be had to a number of non-
legal disciplines explaining the relationship between a corporation and the 
natural persons that it uses to perform actions.128 Such knowledge may 
broaden the view of judges and legislators and guide their interpretation and 
explanation of primary rules. However, as noted above, describing principles 
deduced from non-legal categories as secondary rules solely because of their 
content may lead to inconsistency especially where judges may be 
empowered to disregard the primary rule. Thus, it is important that principles 
are deduced only from non-legal categories that previous courts referred or 
alluded to.129 
 
4.3.2.1.2 Rules of recognition deduced from non-legal categories 
                                                 
126 The overlap of discussion on the law as it operates and as it ought to operate stems from 
the fact that there is no clear-cut distinction between the law as it “is” and as it “ought to be.” 
See Marmor’s (2006: 690-693) discussion on ethical positivism and legal positivism. 
127 That is why judges readily use metaphors to compare legal experiences to other 
experiences outside the realm of law such as biology and mechanics. Equally, that is why 
Lord Hoffmann referred to a corporation’s constitution as its “primary rules of attribution.” 
128 This knowledge will no doubt help avert the fallacy described above. 
129 This may enable courts to avoid diluting the legal tenets to such extent that the integrity of 
the applicable law is brought into disrepute. See a similar problem discussed by Legrand and 
Munday, 2003: 126. 
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In Nattrass, Viscount Dilhorne stated that: 
[Lennard’s Carrying Co and Bolton Engineering], I think clearly 
indicate that one has in relation to a company to determine 
who is or who are, for it may be more than one, in actual 
control of the operations of the company, and the answer to 
be given to that question may vary from company to company 
depending on its organisation.130 
 
Lord Pearson also noted that:  
It was suggested in the argument of this appeal that in 
exercising supervision over the operations in the shop Mr 
Clement was performing functions of management...But 
supervision of the details of operations is not normally a 
function of higher management.131 
 
These judges were no doubt alluding to the fact that the court has to examine 
a corporate structure and determine whether the agent who performed the act 
under consideration exercised the requisite amount of control in order to be 
deemed the directing mind of the corporation.132 As such, courts are advised 
to consider the system of management and control adopted by the accused 
corporations and may therefore look beyond legal edicts (statutes and 
rationes decidendi of precedent) to obtain knowledge of the different types of 
systems that corporations may adopt. There are for example, four functions of 
management commonly cited in management studies: planning, organising, 
controlling and leading.133 Planning involves devising strategies for the future 
to foresee problems and decide on actions to evade these problems; 
organising involves designating individuals to different tasks or responsibilities 
that work together to accomplish the goals of the corporation;134 controlling 
involves ensuring that plans are being implemented properly; and leading 
involves guiding, directing and overseeing of employees to achieve the goals 
of the corporation. As such, a simple overview of the functions of 
management in management studies may lead to the suggestion that 
corporations are instruments designed to control and coordinate human 
                                                 
130 Nattrass at 187. 
131 Nattrass at 193. 
132 See also Nourse LJ in El Ajou at 696 and Eveleigh J in R v Andrews-Weatherfoil Ltd 
[1972] 1 All ER 65 at 70. 
133 See Higgins, 1994: 7. 
134 See Bateman and Snell, 2007: 16 -18. 
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activities in order to achieve defined goals.135 Thus, the manager that plans 
strategies, organises other agents and leads them toward specific goals may 
be said to be representative of the corporate entity. 
 
Organisation theory also presents a gamut of conceptions of such systems. 
The existence of so many conceptions is indicative of a number of things: 
firstly, there are diverse forms of corporations; secondly, there are different 
ways in which organisations use their agents to perform defined actions (and 
thus breach the law);136 and thirdly, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a single 
conception to capture the complexity of the structure and functioning of 
corporate entities to such extent that it may be said to be a blueprint for 
ascertaining corporate action.137 A number of legal researchers have 
examined a number of these conceptions with the objective of deducing 
conventions from them that may guide the process of imputation by judges. 
Fisse and Braithwaite for example present four typologies tied to different 
ways in which different types of organisations act and think via the agency of 
their agents. They advise that a model for regulating corporations must 
harmonise these varieties of structures and actions to enable the criminal 
justice system to diagnose corporate crime in its complex and paradoxical 
setting and impose liability in a justified manner. Unfortunately, they embarked 
instead on a search for the magic bullet that will serve as ultimate guide for 
imposing criminal liability on all corporations.138 Equally, the Accountability 
Model that they introduce, as well as its regulatory framework (pyramidal 
enforcement), seems to negate the use of the primary rule of attribution in 
spite of the fact that the essence of the use of knowledge from non-legal 
categories is to determine when it is appropriate to impute acts and intents to 
corporations.139 Kriesberg also discusses three models of organisational 
                                                 
135 Abell, 2006: 9-10. 
136 See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 101-132. 
137 Kriesberg, 1976: 1100; and Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 122. See also Morgan, 1986: 
348. 
138 See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 104, 122. 
139 Fisse and Braithwaite seem to have placed too much reliance on the notion that 
corporations are entities controlled entirely by their agents and less on the fact that 
corporations are autonomous and rational entities. See Chapter 7 for discussion on some of 
the shortcomings of this model and its regulatory framework. 
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behaviour but omits discussing how the knowledge of these different types of 
models ought to be used by courts in given instances and why. 
 
Following the expositions of these commentators, it may be safe to submit 
that seeking to put a finger on the model that will stand out as the blueprint for 
corporate decision-making and actions is to thrash straw. In other words, no 
single theory deduced from organisation theory may be held to represent the 
secondary rules (to guide the interpretation of primary rule by courts). A more 
reasonable approach may be to ascertain a means of determining how 
knowledge obtained from organisation theory may help courts in 
understanding the nature and functioning of corporations. Thus, if such 
knowledge is shown to be helpful to the court’s obligation to punish the 
corporation for an offence particular to the corporation (and not its agent), 
then it may provide good guidance as a secondary rule. However, given the 
complex nature of the agency relationship, as well the diverse number of 
management structures that corporations may adopt, it may be difficult to 
build a clear framework of conceptions that justify the imputation of acts and 
intents to corporations in different instances. Moreover, such framework ought 
to enable courts to consistently implement the primary rule of attribution 
irrespective of the size and structure of the corporation and the offence 
committed. Nonetheless, it is already an arduous task penetrating the intricate 
structure of corporations and identifying the agent or agents at fault; and this 
is exacerbated by the fact that the same corporation’s structure and 
functioning may reflect different conceptions of organisation theory at the 
same or different times.140 As such, where in the first year, senior manager A 
was responsible for general transactions in departments X and Y and in the 
second year changes in the market or other circumstances pushed the senior 
management to delegate (unofficially) the management of department Y to 
junior manager B, it may be difficult to identify the agent at fault if the 
criminogenic transaction was carried out in department X in the first year and 
completed in department Y in the second year.  
 
                                                 
140 Different departments may adopt different decision-making models. See Fisse and 
Braithwaite, 1993: 104. 
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It is submitted here that organisation theories on the restructuring of 
corporations to suit contingencies or external circumstances may be helpful in 
this regard. Some theorists have established that the behaviour of 
organisations is a function of the relationship between the organisation and 
the system in which it operates. So where the market becomes unpredictable 
a corporation may be impelled to move from a rigid hierarchical management 
system to a system of project management by specialists. This is referred to 
as the contingency approach to organisational behaviour and management.141 
The crust of this approach is that managers should not believe in panaceas 
because there is no single best way to structure and manage an 
organisation.142 The same advice may be given to judges. As such, it is 
submitted here that rather than engage in a futile search for a panacea it may 
be preferable to borrow (albeit a small part of) the explanation of contingency 
theorists to justify a court’s decisions to impute the action and intent of senior 
manager A to the accused corporation in a given instance and the act and 
intent of junior manager B in another. Given that there are different 
explanations for the different processes and interactions that may result in the 
performance of an action by a corporation, these different processes and 
interactions may be deemed to reflect the different ways in which corporations 
may modify their structures in order to cope with contingencies.143 As such, 
the contingency approach may guide the court’s interpretation of the primary 
rule of attribution in enabling the court to consider how the senior 
management of the accused corporation assessed the different contingencies 
and which system (processes and interactions) they deemed most 
appropriate to adopt in order to cope with these contingencies. Thus, actions 
of agents that may be explained on the basis of this system would logically be 
                                                 
141 See generally Legge, 1978 and Tosi, 1990. 
142 See Wood, 1979: 334. See also Burns and Stalker, 1990: 253; and Burns and Stalker, 
1966: vii. 
143 It must nonetheless be pointed out that this is in no way an attempt to broaden the scope 
of the already expansive organisation theory. Focus here is simply on the way in which the 
relationship between a corporation and its agent may be institutionalised to such extent that it 
may be used to distinguish the corporation’s actions and those of its agent on a consistent 
basis. See the boundaries of organisation theory drawn by L Donaldson (1985: 119).  
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imputed to the corporation.144 It may then be submitted that an appropriate 
way of imputing acts and intents of agents to corporations should be via a 
mechanism whose primary rule provides sufficient flexibility to courts in order 
for them to establish a link between the corporations and their agents 
irrespective of the system adopted or the way activities were organised. 
 
The above notwithstanding, it may also be important for the court to have 
knowledge of the different systems that different corporations may adopt 
when dealing with contingencies. Kriesberg, Fisse and Braithwaite, cited 
above, discuss different ways in which organisations may be structured and 
how these may (to a certain extent) be harmonised with rules of corporate 
criminal accountability. Given that an exhaustive analysis of theories 
explaining the structure and functioning of organisations is both unrealistic 
and unnecessary a few theories discussed by these commentators will be 
grouped under two heads representing two major management systems 
regularly adopted in contingency thinking. These are the mechanistic and the 
organic systems. Thus, a corporation seeking to adapt to its changing 
environment may either adopt a mechanistic or an organic system. These 
systems are important because they describe the agent’s commitment to the 
corporation with regard to her function and responsibility and the mode she 
adopts to perform her function or further the corporation’s interests.145 
 
Mechanistic systems are characterised by clearly defined hierarchical levels 
(often vertical) with well-established policies and procedures and little or no 
discretion to operational agents that often have low levels of skill.146 Each 
agent knows what is expected of her and how she is required to perform the 
task although she may not always be aware of her job’s end goal. 
Nonetheless, her loyalty and compliance with the instructions from the 
hierarchy are bigger motivations and quite crucial for the smooth functioning 
                                                 
144 This reflects the idea of “organization culture” where agents rely on an existing culture to 
justify their actions. See Tosi, 1990: 19. See also the discussion of corporate culture as a 
mechanism of imputation in Chapter 6. 
145 See Burns and Stalker, 1990: 248. 
146 See Tosi, 1990: 18-19. 
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of the system.147 This implies that low-level employees are largely dependent 
on their superiors (senior managers) who are required to have a panoptic 
view of the activities of the former. It is the same senior managers who from 
the viewpoint of the psychologist, as shown by Abell,148 use incentives and 
other motivating factors (which shape values and experiences) to induce 
junior employees to contribute to defined objectives. Organisation theories 
that are concerned with centralised decision-making and simple structures 
may therefore be described as mechanistic.149 Equally, the models discussed 
by Kriesberg150 may be said to describe (to a certain extent) mechanistic 
organisations: the Rational Actor Model describes the corporation as an entity 
whose decisions (taken by senior officers) are based on the rationale of 
maximising benefits; and the Organisational Process Model and Machine 
Bureaucracy Model favour the placing of emphasis on values and 
experiences that emerge from established standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) within the corporation and the bargaining process involving different 
persons of the hierarchy. Although the question of corporate liability is 
unfortunately given less regard in the illustration of the Organisational Process 
Model and Machine Bureaucracy Model, it may be argued that they require 
the court to impute the acts and knowledge of the officers that formulate, 
implement and monitor the SOPs.151 However, where the formulation of 
defective SOPs was done by a collective unit (as it is often the case), it is 
uncertain whose acts and possibly knowledge would be imputed to the 
corporation. Also it is uncertain which act would be attached to the corporation 
where the offence was the result of a combination of the formulation, 
enactment and implementation of the SOPs by different agents at different 
stations and departments. Unsurprisingly, after a thorough analysis of these 
theories and several others (mentioned above), Fisse and Braithwaite152 
                                                 
147 Burns and Stalker, 1990: 248-250 and Tosi, 1990: 18-19.  
148 2006: 14, 23. 
149 Examples include Mintzberg’s Simple Structure Model, Max Weber’s conception of 
bureaucracy (Professional Bureaucracy), the Noblese Oblige Model, the Fault-based 
Individual Responsibility Model, and the Autopoiesis Model all discussed by Fisse and 
Braithwaite (1993: 105-117). 
150 1976: 1091-1029. 
151 This may be said to concord with French’s (1995) “corporate internal decision structure” or 
CID. 
152 1993: 118. 
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remarked that they shed little light on how legal principles of accountability 
ought to be patterned to suit corporate behaviour. However, they may be said 
to show that if the corporation had adopted a mechanistic system, it is less 
likely to be identified with a low-level employee unless her attitude was one of 
allegiance and her act that breached the law was influenced by practices and 
procedures established by the senior managers.153  
 
Organic systems on the other hand are characterised by a more flexible 
structure where the power to create practices and implement procedures is 
proportional to the agent’s competence and skill or what she contributes.154 
The established practices and procedures are less influential in this system 
given that agents enjoy much wider discretions in planning and performing 
their tasks.155 The commitment of an agent stems from the community of 
interests she has with other agents and the corporation.156 The agent is 
therefore more likely to take responsibility for omissions or failures given that 
she has control of the planning and implementation. As such, the organic 
system has no defined locus of command and control as changes in the 
surrounding circumstances dictate which department or person with the 
requisite knowledge and competence should guide the concern.157 This 
system is akin to a number of theories discussed by Fisse and Braithwaite. 
The Nominated Accountability Model may operate to attach the acts and 
intents not of the titular head but the person that was charged with the 
function of managing or performing a task within the corporation.158 Equally, 
the Divisionalised Form may be said to describe an organic structure because 
it operates to attach the activities of different semi-autonomous departments 
that are simply required to meet defined targets by the senior management or 
board of directors.159 This is also similar to Adhocracy where loosely related 
experts are brought on ad hoc projects and established practices and 
                                                 
153 This implies that a hypothetical reasonable worker would have acted likewise in similar 
circumstances given that workers in a mechanistic setting are interchangeable. 
154 Tosi, 1990: 19. 
155 Tosi, 1990: 19. 
156 Burns and Stalker, 1990: 250. 
157 Burns and Stalker, 1990: 250. 
158 Fisse and Braithwaite: 1993: 116. 
159 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 106. See also Mintzberg, 1979: 380-387. 
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procedures have little or no influence on the experts.160 Also, it reflects the 
Dramaturgical Model that operates to hold a corporation liable for acts of 
agents performed in a makeshift manner following general guidelines.161 
Given that discussion here is based on imputation, it may be said that once it 
is ascertained that the accused corporation had adopted an organic structure, 
the court ought to allow the imputation of the knowledge or act of the 
nominated person or department that had control over the transaction under 
consideration and not the executive head or senior management.162  
 
It must however be noted that there is hardly any organisation that is simply 
mechanistic or organic. The adoption of either system is often not an objective 
reality since corporate managers may adopt one system or the other in short 
intervals or even a hybrid of both systems to deal with different 
contingencies.163 As such, organic organisations are not always adhocracies 
and are more often than not stratified while mechanistic systems may also 
sometimes allow greater discretion to operational employees.164 As such, it is 
important that emphasis is placed on the transaction under consideration by 
the court (that allegedly breached the law) and the motivations and objectives 
of the various persons that were involved. Thus, the court ought to refer to this 
approach to determine how the corporation reacted to contingencies and how 
the reaction affected its structure and functioning as regards the relevant 
transaction. In other words, the court would determine whether in allocating 
responsibilities with regard to that transaction the corporation acted as a 
mechanistic or organic organisation and whether the agent or agents that 
acted were motivated or influenced by established practices and procedures 
or were empowered to use their discretion to meet the objectives of the 
corporation. The actions of these agents should logically be imputed to the 
                                                 
160 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 106-108. 
161 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 109-111. See also Mangham, 1978: 27. 
162 The likelihood of other persons or departments that were not responsible to claim 
responsibility for the transaction (Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 117) will be considerably low 
since it is the whole corporation that will nevertheless bear the brunt and there is often a 
community of interests shared by most agents and departments. 
163 Burns and Stalker (1990: 251) advance that both systems represent two opposite 
tendencies and not mutually incompatible attributes. 
164 The leadership often seeks to respond to the contingency in a manner that is most 
effective. 
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corporation because they are particular to it and not the agents who were 
mere instruments that were used to achieve set goals. 
 
It may then be contended that a mechanism of imputation is not supposed to 
enable the court to identify the guilty agent with the corporation but simply to 
link the wrongdoing of one or many agents (as well as the acts and the 
variables that motivated the acts) to the corporate principal to such extent that 
it may be said that the latter perpetrated the wrongdoing through the agent.165 
Thus, the court should not dwell on the question of whether the surgeon that 
performed the operation was at fault (which should be the concern of 
individual liability and not corporate liability) but on the question of whether 
such surgeon performed the operation in a setting created by the hospital that 
tended to encourage negligence on her part. In other words, it is not the 
surgeon’s fault that is imputed to the corporate principal166 but the relationship 
between the surgeon’s negligent act and a number of different variables that 
tolerated or encouraged the negligent act and the breach of the law.167  
 
What the discussion above shows is that the theoretical and practical 
understanding of the nature and functioning of corporations imported from 
non-legal disciplines may help in establishing reasonable parameters for 
showing how and why the acts of certain agents may be imputed to a 
corporation in a given instance. These may therefore constitute secondary 
rules that guide the interpretation and use of a primary rule of attribution by 
courts. However, they must not only be considered because of their content 
but also because of their pedigree. Hence, given that it is submitted that they 
must be derived from the obiter dicta of previous judgements, the knowledge 
they provide may be said to be persuasive. As such, they may be used to 
                                                 
165 As noted above, even though I talk of the imputation of acts and intents to corporations, it 
is actually the causal relationship between the agent’s acts and intents and the offence that is 
imputed to the corporation and not the whole acts and intents. This is because a corporation 
does not actually perform the act or entertain the intent but incites the agent to perform the 
act or entertain the intent. 
166 This would be tantamount to vicarious criminal liability. 
167 This does not imply that the imputable act of a single agent may not suffice to render a 
corporation guilty. Nonetheless, there will seldom be sufficient justification to impute only the 
one act of a single agent to the accused corporation since it is a complex of several acts of 
several agents. See Chapters 6 and 8 for discussion on aggregation. 
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evaluate a mechanism of imputation in order to determine whether the pattern 
of imputation embedded in the mechanism is justifiable from an objective 
perspective. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
It is argued above that when one talks of “rule of attribution” one is strictly 
referring to the primary rule embedded in the statute or precedent and not the 
whole process of attribution. However, the law constitutes of both legal rules 
and normative notions established by courts in the process of interpreting and 
implementing the former.168 Thus, Dworkin’s Hercules would not arrive at the 
right answer (of how to impute acts and intents to corporations) by having 
recourse solely to the primary rule since this rule plays only an expressive 
function. Within each jurisdiction there is a mutable mechanism that describes 
an ascertained process of attribution involving both the primary rule 
embedded in the applicable statutory provision or precedent and other rules 
that explain or modify the primary rule. These other rules are referred above 
as secondary rules (following Hart’s use of these terminologies) because they 
confer the power upon judges to interpret and explain the primary rule in a 
particular way. The mutable mechanism is referred to as the mechanism of 
imputation. It has been shown that a defective mechanism is likely to 
compromise the consistent imposition of liability on corporations while an 
entirely adequate one will enhance the process. Thus, in order to determine 
whether a mechanism is appropriate or not, some substantive parameters for 
evaluating them are suggested.  
 
The parameters are shown to determine the efficaciousness of the 
mechanism on two bases. Firstly, how the primary rule of the mechanism 
corresponds with other legal principles (following Dworkin’s terminology) that 
are implied by the operation of related branches of law such as criminal law, 
company law and agency law. Emphasis is placed on agency law principles 
                                                 
168 See Cohen, 1933: 11. See also Gray, 1921: 84 cited in Golding, 1981: 1034-35. 
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due to the fact that principles of company law and criminal law such as legal 
personality and culpability and responsibility are discussed in Chapters 2 and 
3. This test is therefore a pedigree-based test, assessing legal rules by 
referring to legal edicts. Secondly, the mechanism may be also evaluated by 
looking at how its primary rule corresponds with rules of recognition 
(secondary rules).169 The rules of recognition here are divided into two, viz. 
rules that may be inferred from the normative outlook of judges and rules that 
may be deduced from non-legal categories. Although this is a content-based 
test, the use of “non-pedigreed” principles is limited to their referral by 
previous courts. This reduces ambiguity (moral considerations), enhances 
consistency and averts a situation where judges may depart from the 
precedent by “plucking an idea literally from the air.”  
 
As regards rules inferred from the normative outlook of judges, the focus was 
on devices that judges often use to confer the apposite message in cases 
where they are dealing with abstract concepts such as corporations and 
where they are stepping on largely undeveloped ground such as corporate 
criminal liability. These devices are metaphors (narrowed down to 
enforcement-generated metaphors) and tend to reveal a figurative legal world 
wherein a corporation exists in the form of an entity with a head, a brain and 
body but no soul or conscience. However, the metaphors direct courts (when 
interpreting and applying a primary rule) to ensure that a corporation is liable 
because an agent that may be described as its directing mind (because she 
controlled the corporation as the mind controls the body) was at fault. With 
regard to rules that may be deduced from non-legal categories, emphasis was 
placed on organisation theory and its contingency approach to management 
because of the allusion to such theories in the obiter dicta of their Lordships in 
Nattrass.170 This approach directs the court to consider how a corporation 
structured itself (whether in a mechanistic or an organic way) in order to deal 
with contingencies at the time when the offence was committed. Thus, if the 
                                                 
169 In Chapter 7, the mechanisms are evaluated by reference to other secondary rules called 
the rules of adjudication. 
170 The assumptions are that there are no orthogonal values influencing the judge’s 
comprehension and explanation of the primary rule; and moral considerations involve turning 
toward the secondary rules.  
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agent or agents at fault were motivated due to the corporation’s organisation, 
it is logical that their fault be imputed to the corporation. As stated above, 
these rules are not legally valid as the courts are not obliged to invoke them 
and the framework is not watertight as many more rules may be included. As 
such, there is truly no universal litmus test for an effective mechanism of 
imputation given that corporations come in different sizes and carry out 
diverse activities and may commit a range of crimes in diverse ways.171 
Nonetheless, where the primary rule of a mechanism reflects the above 
parameters it is more likely that courts would impute acts to corporations 
because the acts are particular to the corporations and not to their agents. 
Thus, in the next two Chapters five mechanisms describing different ways in 
which agents may be identified with corporations will be evaluated on the 
bases of these substantive parameters in order to determine which 
mechanism is the most appropriate for the United Kingdom. However, given 
that courts apply the same procedural rules where the accused is a natural 
person and where the accused is a corporation, the evaluation of these five 
mechanisms on the bases of rules of recognition called rules of adjudication 
will be carried out by referring to the procedural rules governing the trial of 
natural persons. This will be done in Chapter 7. 
 
 
                                                 
171 What this thesis seeks to establish is whether given the circumstance (the criminal law in 
the United Kingdom), the applicable mechanisms can be employed efficaciously and not 
whether they are the most efficacious mechanisms in all circumstances because there can 
hardly be any such mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 5 SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATION OF THE 
APPLICABLE MECHANISMS OF IMPUTATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis seeks to develop a template that 
consistently guides prosecutors and courts in the process of imputing acts 
and intents to corporations for the purposes of imposing criminal liability and 
sanctions on them. In Chapter 4, this template was termed mechanism of 
imputation and it was noted that each jurisdiction has such a mechanism 
given that courts are required to apply laws in a consistent manner. 
Substantive parameters for determining the suitability of such mechanisms 
were generated from an understanding of how courts impute or ought to 
impute acts and intents to corporations. Thus, they were generated as a guide 
towards evaluating mechanisms of imputation. This Chapter is focused on the 
evaluation of the mechanisms of imputation used by courts in the United 
Kingdom. These mechanisms are the identification doctrine and the senior 
management failure test.  They are mechanisms of imputation because they 
are a logical consequence of the endeavours by courts and Parliament in the 
United Kingdom to ascertain (in accordance with prescription and practice) a 
measure of determining when the act or knowledge of an agent will be 
imputed to the corporation under defined circumstances. As such, they 
comprise primary rules that indicate the requisite pattern of attributing acts 
and intents to corporations in light of a number of related secondary rules. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, both mechanisms (especially the identification 
doctrine) have been subjected to scathing criticisms by many commentators 
and judges. Thus, the evaluation below will also involve an appraisal of some 
of these criticisms. In the first part of this Chapter, I will examine the primary 
rule of the identification doctrine and evaluate this rule on the bases of the 
rules of recognition (guiding the interpretation and implementation of the 
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primary rules) generated in Chapter 4. In the second part, I will focus on the 
primary rule of the senior management failure test and equally evaluate this 
rule on the bases of the rules of recognition generated in Chapter 4.  
 
5.2 THE IDENTIFICATION DOCTRINE 
 
The identification doctrine has invariably been referred to as the “directing 
mind and will” doctrine and the “alter ego” theory.1 In Chapter 3, it was shown 
how the doctrine was imported from the civil law (Lennard’s Carrying Co) by 
some criminal law courts in 1944, later on developed by Denning LJ (Bolton 
Engineering), affirmed by the House of Lords  (Nattrass) and furtively modified 
by Nourse LJ in El Ajou and Lord Hoffmann in Meridian. There is hardly any 
book or article on corporate criminal liability that has not reserved a number of 
pages or paragraphs for discussing and then lambasting this doctrine as a 
model for imputing acts and intents and/or liability to corporations. Some 
commentators have thus marvelled at its adoption by the House of Lords 
while others have sought to remove what they consider irrational restrictions 
and expand its scope of application.2 Equally, some judges have sought to 
distinguish the cases before them with Nattrass in order to avoid employing 
the restrictive form of the doctrine.3 That notwithstanding, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the identification doctrine may be said to represent the legal 
position as regards the imputation of acts and intents of agents to 
corporations for the purpose of holding the latter criminally liable. Its primary 
rule may therefore be described as the primary rule embedded in the 
precedent for imputing acts and intents to corporations in the United Kingdom. 
However, this rule requires courts to impute not the acts or intents but the 
                                                 
1 However, Stern (1987: 129), in line with Gower, refers to the doctrine as the “organic 
theory.” See also Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) in El Ajou at 705; and Gower, 1992: 194, 
footnote n. 36. 
2 See Stern, 1987: 142-147. See also Wells, 1995: 43-44; and 2001: 155-156. 
3 In addition to El Ajou and Meridian, see Alphacell; Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No 
2); National Rivers Authority v Alfred McAlpine East Homes Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 286, 
hereinafter referred to as Alfred McAlpine; and R v Gateway Foodmarkets [1997] 3 All ER 78, 
hereinafter referred to as Gateway Foodmarkets. This tendency has become the rule in many 
cases involving the enforcement of statutory offences as judges conveniently claim that policy 
considerations impel them to look past Nattrass. See also Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London 
Borough Council [1993] 2 All ER 718. 
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criminal liability of any senior officer that controls the corporation as the mind 
controls the body to the corporation. As such, courts are required to dissect 
the body corporate, identify the agent that was its “directing mind” and hold 
the corporation liable if such “directing mind” is shown to be liable.4 This 
primary rule may thus be said to provide straightforward instructions to the 
court and performs its linguistic or expressive function efficaciously. However, 
given that the rule ought to be invoked to impose liability on different types of 
corporations in a variety of circumstances, the efficaciousness of the rule 
would depend not on its linguistic clarity but on the possibility of courts to 
consistently interpret and apply it in diverse circumstances. In Chapter 4, it 
was advanced that the prospect of this happening is enhanced where the 
primary rule of the mechanism is consonant with the rules of recognition 
comprising some related legal principles and the viewpoints of both 
participants of the criminal justice practice and non-legal experts. As such, the 
first part of this Chapter will consider how the identification doctrine’s primary 
rule concurs with these substantive rules of recognition.  
 
5.2.1 The congruency of the doctrine’s primary rule with related legal 
principles 
 
As mentioned above, the primary rule of the identification doctrine may be 
said to be the principle directing a court to impute the guilt of an agent to a 
corporation only where such agent may be described as its “directing mind 
and will.” This is what Lord Hoffmann described in Meridian as the basic 
principle in Lennard’s Carrying Co. Criminal law courts have employed this 
rule as the “formal” or “first-order” reason for imposing liability on corporations 
for crimes of intent since 1944. As such, where courts have identified 
corporations with guilty persons not deemed to be the “directing minds” the 
                                                 
4 The fact that courts are directed to impute the liability and not the acts and intents of agents 
to corporations may be said to imply that the identification doctrine cannot be employed to 
enforce strict and absolute liability offences against corporations. This is because corporate 
liability for these offences follows the breach of a duty owed by the corporation and none of its 
agents can be liable. 
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convictions have been quashed on appeal.5 From a formalistic perspective, 
this rule may be said to be consonant with other legal principles that are 
relevant to corporate criminal liability. Firstly, it is conformable with the 
recognition of a corporation’s separate personality since liability is imposed 
directly or personally on the corporation. Secondly, it is congruent with the 
criminal law components of liability, mens rea and actus reus, given that a 
corporation is held liable only where it is shown to have entertained the 
relevant mens rea and performed the actus reus of the offence charged. 
Thirdly, it is congruent with the principle of agency since the corporation’s 
liability is limited to offences committed by agents (directing minds) while 
acting within the scope of their authority.  
 
With regard to the mechanism’s congruency with legal personality, it may be 
stated that the identification doctrine provides an appropriate method of 
imputing acts of agents to corporate principals in order to hold them 
personally and not vicariously liable.6 Although the agent may be called thus, 
she is actually “something more;”7 she is the corporation’s “directing mind and 
will” or the “very ego and centre” of its personality.8 This means that a 
corporation qualifies for legal personality because, amongst other things, it 
may consistently act intentionally and rationally through its “directing mind”9 
and therefore chooses to comply with the law or commit a crime. It is however 
uncertain why the corporation’s personality is reduced to the attributes 
exhibited by a single agent in a given instance although a corporation often 
represents a complex network of several actions and decisions of more than 
one agent.10 Some commentators also contemplate that the use of equivocal 
terms by courts (to describe such agent) such as “brain,” “nerve centre,” “alter 
ego” and “directing mind and will” confuse the debate by merging and 
                                                 
5 See Alfred McAlpine. 
6 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this is equally the case where the corporate principal is held 
liable as an accessory. However, there is nothing in the historical development (see Wells, 
2001: 86-105) to suggest that the identification doctrine was created as a convenient means 
of going around the difficulty of holding corporate principals vicariously liable for the crimes of 
their agents. Cf Lederman, 2000: 655; and Stern, 1987: 128.  
7 Kent and Sussex Contractors at 146. 
8 Viscount Haldane in Lennard’s Carrying Co at 713; and Lord Reid in Nattrass at 171-172. 
9 Lord Reid in Nattrass at 170; and Denning LJ in Bolton Engineering at 175. 
10 See the criticism of the idea that corporate liability should be based on methodological 
individualism by Braithwaite and Fisse (1993: 19-31). 
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overlapping their context with the concept of vicarious liability.11 The argument 
is that the identification doctrine does nothing more than compel a corporation 
to substitute for its delinquent senior manager and its liability is essentially 
vicarious.12 As such, the identification doctrine may be said to be 
inappropriate for holding corporations directly or personally liable.13 
 
Gobert14 also points out that if a corporation is an autonomous actor with 
distinct goals that do not necessarily agree with the goals of any particular 
manager and sometimes all managers and employees, it is awry for the 
corporation to take responsibility for the acts of any agent (derivatively or 
vicariously). It ought to take responsibility only for acts that can be identified 
as its own and it is of little importance whether the agent that perpetrates the 
act is a top executive or not.15 The identification doctrine is therefore criticised 
for the unnecessary bifurcation that does not represent the reality of corporate 
structures given that a corporation’s psychology is much broader than the 
thoughts of an individual senior manager in one instance.16 In the same vein, 
Donaldson17 argues that this stance is as good as focusing attention only on 
one part of the corporation or one aspect of its character.  His argument is 
reinforced by the fact that in cases of strict and absolute liability, a corporation 
(as the duty-holder) is personally liable if the prohibited act was performed by 
a junior employee or was the result of the confluence of acts of several 
agents. As such, corporate activity in breach of a criminal law standard may 
be the result of the failure in more than one component of the whole corporate 
structure.18 In other words, it may be the result of poorly conceived policies or 
poor monitoring of front-line employees by middle-level managers or poor 
implementation of policies or a combination of all these in varying degrees.19 
                                                 
11 See for example Stern, 1987: 132. See also Evans J in Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd at 84. 
12 Stern, 1987: 130; and Wells, 2001: 153-154.  
13 Hill, 2003: 12; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 64. 
14 1994: 396. 
15 This implies that the court should be able to distinguish between acts that are particular to a 
given corporation or intentions that arise from its personality and acts and intentions that are 
particular to its agent. 
16 See also Field and Jorg, 1991: 158-60. 
17 1982: 15. 
18 Gobert, 1994: 395. 
19 See United States v Bank of New England, 821 F 2nd 844, Court of Appeals (First Circuit) 
1987 (hereinafter referred to as Bank of New England) where it was held that collectivism in 
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Hence, seeking to identify the corporation with the blameworthy intent of the 
senior manager only is tantamount to deliberately ignoring other motivations 
and causes of corporate crime. Corporations with management systems that 
are designed to diffuse and not centralise responsibility will escape liability.20  
 
As such, it may be understood that collective responsibility ought to be the 
basis of corporate liability21 and prosecutions ought to be able to prove their 
cases against the collective unit, the corporation, rather than strain to dissect 
the unit that may be very complex and show that the corporation is guilty 
because some officer that may be said to be its “brain” is guilty.22 As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the identification doctrine is based on mechanistic 
models of corporate structure and functioning and crumbles when faced with 
organic corporations that have complex decision-making structures. It may 
therefore be contended that the use of this doctrine may impel corporations to 
vest responsibilities for activities susceptible to prosecution in middle-level or 
operational managers in order to escape liability.23 Even where there is no 
desire to circumvent the law, the fact that senior officers of large corporations 
are often remote from routine management means that restricting the liability 
of such corporations to the acts of senior officers makes it more likely for them 
to escape liability for crimes perpetrated by front-line employees under the 
supervision of junior or middle-level managers. Gobert24 thus deplores the fact 
that something that invariably appears in business can be employed as a 
legal defence.25  
                                                                                                                                            
the form of aggregation of fault is the basis of corporate criminal liability because the 
knowledge of corporations is separated into compartments. This position will be discussed 
further in Chapters 6 and 8.  
20 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 112-113. 
21See Wells, 1995: 44; Hill, 2003: 12; Archibald, Jull and Roach, 2004: 371; and Clark and 
Langsford, 2005: 30. See also Law Commission No 237, 1996: para. 7.11. 
22 Field and Jorg, 1991: 162. 
23 See Khanna, 1996: 1496. See also Law Commission No 237, 1996: para. 7.10. The 
temptation to pin the blame on junior employees or middle-level managers may be strong 
because the fault of the latter would not imputed to the corporation and the prosecution may 
be reluctant to prosecute the junior employee for an offence that was clearly the result of 
inadequate supervision and general sloppiness. Thus, in P&O European Ferries, although the 
company did not pin the blame on the driver, the CPS was quite reluctant to prosecute him 
after Turner J had directed the acquittal of the company. 
24 1994: 401. 
25 In this light, the British Government in June 2000 undertook to develop a code for directors’ 
responsibilities for health and safety that will oblige organisations to appoint an individual 
director for health and safety (See the “Strategy Statement” by the Department of 
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Equally, where a corporation decides not to officially designate any senior 
officer as the person responsible for criminogenic activities it is unclear 
whether the prosecution would be able to identify the corporation with a senior 
officer that oversees the range of activities that comprise the criminogenic 
ones. This is because Lord Diplock in Nattrass and Lord Hoffmann in Meridian 
advanced that the corporation’s constitution or other such document may be 
consulted to determine whether one of the negligent agents having control 
over the relevant transaction was a senior officer. Admiralty v Owners of the 
Steamship Divina (The Truculent)26 and The Lady Gwendolen suggest that 
the corporation may be held liable because of the apparent failure of such a 
senior officer to supervise the middle-level managers and front-line 
employees, although it is uncertain whether her failure may be said to be 
negligent to such degree as to be deemed criminal. Nevertheless, where a 
junior officer was officially designated to manage the relevant transactions, 
the identification doctrine cannot be used to convict the corporation.27  
 
It may however be argued that although the identification doctrine is 
concerned with corporate liability and not individual liability, the former does 
not exclude the latter. Thus, if a junior officer is sufficiently blameworthy and 
deserving of punishment, she may be punished. This has nothing to do with 
both corporate liability and the identification doctrine. This is because the 
doctrine distinguishes between acts that are particular to a corporation and 
those particular to its agents on the basis that acts and intentions of senior 
managers or other persons that may be called the corporation’s “directing 
mind and will” are particular to the corporation and acts of other agents are 
                                                                                                                                            
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000: 26, para. 68.) However, four years later, the 
Government declined to legislate in such manner and sought to encourage or persuade 
organisations via non-binding guidance to provide leadership on health and safety.  The 
voluntary guidance for leadership action to directors and board members published by the 
Institute of Directors and the Health and Safety Commission (2007) for example, entreats 
organisations to adopt an unambiguous health and safety policy and encourages them to 
ensure board level involvement in health and safety matters and appoint a senior manager 
that will effectively oversee the implementation of such policy. 
26 [1951] 2 All ER 968, hereinafter referred to as The Truculent. 
27 See Law Commission No 237, 1996: para. 6.9. However, if the junior manager was given 
full discretion to act independently of instructions from the hierarchy, then she may be 
deemed to be the directing mind. 
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not. Thus, the question that should be asked is whether this is the most 
rational way of ascertaining acts and intentions that are particular to 
corporations. The answer to this question is that it would be ruinous to 
business and enterprise to burden corporations with all the wrongs of all 
employees (especially junior ones).28 However, even if it is assumed that this 
is true, it may still be advanced that there are other ways (not synonymous to 
unlimited vicarious liability) of achieving the goals of holding corporations 
liable for the wrongs committed by their employees. Equally, the reductionist 
trend of the identification doctrine has been blamed not on the entreaty of 
business expediency but on the unfortunate proclivity of judges and legislators 
to imitate human criminal liability.29 Such anthropomorphism is preposterous 
given that the nature and functioning of corporations are trenchantly distinct 
from those of human beings.30 Nonetheless, irrespective of the judges’ 
reasons for making comparisons between corporations and human beings, 
the fact that the primary rule of the identification doctrine relies solely on 
derivative liability makes it paradoxical for the mechanism to be used to 
impose liability directly on corporations.31 
 
In spite of the difficulty of explaining the use of the identification doctrine to 
impose liability directly on the corporate person it must be noted that the 
corporate person is treated as morally blameworthy and deserving of 
punishment. Establishing its guilt by adducing evidence showing that its 
“brain” or “directing mind” entertained the mens rea and/or performed the 
                                                 
28 See Estey J in the Canadian case of R v Canadian Dredge & Dock Ltd (1985) 19 CCC (3d) 
1 at 29. Although Estey J described this explanation as “pragmatic,” placing too much 
emphasis on business commonsense and very little on legal theory compromises the integrity 
of the criminal law. 
29 Thus, a corporation with senior and junior officers is similar to a human being with a brain 
and hands. See the discussion on metaphors used by judges in Chapter 4. However, it was 
argued that pre-Nattrass judges were not suggesting human features for corporations but 
rather drawing an analogy between the human and corporate systems. 
30 See Gobert, 1994: 393; Wells, 1988: 799, 801; Lederman, 2000: 655; Mays, 2000: 57; and 
Wells, 2001: 154.  
31 This is confounded by the fact that only guilt or liability is imputed to the corporation. Thus, 
it is deceptive to talk of the corporation’s personal or direct liability since the liability was 
established against another person. If the doctrine allowed for the imputation of acts and 
intents that did not necessarily amount to an offence at the time they were performed or 
entertained then it would have been more logical to talk of the corporation’s guilt or liability 
resulting from the confluence of these acts and intents. As noted in Chapter 2, two concepts 
come to mind in this respect: innocent agency and aggregation. 
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actus reus thus means that the criminal law requirements of mens rea and 
actus reus are fulfilled. However, as a tool of the criminal law, the legitimacy 
of corporate criminal liability may be said to rest on its ability to predict and 
punish corporate behaviour that is reprehensible (from a criminal law 
perspective). As shown above, the restrictive form of the identification doctrine 
as set out in Nattrass sanctions only simple predictions or those concerning 
mechanistic structures. This is because senior officers of corporations that 
have clear hierarchical structures would most probably be the ones that 
formulate and implement policies and monitor their implementation.32 Gobert33 
therefore states that the doctrine “works best in cases where it is needed least 
and works least in cases where it is needed most.”34 In the same vein, Box35 
notes that an analogy may be drawn between the criminal justice system 
letting the largest (and organic) corporations that commit widespread 
calamities off the hook and a system ignoring crimes committed by the 
majority of natural persons. 
 
As regards the congruency of the doctrine’s primary rule with the principles of 
agency (maverick agent/scope of employment and constructive knowledge), it 
may be contended that although a corporation can only form an intention or 
perform an act through its “directing mind” it may only be identified with the 
latter where she was acting within the scope of her employment and not as a 
maverick agent. However, the doctrine’s consonance with agency law may be 
questioned because the “directing mind” is not identified with the corporation 
because she is the corporation’s agent but because she is the corporation. 
This implies that crimes committed by the senior officer or “directing mind” 
outwith her scope of employment are imputable to the corporation. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the doctrine is not incompatible with 
agency but represents a limited form of agency where the corporation is liable 
for the acts of any agent that directs or controls its activities. However, if this 
were the case then Lord Reid would not have clearly stated that an officer 
                                                 
32 See for example the successful manslaughter cases cited in Chapter 3. 
33 1994: 401 
34 See also Law Commission Consultation Paper No 135, 1994: 129-30, paras 5.77 and 5.80; 
Gobert and Punch, 2003: 63; and Hill, 2003: 12. 
35 1983: 79. 
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should not be deemed to be the “directing mind” simply because her “work is 
brain work.”36 As such, it is uncertain whether a corporation will be identified 
with a rogue senior officer. As shown in Chapter 4, corporations have 
sometimes been identified with agents that defrauded them or acted contrary 
to directives from the board of directors. This may be justified by the 
contention that the corporations were deemed to have had constructive 
knowledge of the agents’ dishonest acts. However, this would imply that the 
agents that had constructive knowledge were sufficiently senior for the courts 
to attach their knowledge on the corporation. There was no contention to this 
effect and the accused corporations were identified with the dishonest senior 
officers because the latter were deemed to be the directing minds of the 
former. This shows another shortcoming of the identification doctrine given 
that the honest acts of other senior officers were ignored. It has been noted 
that the corporation has only one mind, which is the directing mind.37 
However, it is uncertain whether such directing mind is the dishonest senior 
officer or the honest one. Given that the identification doctrine is centred on 
the question of seniority, the most senior of both officers would logically be the 
directing mind. However, where they are at the same level and none of them 
had control over the relevant transaction the court may find itself in a 
quagmire.  
 
An evaluation of the primary rule of the identification doctrine thus reveals a 
number of shortcomings. The liability that is imposed is essentially derivative 
and not personal and so the doctrine is not conformable with the concept of 
corporate personality implied by company law. Equally, the doctrine is based 
on a parochial form of individualism that is counterproductive because the 
corporation is treated as the individual that committed the offence and not as 
a principal that used such individual or encouraged or assisted her in 
committing the offence. The doctrine also lacks the sophistication required to 
deal with difficult and conflicting concepts such as maverick agents, scope of 
employment and constructive knowledge as regards the actions of agents that 
may not be deemed to be the directing mind. These weaknesses no doubt 
                                                 
36 Nattrass at 171. 
37 See R v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233.  
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raise questions about the efficaciousness of the identification doctrine as a 
mechanism of imputation. Many commentators (some are cited above) have 
called for the dispensing with the doctrine or the expansion of its scope of 
application.38 However, it would be assumptive to dismiss the primary rule of 
this mechanism on the basis of these inconsistencies without reference to 
other rules of recognition that may explain and justify its use. As such, 
although the doctrine’s primary rule does not necessarily accord with the legal 
principles discussed above it may be shown to be valid from a normative 
perspective. This is because although many of these legal principles seem to 
outweigh the primary rule where a pedigree-based test is carried out, the 
primary rule may still apply on the ground that it has sufficient pedigree and 
outweighs these legal principles where a content-based test is applied.  
 
5.2.2 The congruency of the doctrine’s primary rule with other rules of 
recognition 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, these rules constitute principles that enable courts 
to interpret and explain the primary rule. They may be deduced from the obiter 
dicta of criminal law judges and comprise a wide variety of internal and 
external viewpoints describing the normative perspectives of these judges and 
the prescriptions of organisation theorists within a model described as the 
contingency approach. As such, the evaluation of the primary rule of the 
identification doctrine will be based on how it corresponds with these rules of 
recognition. 
 
As regards the internal point of view, discussion was limited to the picture 
depicted by the framework of metaphors (enforcement-generated metaphors) 
used by judges to explain the appropriate pattern of attribution. Hence, a 
corporation is viewed as representing an entity existing in the legal world and 
analogous to the human body or a machine. Courts are then required to 
                                                 
38 Such calls have been heeded in jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia where there 
has been a shift towards other mechanisms such as an expanded version of the identification 
doctrine and corporate culture. There has equally been a shift in the United Kingdom in 
culpable homicide and manslaughter cases involving corporations. 
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impose liability on it where the evidence shows that the offence was 
committed by an agent that does not represent the corporation’s “hand” but its 
“directing mind and will.” In other words, the agent must not simply be a “cog” 
in the machine. The identification doctrine certainly directs courts to impose 
liability in like manner given that many of these judges were interpreting and 
explaining the primary rule of the identification doctrine, which is the 
applicable mechanism in the United Kingdom. However, the reasoning of 
these judges (from a normative perspective) does not necessarily show that 
the identification doctrine is the suitable mechanism in the United Kingdom. A 
strict interpretation of Nattrass shows that it is tantamount to 
anthropomorphism although the outlook of pre- Nattrass judges suggests that 
a corporation is comparable to a human body and not itself a fictional human 
body.39 Thus, the “directing mind” or the “brain” may not always be the same 
person or organ as is the case with human beings. This means that the 
primary rule of the identification doctrine is untenable unless it is interpreted to 
the effect that it would depend on circumstances of each case whether an 
agent is the “directing mind” or the “hand” of the corporation. However, as 
noted above, it was established in Nattrass that the corporation’s “brain” is not 
simply any agent that does brain work but a senior officer with managerial 
functions and full discretion to act.40 
 
As regards the external point of view, the perspective of some organisation 
theorists were subsumed within a model on the relationship between 
contingence, structure and performance called the contingency approach. The 
idea is that whichever structure the corporation chooses to adopt (contingency 
structure) and consequently whatever size it operates with, the prosecution 
should be able to use the mechanism of imputation. Using this approach to 
                                                 
39 Cf Hans: 2000: 60; and Minkes and Minkes, 2001: 245-6. 
40Nonetheless, in Nattrass, Viscount Dilhorne (at 187) also posited that the test for 
determining the directing mind may vary from one corporation to another depending on their 
organisation. Equally, Lord Reid (at 170) acknowledged that although the identification 
doctrine is a question of law, determining whether an officer is sufficiently senior to be 
identified with the corporation is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. As such, Lord 
Reid’s grudge against Stable J (ICR Haulage) may be blamed on the fact that he thought the 
latter was inspired by RC Hammet Ltd v London County Council (1933) 97 JP 105, where it 
was established that the employer’s liability was a question of fact and she was liable if she 
could not show that the due diligence was exercised by all her servants.  
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determine whether the primary rule of the identification doctrine captures the 
reality of how corporations are diversely structured entails determining how 
the doctrine concords with the way these theories delineate control and 
accountability within the corporate structure. Theories describing the various 
ways in which corporations are organised were grouped under two heads 
representing two major conceptions of management systems regularly used in 
contingency thinking: the mechanistic and the organic theories.  
 
The mechanistic theories are said to characterise clearly defined hierarchical 
levels (often vertical) with well-established policies and procedures and little 
or no discretion to operational agents. Thus, a corporation that has adopted a 
mechanistic system is less likely to be identified with a low-level employee. 
The identification doctrine as noted above corresponds with this theory given 
that a corporation is said to be guilty only where a senior manager at the top 
of the hierarchy (directing mind) is shown to have perpetrated the offence 
charged. Lord Reid said a corporation’s directing mind equally extends to 
other superior managers of the corporation that carry out functions of 
management and officers to whom the board has delegated management 
functions with full discretion to act independently of instruction.41 Viscount 
Dilhorne42 stated that the directing mind must be “a person who is in actual 
control of the operations of a company or of part of them and who is not 
responsible to another person in the company for the manner in which he 
discharges his duties in the sense of being under his orders.” As well as Lord 
Pearson, he pointed to the list provided by the applicable statutory provision, 
the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (section 20).43 Lord Diplock on his part 
advanced that regard should be given to the memorandum and articles of 
association and actions normally taken by the directors, or by the company in 
a general meeting.44 Such directing mind is therefore the only one that is 
strictly accountable because she controls the corporate internal decision 
structure (CID) or is the one that formulates and implements or monitors 
                                                 
41 Nattrass at 171. 
42 Nattrass at 187. 
43 This list includes “any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer...purporting to act 
in any such capacity.” 
44 Nattrass at 199-200. 
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established standard operating procedures (SOPs) or uses incentives and 
other motivating factors (which shape values and experiences) to induce 
junior employees to contribute to defined objectives.  
 
On the other hand, organic systems are characterised by a more flexible 
structure where the power to create practices and implement procedures is 
proportional to the agent’s competence and skill or what she contributes. As 
such, a corporation ought to be identified not with a senior officer but with any 
agent that was charged with the function of managing or performing a task 
even though she had little or no influence on other agents. Organic structures 
are therefore amorphous and are likelier to change in accordance with the 
dictates of contingencies. As such, the question of whether the identification 
doctrine shows flexibility in accommodating the structural changes that 
corporations effect is an indication of whether the doctrine reflects the external 
viewpoint on the nature and functioning of organic organisations. However, 
the list of officers that constitute the directing mind provided by their Lordships 
in Nattrass may be said to support the idea that the identification doctrine was 
developed based only on mechanistic models of corporate structure and 
functioning. Criminal law courts in the United Kingdom are required to give 
importance to labels; and middle-level managers carrying out functions of 
management without what their Lordships described as “full discretion” will not 
be identified with corporations.  
 
As such, it may be posited that the identification doctrine may be used to 
enforce crimes of intent against organic structures only to the extent to which 
their Lordships may be said to have considered that the directing mind may 
also be the middle-level manager that had actual control over the relevant 
operations of the company or part of them. Such flexibility may be assumed 
on the ground that their Lordships did not establish what constitutes the 
“functions of management with full discretion.” However, Lord Pearson stated 
that the supervision of the details of operation is not a function of 
management45 although he said nothing about the formulation and 
                                                 
45 Nattrass at 193. 
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implementation of the policy, as well as general supervision.46 Thus, it may be 
important to determine whether formulation and general supervision form part 
of the functions of management by implication or whether these functions 
require a lot more.  
 
The Model Penal Code of the United States for example, specifies as a 
requirement for the imposition of criminal liability on corporations that 
the commission of the offence was authorized, requested, 
commanded, or performed by the board of directors, or by an 
agent having responsibility for formulation of corporate policy, 
or by a high managerial agent having supervisory 
responsibility over the subject matter of the offense and acting 
within the scope of his employment on behalf of the 
corporation.47  
 
This section of the Model Penal Code thus adopts a two-pronged approach 
that involves determining whether the people that normally carry out 
management functions, the board of directors, authorised or tolerated the 
commission of the offence and whether the people in positions designated to 
carry out management functions authorised or tolerated the commission of the 
offence. There is nothing to suggest that their Lordships in Nattrass 
established a more restrictive definition of the functions of management 
excluding supervision and implementation.  
 
Looking beyond the legal discipline, a simple overview of the functions of 
management in management studies is said in Chapter 4 to suggest that the 
agent that plans strategies and leads other agents toward specific goals ought 
to represent the corporate entity. Hence, in ascertaining whether the agent 
that acted is a corporation’s directing mind the judge may instruct the jury to 
consider whether the agent controlled and coordinated the activities of the 
corporation in such manner irrespective of her official title. It must nonetheless 
be noted that their Lordships in Nattrass required that the officer in question 
                                                 
46 In the Canadian case of “Rhone” (The) v “Peter BB Widener” (The), [1993] 1 SCR 497, 
Iacobucci J sought to distinguish between “executive authority to design and supervise the 
implementation of corporate policy” and authority to “carry out such policy.” Lord Pearson in 
Nattrass may be held to have implied the latter when stating what does not constitute the 
functions of management. 
47 Section 2.07(1) of 1956 Proposed Official Draft. 
169 
 
must also have had full discretion to act, that is, she did not account to some 
superior officer for her actions. Given that corporations use a variety of 
models to organise their activities and achieve their goals, the functions of the 
manager may vary from corporation to corporation and may also depend on 
the transaction in question. The general manager with little or no expertise on 
health issues will naturally have little or nothing to do with the control and 
coordination of activities for health and safety purposes, especially in an 
Adhocracy. Thus, the requirement of full discretion when interpreted in this 
light may be deemed to be flexible and the identification doctrine may be used 
to regulate both mechanistic and organic systems. However, if identification is 
hinged upon the question of formulation and implementation of policy then 
courts may also be required to provide answers to other questions such as 
what constitutes corporate policy, what are its essential ingredients and when 
is it established.48 It is nonetheless uncertain whether the identification 
doctrine is concerned only with officers charged with the implementation of 
corporate policy or whether the test of the directing mind requires less than or 
more than these or whether it may not even have anything to do with 
corporate policy.49 That notwithstanding, it may be submitted that based on 
the analysis above the directing mind is located at the second tier (upper 
management) and sometimes below (middle-level).50  
 
The interesting question is whether the directing mind may be located at the 
operational or low-level since agents at different levels may be involved in the 
formulation of policy as well as its implementation and supervision in varying 
degrees.51 What their Lordships in Nattrass required was that a delegate (if it 
                                                 
48 See Stern, 1987: 135-136 discussing related questions concerning the Model Penal Code 
of the United States. 
49 See Bresler; The Truculent; The Lady Gwendolen; and Meridian. However, refraining from 
discussing what constitutes policy and how it ought to be formulated may help in keeping the 
focus on the legal process and also help in avoiding to delve into the mire of principles of 
management and organisation theory.  
50 Cf Sealy, 1992: 76. 
51 In the Canadian case of R v Safety Kleen Canada Inc (1997), 145 DLR (4th) 276, it was 
held that a truck driver with “extensive responsibilities and discretion” was not the 
corporation’s directing mind because he did not have the “power to design and supervise the 
implementation of corporate policy.” Archibald, Jull and Roach (2004: 374) however contend 
that under the amendments of the Canadian Criminal Code 1985 by Bill C-45, courts would 
consider such truck driver as the directing mind because he managed “an important aspect of 
the organization’s activities.” It is however difficult to see any major difference between the 
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happens to be a middle-level manager) must have been assigned a task that 
would normally be performed by directors or senior managers and was 
expected to perform such task with full discretion.52 The danger in Lord Reid’s 
eyes was that the term “delegation” may be given a very broad meaning to 
such extent that the identification doctrine becomes synonymous to vicarious 
liability.53 Lord Morris54 also warned that the board of directors or senior 
management must not retain control over the person to whom the functions of 
management is delegated. In Bolton Engineering, the board of directors only 
held one meeting per year and its mode of conducting business was to 
delegate the functions of management to three directors who did not act 
collectively but each played a designated part. Denning LJ cited Austin Reed 
Ltd v Royal Assurance Co Ltd (No 2)55 to the effect that the decision of the 
board of directors must not necessarily be express and may be inferred from 
the way the corporation deals with important business matters. He went on to 
state that the three directors to whom the board had delegated functions of 
management were the “brain and nerve centre” of the corporation.  
 
Thus, drawing a line between low-level employees that perform the functions 
of the corporation’s “brain but that have to routinely account for their actions 
and decisions” and middle-level managers that have been delegated functions 
of management with full discretion to act independently of directives is 
important because if no such distinction was made and each corporation’s 
“directing mind” was a person that simply had control over a particular 
transaction, then their Lordships would have had to squelch through a mire of 
intermingling concepts of vicarious liability and direct liability via the 
identification doctrine; a puddle they laboriously sought to avoid. This is 
because holding a corporation liable for the acts and states of mind of all 
                                                                                                                                            
previous requirements and the amendments apart from the semantic analysis of the words 
“design,” “implement” and “policy” on the one hand, and “manage” and “important aspect” on 
the other. Thus, Archibald, Jull and Roach (2004: 374-378) concede that they are both 
matters of fact. 
52 See Lord Reid at 174-5. See also The Truculent where the Crown was identified with the 
Third Sea Lord who supervised systems of navigation of its submarines because the task was 
one which an individual ship owner would normally be expected to perform.  
53 If we construe the term linguistically then we may agree with Laufer (1994: 654) that a 
corporation has delegated powers to all its employees and should be liable for their acts. 
54 See Nattrass at 180-181. 
55 [1956] 3 All ER 490. 
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employees that exercise management and control in relation to any particular 
transaction may invariably be synonymous to holding the corporation liable for 
the acts and states of mind of all or most of its employees. It is therefore 
submitted here that a corporation ought to be identified with the acts of a 
middle-level manager only where she managed and controlled the relevant 
transactions in a manner that they are traditionally managed and controlled by 
senior managers, that is, with full discretion and independently of instructions 
from above.56 As such, where a director was accustomed to making 
arrangements for the receipt or disbursement of funds and signing 
agreements without prior authority from the board of directors, he was 
deemed to be the company’s “directing mind” and his acts were the acts of 
the company.57 The management system adopted by the corporation or the 
relevant department may be a good indication of the amount of discretion 
enjoyed by such an agent since a middle-level manager will seldom have full 
discretion in a mechanistic system.58 
 
In light of the above, it is misleading to make categorical statements about the 
virtual impossibility to prosecute corporations of different sizes and structures 
employing the identification doctrine.59 The primary rule of the doctrine is 
shown to fit the bill of the contingency approach to a certain extent since it 
gives the jury the opportunity to examine the managerial structure of the 
accused corporation and determine whether in the circumstances a person’s 
                                                 
56 It is difficult to envisage a situation where an operational or front-line employee would 
manage and control transactions that are normally managed and controlled by senior 
mangers and with full discretion to act independently of instructions. Not only would they 
seldom have such competence but it would equally be ruinous to the business to allow final 
decisions to be made at the operational level. However, there are exceptional cases such as 
the Canadian case of R v Safety Kleen where a person referred to as a “truck driver” was 
actually the only agent responsible for collecting waste oil, billing and attending to customers 
and regulators over a large geographical area. Given that waste oil collection was one of the 
main activities of the corporation, the “truck driver” had been given wide discretion and no 
business was conducted in the large geographical area in his absence. As such, the Court of 
Appeal could certainly have contended that for the purpose of waste oil collection in the large 
geographical area, the said “truck driver” was far more than simply an operator of the 
corporation’s vehicle but its directing mind. Unless it was shown that what the “truck driver” 
controlled and managed in terms of turnover and size of the market was reasonably small. 
57 See Nourse LJ in El Ajou at 696-697. 
58 The court should however consider the actual and not the official system since a 
corporation may have a mechanistic system on paper and yet its middle-level managers are 
sufficiently empowered in practice. 
59 Cf Ferguson, 2007: 251. 
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acts should be imputed to the corporation. In the words of Lord Reid, “the 
judge must direct the jury that if they find certain facts proved then as a matter 
of law they must find that the criminal act of the officer, servant or agent 
including his state of mind, intention, knowledge or belief is the act of the 
company.”60 Nonetheless, it remains uncertain whether a corporation will be 
identified with a middle-level manager where the board takes no interest in 
supervising her activities. Equally, there is no steadfast measure for 
determining whether the discretion exercised by a middle-level manager was 
full in order for her to qualify as the directing mind.61 The internal point of view 
of the Court of Appeal (El Ajou and Real Estate Opportunities) and the Privy 
Council (Meridian) may be said to augur well for the doctrine in such cases 
although the views of these judges cannot be prioritised over those of higher 
courts (Nattrass and Transco) when ascertaining the rules of recognition. 
However, if the explanations of these different judges are synthesised, then it 
may be contended that the identification doctrine ought to operate to hold a 
corporation liable for the offence perpetrated by a person having control over 
the transactions generally where the corporation has adopted a mechanistic 
system or a person having control over the specific transaction that resulted in 
the offence where the corporation has adopted an organic system. In both 
instances, such person controls the corporate body as the brain or mind 
controls the human body.  
  
5.3 EVALUATING THE SENIOR MANAGEMENT FAILURE 
TEST 
 
Although largely untried, the senior management failure test has been the 
subject of much discussion since the Law Commission recommended the 
creation of a new offence called “corporate killing.”62 The Government reacted 
with a Consultation Paper in 2000 and three draft Bills that focused on the 
                                                 
60 Nattrass at 173. Emphasis added. 
61 If the negligent middle-level manager did not enjoy the requisite discretion, the court would 
have to determine whether the failure of the board of directors to supervise her and 
consequently prevent her negligent act is “sufficiently blameworthy.”  
62 See Law Commission Report No 237, 1996: 8.1-8.44. See also Wells, 2001: 120-125. 
173 
 
liability of corporations for deaths caused by failure in the way in which their 
activities were managed or organised by their senior management.63 As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the high profile unsuccessful prosecutions of 
corporations for manslaughter and culpable homicide were invariably blamed 
on the rigidity of the identification doctrine64 and gave an incentive for the 
consultation process that began in 1996, as well as the Draft Bills of 2005 and 
2006 and the CMCHA. Thus, during the period between the introduction of the 
draft Bills and the enactment of the CMCHA, the senior management failure 
test underwent some scrutiny. Nonetheless, the mechanism referred to here 
as the senior management failure test that was introduced by the CMCHA is 
logically deemed by the British Parliament to be the appropriate instrument for 
holding corporations, large and small, mechanistic and organic, accountable 
for deaths that occur as a result of the reprehensible ways in which they 
conduct business. Equally, the Government stated in the Draft Bill of 2005 
that the purpose of this mechanism is to replace the identification doctrine that 
is far removed from the complexities of decision-making and control in 
modern and large organisations.65  
 
However, the Government’s conclusion was premised to a greater extent on 
criticisms directed at the identification doctrine and vehement calls for its 
disposal and to a lesser extent on an objectively established set of 
parameters by which mechanisms of imputation may be evaluated. As such, 
in light with the substantive parameters established in Chapter 4 and the 
evaluation of the identification doctrine above, the senior management failure 
test will be evaluated in order to determine whether it truly reflects the 
complexities of decision-making in contemporary corporations. If its primary 
                                                 
63 The Law Commission had proposed that the offence be based on wider management 
failures within the corporation. The Corporate Homicide Expert Group Report (Scotland) 
(2005: para. 6.1-6.2) even went further and proposed that the acts of individuals should be 
aggregated and attributed to the corporation on the basis of vicarious liability and the 
corporation should be liable unless it had put in place comprehensive management and 
health and safety systems. 
64 Although it is shown above that the identification doctrine is not certainly as rigid as 
contended by many judges and commentators. 
65 Draft Bill, 2005: para. 25. However, the official position is that the identification doctrine is 
appropriate for enforcing crimes of intent except manslaughter and culpable homicide. Thus, 
the CMCHA is restricted to the latter cases and does not cover corporate criminality in its 
entirety. See the criticism by Gobert (2008: 414) of the limitation of the mechanism to an area 
that he deems “statistically minor.” 
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rule is consonant with the rules of recognition identified in Chapter 4 then the 
mechanism may be said to be the appropriate mechanism (from a substantive 
perspective) for imputing acts and intentions to corporations for the purpose of 
imposing liability (for corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide) on them. 
Accordingly, it may be recommended that the mechanism be employed to 
enforce other criminal offences. Nonetheless, given that the mechanism is 
restricted to the prosecution of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide, 
what is important to determine here is whether it is the most appropriate 
mechanism for the enforcing this offence.66  
 
5.3.1 The congruency of the mechanism’s primary rule with related 
legal principles 
 
Section 1 of the CMCHA provides that an organisation is guilty of the offence 
of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide if the way in which its 
activities are managed and organised by its senior management causes a 
person’s death and amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed 
by the organisation to the deceased.67 This section gives a concise 
presentation of the mechanism’s primary rule because it describes what the 
courts require in order to establish the offence against a corporation. As such 
                                                 
66 It must be noted that the CMCHA is an example of a statute that has its own primary rule of 
attribution. Thus, unlike the recommendation by Lord Hoffmann that courts have to fashion a 
“special” rule for the statute, its rule is not “special” in the sense of being specific to any 
particular set of facts but is systemic to the enforcement of corporate manslaughter or 
corporate homicide in all circumstances. As such, where the evidence adduced shows that 
the death of an agent was caused by the negligent management or organisation of the 
activities of a corporation, courts are obligated to refer to the rule embedded in the CMCHA 
(primary rule), as well as the rules that guide its interpretation and implementation (secondary 
rules) in order to determine whether the corporation is liable or not. That is why it is submitted 
here that the CMCHA actually introduces a new mechanism of imputation. 
67 The Government’s decision to use the word “organisations” rather than “corporations” was 
an expedient way of allaying fears such as those expressed by the Home Affairs and Work 
and Pension Committee (2005: para. 62) that  large unincorporated associations would not be 
prosecuted. However, it is shown in Chapter 2 that unincorporated associations may be 
deemed legal persons in certain instances given that incorporation is not the only source of 
legal personality for artificial entities. Nevertheless, the word “organisation” cannot be 
criticised for being unreasonably broad (Cf Gobert, 2008: 415) given that the activities of the 
vast array of organisations covered do sometimes result in unlawful death and the structure 
and functioning of corporations are often analysed based on general organisation theories.  
However, since this thesis is limited to the criminal liability of corporations, discussion below is 
focused on how the CMCHA affects corporations. 
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the “formal” or “first-order” reason for holding a corporation liable for corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide is that its senior management’s gross 
negligence caused the death of a person to whom the corporation owed a 
duty of care. It establishes a causal link between the corporation (duty-
holder), the senior management failure and the death of the victim. The 
primary rule will be evaluated in terms of how it accords with some related 
principles implied by other branches of law, namely, company law, agency law 
and criminal law. 
 
With regard to the rule’s congruence with company law, focus is on how the 
concept of corporate personality is accommodated. Section 1(4)(c) of the 
CMCHA ordains that the senior management of a corporation represents 
persons who play major roles in the making of decisions about how the whole 
or a substantial part of its activities are to be managed or organised, or who 
actually manage or organise the whole or a substantial part of its activities.68 
The practices adopted by the senior management also include attitudes, 
policies and systems within the corporation given that section 8(3) of the 
CMCHA provides that the jury may consider evidence of these in order to 
determine whether the senior management was in gross breach of the 
corporation’s relevant duty of care.69 The CMCHA can thus be given credit for 
not placing undue importance on labels but specifically defining the functions 
of persons who may be identified with the accused corporation.70 It may 
therefore be contended that the legislator sought to impose liability directly on 
the corporation owing to the fact that it is a separate person, unlike the judges 
that developed the identification doctrine as a means of simply compelling the 
accused corporation to substitute for its delinquent senior manager (thus 
                                                 
68 In the Draft Bill of 2005 (para. 26), the Government stated that the liability of corporations 
will not be dependent on the negligence of operational managers and maverick employees 
that causes death but solely on the working practices adopted by the senior management.  
69 The idea of considering evidence of attitudes, policies and systems within the corporation 
reflects the corporate culture mechanism adopted in Australia. However, Part 2.5 of the 
Australian Criminal Code 1995 designates specific persons (members of the board of 
directors) that would normally “authorise” or “tolerate” and “encourage” such practices but 
also talks ambiguously of “high managerial agents” that should be considered. The corporate 
culture mechanism is discussed in Chapter 6. 
70 Nonetheless, the word “substantial” used in defining the functions of senior management is 
not defined by the CMCHA as recommended by the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions 
Committee in their join report on the Draft Bill of 2005 (paras. 145 and 153). 
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overlapping with vicarious liability). However, as stated in Chapter 2, there will 
hardly be consensus on the nature of the acts that may be said to be 
particular to a corporation, whether they must be performed by a person that 
may be called its directing mind or by all agents within the scope of their 
authority. The important thing seems to be that the rule ought to target the 
corporate person and not its agents.71  
 
Nonetheless, the senior management failure test is surprisingly not far from 
employing the same means to achieve the goal of direct corporate liability as 
the identification doctrine. Under the CMCHA, the failure of a restricted 
collective of the corporation’s agents (the senior management) is the failure of 
the corporation.72 However, it may be retorted that the corporation is not liable 
for the gross negligence of an individual senior manager but for the gross 
negligence of the collective of senior managers. Equally, as noted above, the 
CMCHA directs juries to consider how existing attitudes, policies and systems 
within the corporation encouraged or tolerated the breach of health and safety 
standards.73 Thus, it may be said that the CMCHA looks far beyond the 
confines of the individual act of an agent (directing mind) in order to establish 
a corporation’s action. The senior management failure test is therefore an 
improvement upon the identification doctrine as regards actually holding 
corporations directly liable although the restriction of the aggregation of 
negligent acts to those of the senior managers raises the question of whether 
the CMCHA accurately distinguishes acts that are particular to corporations 
from those that are particular to its senior managers.74    
                                                 
71 There is no question that Parliament intended direct or primary liability of organisations. 
Section 18 of the CMCHA excludes individual liability. 
72 This may be deemed, with good reason, to be an appropriate definition of the “directing 
mind” required by the identification doctrine. Although, a codified definition of “senior 
management” may be said to be predicated on the need to avoid ambiguity, as mentioned 
above, the term “substantial” is left undefined and categorised as a question of fact meaning 
that the CMCHA does not bring anything new to the common law judge’s table apart from the 
need to aggregate the acts of senior managers. So just as the House of Lord ordained in 
Nattrass, the CMCHA may be said to provide that once the facts have been proved that the 
gross negligence of senior officers motivated or tolerated the manslaughter, it becomes a 
matter of law that their gross negligence be imputed to the corporation. 
73 It is unclear whether the identification doctrine may be used to hold corporations liable for 
criminogenic working practices. 
74Also, it may not be said that the liability of the senior management is attributed to the 
corporation. This is because the prosecutor is not required to establish the liability of any 
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As regards the consonance of this mechanism’s primary rule with rules 
implied by agency law, the discussion here is restricted to the principles of 
scope of employment/maverick agent and constructive knowledge. It must 
however be noted that the CMCHA talks of senior management and not of a 
single senior manager and the agency employed by the corporation to 
perpetrate the offence is that of the collective of senior managers. Hence, 
there is no agency relationship between the middle-level managers or 
frontline employees and the corporation. Like the identification doctrine, the 
senior management failure test does not provide any clear directive as 
regards whether the corporation’s liability is limited to the gross negligent 
actions of the senior management that may be said to be within this organ’s 
scope of authority or the corporation will be liable simply because the senior 
management is shown to be grossly negligent simpliciter. It is for example 
axiomatic that actions of negligent directors ratified by the corporation in 
accordance with section 239 of the Companies Act 2006 would be imputed to 
the corporation under the CMCHA. However, this section of the Companies 
Act concerns commercial misjudgements or reasonably negligent decision-
making to the extent that if the acts are grossly negligent they would be held 
against the directors and not the company.75 The words of the CMCHA are 
not unequivocal about the corporation‘s liability for the grossly negligent acts 
or practices of the senior management that are not incidental to commercial 
misjudgements or within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is uncertain 
whether a corporation will be liable if an employee’s family member is killed 
due to the failure of the senior management to issue proper warnings about 
the steepness of slopes of a mountain on which they had organised an 
excursion for both workers and families. This is because it may not be said 
that the corporation owed to a duty to warn the employee’s family member 
about the steepness of the slopes. This means that the corporation will be 
acquitted because the courts consider the question of whether the corporation 
owed a duty of care as paramount. 
                                                                                                                                            
individual manager. Thus, the senior managers are ‘innocent’ agents through whom the 
corporation perpetrates the offence.  
75 See Reed, 2006: 170-171. 
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Section 2(1) of the CMCHA provides a list of duties owed by a corporation that 
will be relevant for the purposes of the offence. This includes duties 
commonly owed by corporations such as the duty owed to employees or other 
persons working for the corporation or providing services on its behalf.76 
However, section 2(1) and (4) make reference to the duty owed under the law 
of negligence as the crux of what is required by the CMCHA. In the Draft Bill 
of March 2006,77 the Government advanced that its decision to adopt the civil 
law approach of gross negligence was based on the need to clearly define the 
corporation’s obligation and avoid a situation where the CMCHA will apply in 
wider circumstances than that delineated in gross negligence manslaughter 
cases after Adomako.78 However, the CMCHA does not apply to all cases 
where a corporation may be said to have a duty of care but only to cases 
where the duty of care is defined as “relevant.”79 Nonetheless, this means that 
any senior management failure that falls outside the directors’ scope of 
employment (exercising business judgments) cannot be imputed to 
corporations since they would not be imputed to the employer under the 
common law of negligence. As noted above, the CMCHA does not consider 
this fact. Equally, placing considerable reliance on the law of negligence 
necessitates the invocation of nebulous standards that underpin negligence. 
The concept of duty of care was developed by English courts in the civil law of 
negligence as a means of determining whether the defendant’s actions 
amount to gross negligence. However, there are many questions that remain 
                                                 
76 This may be understood to include the employer’s duties at common law such as the duty 
to provide a safe work environment, competent staff, appropriate tools and a safe system of 
work. See Saleem, 2007: 276-277. 
77 Paras. 13. 
78 It should be noted that the Government has sought to avoid the CMCHA overlapping with 
duties owed under the HSWA and under the common law which are normally duties under the 
law of negligence. However, the “relevant duties” of the CMCHA are broader than those 
covered by both regimes since some common law duties have been superseded by statute. 
An example is the duty owed in relation to a corporation’s status as an occupier of premises 
in common law which has been superseded by the Occupiers' Liability Acts of 1957 and 
1984, the Defective Premises Act 1972 in England and Wales and the Occupier’s Liability 
(Scotland) Act 1960 and the Carriage of Air Act 1961.  See CMCHA – Explanatory Notes: 
para. 21; and Bill 220 – Explanatory Notes: para. 25. As such, section 2(4) and (7) of the 
CMCHA provide that the law of negligence will be interpreted as including these statutes (as 
well as the equivalent statutes in Northern Ireland). 
79 The word “relevant” implies duties commonly owed by corporations such as those 
described above or duties that may be determined by the judge with regard to the facts and 
duties that normally arise under the law of negligence. 
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unanswered by English courts.80 Thus, section 2(6)(a) and (b) provide that 
common law rules (civil law) that may prevent claims being made such as 
those by afflicted parties that are part of the enterprise (ex turpi causa non 
oritur actio) or who knowingly placed themselves in positions where some 
degree of harm might result (volenti non fit injuria) are not applicable.81 That 
notwithstanding, the underpinning logic seems to be that liability can hardly be 
established without the defendant owing a duty in law82 although it has been 
held that an employer may be vicariously liable for the breach of a statutory 
duty owed by her worker and not the employer.83  
 
As such, there is some danger of pulling the criminal law into this quagmire of 
the civil law’s duty of care concept. The Home Affairs and Work and Pensions 
Committee therefore recommended the expunction of the duty of care 
requirement altogether and endorsed the proposal of the Law Commission 
that liability should be based solely on management failure.84 Also, in 
Transco, Lord Osborne had difficulty appreciating any contribution the civil law 
duty of care (imported via Adomako) would make in the assessment of guilt 
apart from delineating the defendant’s responsibility which does not provide 
much help in determining whether the defendant is liable in spite of being 
responsible. His argument is that since the criminal law is geared towards 
linking criminal intentions to actions it is important to address the state of mind 
of the accused.85  
 
                                                 
80 The Report of the Corporate Homicide Expert Group (Scotland) (para 8.1- 8.2) clearly 
expressed concern with importing the civil law concept of “duty of care” into Scottish criminal 
law and deplored the fact the CMCHA leans towards this English formulation without stating 
(nor do the Explanatory Notes of the Draft Bill 220 of July 2006) the advantages that will 
accrue to Scottish criminal law for adopting the civil law concept. However, Ferguson (2007: 
255) argues that the differences between the standards of care applicable in Scotland 
(culpable homicide) and England (civil law of negligence) are largely cosmetic. 
81 See also CMCHA – Explanatory Notes: para. 21. See also Clarkson, 2005: 683. 
82 Ferguson, 2007: 255. See also Lord Fraser in R v Seymour at 499; and Donoghue v 
Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
83 Majrowski at [38] and [40]. 
84 2005: paras. 104-105. 
85 Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal in R v Wacker [2003] 1 Cr App R 329 rejected the 
application of the civil law maxim of ex turpi causa non oritur actio on the ground that civil law 
and criminal law have different objectives. However, as stated above, the CMCHA has 
specifically removed the obstacles posed by the civil law maxims of ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio and volenti non fit injuria. 
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This takes us to the question of whether the primary rule of the senior 
management failure test is consonant with principles implied by the criminal 
law. In this case, the spotlight is on the proof of actus reus and mens rea. 
Proponents of the CMCHA may argue that although a criminal offence is 
predicated on the proof of criminal intent, the fact that the relevant statutory 
provision prioritises proof of the breach of a duty does not make corporate 
homicide or corporate manslaughter less of a criminal offence. In other words, 
the existence of a relevant duty of care although rooted in civil law 
conceptualisation is not a matter for the civil law of negligence because it is 
only an ingredient amongst many of the offence of corporate manslaughter or 
corporate homicide.86 As such, in light of the abovementioned 
recommendations of the Law Commission and the Home Affairs and Work 
and Pensions Committee emphasis should be placed on the way the 
corporation was managed and not how the scope of its duty may be 
delineated. This argument rests on the fact that it is better to avoid judging 
corporations on what they intended or could have foreseen because one of 
the major reasons for legislating on corporate offenders was the difficulty of 
imputing a state of mind to corporations.87  
 
The legislator seems to acquiesce with the recommendation since the 
CMCHA does not require a subjective test of intent. However, the legislator 
also endorses the position that the common law duty of care as it applies in 
gross negligence manslaughter is an important stepping stone toward 
                                                 
86 The prosecution must also show that the accused corporation’s breach of such duty was as 
a result of grossly negligent actions. 
87 See Law Commission Report No 237, 1996: para. 8.1. One may think that this position 
would put to rest questions of whether the corporation’s mind should include the minds of its 
senior officers or its policies and practices and which senior officers and which policies and 
practices should count. However, to discount the consideration of the intentions of individual 
senior officers, as well as specific policies and practices will be synonymous to ignoring the 
complex of all the attributes of the corporate person being tried. This position was certainly 
influenced by Lord Hoffmann’s statement in Meridian that there is no such thing as a 
corporation given that it is a legal fiction. However, it is noted in Chapter 2 that the fiction 
theory propounds the idea of the corporation’s existence (though in a fictitious legal world) 
and overlaps with the realist theory. Also, dicta such as those delivered by Lord Hoffmann 
were motivated to a greater extent by the fierce urgency of departing from the restrictive form 
of the identification doctrine and to a lesser extent by the entreaty of formulating a mechanism 
of imputation that reflects contemporary organisation theory. As such, the Law Commission 
may be said to have examined corporate criminal liability amiss because there is compelling 
evidence that corporations can be brought within the ambit of the criminal law requirement of 
mens rea. 
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establishing senior management failure. The logic is simple: the test of duty of 
care will clarify circumstances where a corporation comes under an obligation 
to act and where it failed to act and if serious enough and if it resulted in 
death, the corporation would be liable. However, this reflects the teleological 
rationale of strict and absolute liability offences where the criminal law 
requirement of proving the state of mind of the accused is ignored in favour of 
punishing the accused because she has breached a duty based on promoting 
social welfare. As such, the prosecution of corporations would have been 
much more straightforward if the CMCHA had simply created a strict or 
absolute liability offence as advised by some commentators88 rather than 
create an offence whose primary rule seems to conflict with a basic principle 
of the criminal law. It is therefore difficult to see the fairness of prosecuting 
and convicting corporations in instances where the evidence simply links a 
duty of care owed by the corporation and the omission or failure of its senior 
management. The CMCHA will certainly take us back to the question whether 
“any blame is enough.”89 If it suffices to pin the blame on the corporation’s 
policies and practices or lack of, then a corporation would be liable where the 
death results from a practice adopted by operational employees. However, 
the fact that operational employees adopted a practice that was contrary to 
duties owed by a corporation does not necessarily imply that the senior 
management of the corporation directed or encouraged such practice or acted 
in a grossly negligent manner.90 Nonetheless, it may be argued that corporate 
homicide or corporate manslaughter is not a strict liability offence and the 
CMCHA is focused on the conduct of the corporation’s senior management 
because they represent its “brain.” Thus, unless it is shown that the senior 
management knew of the criminogenic practice or had decoupled its policies 
and practices the corporation cannot be liable. 
 
That notwithstanding, there may be difficulty agreeing on a test to apply with 
regard to whether the kind of treatment meted out to employees by the senior 
management although poor is below reasonably acceptable standards or is 
                                                 
88 See Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committee, 2005: paras. 102-3. 
89 The rule that “any blame is enough” has certainly not been considered for a while. 
90 See Gateway Foodmarkets. 
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sufficiently blameworthy to found a conviction for a crime such as 
manslaughter or culpable homicide (if it is shown to have caused the death of 
one of them). If an employee dies due to a system of work that is below what 
would reasonably be expected in the industry but the employee happens to 
have contributed in some way to his own death by being reckless it is unclear 
how the jury would go about striking a balance. As stated Chapter 3, there is a 
growing divergence of opinion on how to establish negligence in culpable 
homicide and manslaughter cases. However, given that the offence created 
by the CMCHA is similar to gross negligence manslaughter (and to a certain 
extent involuntary culpable homicide) it may be safe to say that the victim’s 
contributory negligence is of no avail and the court will be focused on the 
negligence of the senior management. Thus, in order to determine the 
seriousness of the failure of the corporation’s senior management, the jury will 
be expected to use the measure of blameworthiness used in establishing 
gross negligence manslaughter. Equally, in order to determine the level of 
“risk of death” that the senior management failure posed, the jury will be 
expected to use the standard of risk assessment and perception used in 
establishing gross negligence manslaughter. As such, if the senior 
management failure is sufficiently serious or blameworthy and the senior 
management did not perceive an obvious and grave risk of death that the way 
they managed or organised the corporation’s activities posed to the 
deceased, the jury will conclude that the conduct of the senior management 
was far below what may reasonably be expected of an organisation in the 
circumstances. In other words, their breach will be a “gross breach” and the 
corporation will be liable consequently.91 
 
What the above discussion shows is that the CMCHA is largely based on the 
proof actus reus and not mens rea. As such, the jury may end up convicting a 
corporation based on objective standards although the senior management 
exercised all due diligence and the breach was caused by impediments 
                                                 
91It is worth noting that the jury is left to determine whether the breach is a “gross breach” 
based on what they think is a reasonably acceptable standard in the industry under 
consideration. This connotes a circular process whereby it is a matter of fact that once certain 
facts have been proved the jury would decide whether in the circumstances the accused 
should be guilty based on the facts proved. This reflects the much criticised circularity of 
Adomako and Paton v HM Advocate discussed in Chapter 3. 
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beyond their control, such as a maverick employee furthering her selfish 
interests. Equally, a corporation may escape liability because it passes the 
objective test although its senior managers were indifferent to the 
consequences of their omission to supervise junior staff and provide adequate 
working tools.92 The question of the subjective judgment of the senior 
management is therefore also important and its absence from the statute is a 
deplorable loophole.93 However, the fact that section 8(4) calls upon the jury to 
consider whether any other matters may in their opinion be relevant leaves 
the door ajar for evidence that shows that in spite of the compliance system in 
place, the risk of death was unreasonably high because the senior 
management (or persons that form part of this organ) of that particular 
corporation were indifferent as to the consequences of some of their 
dangerous policies and practices. As such, the door is ajar to the hope that 
the primary rule of this mechanism of imputation may reflect the principles of 
the criminal law as much as it does some of the principles of company law 
and agency law discussed above.  
 
5.3.2  The congruency of the mechanism’s primary rule with other rules 
of recognition 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, the rules of recognition may involve the normative 
perspective of judges and the external viewpoint of some non-legal theorists. 
The normative perspective of judges was restricted further to the picture 
depicted by metaphors (enforcement-generated metaphors) that they used 
and the external viewpoint was equally restricted to organisation theories 
within a framework derived from the contingency approach to management 
studies. As regards the enforcement-generated metaphors, it may be said that 
the senior management failure test is at a disadvantage when compared to 
the identification doctrine because a good number of these metaphors were 
                                                 
92 See Wells’ (1993, 554-9) discussion on what would have been the outcome of P & O 
European Ferries if the court had also applied an appropriate subjective test. 
93 This implies that the standards of total indifference for the safety of the public for proving 
involuntary culpable homicide established in Quinn v Cunningham and W v HM Advocate and 
affirmed in Transco may have been better measures to determine the senior management’s 
criminal negligence. 
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used to elucidate the identification doctrine. However, the metaphors are 
understood to imply that a corporation is a substantive person with no soul or 
conscience and laws can only be efficacious if they target the individuals (with 
souls and consciences) that control the body corporate as the brain controls 
the human body.  It may be argued that the CMCHA’s conception of the 
corporation’s brain does not conform to the outlook of judges because it is a 
lot more complex than they envisaged. The CMCHA defines only the term 
“senior management” and provides for the imposition of liability on a 
corporation only when failure by the “senior management” causes death. No 
mention is made of “senior managers.” Thus, where a majority of the board of 
directors exercise all due diligence and one of them encourages or tolerates 
breach that causes death the corporation will not be liable. However, it may 
be said that the CMCHA equally treats the senior management as that part of 
the corporation that controls it as the brain and nerve centre controls the body 
and employees that are not part of the senior management as its hands. 
Equally, the fact that only an objective test of the corporation’s guilt is required 
may be said to reflect the embedded conception of corporations as having no 
soul or conscience and thus no need to prove subjective malice or intent. Due 
to the fact that a corporation is like a “machine,” what is required is that those 
that may be deemed to be its central processing unit failed in performing their 
duties.94  
 
With regard to the contingency approach, the senior management failure test 
may be commended for attempting to strike a balance between the extreme 
conceptions of individualism (reductionism) and holism in such manner that it 
may be used to enforce crimes of intent against both mechanistic and organic 
corporate structures. On the one hand, the knowledge of a corporation is 
reducible only to the intentions and knowledge of a few individuals, viz. the 
senior managers (although aggregated).95 On the other hand, the knowledge 
of the corporation is reducible to authoritative directives, policies and practices 
                                                 
94 There is no substantive person with a soul or conscience that is convicted nevertheless. 
The senior management is a collective unit just as a corporation and certainly represents 
Thurlow’s conception of the corporation as having no “soul to be damned and no body to be 
kicked.” Thurlow is cited in Coffee, 1981: 386, footnote n.1.  
95 This concurs with the Rational Actor Model and Dramaturgical Model that focus largely on 
the individuals. 
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that encourage crime whether contrived by any particular individual or not. 
Thus, theories such as the Organisational Process Model and Machine 
Bureaucracy Model that favour the placing of emphasis on values and 
experiences that emerge from the CID or established SOPs within the 
corporation also show that the senior management failure test can be 
employed to effectively enforce crimes against corporations. 
 
However, the senior management failure test may be criticised for placing little 
emphasis on organic structures where decision-making is devolved. The 
failure that causes death may be the result of operations in more than one 
component of the whole corporate structure and as noted above, the senior 
management may not even be aware of such failure. This will usually be the 
case where the board has vested responsibilities for activities on middle-level 
or operational managers that have the requisite expertise such as in Ad hoc 
or Divisionalised structures. The identification doctrine as shown above 
equally faces the same problem, lest the directing mind is interpreted in light 
of who was responsible for the transactions under consideration. Although the 
CMCHA may also be given credit for not placing undue focus on the job titles 
of agents that qualify as the senior management such as director, managing 
director or secretary, the enshrined definition of the “senior management” is 
unduly restrictive and not as adaptable as the words used by courts in 
establishing the identification doctrine. Only a handful of individuals may for 
example manage the whole or a substantial part of a corporation’s activities 
and courts will find it very difficult to flex the word “substantial.”96 Thus, an 
individual that manages only a fifth of the corporation’s activities would not 
render the corporation liable where failure in the way she manages causes 
the death of an employee. As mentioned above, a way out of this tangle may 
be to seek to hold corporations liable for the omission of the senior manager 
that had responsibility to supervise the middle-level manager that was grossly 
negligent. However, it would be difficult to establish the moral 
blameworthiness of the senior manager for failure to supervise the negligent 
                                                 
96 It is possible to envisage situations where the directing mind would be a middle-level 
manager but to call a group of middle-level managers the senior management sounds like a 
misnomer. 
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middle-level manager especially because the jury is required to apply an 
objective test.97 The corporation is more likely to be morally blameworthy if 
either the negligence of the middle-level manager is imputed to it or the 
supervising senior officer is shown to have been subjectively negligent. 
Nonetheless, as noted above, the management system adopted by the 
corporation should guide the process of imputation. As such, where it was a 
mechanistic system the failure of the senior officer should be considered but 
where it was an organic system it is important to also consider the failure of 
the middle-level or operational managers with full discretion. The rigidity of the 
senior management failure test poses a formidable obstacle to this second 
pattern of imputation. The identification doctrine when interpreted as 
extending to middle-level managers may provide a more pragmatic and 
flexible approach.98 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION  
 
The applicable mechanisms of imputation used by courts in the United 
Kingdom have been evaluated on the basis of the substantive parameters set 
out in Chapter 4. In the processes of these evaluations, a number of criticisms 
directed at the mechanisms were addressed and some were shown to be 
justified and others not. Thus, although both mechanisms are congruent (to a 
certain extent) with some important related legal principles such as corporate 
personality, agency and proof of mens rea and they also reflect the normative 
outlook of judges they are largely rigid and may not be suitable to enforce 
crimes of intent against organic and complex corporate structures. However, 
the identification doctrine has been modified by some courts and although the 
rule in Nattrass still obtains such modification has been held to reflect a 
correct interpretation of this rule. The modification (Meridian) no doubt leaves 
a door open for the efficacious use of the mechanism in cases where the 
                                                 
97 Once again, if the test was a subjective one as is the case with involuntary culpable 
homicide, then courts would have had the option of holding the corporation liable where the 
senior management was utterly indifferent to the consequences of not supervising 
incompetent middle-level managers or unskilful front-line employees. 
98 Cf Gobert, 2008: 428. 
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accused corporation had adopted an organic management system and the 
agents that acted were middle-level managers. Nonetheless, it is submitted 
here that such middle-level managers ought to be identified with the accused 
corporation only where they had been delegated managerial functions over 
the relevant transactions, else the corporation’s liability would be unlimited. As 
such, determining the directing mind may involve analyses of hierarchy and 
function and management systems. 
 
The senior management failure test which is supposed to be an amelioration 
of the identification doctrine seems to be more rigid or similar at best. 
Corporate criminal liability is quite complex and no doubt raises many 
metaphysical subtleties that are not unwarranted in the development of the 
law,99 else the subject would have developed solely on teleological or 
consequentialist bases of absolute and strict liability or Parliament would have 
simply endorsed the extreme reductionist or methodological individualistic 
approach of blaming only individuals. Thus, mechanisms of imputation 
employed ought to provide answers to difficult questions about the nature of 
the accused corporation’s mind and standards for establishing culpability. 
From the evaluation above, it may be said that the rules of recognition reveal 
that there is still no clear delineation of actions and intentions that are 
particular to the corporation that ought to be punished for crimes committed 
qua corporation. It is difficult to see how the prosecution can succeed where 
no individual senior manager or collective group of senior managers was 
sufficiently blameworthy and the death of a person to whom the corporation 
owed a duty of care was caused by an aggregation of the acts and omissions 
of middle-level or operational managers. The prosecution would have to rely 
on whether the judge or jury may be satisfied with the causal link between the 
offence and the acts of the senior management and whether these acts may 
be deemed criminal. The requirements of “sufficiently blameworthy” conduct 
of the senior management and “what can reasonably be expected of the 
organisation in the circumstances” are quite nebulous. Hence, the legislator 
would have found clarity by requiring that the offence of corporate 
                                                 
99 Cf Lord Lindley in Citizen’s Life Assurance Co Ltd v Brown [1904] AC 423 at 426. 
188 
 
manslaughter or corporate homicide be established using the subjective test 
of Quinn v Cunningham (involuntary culpable homicide) rather than the 
circular and objective test of Adomako (gross negligence manslaughter).  
 
Another major shortcoming of both mechanisms is the fact that what is 
imputed to the corporation is the agent’s liability and not the agent’s act or 
knowledge. Although the CMCHA does not apply to individuals, it 
nevertheless requires that the prosecution establish the gross negligence of 
the senior management and show how this caused the death of the victim. 
Thus, likewise under the identification doctrine, the corporation’s liability under 
the CMCHA is vicarious or derivative and not direct. As such, where no agent 
is shown to be liable or no collective of agents shown to be grossly negligent, 
these mechanisms cannot be employed because the prosecution would be 
unable to show that the collective of agents whose acts resulted in the breach 
were mere instruments that the corporation as the principal offender used to 
perpetrate the offence. This means that it is preferable that both mechanisms 
are used only to show that the accused corporation encouraged or assisted its 
agents to perpetrate the offence charged and is liable as an accessory. 
However, this would require ascertaining the meaning of the statement that a 
corporation encouraged or assisted its agent. The question whether 
alternative mechanisms applicable in other jurisdictions or devised by some 
commentators are congruent with the substantive rules of recognition and 
may enable the criminal justice system overcome the shortcomings discussed 
above will be considered in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATION OF 
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS OF IMPUTATION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter 5, the applicable mechanisms of imputation in the United Kingdom 
were evaluated with respect to the substantive parameters established in 
Chapter 4. Although they were shown to require substantial development in 
certain areas, the recommendation that they be dispensed with cannot be 
made unless an alternative mechanism is shown to be more amenable to 
these parameters. This Chapter is therefore focused on the evaluation of 
some alternative mechanisms of imputation. Given that it would be neither 
possible nor reasonable to evaluate all the available alternatives or even most 
of them, three mechanisms will be evaluated based on the fact that they have 
been referred to by criminal law judges in the United Kingdom, they are 
applicable in jurisdictions that may trace their legal heritage to the United 
Kingdom and are endorsed by some prominent commentators. 
 
Each alternative mechanism is thus deemed to be the logical consequence of 
the endeavour by foreign courts or Parliament to ascertain a measure of 
determining under specified circumstances when the act of an employee or 
agent may be said to have been that of the corporation that employs or directs 
her. The alternative mechanisms will be evaluated in light of the same 
parameters consisting of related legal principles and the internal and external 
viewpoints of judges and other non-legal theorists. 
 
 
6.2 THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY DOCTRINE 
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“Is corporate liability essentially more than a disguised form of vicarious liability?”1 
 
Vicarious liability is founded on the maxim of respondeat superior2 and to a 
certain extent qui facit per alium facit per se.3 Although some commentators 
posit that it was developed in the medieval era,4 it has been shown that the 
notion was recognised in ancient Rome,5 as well as in African customary law.6 
In fact, it is a concept whose underlying principle may be said to be as ancient 
as civilization.7 It is the applicable mechanism in some influential jurisdictions 
such the United States8 and South Africa9 which do not only trace their legal 
heritage (or part of) to the United Kingdom but also have some important 
generic similarities such as adversarial court procedures and trial by jury (for 
the American legal system), amongst others.10 Equally, commentators, courts 
and Law Commissions in the United Kingdom often review legal 
developments in the United States when considering the best line of approach 
for the United Kingdom.11 However, vicarious liability evolved in its own right 
and in a fairly reasonable manner in the United Kingdom although it has been 
claimed that the operation of the doctrine of common employment (an 
                                                 
1 Leigh, 1966: 570. 
2 Let the master answer. 
3As noted in Chapter 4, this may be translated roughly as he who acts through another acts 
himself. However, vicarious liability has shifted considerably from this maxim given that today 
it is more about the master answering for the offence of her servant as a result of their special 
relationship. Nonetheless, it was also noted in Chapter 4 that the imputation of acts and 
intents to the corporate master should rest on this maxim given that the criminal law targets 
the corporate master for acting through of its servants. 
4 See Wells, 2001: 88 citing Holdsworth, 1944: 46-47. 
5 Where the pater familias or head of an economic group was liable for the debt of a slave to 
the extent of an amount he had entrusted with the latter. See Johnston, 1995: 1515-1538; and 
Perrott, 1982: 81-121. 
6 In South African customary law for example, a kraalhead (a term used by the Dutch settlers 
to refer to the chief or head of a social unit) was vicariously liable for all the delictual/tortious 
acts of inhabitants of the kraal or chiefdom. See Bennett, 1991: 351; and Seymour, 1989: 82. 
7 See Fleming, 1998: 409. 
8 This was affirmed in New York Central. Although a majority of states have modelled their 
laws on the Model Penal Code, they nonetheless endorse vicarious liability as the mechanism 
of imputing acts and intents to corporations. See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 58-59.  
9 See section 332 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 1977. 
10 After its independence, American law relied heavily on developments in England. See 
Friedman, 2005. Also, although the South African system is a mixed legal system, its 
company law was largely shaped by legal developments in the United Kingdom. Moreover, 
the Privy Council in the United Kingdom was the final court of appeal in South Africa until 
1961. 
11 See for example, Law Commission, No 237, 1996: para. 7.28; and Law Commission Report 
No 300, 2006: 2.23, n. 27. See also Turner J in P & O European Ferries; and Lord Woolf in 
Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Lee Kwong-Kut [1993] AC 951 at 969-970. 
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employer could not liable for the negligence of one of her employees to 
another) checked its development,12 especially as regards the employer’s 
liability for the mode chosen by employees to carry out their work.13 
 
Today, vicarious liability essentially operates to hold one person liable for the 
wrongful act of an intermediary employed by the former in spite of the fact that 
the former is not blameworthy in any respect.14 The relationship between the 
former and the intermediary has invariably been described as a master-
servant relationship or principal-agent relationship. The absence of 
blameworthiness on the part of the master or principal distinguishes vicarious 
liability from other forms of liability that require proof of criminal intent of the 
master although it does not make it synonymous to strict and absolute liability. 
In the latter case, the employer is held liable for the fault or breach of her 
employee on the ground that she had an absolute duty to prevent the fault or 
breach and her failure to do so itself constitutes a fault.15 Vicarious liability is 
imposed on the employer because she exercises control over the employee 
and can motivate or compel the latter to comply with the law or because the 
court deems it the right to impose liability on the employer in the 
circumstances.16 It may therefore be noted that the primary rule of vicarious 
                                                 
12 See Simpson, 2000: 584. The doctrine of common employment was abolished in the United 
Kingdom by the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948. Some important decisions 
discussing this doctrine include Priestly v Fowler (1837) 1 M & W 1 (Ex Ch); and Woodhead v 
Gartness Mineral Company (1877) 4 R 469. 
13 See Wilson and Clyde Coal Company Ltd v English (1937) 53 TLR 944 where the House of 
Lords sought to distinguish between the employer’s liability for the conditions of safety under 
which work is carried out by the workers and the employer’s liability for the negligence of one 
worker to another in carrying out the work. Due to the fact that the doctrine of common 
employment was still operational, their Lordships contended that the employer could not 
plead the doctrine of common employment in order to escape liability for the provision of 
safety measures because it was the employer’s duty to provide a safe working environment. 
However, if one agrees that the House of Lords was right in limiting the operation of the 
doctrine of common employment one must nevertheless note that their argument showed a 
marked distinction between common employment and the personal or direct liability of the 
employer and not a distinction between common employment and vicarious liability. As such, 
the impact of common employment on vicarious liability may have been exaggerated given 
that the employer’s vicarious liability was often (and is still sometimes) confused with her 
personal or direct liability. 
14 See Fleming, 1998: 409; and Clough and Mulhern, 2002: 79. 
15 This is especially true in cases where the employer’s duty is non-delegable. See 
Queensland Law Reform Commission Report 56, 2001: 5. However, it is not restricted to such 
cases. As stated in Chapter 3, strict liability and absolute liability are variants of direct or 
personal liability and not vicarious liability. Cf Ho and Papathanassiou, 2006: 19-20; and 
Lederman, 2000: 653. 
16 Queensland Law Reform Commission Report 56, 2001: 13.  
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liability requires courts to compel corporations to substitute for their criminal 
agents in circumstances where the courts believe it is justified to hold the 
corporations liable. 
 
This means that policy reasons constitute the “formal” or “first-order” reason 
for imposing vicarious liability. The facts that the negligent employee would 
most probably be insolvent or judgment proof and the employer who benefited 
from her labour often has the resources to pick up the burden of damages17 
have certainly spurred courts and legislators on to considering extending the 
employer’s liability to include the risks of harm carried by the enterprise.18 This 
is justified by the contention that if a person derives benefit from an act, it is 
only just that she should bear the risk of loss from the same act.19 Equally, it 
has been submitted that where vicarious liability applies, a corporation is less 
likely to adopt measures to defeat the law such as decoupling policies and 
practices or delegating the control of criminogenic to middle-level or 
operational managers.20  
 
It is however difficult to justify the imposition of vicarious liability in criminal law 
on the grounds stated above. The argument of the insolvency of the employee 
or agent does not hold much water because conviction and punishment ought 
to be invoked automatically if the prosecutor proves that a defender 
perpetrated the wrongful act.21 Moreover, the correlation between the benefit 
                                                 
17 This argument also extends to the claim that the employer is in a better position to obtain 
insurance and spread the risk across the network of persons connected to the negligent 
employee. See Fleming, 1998: 410. See also Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report 
56, 2001: 13. 
18 Williams (1957) therefore contended that vicarious liability was founded on the search for a 
solvent defendant. See also Simpson, 2000: 584. See also Hamlyn v Houston & Co [1903] 1 
KB 81 at 85-86 per Collins MR; and Nisbett v Dixon and Company (1852) 14 D 973 at 979 per 
Lord Cunninghame who discusses Richmond v Russell Mcnee and Company (1849) 11 D 
1035; and Barwick v English Joint Stock Bank (1867) LR 2 Ex 259. 
19 New York Central at 307. 
20 See Clark and Langsford, 2005: 33; and Burns PT, 1967: 702-703. These are some of the 
measures which corporations may adopt to circumvent the requirements of the identification 
doctrine and the senior management failure test. 
21 Also, this argument does not hold much water in civil law because there are laws governing 
situations where the defendant is insolvent. The argument that insolvent individuals are less 
likely to be deterred because they have nothing more to lose may explain why liability should 
be extended to the employer in certain circumstances but does not add much to the theory 
that underpins the concept since the employer also may sometimes be insolvent. Equally, the 
law provides for the employer that has been held vicariously liable to seek indemnity from the 
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conferred by the agent’s work and the risk of harm created by the work does 
not always show vicarious liability to be reasonable. The correlation between 
both variables may sometimes be negative, such as where the worker’s 
criminal act, although literarily in the course of employment, is unconnected to 
the purpose for which she was employed to such extent that no benefit is 
conferred on the employer.22 Equally, risk theories based on “risk 
assessment” and “enterprise risk” will not always provide sufficient justification 
for vicarious liability since a worker’s sudden erratic conduct, such as rape, 
which is unconnected to the mode of performing his duties will seldom be 
within the ambit of the employer’s assessment of risks created by the 
employee’s work lest employers are expected to become soothsayers.23 
 
It is in this light that Williams described the abovementioned explanations as 
hollow24 and the Australian Queensland Reform Commission contended that 
there is no single argument or explanation that is weighty enough to justify the 
imposition of vicarious liability.25 The primary rule of this mechanism therefore 
fails to play the requisite linguistic or expressive role as it does not 
communicate what is required of courts in a clear manner. The Australian 
Queensland Law Reform Commission noted that vicarious liability is 
essentially a policy instrument26 and recommended that emphasis be placed 
                                                                                                                                            
worker that was at fault. See the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. Irrespective of the fact 
that employers seldom enforce this right (Ho and Papathanassiou, 2006: 19, footnote n. 12) 
its existence implies that vicarious liability could not have been founded on the worker’s 
insolvency. 
22 If for example, a worker is hired to sell the employer’s cars and in the course of selling a car 
threatens the customer, holding the employer liable for duress on the ground that she 
benefited from the worker’s sale is bluntly speaking absurd because the employer cannot be 
said to derive any benefit from the duress. 
23 However, where the employer is able to foresee the risk of the breach of the criminal law 
created by the worker’s employment, it is logical that the employer should be held to have 
increased the risk of the commission of the crime by employing the worker. 
24 See Williams, 1957. 
25 The difficulty of justifying the use of vicarious liability in criminal law is exemplified by other 
explanations put forward by some commentators that endorse the practicality of the theory. 
Burns PT (1967) for example contended that vicarious criminal liability would be quite 
effective if it was based on the delegation test, although delegation implies personal liability of 
the person delegating her duties and logically excludes vicarious liability. Clark and Langford 
(2005) also suggest that vicarious liability that is based on due diligence is the most 
appropriate means of tackling corporate crime although due diligence also implies personal 
liability of the corporation (often used as a defence to strict liability offences) and logically 
excludes vicarious liability.  
26 See also the statements of McCarthy J in Gifford v Police [1965] NZLR 484 at 500; and 
Scarman LJ in Rose v Plenty [1976] 1 WLR 141 at 147. See also the contention by Gobert 
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on the circumstances of each case and the nature of the relationship between 
the parties in order to determine whether vicarious liability should be invoked 
on policy grounds.27 However, this is the ground on which vicarious liability 
has often been imposed in civil cases and this has resulted in the broadening 
of vicarious liability especially in tort cases where courts have deemed it fair 
and reasonable to hold employers liable for the wrongful acts of their 
employees that were closely connected to their employment.28 Nonetheless, it 
may be fair and reasonable to impose vicarious liability in civil cases because 
court decisions are based on a balance of probabilities and it may be more 
probable that the employer could have prevented the breach by her worker or 
benefited from the latter’s negligence where the bulk of the evidence shows 
that the employer exercised control over the negligent employee. However, in 
criminal cases decisions are based on the guilt or fault of the accused and this 
is a much more slippery ground for vicarious liability.  
 
As such, the importation of the concept into the criminal law has been the 
subject of much controversy. In the United Kingdom, the common law position 
has been that the master is not criminally liable for the crime committed by her 
servant irrespective of whether the servant committed the crime within the 
course of her employment or not.29 However, justifying the exclusion of the 
doctrine of vicarious liability from the criminal law may also prove to be a 
challenging task if one relies solely on the fact that the criminal law operates 
to punish only the morally blameworthy person that is shown to be 
responsible. As shown in Chapter 2, it is misguided to hold out the proof of 
blameworthiness of the accused (deontological facet of the criminal law) as 
the only concern of the criminal law. A person may also be held liable 
because of the need to meet a designated objective irrespective of whether 
                                                                                                                                            
and Punch (2003: 56) that the decision in New York Central was based more on policy 
justifications than legislative intent. 
27 Queensland Law Reform Commission Report 56, 2001: 16. See also Brickey, 1981: 414; 
Clarkson, 1996: 565; and Clough and Mulhern, 2002: 80-85. 
28 See Dubai Aluminium at [23]; Irving at 290; and Canadian Pacific Railway at 599. However, 
these cases dealt with third parties seeking remedies from employers and are not altogether 
analogous to situations where the state would seek to impose criminal sanctions on 
employers for crimes committed by their employees. 
29 See R v Hinggis (1730) 2 Ld Raym 1574; and Roberts v Woodward (1890) 25 QBD 412. 
See also Welsh, 1946: 346, 348, 358; and Gillies, 1997: 111. 
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she is morally blameworthy or not (teleological facet of the criminal law). Also, 
it may argued that ideas of morality and social interest sometimes overlap and 
it is important to show that even though the employer is not morally 
blameworthy she could have foreseen the risk of the worker committing the 
crime or that she provided the opportunity for the worker to commit the crime; 
and the policy objective of deterrence will be achieved if liability is imposed on 
the employer.30 Nonetheless, it is difficult to predict when courts will impose 
vicarious liability. That notwithstanding, the mechanism’s primary rule will be 
evaluated by reference to the substantive parameters set out in Chapter 4 in 
order to determine whether it may provide a better avenue for enforcing 
crimes against corporations despite the nebulousness of the primary rule. 
 
6.2.1 The congruity of the mechanism’s primary rule with related legal 
principles 
 
Vicarious liability is likely to conflict with a related legal principle such as 
separate corporate personality because it is based on the fact that the 
accused corporation was not in anyway personally responsible for the crime 
but is liable due to its relationship with the guilty agent.31 Hence, talking of 
imposing direct liability on corporations via vicarious liability may logically be 
deemed oxymoronic given that direct or personal liability is essentially based 
on the personal fault of the accused. However, there are instances (in civil 
                                                 
30 See the reasons for imposing vicarious civil liability put forward in the United States case of 
Commonwealth v Pulaski County Agric and Mech Association 17 SW 442 (1891) and in the 
Canadian case of Blackwater v Plint 2005 SCC 58. The argument of deterrence is buttressed 
by the contention that imposing vicarious  liability on corporations incites them to closely 
monitor and supervise all of their employees and reduces the probability of the latter 
breaching the law. However, reality may be more complicated than such prediction as it has 
been suggested elsewhere that corporations may dispense with internal audits and thereby 
reduce the risk of detecting crimes for which they would be held liable. See Dana, 1996: 970. 
See also Chu and Qian, 1995: 306. 
31 It may then be posited that the argument put forward by Ho and Papathanassiou (2006: 20) 
that Bank of India was vicariously liable in Bank of India v Morris [2005] EWCA Civ 693 for the 
fraud committed by the general manager of its London branch is misguided. This is because 
the general manager had been vested with management functions with full discretion and 
acted as the company’s “directing mind” and not merely as its agent. Thus, his fault was the 
fault of the company as held by the court. See Bank of India v Morris at [112].  
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law) where vicarious liability may be used to target corporations directly.32 In 
1963, the House of Lords was held to have perforated the boundary between 
contract and tort at common law by ordaining that a claimant may sue in tort 
in situations where no action for breach of contract was available.33 Such 
situations include where the defendant has assumed responsibility to such 
extent that it may be said that there would have been a contract between the 
claimant and the defendant but for the absence of consideration.34 The effect 
of this decision has been to expand the scope of the law of tort to include the 
intentions of the parties involved.35 There is considerable literature on the 
practicality and importance of this position and how it ought to apply.36 
However, the fact that the reasoning is based on the intersection between 
contract law and tort law means that by default it cannot be applicable to the 
criminal law. This is because unlike some tort or delictual claims that may give 
rise to criminal prosecutions (negligence and gross negligence), contract law 
(any agreement between parties) is not the criminal law’s concern. 
Nonetheless, the mingling of tort (and delict) and contract may bridge the 
criminal law and contract law and it is suggested here that vicarious liability 
may serve as the brick of such a bridge.   
 
Normally, an employer is vicariously liable for the acts of her worker 
committed within the course or scope of the latter’s employment, thus, the 
worker is personally responsible and the employer is vicariously liable.37 As 
such, the worker’s personal responsibility does not render her liable unless 
she also had a special relationship with the plaintiff, in which case the worker 
would not be able to escape liability on the ground that she was acting solely 
                                                 
32 In establishing vicarious liability as the applicable mechanism, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in New York Central was clearly understood to imply that the master is 
answerable for the criminal acts of his servants as she is in civil law. See also Vu, 2004: 466. 
However, the argument below is not based on the endorsement of such brazen importation of 
the concept as it applies in civil law into the criminal law. 
33 See Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, hereinafter referred to 
as Hedley Byrne. 
34 See O’Sullivan, 2007: 165. See also Whittaker, 1997: 169. 
35 See Barker, 1993: 464. 
36 See for example, Barker, 1993; Witting, 2005; Stanton, 2007; and O’Sullivan, 2007. 
37 Todd, 2003: 202. 
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in the capacity as servant of the employer.38 The person that is normally liable 
is the employer although such liability is vicarious. However, where the 
employer assumed responsibility for the acts of a client in circumstances 
where but for the absence of consideration there would have been a contract 
and the employer’s worker (who was not in a special relationship with the 
client) breaches the duty of care to the plaintiff, the employer is vicariously 
liable for the worker’s breach although her vicarious liability is treated as 
identical to personal liability. This is because the worker or agent who actually 
commits the tort or delict is not in a special relationship with the client and 
does not owe an incidental duty of care; her act does not amount to a breach 
of such duty of care unless the act is imputed to the employer that owes the 
duty of care. 
 
This may be deemed a classic example of identification given that the worker 
is treated not as an agent of the company but as something more: the 
“embodiment” of the company.39 However, identification will be discounted on 
the ground that the doctrine requires the court to impute the agent’s liability 
and not just her acts to the corporation and in this case the worker is 
responsible for the breach and not liable in law since her liability depends on 
whether she also assumed personal responsibility.40 Thus, it is the corporate 
employer and not the agent that is liable because it was the former that was in 
a special relationship with the client and what is imputed to the corporation is 
simply the worker’s action. If this reasoning is imported into the criminal law, 
                                                 
38See Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corporation [2002] 3 WLR 
1547, hereinafter referred to as Standard Chartered Bank. 
39 See Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830 (hereinafter referred to as 
Natural Life Health Foods) at 838-839 where Lord Steyn held that the manager in such 
instance is not a joint tortfeasor with the company but the embodiment of the company or an 
instrument which the company employed to perpetrate the act that resulted in the breach. See 
however Todd’s (2003: 202) argument that the company is both vicariously liable and a joint 
tortfeasor. Vicarious and direct liability are fused here because in order to qualify as a joint 
tortfeasor, the company should be shown to be equally responsible for the breach while in 
order to be vicariously liable, the company should not be responsible but should be liable 
simply because the breach was caused by an employee acting within the course or scope of 
her employment. 
40 Campbell and Armour (2003: 292-296) describe this approach as the “disattribution heresy” 
because the employee’s acts are “disattributed” from her and attributed to the company. See 
also the New Zealand case they cite: Natural Life Health Foods and Trevor Ivory Ltd v 
Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517. See also Grantham and Rickett (1999: 133-139) focusing on 
directors’ immunity. 
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the imputation of the worker’s wrongful act to the corporation would be more 
indicative of vicarious criminal liability although that derives from the fact that 
the employer had assumed personal responsibility. A good example of such 
conception of vicarious criminal liability is the South African case of N K v 
Ministry of Safety and Security41 where a woman was raped by three 
policemen in a police van during night patrol. The Constitutional Court held 
the state vicariously liable because it contended amongst other things that the 
state had undertaken via the Constitution to ensure the safety and security of 
all citizens using its policemen. As such, even though the state was not 
responsible for the rape, it was vicariously liable due to the fact it had 
assumed personal responsibility for the victim’s safety and was in a special 
relationship with her.42 
 
It must however be noted that the operation of Hedley Byrne duty of care (and 
other duties of like design) in civil law is different from the plain and 
straightforward statutory and common law duties of care in criminal law. The 
Hedley Byrne duty of care arises not necessarily by operation of the law and 
certainly not by contractual obligations but by virtue of a special relationship 
that exists between the employer and a third party. The employer may only be 
held (vicariously) liable if it has assumed personal responsibility for the acts 
carried out by its agents or employees that adversely affects a third party. As 
such, we may refer to this line of reasoning only as an attempt to provide an 
aperture through which corporations may be targeted directly via the 
mechanism of vicarious liability and through which the mechanism may gain 
access into the criminal law (of the United Kingdom). Nonetheless, it may be 
argued that the fact that courts in such instance would assume that the 
corporation’s failure to perform its duty is sufficiently blameworthy (though not 
uncommon) implies that the corporation is personally and not vicariously 
liable. But given that the failure is not as a result of the corporation’s act but 
that of an agent that may not be identified with it, the corporation is more likely 
                                                 
41 [2005] JOL 14864 (CC). 
42 Thus, given that the state cannot physically commit the offence of rape, its liability was 
essentially vicarious, although equally direct since it was in a special relationship with the 
victim. See Nana, 2008: 265-266. 
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to be vicariously liable.43 Thus, the fact that vicarious liability may be imposed 
in this instance via the assumption of personal responsibility implies that 
vicarious liability can be used in criminal law to target corporations directly or 
personally.44 
 
It is difficult to see another way in which the conception of the corporation 
within the context of vicarious criminal liability may be shown to correspond to 
the notion of corporate personality. As noted in Chapters 3 and 5, corporate 
psychology is much broader than the thoughts of an individual employee or 
manager and to reduce a corporation’s knowledge to that of its individual 
employee or manager is tantamount to focusing only on one aspect of the 
corporate psychology. However, it may be argued that vicarious liability 
applies to all employees of the corporation irrespective of their station and 
logically provides a more holistic perspective to preventing and punishing 
crime in the corporate context when compared to the identification doctrine 
and senior management failure test. Where the corporation benefits from the 
criminal or negligent act of any agent, whether a middle level manager (that 
does not exert substantial authority) or low-level employee, it cannot be 
prosecuted using the identification doctrine or senior management failure test. 
However, vicarious liability (supported by policy considerations) would give 
courts good grounds to contend that it is fair to hold the corporation liable 
since it had control over the employee or manager. Conversely, where the 
crime is the result of the sum of the acts of several managers and junior 
employees, the corporation will be acquitted because the prosecution would 
not be able to pinpoint any manager or employee that may be sufficiently 
blameworthy to be deserving of punishment.45 The prosecution may thus be 
                                                 
43 This line of reasoning is buttressed by the argument that where an act creating a legal 
relationship between the principal and a third party is most likely to be performed by an agent 
(such as selling alcohol in a licensed inn) the principal is more likely to be vicariously liable. 
See Clough and Mulhern, 2002: 85.  
44 This argument should not be discounted simply on the basis of the apparent sinuosity of the 
reasoning given that changes in the commercial world may lead to the criminal justice system 
confronting such situations in real life. It should not be forgotten that vicarious liability has 
been justified over the past centuries by social and economic changes. See Williams, 1957: 
228. 
45 This is referred to by Png (2001) as the “problem of many hands.” In as much as one may 
try to show that the doctrine does not rely on individualism, the fact that it faces this problem 
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tempted to identify the individual that had ultimate responsibility and 
knowledge of the consequences of the activities.46 However, whether such 
responsibility and knowledge would be “sufficiently blameworthy” or meet the 
requirements of a crime (mens rea and actus reus) is another question. As 
noted in the discussion of the identification doctrine, The Truculent and The 
Lady Gwendolen provide hope that this may be possible although they 
constitute the exception and not the rule.  
 
The use of vicarious liability to impose criminal liability may generally pose 
particular problems with regard to fulfilling the requirements of mens rea and 
actus reus. It must be noted that vicarious liability is a graft from the civil law 
although in ancient societies (in its crudest form) such as those cited above, it 
was also conceived to be applicable in criminal matters given that the head of 
a household was sometimes liable for the offences committed by members of 
his household. Equally, the contemporary use of vicarious liability relates to 
situations where Parliament or courts seek to protect social welfare by 
compelling employers to closely monitor their employees. Such situations 
logically include both civil wrongs and criminal offences committed by 
employees within the course of their employment. In line with the contention in 
Chapter 5 that credit should be given to the identification doctrine for providing 
the means of convicting corporations of offences requiring proof of mens 
rea,47 it may equally be submitted here that credit should be given to vicarious 
liability for the same reason with regard to jurisdictions where it was the 
mechanism first employed.48 However, there is little evidence that vicarious 
liability was sufficiently modelled to suit the requirements of the criminal law. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
implies that its reliance on individual fault is excessive and unfairly precludes the prosecution 
of corporations in a number of instances where the fault is collective. 
46 There is also the argument that where liability equally depends on the policies and 
practices of the corporation, the prosecution may be tempted to avoid the difficult channel of 
identifying the managers or employees that entertained the intention to commit the crime and 
also deserve to be punished. See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 1. 
47 In the United Kingdom or other commonwealth jurisdictions that began prosecuting 
corporations for crimes of intent employing the identification doctrine. 
48 Such as the United States. See Coffee, 1983: 253-254; and Khanna, 1996: 182. 
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This mechanism involves substituting an employer that is free from guilt with 
an employee that is guilty and may have even acted contrary to instructions.49 
What is required as shown above is either evidence that the employee acted 
within the scope or course of her employment or that courts believe that the 
employer should be liable in the interest of the public. The idea of holding a 
person (the employer) criminally liable without proof of her culpability is 
incongruous with the fundamental principles of the criminal law and may even 
be said to be contrary to public policy itself.50 That is why in some jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom, the criminal law is said to preclude vicarious 
liability. However, as noted above, it may be argued that given that vicarious 
liability is based on policy considerations it may be considered to part of the 
consequential or teleological facet of the criminal law as described in Chapter 
2. It is true that a statute may decide to target a particular ‘person’ by 
imposing liability on her with no requirement of proof of culpability because it 
promises the most desirable of consequences. Nonetheless, these situations 
include strict and absolute liability and not vicarious liability.51 Strict and 
absolute liability offences are governed by policy defined by legislation and 
sometimes courts52 while vicarious liability is not based on any defined policy 
but considerations of the court in the circumstances.53 Such considerations 
relate to reasoning about facts and do not fit the bill of the consequentialist or 
teleological criminal law facet which is concerned with rules of statutes or 
precedent. Hence, it would be absurd to seek to justify the use of vicarious 
liability to prosecute corporations (especially for mens rea offences) by 
referring to the mechanism’s teleological or consequentialist basis.  
 
                                                 
49 This is however most unlikely given that an employer can only be vicariously liable where 
the employee acted within her scope of authority. An employee acting contrary to instructions 
may therefore be held to be acting outside such scope. Nonetheless, this is subject to debate 
since as noted in Chapter 4, the term ‘scope of employment’ is broadly interpreted by civil 
courts. 
50 Especially for crimes with high stigma. See Hippard’s (1973: 1040) argument that criminal 
liability without fault (not mens rea) is inconsistent with the principles that underpin the 
American Constitution. 
51 It is the jumbling of these types of liability that has no doubt incited a backlash against strict 
and absolute liability in some quarters. 
52 For example liability for escape in Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1. 
53 The different considerations by different courts in different circumstances cannot be said to 
amount to precedent (because there is nothing to bind subsequent or lower courts) unless all 
cases are deemed to be “cases of first impression.” See Cross R and Harris, 1991: 186-187. 
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As such, the absence of proof of the culpability of the accused, as well as 
looking past her personal or direct liability is inconsistent with criminal liability. 
The accused corporation is expected to answer for the behaviour and 
subjective acts and intent of its employee or be treated as a criminal although 
it has not committed any crime and is not in any way art and part in the 
employee’s crime.54 Moreover, a person’s status as employer or employee is 
very relevant to the operation of vicarious liability unlike in criminal law where 
it is simply a question of whether such person entertained the mens rea and 
performed or pushed another person to perform the actus reus of the 
offence.55 Thus, under vicarious liability an agent is logically not liable if she 
acted in her capacity as agent (on instructions from the principal). This is 
because her wrongful act is not legally attributable to her unless she assumed 
personal responsibility to the plaintiff or claimant.56 As mentioned earlier, this 
is called the “disattribution heresy” and proponents of the approach contend 
that it is the result of the distinction between a corporation’s personality and 
that of its agent.57 Although the House of Lords in Standard Chartered Bank 
dismissed the argument that agents could not be personally liable where they 
had knowledge of the illegality of their acts, it is unclear whether the liability of 
such agents is secondary or primary where they were following instructions 
and whether the corporate employer would escape liability in spite of the 
instructions. This is related to the question of whether the agent through 
whom a company contracts with the plaintiff would be liable in case of breach 
of contract.58 Notwithstanding, vicarious liability is simply unreasonably broad 
and the fact that it is imported into the criminal law with little or no modification 
implies that there is a major risk of intermingling civil law concepts with the 
                                                 
54 It has been argued that this principle has sometimes been applied by criminal law courts in 
the United Kingdom as in the case of criminal libel prior to the Libel Act 1843 (section 7). See 
Welsh, 1946: 348-349. See also R v Holbrook (1878) 4 QBD 42 at 46-49. See also Brickey’s 
(1981: 414) argument that corporations were vicariously liable for tortious or delictual acts of 
their employees that required proof of intent such as battery and assault. Thus, importing the 
concept into the criminal law is not altogether absurd. 
55 This is also open to argument because irrespective of the mechanism employed, the 
corporation can only be liable for the act or omission of its employee or agent. Thus, although 
the status of corporate employer/principal or employee/agent is not important to the criminal 
law, it is as important to corporate criminal liability as it is to vicarious liability. 
56 See Natural Life Health Foods and Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517. See 
also the Canadian case of Scotia McLeod Inc v Peoples Jewellers Ltd (1995) 129 DLR (4th) 
711. 
57 See Grantham and Rickett, 1999:138-139. 
58 See Campbell and Armour, 2003: 302. 
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criminal law, something which may greatly impact upon the efficaciousness of 
criminal law sanctions. 
 
As regards vicarious liability’s congruence with rules implied by the law of 
agency, it must be noted that both concepts of vicarious liability and agency 
are founded on the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se. Hence, they both 
operate to substitute the principal for her delinquent agent because the former 
was in a position of control and both parties consented to the power-liability 
relationship. Also given that vicarious liability is largely governed by policy 
considerations and is not concerned with the principal’s responsibility, the 
same reasons that justify the operation of agency may be said to explain why 
vicarious liability is employed in certain instances.59 Thus, the courts may 
decide to hold a corporate employer vicariously liable because its guilty agent 
acted within the scope of her employment or because the corporate employer 
is deemed to have had constructive knowledge of the agent’s intent to commit 
the offence or the likelihood of that happening. However, unlike agency, the 
employer may only be vicariously liable where the agent was at fault. Thus, 
acts or intents that do not amount to an offence cannot be imputed to the 
corporation to hold it vicariously liable in spite of the fact that they were 
performed by its agent in the course of the agency.  
 
6.2.2 The consonance of the mechanism’s primary rule with 
other rules of recognition 
 
Vicarious liability seems to be largely unconcerned with the essence or nature 
of the corporate person. Questions of its “brains” or “nerve centre” and 
“hands” and how these organs interact with each other and towards the 
corporation’s objectives are largely ignored. A mechanism could not be further 
from the normative perspective of judges discussed in Chapter 4. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that vicarious liability treats corporations as 
                                                 
59 It is however challenging drawing a fine line between both concepts as they sometimes 
overlap in both their legal and normative applications. Some commentators thus treat both 
concepts as synonyms. See for example, Lederman, 2000: 652. 
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having no “souls” or “consciences” by not requiring proof of their 
blameworthiness but of that of their agents (natural persons). Also, it may be 
argued that the corporate employer’s psychological autonomy is recognised 
by the requirement of proof of control over the employee’s activities such as in 
cases where assumption of responsibility by the corporate employer is 
required. However, these arguments would have been valid if entertaining 
mens rea predicated the possession of a “soul” or “conscience” and if they 
applied to exonerate the corporate employer in a situation where it did not 
assume responsibility. Mens rea is related to the capacity of the accused and 
vicarious liability extends even to situations where the employer did not 
assume responsibility; it is sufficient that the guilty worker acted within the 
scope of her employment. As such, it may be advanced that the fact that 
vicarious liability is only at best remotely connected to the enforcement-
generated metaphors implies that it is a mechanism that is out of touch with 
the reality of corporate criminal liability, at least in the United Kingdom.60 
 
The mechanism’s sweep however comprises some organisation theories (that 
fall within the contingency approach discussed in Chapter 4) that identify the 
corporation with the decision-maker or the individual responsible for 
implementing policies or designated to perform any task. These theories 
include the Nominated Accountability Model, Mintzberg’s Simple Structure 
Model, the Noblese Oblige Model, the Fault-based Individual Responsibility 
Model, and the Autopoiesis Model. Vicarious liability may also be said to 
include the Bureaucratic Politics Model that applies to senior managers 
because they exert more influence in bargaining processes although it will be 
restricted to situations where one of the agents that constitute the senior 
management can be identified and shown to be at fault. The intriguing feature 
of vicarious liability is that it may be used to impose liability on any corporation 
irrespective of the structure it adopts in response to contingency factors. 
However, theories such as the Organisational Process Model and Machine 
Bureaucracy Model that place emphasis on established SOPs do not accord 
                                                 
60 It is therefore unsurprising that it is reported that after the decision in New York Central 
importing vicarious liability into the criminal law of the United States, accused corporations 
entreated courts to consider their complex nature and the diligence that their board of 
directors or senior management had shown in preventing the crime. See Laufer, 2006: 17. 
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with vicarious liability except to the extent that they require liability to be 
imposed on the officer that formulates, implements and monitors these SOPs. 
Since such officers would normally formulate, implement and monitor these 
SOPs within the course of their employment, their corporate employers may 
naturally be held vicariously liable. Nonetheless, the formulation or 
implementation or monitoring of the SOPs must itself amount to an offence 
before vicarious liability may apply.  
 
That notwithstanding, vicarious liability may be said to be more flexible than 
the two mechanisms evaluated in Chapter 5. There is no need, for example, 
to broadly interpret the statements of their Lordships in Nattrass in order to 
determine whether the mechanism is more flexible than envisaged or to seek 
to interpret the words of the CMCHA to such extent as to indulge in sinuous 
dialectics. Whether it is a bureaucracy or an adhocracy the corporate 
employer is simply vicariously liable if the guilty employee acted within the 
course of her employment. This means that vicarious liability may be said to 
accord with the reality of contemporary complex corporations on the ground 
that it enables courts to hold corporations liable for the offences perpetrated 
by all employees. Given that some corporations employ thousands of 
employees and have hundreds of departments or branches, proving the guilt 
of a senior manager or the senior management may be an uphill task for the 
prosecution, especially where the corporation does not make use of central 
coordination. As such, vicarious criminal liability was adopted in the United 
States based on the contention that it may in several instances be the only 
instrument of regulating corporate behaviour.61  
 
However, a number of commentators have contended that collective 
responsibility is the basis of corporate liability and the prosecution should be 
able to prove its case against the collective unit rather than strain to dissect 
the corporation’s complex structure and identify a single manager or 
employee that is guilty.62 This means that the vicarious liability, as well as the 
identification doctrine  (and to a certain extent the senior management failure 
                                                 
61 See Brickey, 1981: 413-414; and Khanna, 1996: 1483. 
62 See discussion on the corporate culture mechanism below. 
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test) are less sophisticated in dealing with crime committed by complex 
organic corporate structures that may be the result of poorly conceived 
policies or slapdash implementation or inadequate supervision or a 
combination of the three in varying degrees. The prosecution is not required 
to examine the distribution of roles and responsibilities within the complex 
corporate structure or the corporation’s policies and their implementation63 but 
simply to show that the act that breached the criminal provision was 
perpetrated by the corporation’s agent within the course of her employment. 
The argument in favour of vicarious liability is that focussing on corporate 
policies and employment practices of large corporations invariably involves 
showing that they encouraged or tolerated the commission of the offence by 
one of the corporation’s agents. However, where the employee that acted 
does not have the requisite intent, since she was simply obeying instructions 
from the hierarchy, vicarious liability may be precluded because the worker 
was not at fault. In this case, one agent entertained the mens rea and another 
performed the actus reus and the employer may not substitute for any of the 
agents since none of them is actually at fault. 
  
Thus, in spite of the attempts at justifying the use of vicarious liability it seems 
the mechanism sanctions only simple predictions. There is no doubt that 
holding corporations liable for the criminal acts of all of their employees is an 
oversimplified solution and may in some instances be as ludicrous as holding 
natural persons liable for every offence that is remotely connected to them.64 
A rigorous application of vicarious liability would no doubt be ruinous to 
business as corporations, especially the large ones with thousands of 
employees, would be subjected to routine sanctions. That notwithstanding, as 
stated in Chapter 2, no single theory can capture the complexity of decision-
making in the corporate context to such extent that it can be held as a 
template for the enforcement of laws on corporate crime. A mechanism may 
therefore be more efficacious in certain situations and less in others. 
However, the most appropriate mechanism ought to provide a fair means of 
                                                 
63 Lest it is to show that the corporation assumed responsibility over the employee’s actions 
that were not strictly within the scope of her employment. 
64 Gobert and Punch, 2003: 70. 
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modifying its structure in order to overcome the obstacles identified. As shown 
above, vicarious liability does not have such adaptability. It is largely based on 
consideration of policy rather than the reality of the defender’s guilt implying 
that it places more emphasis on the end rather than the means. This makes it 
difficult to predict what the courts will do and such uncertainty does not augur 
well for business, as well as the coherent development of the subject of 
corporate criminal liability. It must however be noted that the principle 
underlying vicarious liability preceded the conception of corporate forms and 
has been modified to suit social and legal changes on a continuous basis. 
Thus, this may also be the case with the prosecution of complex and large 
corporations.65  
 
6.3 THE AGGREGATION DOCTRINE 
Due to the difficulty of identifying employees that could be shown to be 
responsible for the offence in order to hold their corporate employers 
vicariously liable, American courts devised a mechanism by which 
corporations could be held liable for offences  caused by a combination of the 
actions, omissions and intentions of some or all of their employees.  Such 
combination must amount to the requisite mens rea and actus reus of the 
offence to the effect that if it had been entertained and performed by an 
individual she would be liable in her personal capacity and/or her act and 
state of mind would have been imputed to her corporate employer in order to 
hold it vicariously liable. This mechanism is the aggregation doctrine and has 
invariably been referred to as the collective knowledge doctrine or collective 
mens rea standard.66 It is based on the rationale that the aggregation of the 
acts, omissions and states of mind of a corporation’s employees involved in a 
particular transaction is a more realistic reflection of the corporation’s fault.67 
This is thought to provide even stronger motivation for the board of directors 
                                                 
65 In fact, in systems like the United States where vicarious liability is applicable it has often 
been transformed to something similar to the identification doctrine or sometimes applied in 
contiguity with the aggregation doctrine. 
66 See Clarkson, 1998: 6; and Khanna, 1999: 371. 
67 Gobert, 1994: 404. In other words, corporate activities that result in the breach of criminal 
law standards are almost always a combination of the acts and omissions of many 
individuals. See also Norrie, 2001: 95; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 82. 
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or senior management of a corporation to monitor its employees and ensure 
that they communicate with each other and the hierarchy.68 Equally, the board 
or senior management would be less inclined to seek to defeat the course of 
justice by allocating criminogenic tasks in such a way that no single senior 
manager would have the full import.69  
 
Two widely discussed American cases exemplify the application of the 
aggregation doctrine. The first is Bank of New England. In this case, a bank 
was convicted in a jury trial of thirty-one counts of infringing the Currency 
Transaction Report Act 1982. This Act required financial institutions to report 
transactions in excess of $10,000 and the court held that the bank had 
“wilfully” failed to report cash withdrawals by a customer that cumulatively 
exceeded the statutory limit although they were made using multiple cheques 
that were individually under $10,000. The bank’s appeal was hinged upon the 
facts that no single cheque exceeded the statutory limit and the evidence 
adduced was not sufficient to justify the verdict that it had wilfully omitted to 
file reports on the said transactions.70 Given that vicarious liability was the 
applicable mechanism, the trial judge instructed the jurors to first of all 
determine whether the employees involved in the transaction were acting 
within the course of their employment. He then advanced that the knowledge 
of the bank could be established by showing that one of these employees had 
the said knowledge of the reporting requirement and wilfully failed to file a 
report. He also stated that given that certain responsibilities accrue to the 
bank as an organisation the jury should determine whether the evidence 
showed that the organisation as a whole was indifferent to the requirements of 
the applicable statute. Such evidence included the supervision and monitoring 
of employees and the establishment of effective communication channels at 
all levels.71 The court then concluded that even if the teller that dealt with the 
customer was not aware of the reporting requirements, the corporation had 
                                                 
68 Khanna, 1999: 372. 
69 Clarkson, 1998: 6. 
70 The Act required evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the requirements and specific 
intention to commit the offence. See Brickey, 1995: 45. 
71 Bank of New England at 855-856. 
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knowledge because some employees had been shown to be aware of the 
obligations. The knowledge of these employees and the failure of the tellers to 
file a report were thus aggregated and imputed to the corporation as mens rea 
and actus reus of the statutory offence.  
 
The second case that exemplifies the application of the aggregation doctrine 
is United States v TIME-DC, Inc.72 In this case, the defendant corporation was 
held liable for knowingly and wilfully violating section 322(a) of the Interstate 
Commerce Act which prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle by a driver 
whose attentiveness was impaired by exhaustion or illness, as well as the 
granting of permission to such driver to operate a motor vehicle. The 
corporation had adopted a practice of exerting pressure upon its drivers 
requiring them to continue working even when ill unless they could show a 
statement from a physician advising the contrary. The wife of a driver that had 
taken ill called the dispatcher and informed him of her husband’s illness, the 
dispatcher referred her to the corporation’s policy and the distressed husband 
later on called another dispatcher and asked to be placed on call. The court 
held that the corporation had the collective knowledge of both dispatchers and 
thus knew that the driver was ill and intended to work in spite of the illness.73 
As such, the information acquired by the employees was aggregated and 
imputed to the corporation as mens rea of the offence created by the 
Interstate Commerce Act.  
 
These two cases elucidate the primary rule of aggregation doctrine. This is to 
the effect that where no employee neither entertained the requisite mens rea 
nor performed the actus reus of the offence, the intent and knowledge of 
different employees may be combined together with the relevant deeds of 
other employees and the aggregate may be imputed to the corporation as 
mens rea and actus reus of the offence in order to hold it liable. In other 
                                                 
72 381 F Supp 730 (1974), hereinafter referred to as TIME-DC. 
73 TIME-DC at 738. 
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words, the partial knowledge of one employee may be combined with the 
partial knowledge of another employee and the sum (full knowledge) may be 
imputed to the corporation. The logic is that the corporation’s act and 
knowledge constitute the sum of the acts (within the scope of their authority) 
and knowledge of all its employees or agents.74  
 
This primary rule however invites several questions. It is true that the 
aggregation of the acts, omissions and states of mind of a corporation’s 
employees involved in a transaction is a more realistic reflection of what was 
known and done within the corporation than the stress on what a single 
individual (senior manager) knew and did. However, determining the 
‘corporation’s fault’ using this theory begs the question of which employees 
should be considered in the aggregation process and why.75 This is because 
some transactions involve a cross-section of employees and information may 
be obtained from different departments. Thus, if focus is limited to the acts 
and mental states of senior officers then we would be talking of a variant of 
the senior management failure test instituted by the CMCHA. If the 
aggregation should extend to all of the company’s personnel regardless of 
status then we would be talking of a variant of vicarious liability.76 Equally, if 
the aggregation should extend beyond the acts of junior employees and 
senior officers to include the organisational indifference as posited in Bank of 
New England then we would be talking yet again of a disguised form of the 
corporate culture mechanism.77 The aggregation doctrine therefore brings 
nothing new to the judge’s table and can hardly be said to more reflective of 
corporate fault than the other mechanisms that it simply emulates and thereby 
gives credence to. This muddiness notwithstanding, it would be hasty to 
discard the aggregation doctrine given that it may nonetheless provide better 
solutions to some of the problems encountered by the use of the identification 
                                                 
74 See Brickey, 1995: 47. 
75 Gobert, 1994: 406. See also Clough and Mulhern, 2002: 107. 
76 See Bucy, 1991: 1157; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 85. 
77 This mechanism is discussed below.  
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doctrine and the senior management failure test in the United Kingdom, as 
well as those revealed by the evaluation of vicarious liability.  
6.3.1 The congruence of the mechanism’s primary rule with related legal 
principles 
 
The identification doctrine sometimes overlaps with vicarious liability in the 
imposition of liability on corporations for the acts and intentions of their 
agents. The reasoning underpinning these mechanisms is that the act and 
intention of a guilty agent (employee or senior manager) are a better reflection 
of the corporation’s guilty act and intention. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this 
position has been criticised for failing to impose liability directly on the 
corporation by simply compelling it to substitute for its delinquent agent. This 
criticism is mostly levelled by proponents of the contention that corporate 
personality (though characteristic of a single entity) is founded on collective 
responsibility.78 Hence, acts that are particular to a corporation are those that 
result from a confluence of acts of its employees or agents. Equally, 
knowledge particular to a corporation is an aggregate of the information 
obtained by its employees in their various compartments.79 The aggregation 
mechanism may therefore be said to be a more appropriate tool for enforcing 
crimes directly against the corporate person given that it is focused on the 
collective unit and not the individuals that form part of this unit. Thus, where 
the aggregation doctrine is invoked the focus shifts from the individual 
employee or manager to the corporate person who is the person that is 
prosecuted, convicted and sanctioned.  
 
However, the selling point of the mechanism is not the claim that it focuses on 
the personal or direct liability of corporations80 but that it focuses on a more 
realistic conception of the corporation’s personality. As such, Gobert81 posits 
that rather than proclaiming that an employee or senior officer is the company, 
it may be more appropriate to begin from the premise that the knowledge of 
                                                 
78 See Chapter 2. 
79 Brickey, 1995: 47. 
80 All mechanisms (except vicarious liability to a certain extent) lay claim to this assertion. 
81 1994: 405. 
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the corporation is the aggregate of the knowledge of all its employees 
(including senior managers) and then concluding that there are situations 
where the knowledge of one of them may be the knowledge of all of them. 
Nonetheless, in instances where the knowledge required to prove mens rea is 
located in the brain of a single individual, that individual will most probably be 
a senior manager or a middle-level manager that has been delegated senior 
management functions. This takes us back to the identification doctrine.82 
Also, Gobert’s contention that the corporation’s knowledge may in this vein be 
determined in line with a University Challenge quiz team may be questioned. 
The University Challenge quiz team is said to know the answer to a question 
whenever any of its members has knowledge of the correct answer. However, 
such team is deemed to know the correct answer whenever any of its 
members has knowledge of the correct answer because the members concert 
and agree to put forward an answer as ‘their’ answer. Where there is no 
consensus and several members of the team suggest different answers to the 
umpire, the team cannot be said to know the correct answer even if one of the 
answers suggested is the correct answer.83 In the absence of consensus,84 it 
is difficult to determine the team’s position; it cannot be determined by 
referring to any one member’s opinion because it will not suit the purpose of 
the enquiry nor can it be determined by combining the opinions of all 
members, which may be contrasting. 
 
This requires us to enquire about the process of aggregating the knowledge, 
acts and omissions of employees that form the corporate entity. What is the 
sum of employee A having knowledge of a faulty safety mechanism plus 
employee B having no knowledge of a faulty safety mechanism?85 If the sum 
ought to be the corporation’s act, is it possible to obtain such sum by adding 
employee A’s act that is contrary to corporate policy and employee B’s act 
                                                 
82 See Clough and Mulhern, 2002: 108. It is hard to see how an operational employee would 
apprehend the full import of information obtained by different departments and employees 
and can hardly be the employee whose knowledge can be regarded as the knowledge of all. 
83 Lest the umpire decides to accept the answer given by the team leader that happens to be 
correct. 
84 Consensus certainly founds the agreement that brings the members together in the same 
light as the nexus of contracts brings employees and managers together. 
85 See Gobert, 1994: 406; and Clough and Mulhern, 2002: 109-110. 
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that was performed with due diligence and in accordance with corporate 
policy?86 Looking at the cases where the aggregation doctrine has been 
applied one wonders how the sum approximated to the requisite mens rea 
and actus reus given that some or most employees did not entertain any 
intent to breach the statute or did not perform any act in violation of the 
statute. Thus, why is it that a wrongful act when added to a conforming act 
yields a bigger wrongful act (that is imputed to the corporation)? It seems the 
conforming act has no measurable or determinable value and so the 
corporation is simply liable because one or a number of its employees 
performed a wrongful act, in which case it may be concluded that this doctrine 
is just a fanciful restatement of vicariously liability.87  
 
Even if it is accepted that a corporation may have knowledge of more than 
one thing through different agents, it is important to delineate the temporal 
context within which the knowledge and acts of the corporation’s agents may 
be aggregated. In the Australian case of Brambles Holdings Ltd v Carey,88 it 
was held that if employee A obtained information about X and employee B 
obtained information about Y, the company had knowledge of both X and Y. 
As such, it may be assumed that if employee A retired, the corporation should 
logically be held to have continuing knowledge of X.89 Clough and Mulhern90 
discuss the El Ajou case and also cite the Australian case of Fightvision Pty 
Ltd v Onisforou where it was held that “[a] corporation cannot cause itself to 
shed knowledge by shedding people.”91 They however argue in line with the 
trial judge (Miller J) of El Ajou that where employee A obtained information 
about X and retires or leaves the company, the latter may be said to have 
“lost its memory” and thus cannot be said to possess information about X at 
the relevant time since it cannot be proved that any officer has such 
                                                 
86 Another interesting question is the importance of the employee’s status on the 
measurement of her knowledge and acts given that an employee that exerts more influence 
would most probably impose her opinion on others and those that exert little or no influence 
can only act on instructions.  
87 See Bucy, 1991: 1157.  
88 (1976) 15 SASR 270 at 275-276 per Bray CJ. 
89 See El Ajou at 700 and 706 as per Rose LJ and Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) 
respectively. 
90 2002: 111-112. 
91 (1999) 47 NSWLR 473 at 527.  
214 
 
information. However, their argument is based on the assumption that there is 
no proof that employee A communicated the information to another employee 
or officer that could be said to be the directing mind. Nonetheless, the 
importance of the information should be indicative of whether the company 
had continuing knowledge of it.  Proof that at the time that the crime was 
committed a senior officer (or directing mind) had such knowledge may be 
implied in accordance with the constructive knowledge rule discussed in 
Chapter 4.92 This is because if certain information still enables a corporation 
to obtain certain benefits, it is more likely that the senior management or 
board of directors still use the information. However, where the policy is not 
criminogenic and the company is reasonably structured but employees A, B, 
C and D act contrary to corporate policy and by so doing breach the criminal 
law, they may be said to have acted outwith their scope of authority and the 
corporation’s liability may in no way be reflected by the combined acts of A, B, 
C and D.93 Nonetheless, if an officer obtained information outside her scope of 
authority or from another agent who had since left the corporation and the 
information ought to have enabled the corporation to perform a statutory duty, 
in the event that it failed to perform such duty because the information was 
considered redundant at some point, the corporation should be liable for the 
consequences of its poor diligence. However, there is a danger here of 
extending corporate liability beyond acceptable limits in instances where the 
information obtained by agents over an unreasonably wide time span are 
aggregated. It will be unreasonably wide where such information was truly 
redundant to the current operation of the corporation’s activities and its 
managers and employees could not be expected to still retain such 
information. Such aggregation that is carried out in an indefinite temporal 
context is referred to here as ‘anachronistic aggregation’ and involves a major 
                                                 
92 The question of the station of the agent that possessed the knowledge at the relevant time 
is not as important as the fact that the information was important and ought to have been 
communicated to the senior management of the corporation given that any reasonable senior 
management or board of directors would have ensured that such information was 
communicated to them. 
93 This is equally true of a scenario put forward by Khanna (1999: 375) whereby a corporation 
exercises due diligence in ensuring that its employees communicate and consolidate 
information but is held liable because the aggregation of the knowledge of its employees 
amounts to the requisite mens rea. 
215 
 
challenge to the process of aggregating the knowledge, acts and omissions of 
agents.  
 
It may nevertheless be said that the aggregation doctrine reflects the legal 
principle of corporate personality in a more sophisticated and rational way 
although its rationale for establishing the corporation’s separateness may be 
clogged by the sophistication required. The aggregation process explained 
above also concords with other legal principles such as the constructive 
knowledge of the corporation of information obtained by its agents, as well as 
its responsibility for acts of such agents that were intended to further its 
interests (within the scope of their employment). However, little regard is 
given to the fact that the individual that obtained the information or performed 
the requisite actus reus could have been acting to further her own selfish 
interests and may be to defraud or hurt the corporation. Just like the other 
mechanisms, the corporation will be liable for the acts of such maverick 
insofar as they are within the scope of her employment.94 Given that the 
courts are required to simply aggregate acts and knowledge of different 
employees, they may add the fraudulent act of one selfish employee to the 
information obtained by another employee and the corporation may be held 
liable for the actions of a maverick employee.  
 
The above notwithstanding, this mechanism may be lauded for providing the 
incentive for more oversight and overcoming the risk of making scapegoats or 
the disingenuous allocation of tasks susceptible to result in the breach of the 
law. Whether the method employed by the aggregation doctrine is legitimate 
from a criminal law perspective is another question. It has been argued that 
the mechanism operates to punish the corporation for its failure to maintain a 
proper and effective communication system and enabling its employees 
consolidate information rather than intentionally perpetrating an offence.95 
                                                 
94 This shows that this mechanism equally relies on individualism a little bit more than is 
necessary. 
95 See Brickey, 1995: 46-47. It may be advanced that given that there is no obligation to 
obtain information on a particular issue a corporation may escape liability if no employee has 
knowledge of what is required. See Khanna, 1999: 375. However, where obtaining such 
information is an obligation imposed by law, a corporation would not escape liability on the 
ground that its employees had no knowledge of the law. Also, if obtaining such information is 
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This certainly does not prove that that the corporate defendant made a 
decision to violate the law.96 Instead, it implies that using the aggregation 
doctrine for a mens rea offence is tantamount to creating a strict liability 
offence that nonetheless carries a mental element;97 or worse components 
that are not blameworthy are added up to get a blameworthy element of a 
crime.  However, it may be posited that the doctrine provides the most 
appropriate way of punishing corporations for acts committed by their 
agents/employees without punishing the employees themselves for the acts, 
given that no single individual has the requisite mens rea of the offence. But 
this would certainly require a redefinition of mens rea, else one would hardly 
know what is actually imputed to a corporation and how the process of 
imputation converts employee A’s knowledge of the statutory requirements 
and employee’s B knowledge of a suspicious transaction into an intention to 
violate the statute (mens rea).98 Apart from policy reasons, which are largely 
unsatisfactory in developing the theory, there is no cogent reason why such 
conversion takes place. Providing stronger motivation for the board of 
directors or senior management to closely monitor the employees and ensure 
that they communicate with each other and the hierarchy is a benefit to both 
the corporation and the society but it does not provide any justification for 
using the criminal law.  
 
Also, following the reasoning underpinning the decision in Bank of New 
England, there is a possibility that the acts and intentions of employees A, B, 
                                                                                                                                            
not a legal obligation but something that each employee in the industry is expected to do then 
the corporation will not escape liability on the ground of its employees’ omission to obtain the 
information. 
96 See Walsh and Pyrich, 1995: 641. 
97 See Khanna, 1999: 375 and 401-406. He suggests that mens rea could be considered an 
aggravating factor in the sanctioning of corporations for strict liability offences and elaborates 
on his proposal by putting forth a number of assumptions (some of which are numerical). In 
spite of the cogency of the proposal, it is worth mentioning that it is founded on the 
combination of contradictory concepts (strict liability and mens rea) and exemplifies a major 
problem with the aggregation doctrine, which is the undermining of principles of the criminal 
law, given that in practice courts would have to create mens rea by aggregating ‘innocent’ 
knowledge and omission even though there was no motive to commit the crime. 
98 Clough and Mulhern (2002: 108-109) warn that “knowledge will rarely fit together like a 
conceptual jigsaw to produce the desired mental state.” They also cite the case of Armstrong 
v Strain [1952] 1 KB 232 at 246 where Birkett J cites Devlin J as saying that it is not possible 
to add one innocent state of mind to another innocent state of mind to get a criminal state of 
mind. 
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C and D may not add up to the mens rea and actus reus of the crime. In such 
instance, the courts may use the absence of an effective system and policy to 
prevent A, B, C and D from breaching the law as the quantity that may be 
added to the acts and intentions of these employees to finally get the sum that 
is the crime.99 It would nonetheless be fair to ask who formulated the policy 
and designed the system and whether such person or persons did not know 
or could not foresee that the acts of A, B, C and D (if they were not properly 
instructed and controlled) would result in the breach of the relevant law. Such 
person’s liability would be a better reflection of the corporation’s fault than the 
cumulative acts of the employees who were simply submitting to the 
hierarchy.  
 
It may therefore be said that although the objective intended to be achieved 
by the aggregation doctrine is commendable, the means indicated 
(aggregating the knowledge and acts of all or some of the employees) is 
beset by a number of flaws. These flaws are mainly in the process of 
aggregating the knowledge, acts and omissions of employees whereby some 
aspects of some legal principles (agency law and criminal law) are 
disregarded. Nonetheless, it may also be important to see whether the 
primary rule of the mechanism is consonant with other rules of recognition.   
 
6.3.2 The congruency of the mechanism’s primary rule with other rules 
of recognition 
 
It was established in Chapter 4 that an appropriate mechanism of imputation 
ought to reflect the normative perspectives expressed by criminal law judges 
and some non-legal experts. Unfortunately, the aggregation doctrine as 
employed by courts in the United States hardly reflects the images of “body,” 
“persons,” “soul,” “head,” “alter ego,” “brain,” “nerve centre,” “machine” and 
“hands.” Proponents of aggregation conceive of the corporation as a 
substantive person that commits crimes by manipulating the individuals in its 
employment and little regard is given to the person’s “head” or “nerve centre” 
                                                 
99 Cf Clarkson, 1996: 6. 
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that entertains the intention to violate the law and directs the “body” 
accordingly. Nonetheless, the aggregation doctrine provides a good picture of 
how the corporate “machine” functions with several “cogs” or how the “body” 
functions with different units feeding information through designated channels 
and impelling other units to act upon such information.100 As such, the 
aggregation doctrine may be said to provide a more substantial justification for 
treating criminal corporations as defective “machines.” However, given that no 
emphasis is placed on the department or person that acted as the 
corporation’s “brain” or “nerve centre” or “head,” the aggregation doctrine may 
be said to treat the corporation as an acephalous entity. This implies that 
questions of the management and control of corporate activities are ignored101 
and one may even wonder whether such corporation has the capacity to 
commit a criminal offence. Nonetheless, it may be argued that as a distinct 
person a corporation ought not to be liable for the criminal intention and act of 
another distinct person (senior manager and employee) but for that which 
may be said to be particular to the corporation.102 Thus, the corporation is not 
identifiable only with the criminal thought of one agent but with the 
synchronised thought processes of all agents. However, the judges and 
commentators that have applied this mechanism have proffered little evidence 
(theoretical or empirical) to support this postulate. It therefore seems that the 
aggregation doctrine was motivated by reasons of expediency rather than 
theory as American courts sought to overcome the difficulty of enforcing 
crimes of intent against corporations in situations where no employee at fault 
could be identified. That notwithstanding, if certain obstacles (such as 
                                                 
100 However, these units may not always reflect corporate policy and a corporation cannot 
always control them. See Walsh and Pyrich, 1995: 643-644. Also, in some instances the 
corporation’s fault may be more than the sum of these units or departments while in other 
instances (such as where there are maverick employees) it may be less. That 
notwithstanding, it will be more appropriate to hold a corporation accountable for the practices 
and policies of a dissident unit than for the acts and knowledge of a maverick employee. 
101 This may also be the reason why a corporation’s liability under this doctrine is unlimited. 
Given that there is no ascertained way in which a corporation is expected to act and think 
(and thus no ascertained way of aggregating the acts and intentions of its agents), the 
knowledge and acts or omissions of all employees are held against the corporation. It is 
analogous to the situation of an umpire taking into consideration random answers suggested 
by all members of a rowdy University Challenge quiz team. 
102 In Chapter 8, the principle of “discursive dilemma” that describes how purposive bodies 
collectivise reason is shown to concur with the aggregation doctrine (and to a certain extent 
corporate culture) better than the other mechanisms that simply identify corporations with 
guilty or negligent individuals. 
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delineating the process of aggregation and identifying the corporation’s head) 
are overcome, the mechanism would be said to represent a more 
sophisticated approach to understanding corporations and holding them liable 
for crimes committed qua corporations and not qua agents.103  
 
It is easier for the aggregation doctrine to come into adjustment with the 
perspective of non-legal categories because even if the corporate defender 
employed thousands of workers or had hundreds of branches and irrespective 
of whether it had adopted a mechanistic or an organic system, the relevant 
knowledge of any employee or employees and the acts of those that 
performed the actus reus of the crime may be aggregated and held against 
the corporation. However, the main problem as mentioned above concerns 
the unfairness of imputing the knowledge of any agent to the corporation. The 
knowledge of some agents (middle-level or senior managers) must surely be 
weightier than that of others (operational employees) given that the 
knowledge of the former is more likely to be communicated across the 
corporation or to the board of directors. It may therefore be advanced that the 
aggregation doctrine reflects the realities of contemporary corporate 
structures only if it is based on the assumption that the acts and knowledge of 
certain employees have more value than the acts and knowledge of others.104 
That notwithstanding, even if it is agreed that the knowledge and acts of 
agents can be given measurable or determinable values or their judgements 
may be aggregated into collective judgements, it is still important to show that 
such assumption or equation that underpins the mechanism approximates 
reality. In this context, reality connotes the different structural arrangements 
that may be made by corporations (elucidated by organisation theory). 
 
                                                 
103 It does not endorse the metonymic description of the human body by reference its brain or 
mind. 
104 The importance of such assumption lies in the fact that decisions are made in a 
corporation either by majority voting in board meetings or by senior managers or empowered 
middle-level managers. Thus, a corporation’s collective judgment as regards a particular 
transaction is heavily influenced by the position (or influence) of the most senior agent 
involved in the transaction lest the corporation’s modus operandi would not be consistent and 
businesspersons would seldom invest with such uncertainty. 
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As such, Mintzberg’s Simple Structure Model, the Noblese Oblige Model, the 
Fault-based Individual Responsibility Model, the Nominated Accountability 
Model, the Autopoiesis Model and the Rational Actor Model105 would all fit 
within the aggregation paradigm because the knowledge and acts of the 
operational employee and responsible manager that furthered the interests of 
the corporation in a rational manner would be aggregated.106 This is equally 
the case with theories that largely describe the functioning of large and 
organic structures such as the Organisational Process Model and Machine 
Bureaucracy Model. This is because the experiences that emerge from 
established SOPs or policies dictated by the CID would be aggregated with 
the knowledge of the officers that formulate, implement and monitor these 
SOPs, as well as the acts of operational employees that were motivated by 
these SOPs.107 These policies and decisions do not reflect the choice of any 
particular individual but the collective preference of many individuals at 
different stations.  
 
From the above, it may be contended that unlike the mechanisms evaluated 
previously, the aggregation doctrine does not rely on the fault of the 
corporation’s agents as much as it relies on the construction of the 
corporation’s conduct. However, policy considerations and the need to 
overcome the shortcomings of vicarious liability impelled courts in the United 
States to hastily employ this mechanism without setting the theoretical 
groundwork. As such, there are several theoretical loopholes that mar the 
logical and consistent use of the mechanism. The process of aggregating the 
acts, omissions and knowledge of agents and in some cases the corporation’s 
criminogenic policies is obscure because these variables have not been given 
                                                 
105 However, it must be noted that the Rational Actor Model endorses the idea of manipulating 
the corporation by punishing its responsible agents and agrees with other individualistic 
models such as the Dramaturgical Model that place much emphasis on the agent’s autonomy 
and responsibility for the offence. The aggregation doctrine is centred on the regulation of 
corporate behaviour by punishing the corporation itself although it does not preclude the 
punishment of both the agent and the corporation where only a single agent is at fault. 
106 However, under the aggregation doctrine, the corporation will account for the actions and 
omissions of these individuals and the latter will seldom be held to account in their individual 
capacities unless there is evidence that a manager’s intention amounts to the requisite mens 
rea of the offence or her omission amounts to negligence as defined by the law.  
107 Nonetheless, as mentioned above, we must assume that the knowledge or act of one 
employee or manager has a higher measurable value than that of others, although this is not 
what obtains at present. 
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any kind of determinable or additive value. It also remains unclear why the 
conforming acts of other agents or corporate policy that is compliant with the 
law are not equally given determinable value and aggregated in order to 
determine whether the balance tilts toward collective non-compliance or 
collective diligence. Moreover, the temporal context within which the requisite 
knowledge, acts and omissions ought to be considered is not defined. Finally, 
the level of blameworthiness required for each of the individual acts and 
omissions or intents that are aggregated poses another challenge.  In light of 
the above, it may be hasty to recommend the application of this doctrine 
without appropriate solutions to the problems identified.  
 
6.4 THE CORPORATE CULTURE MECHANISM 
 
The idea of holding corporations liable because of a causal link between an 
existing criminogenic culture and the offence charged was adumbrated by the 
Dutch Supreme Court in the IJzerdraad case,108 the Australian Criminal Code 
of 1995 and the CMCHA. Commentators have developed a number of 
mechanisms of attribution around this idea. Hence, the discussion below 
focuses on the provisions of the Australian Criminal Code,109 the CMCHA and 
a number of cognate mechanisms devised by commentators, viz. the self-
identity,110 corporate ethos111 and corporate mens rea mechanisms.112 
“Corporate culture” is therefore used in this thesis as a generic term 
encapsulating the ideas underpinning these mechanisms, as well as the rules 
                                                 
108 Hoge Raad, February 23, 1954, NJ 378, hereinafter referred to as IJzerdraad. For 
discussion of this case, see Field and Jorg, 1991. 
109 Australian jurisprudence is founded on the common law developed in the United Kingdom. 
The Australian Courts Act 1828 provided that the laws in force in England would apply in New 
South Wales (including Victoria and Queensland) and Tasmania. The Interpretation Act 1918 
and Interpretation Act 1919 provided the same for Western Australia and South Australia. 
Also, some Australian cases were referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
before the coming into force of the Australia Act 1986.  
110 Lederman, 2000. 
111 Bucy, 1991. 
112 Clarkson, 1998. 
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governing the interpretation and the application of the relevant provisions of 
the Australian Criminal Code 1995 and the CMCHA.113  
 
With regard to the Australian Criminal Code 1995, corporate culture is 
captured by section 12.3(2)(c) and (d) and 12.6 and constitutes the response of 
the Australian Standing Committee of Attorneys-General from Federal, State 
and Territory Governments to what it perceived as the insular and rudimentary 
principle established in Nattrass.114 This mechanism is therefore based on the 
contention that it is a much better reflection of how contemporary corporate 
structures violate the law.115 The argument is that mechanisms such as those 
evaluated above and in Chapter 5 are essentially derivative while this 
mechanism is based on organisational liability.116 However, the description of 
the corporate culture mechanism as representative of organisational liability 
may be presumptuous given that other mechanisms are equally based on 
what is perceived as a guidebook for determining an organisation’s 
blameworthiness.117  
 
Emphasis is placed on the link between the requisite mens rea and the 
corporation’s culture rather than the requisite mens rea and the knowledge 
and action of an agent.118 This may be understood to imply that “corporate 
culture” is the corporate equivalent for the intention or mind of a natural 
person.119 The Dutch Supreme Court held in IJzerdraad that the corporate 
                                                 
113  Reference is made to the Dutch Supreme Court in IJzerdraad here only for purposes of 
discussing the origin of the idea and understanding the contention by Field and Jorg (1991) 
that the Dutch position is more appropriate. 
114 See Rose, 1995: 129; and Hill, 2003: 17-18.  
115 See Laufer, 1994: 660; and Clarkson, 1998: 10. 
116 See Robinson, 2008: 68. Unfortunately, proponents of this approach do not distinguish 
between derivative liability and organisational liability in light of the fact that it is an individual 
that invariably acts or omits to act.  
117 This is even more so because the term ‘corporation’ is not defined in criminal law in terms 
of how it should be structured unless one refers to the normative perspective of judges 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
118 See Colvin, 1995: 36; and Lederman, 2000: 680-681. As advanced by Gobert and Punch 
(2003: 86) a corporation’s liability for gross negligence does not often depend on any agent’s 
negligence or even the aggregated negligence of all agents but on the failure of the 
corporation to prevent the negligent actions or omissions of its agents. 
119 Hill, 2003: 18. The Australian Criminal Code however hardly adopts this view given that it 
provides for the examination of a corporation’s culture only where there is no evidence that an 
agent entertained the relevant mens rea; and also even if there is such evidence, the 
corporation may only be shown to be at fault if the culture was maintained by its board or 
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employer will be liable for the acts of its employee if it exerted control over the 
employee and if the employee’s act accorded with accepted practices within 
the corporation.120 This bears a likeness to the provisions of section 12 of the 
Australian Criminal Code 1995 imposing liability on a corporation for amongst 
other things having a criminogenic culture. Section 12.6 of the Australian 
Criminal Code 1995 defines corporate culture as “an attitude, policy, rule, 
course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in 
the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes place.” 
This also bears a likeness to section 8(3)(a) of the CMCHA (although no 
mention is made of corporate culture) which directs the jury to “consider the 
extent to which the evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, 
systems or accepted practices within the organisation that were likely to have 
encouraged any…failure...or to have produced tolerance of it.”  
 
It is important to note that in both Australian and British systems corporate 
culture does not constitute the only basis on which the corporation’s liability is 
established.121 Section 12.2 of the Australian Code provides for the imputation 
of the physical element of any offence committed by an agent (while acting 
within the scope of her employment or authority) to the corporation, implying 
that the corporation is vicariously liable insofar as the offence committed by 
the agent does not have a mental element.122 Section 12.3(1) and (2)(a) and (b) 
of this Code provide for the imputation of a mental element (intention, 
knowledge or recklessness) to the corporation only if the latter is shown to 
have authorised or permitted the commission of the offence charged via its 
board of directors or a high managerial agent or that the board of directors or 
a high managerial agent intentionally or recklessly perpetrated the offence. 
                                                                                                                                            
senior management and it motivated the non-compliance of the agents. See the Guide for 
Practitioners (2002: 309) published by the Australian Attorney-General’s Department. It may 
nevertheless still be argued that since a corporation’s failure to maintain a culture that 
prevents wrongdoing by its agents is the basis on which it is can be held liable (as per the 
abovementioned Australian Department’s interpretation of the Criminal Code 1995) then a 
corporation’s culture may be said to represent its intention or omission. These arguments will 
be considered below. 
120 See Field and Jorg, 1991: 163-164. 
121 It is shown in Chapter 5 that the CMCHA revolves around senior management failure and 
what can be described as a “corporate culture” is provided by the Act only as indication to this 
state of affairs. 
122 Hill, 2003: 17. 
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This section may therefore be said to predicate the adoption of three 
mechanisms: vicarious liability, identification and corporate culture.123 The 
imposition of liability on the corporation based on the acts or omissions of a 
high managerial is in line with vicarious liability given that “high managerial 
agent” is defined as “an employee, agent or officer of the body corporate with 
duties of such responsibility that his or her conduct may fairly be assumed to 
represent the body corporate’s policy.”124 Also, the imposition of liability on the 
corporation based on the acts or omissions of the board of directors is no 
doubt evocative of the identification doctrine, while evidence of a criminogenic 
corporate culture is only a third means of establishing the corporation’s guilt 
by showing that the corporation authorised or permitted the commission of the 
offence. As such, the Australian Criminal Code may be said to provide a 
framework encapsulating different mechanisms and should be more 
appropriate in enforcing the criminal law against corporations.125  
 
What is important to note is that a culture existing within a corporation is used 
in the Australian Criminal Code (and also the CMCHA) only as an indicator of 
whether a corporation (or its senior management) permitted or authorised the 
commission of an offence. Thus, unlike the recommendations of some 
commentators cited above, these statutes do not employ corporate culture as 
a separate mechanism given that they do not direct the prosecution and court 
on how to locate a corporation’s intention, knowledge or recklessness by 
referring to the corporation’s culture but simply advise that in the absence of 
evidence showing the negligence or failure of specific agents, the existence of 
a criminogenic culture may be taken as an indicator of such intention or 
failure.126 This means that the approbation of the position adopted in the 
                                                 
123 This is in line with the contention by Gobert and Punch (2003: 87) that an appropriate 
mechanism ought to provide a number of tools to the prosecutor to use against the accused 
corporation. 
124 Section 12.3(6). This may thus be any employee or agent especially in organic structures. 
125 Lederman, 2000: 699.  Woolf (1995: 262) intimates that vicarious liability and identification 
may only be used to prosecute small and simple structures while corporate culture would be 
appropriate for large and complex structures. 
126 If the statutes had provided for the court to refer to the corporate culture in order to 
determine a corporation’s liability irrespective of whether there is any evidence of negligence 
or failure of a high managerial agent or senior manager, then it could have been said that 
corporate culture is established as a separate mechanism. Courts in both systems therefore 
refer to the corporation’s existing culture only to determine whether the corporation may be 
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Australian Criminal Code by many commentators is restricted to the 
introduction of corporate culture mechanism within the pack.127  
 
However, corporate culture may only exist as a separate mechanism if it can 
be shown to represent a corporation’s criminal fault to such extent that the 
corporation may be convicted or acquitted based on such fault. When courts 
have to refer to the intention, knowledge or recklessness of the senior 
managers then one is simply referring to either the senior management failure 
test or the identification doctrine and has to confront the shortcomings of 
these mechanisms. Nonetheless, if courts have to convict solely on the 
attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices existing within the 
corporation (at all levels) then the need for aggregation may also arise and 
the challenges facing the aggregation doctrine may have to be overcome. It 
may therefore be advanced that the corporate culture mechanism is based on 
the objective of targeting the corporation directly but in the process of outlining 
the mental state and acts of the corporation the mechanism overlaps with 
other mechanisms. It then becomes fair to ask whether it is reasonable to 
develop a mechanism along the lines of the corporation’s culture when it 
seems to be not a hybrid but an ordered set of other mechanisms.128 
However, Lederman129 contends that the corporate culture mechanism (he 
calls it the self-identity doctrine) expands the scope of application of the other 
mechanisms and completes the development of the theoretical link that courts 
have sought to establish between the offence charged and the corporation 
and its agents.130 Thus, the provisions of the abovementioned statutes 
foreshadow a more sophisticated mechanism. This means that there is a 
clearly defined primary rule requiring courts to impose liability on corporations 
                                                                                                                                            
said to have authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. However, the absence of 
any clear outline on how to establish such culture further compromises its use as a 
mechanism. 
127 See Hill, 2003: 18; and Lederman, 2000: 681. 
128 This does not imply that the provision of different mechanisms (ammunition) to the 
prosecution by the Australian Criminal Code 1995 or the CMCHA is necessarily flawed. The 
corporate culture mechanism is evaluated here independently of how it may be used with 
other mechanisms to regulate corporations. The question of a comprehensive approach 
capturing salient features of different mechanisms is addressed in Chapter 8. 
129 2000: 682. 
130 Nonetheless, this is hardly the case with the Australian Criminal Code given that section 
12.3(1) and (2)(a) and (b) stipulate that a corporation can be convicted for acts of its agents or 
employees without any consideration of the corporate culture. 
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for creating or failing to uproot a culture that encouraged or tolerated non-
compliance by agents. Whether the pattern embedded in this rule is more 
suitable for enforcing crimes against corporations than those evaluated above 
and in Chapter 5 would depend on how it accords with the rules of 
recognition.  
 
6.4.1 The congruency of the mechanism’s primary rule with related legal 
principles 
 
As stated above, Lederman contends that this mechanism links the concept of 
corporate personality with the acts of the agents and the policies and 
practices that they adopted and the offence. Thus, it shows how an artificial 
legal entity exercises its volition in particular situations and holds regard for its 
existence in such way that its self-identity can be established and 
distinguished from the identity of its members and employees.131 Lederman 
also posits that one of the factors that influenced the development of the 
mechanism was the trend toward theories of rights and obligations of groups 
or collectivities and so the mechanism reflects realist theories of the 
corporation’s separate existence and independent action and fault.132 The 
idea of placing emphasis on the corporation’s exercise of volition and its 
independent actions no doubt accords with the concept of corporation within 
criminal liability discourse.133 However, in light of the discussion in the 
introduction to this section, it may be a little presumptuous to treat the 
corporate culture mechanism as synonymous to organisational liability. This 
seems to be more of the objective of the proponents of this mechanism than 
what obtains in practice and unfortunately the proof of the pudding is not the 
baker’s objective; in as much as the objective may be noble. Unless it is 
                                                 
131 Lederman, 2000: 678. 
132 Lederman, 2000: 680, 684. See also Colvin, 1995: 36. 
133 See Chapter 2. Thus, contrary to mechanisms such as the identification doctrine, senior 
management failure test and vicarious liability, corporate culture does not (in theory) reduce 
the corporation’s act and intent to those of a single individual or a particular group of 
individuals. It accords with the contentions of Donaldson (1985) and Gobert (1994a) 
discussed in Chapter 5 that individuals within the corporation such as the senior managers or 
the collective of managers or directors constitute only on one component of the corporation or 
one aspect of its character and corporate activities in breach of criminal law standards often 
result from the failure of more than one of such components. 
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shown that a culture consisting of attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices existing within the corporation represents a corporation’s intention or 
recklessness, it may be difficult to submit that courts may not look elsewhere 
to ascertain the corporation’s intention or recklessness.134 Even Lederman135 
concedes that there has been little attempt at formulating a cogent theory that 
could be used by courts to establish the corporation’s mental state on a 
consistent basis. Also, Fisse and Braithwaite136 who advance unequivocally 
that a corporation’s policy of non-compliance and collective capacity to 
prevent the commission of a crime are indicative of its intentionality hardly 
provide any concise explanation of terms such as “policy” and “collective 
capacity” in order to guide courts when determining the accused corporation’s 
state of mind.137  
 
In this light, it is difficult to see how corporate culture represents a 
corporation’s intention or negligence and is predicated on the liability of the 
corporate person. It may only be liable unless one implies that such liability is 
vicarious given that the existence of the criminogenic culture only shows that 
the negligent agent acted within the scope of her authority. However, if the 
corporation is said to have been an accessory to the negligent agent then it 
may escape liability if it is shown that the senior management and others 
exercised all due diligence (the culture was not criminogenic) and the agent 
was a maverick. Conversely, if the senior management exercised all due 
diligence at their level, the corporation may still be liable for having a culture 
that encouraged or tolerated the commission of an offence by middle or 
                                                 
134 They may look toward the intention or recklessness of the senior officer that managed the 
relevant transaction or of any employee that was acting under instructions from the senior 
management. 
135 2000: 700. 
136 1993: 25. 
137 It may nonetheless be contended that although the concept of “policy” is a nebulous one, it 
sometimes refers to the directions given by one person (senior manager) or group of persons 
(board of directors or senior management) responsible for formulating and/or implementing a 
plan of action. Thus, where it is accepted that policy emanates from these sources only, it 
would be natural to consider any plan of action drafted and/or adopted by the board of 
directors or senior management or senior manager as corporate “policy.” This would imply 
that the term ‘policy” underpinning the “corporate culture” as used in the Australian Criminal 
Code is the same as the term “policy” used by the US Model Penal Code (section 2.07(1) 
whereby a corporation is liable if “the commission of the offence was authorized, requested, 
commanded, or performed by the board of directors, or by an agent having responsibility for 
formation of corporate policy.” 
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operational level employees.138 In the second instance, although the frontline 
employees are not acting in accordance with the corporation’s direct 
instructions from the senior management, they are still acting within the scope 
of their employment (and are not rogue employees) because their actions are 
sanctioned by an existing culture. As such, the corporate culture mechanism 
does not only reflect the legal principles of maverick agent and scope of 
employment but also justifies the imposition of liability in cases where junior 
employees disobey instructions. Equally, a corporation may be said to have 
had constructive knowledge of these acts on the ground that the existence of 
a criminogenic culture indicates failure (by the senior management) to foresee 
that frontline employees would breach the law in circumstances where a 
hypothetical reasonable management would.139 
 
It is interesting that corporate culture concurs with some important legal 
principles of agency law although it is not a graft of the civil law. However, the 
fact that it was specifically devised to hold corporations liable in 
circumstances where no identifiable agent entertained the relevant mens rea 
or even committed the actus reus140 means that courts are eventually called 
upon to impose liability where there may be no proof of mens rea and actus 
reus per se. The argument in favour of this approach is that although a 
corporation is capable of malice and motive there is no evidence (both 
theoretically and practically) of an ascertained way in which this may be 
established and any rule describing the mental processes of the corporate 
entities either by referring to one agent or a collective of agents is at best 
conceptional. Nonetheless, given that corporations invariably act through 
natural persons and mens rea can only be established with regard to the 
intentions of natural persons, those mechanisms that provide for a form of 
derivative (not vicarious) liability are more in keeping with the criminal law 
than mechanisms such as corporate culture that require courts to establish 
                                                 
138 Gobert and Punch, 2003: 74. The corporation in such instance may be said to have two 
sets of intentions. 
139 It must be noted that it is difficult to establish the existence of a criminogenic culture 
without recourse to senior management failure and it is difficult to establish the latter without 
recourse to the identification of the directing mind. 
140 Difficulties that mar other mechanisms such as the identification doctrine and vicarious 
liability. 
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some special form of corporate mens rea.141 On the face of this, the corporate 
culture mechanism may be said to fall outside the regulatory framework of the 
criminal law as regards the enforcement of crimes of intent. However, it may 
then be posited that this mechanism may enable courts distinguish acts and 
intentions particular to the corporate entity and those particular to its agents 
and thereby focus on corporate mens rea142 and corporate actus reus.143 That 
notwithstanding, the fact that a corporation is not shown to entertain the 
specific intent and perform the specific act (required by the law), it may be 
said to imply that the corporation may only be guilty for being an accessory by 
maintaining a defective compliance programme and not for personally 
committing the offence as charged.144   
6.4.2 The congruence of the mechanism’s primary rule with other rules 
of recognition 
 
This mechanism may to be said to provide (to a certain extent) a channel for 
applying the criminal law to corporations in light of the characteristic features 
of corporate entities that may be abstracted from the outlook of criminal 
judges. Even though it is difficult to pinpoint any equivalent for images such as 
“body,” “head,” “soul,” “brain,” “nerve centre,” “hands” and “directing mind and 
will,” what is important is that it was established in Chapter 4 that these judges 
intimated that the prosecution of a corporation is analogous to that of a 
“person” who is psychologically autonomous. Thus, the corporate culture 
mechanism effectively shows how this can be done, albeit with a few 
modifications. The identification doctrine that was built around these 
                                                 
141 As such, Clarkson (1998) describes this mechanism or an outline of its attributes as the 
corporate mens rea model. 
142 The development of the concept of corporate mens rea may have the effect of lowering the 
level of blameworthiness required and making the prosecution of corporations easier and 
lessening the impact of the entire criminal process. 
143 It may be argued here that it provides an opportunity for these collective theories to 
develop the criminal law in light of knowledge of new kinds of offenders (corporations) and 
novel ways of transgression (collective offending). However, if this were the case, the idea of 
corporate culture would have been expressed as a secondary rule and not as a primary rule 
(statute or precedent).  
144 Given that accessorial liability also requires specific intent it may be ruled out and only the 
failure to maintain an effective compliance programme (low level of culpability) may be 
plausible. However, it is uncertain whether this may be held to be a criminogenic culture and 
the question whether a court should employ an objective test or a subjective test in this regard 
remains to be answered. 
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metaphors has been enmeshed by their literary definitions to the extent that 
the mechanism shows little flexibility as regards moving beyond what has 
been seen as an attempt at anthropomorphism.145 However, corporate culture 
may be said to be based on the figurative meaning of the terms mentioned 
above (which concurs with their use as metaphors) and focuses on what may 
constitute a corporation’s “brain” or “nerve centre” and why and how its “brain” 
is separate from its “body.” Thus, the attitudes, practices and policies existing 
within a corporation are held to be indicative of its reasoning. 
 
Equally, other mechanisms such as the identification doctrine, vicarious 
liability and the senior management failure test were shown to identify an 
individual manager or employee or a collective of managers as the “brain” or 
“nerve centre” although there are instances where the breach of law is related 
to the corporation’s activities and not the fault of an individual. Nonetheless, 
given that the acts of different individuals may at different times reflect 
different attitudes and practices implies that the corporation’s reasoning may 
not be inferred from one source only. Its nerve centre may be manager A and 
employee B in one instance and manager C and employee B in another 
instance. Corporate culture (and to a certain extent aggregation)146 provides 
the opportunity for the courts to consider the effects of the confluence of 
actions of different individuals. The contention that the “brain” or “nerve 
centre” may not necessarily be an individual within the corporation but the 
collective attitudes, policies and practices that motivate employees or 
managers to act on behalf of the corporation is therefore more characteristic 
of an entity that exists as a collective unit. Thus, it may be contended that 
judges employed metaphors such as “brain” and “directing mind” to draw a 
comparison between an organism with distinct units or organs and a 
corporation with distinct units and persons. However, they may not be 
                                                 
145 This is because these mechanisms are based on the contention that such images may 
naturally represent natural persons that make up the corporation and the job of the prosecutor 
is to find the individual that was empowered to control the corporate body (under all 
circumstances) like the “brain” controls the “body.” 
146 As noted above, the aggregation doctrine simply describes (albeit unconvincingly) the 
process by which such collective attitudes and practices may be obtained and does not 
provide any justification for finding recourse in such process. Thus, the fact that he corporate 
culture mechanism is not founded on the delineation of such process is also a flaw that needs 
to be addressed. 
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deemed to have insinuated that the corporation’s “brain” or “directing mind” 
represents a wide range of persons and units, which may be disparate. As 
such, it is very unlikely that they sought to establish that corporations could be 
held accountable for the attitudes of frontline employees irrespective of 
policies formulated by the hierarchy. This shows that the primary rule of the 
corporate culture mechanism ought to be modified to take into consideration 
the acts of the corporation’s “directing mind” when determining its culture. 
 
In Chapter 4, rules of recognition were also shown to emanate from non-legal 
categories and stress was laid on a framework (the contingency approach) 
within which a number of organisation theories describing the functioning of 
organisations were fitted. It was noted that an appropriate mechanism for 
imputing acts and intents to corporations ought to reflect these theories 
because courts entertain cases of corporations that are not similarly 
structured. The ways in which corporations could be structured (in response 
to contingencies) were grouped under mechanistic and organic systems. The 
mechanisms evaluated above (except the aggregation doctrine) are shown to 
be largely focused on mechanistic systems. However, corporate culture 
provides an option of holding corporations accountable for crimes that are 
perpetrated or aided by the synthesis of the activities of different agents at 
different stations. As such, it does not accord with organisation theories that 
largely describe mechanistic systems such as the Rational Actor Model, 
Mintzberg’s Simple Structure Model, the Noblese Oblige Model, the Fault-
based Individual Responsibility Model and the Autopoiesis Model. This implies 
that it would be difficult to use the corporate culture mechanism to target a 
corporation with a simple hierarchical structure in a situation where the 
offence is perpetrated by a senior officer although there was no existing 
culture that motivated or tolerated her action.147 Equally, theories such as the 
                                                 
147 This takes us back to the definition of “culture” and related concepts such as “corporate 
policy” and “accepted practices.” This is because it may be argued that if the senior officer 
sought to further the interests of the corporation, then she may be said to have been 
motivated by an existing culture (of making profits). However, such culture was not 
criminogenic. Just as in the case of the aggregation doctrine, proponents of the corporate 
culture mechanism have not provided guidelines on how relevant values and experiences 
may be sifted from irrelevant ones in order to determine whether the accused corporation had 
a criminogenic corporate culture or not. 
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Organisational Process Model and Machine Bureaucracy Model that favour 
the imposition of liability on agents that formulate, implement and monitor 
SOPs and control the bargaining processes do not reflect the logic that 
underpins corporate culture given that these models are geared toward 
targeting the individuals that formulated or implemented the SOPs and not the 
SOPs themselves.148 
 
The corporate culture mechanism may however be held to be more adaptable 
to the enforcement of the criminal law against organic structures. Where the 
management of different activities has been delegated to separate 
departments, it may be difficult to hold the corporation liable by referring only 
to the acts of a particular senior manager or the senior management. As such, 
where a criminogenic practice was adopted in one department the corporation 
may be liable if such practice encouraged employees within that department 
to breach the law. Equally, where loosely related experts are brought on ad 
hoc projects and left to work without guidelines and control their actions if 
motivated by the lack of control would be imputed to the corporation. This 
means that the corporate culture mechanism is consonant with theories such 
as Adhocracy and Dramaturgical Model. However, other theories such as 
Divisionalised Form and the Nominated Accountability Model (that are 
discussed as organic conceptions in Chapter 4) would only be consonant with 
the corporate culture mechanism if the criminogenic culture may be 
ascertained by referring to the activities of the heads of the relevant units.149  
 
However, in both instances (mechanistic and organic), courts would have to 
overcome the difficulty of ascertaining what constitute ‘quantities’ such as 
policies, practices and attitudes that are used to define corporate culture in 
                                                 
148 However, corporate liability may be established by evidence showing that the SOPs (and 
to a certain extent the bargaining processes) motivated non-compliance. See Gobert and 
Punch, 2003: 88; and Field and Jorg, 1991: 164. 
Nonetheless, in light of compliance programmes they may seldom be criminogenic and the 
culture that motivated non-compliance may often be ascertained by looking beyond the SOPs 
and considering the attitudes and practices existing unofficially. 
149Once again, this shows that the primary rule of this mechanism ought to be modified to 
take into consideration the acts of the corporation’s “directing mind” when determining its 
culture. However, in this case the “directing mind” is the person that had control over the 
relevant activities. 
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order to determine whether a criminogenic culture existed in a given case. It 
may also be important to determine whether the fact that the culture existed 
within the one branch or department may be understood to mean it existed 
within the entire corporation in order to hold it liable even though other 
departments or branches exercised all due diligence.150 It seems the courts 
would have to first of all aggregate the acts and knowledge of the employees 
and managers in each department in order to determine the culture that 
existed within each department and then aggregate the cultures existing 
within all departments in order to determine the corporate culture and then 
decide whether the act that breached the law was encouraged or tolerated by 
that corporate culture. Thus, corporate culture as a separate mechanism 
faces the same problems as the aggregation doctrine, which includes inter 
alia giving determinable values to the acts and knowledge of the corporation’s 
agents, as well as to the practices and policies that existed within each 
department.151  
It may be concluded that the emphasis on collective failure provides impetus 
for claims that the corporate culture mechanism is a better reflection of 
contemporary corporate structures. It is an attempt to improve upon the 
shortcomings of other mechanisms discussed previously. However, to claim 
that it is more appropriate than these mechanisms is presumptuous given to 
the uncertainty of what constitutes ‘corporate culture’ and how the prosecution 
may show that such culture existed within a corporation and motivated or 
tolerated non-compliance. There is no doubt a strong possibility that this 
mechanism if properly developed may provide a suitable means of enforcing 
crimes committed by a corporation qua corporation.152 Nonetheless, 
corporations would most likely be held liable as accessories and not as 
principal offenders since the existence of a criminogenic culture presupposes 
the corporation aiding and abetting the commission of an offence by another 
person (its agent). As suggested in Chapter 3, this may be the appropriate 
                                                 
150 Following Nattrass, it seems the corporation will not be liable if the department or branch 
was only one of several. However, Nattrass did not consider the question of corporate culture. 
151 This may even involve a more tortuous computation than is required by the aggregation 
doctrine given that large corporations have thousands of employees and hundreds of 
departments. The daunting prospect of such endeavour may no doubt push the prosecution 
into looking for more expeditious channels. 
152 Although this may be said of the other mechanisms equally. 
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form of liability to impose on corporations in cases where the offence may be 
proved against one of its agents. 
 
6.5  CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter 5, the mechanisms of imputation applicable in the United Kingdom 
were evaluated and a number of loopholes were identified. In this Chapter, I 
have evaluated some alternative mechanisms applicable in other jurisdictions 
and/or proposed by some commentators and have shown that they are 
equally flawed and require modifications. The evaluations in both Chapters 
therefore support the statement that no single theory can effectively capture 
the realities of the functioning of contemporary corporate structures in order to 
serve as a template for the regulation of the activities of corporations. 
Nonetheless, some mechanisms are more suited to deal with certain issues 
than others. As such, the most appropriate mechanism is logically that which 
can be modified to suit issues that it does not effectively address.153 Such 
modified mechanism would provide the prosecution with an arsenal consisting 
of diverse weapons to deal with the diverse forms of corporate entities and 
corporate offending under justifiable circumstances.154  
 
The alternative mechanisms were evaluated above on the bases of how they 
concur with rules described in Chapter 4 as rules of recognition. As regards 
                                                 
153 Given that each mechanism is confronted with specific problems it is important to 
determine which one has the most potential of being modified to such extent that it may be 
used by courts in consistent and coherent manner.  
154 As shown above, the Australian and British legislators (and to a certain extent the Dutch 
Supreme Court) have attempted to provide their prosecution services with such arsenal. 
However, their attempts leave much to be desired because what they have done is simply 
stuff one wrapping with a number of mechanisms and this runs the risk of creating a situation 
where the corporation’s liability becomes over inclusive. If for example, the prosecution 
cannot prove the guilt of the accused corporation because it cannot identify a grossly 
negligent “high managerial agent” or “senior management” it can then establish the 
corporation’s guilt by adducing evidence of the existence of a criminogenic culture that 
encouraged or tolerated non-compliance. This is no doubt unfair to the accused corporation 
as its liability is almost absolute in spite of the fact that most of its managers and employees 
may have exercised all due diligence and complied with the law in both instances. Equally, in 
spite of the fact that the attempt at providing the prosecution with such arsenal is laudable, 
the Australian Criminal Code 1995 and the CMCHA fall short of delineating the process by 
which an incriminating element such as the existence of a criminogenic culture may be 
established.  
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rules deduced from related legal principles, separate corporate personality 
was shown to be reflected in the primary rules of the three mechanisms, 
although the channel for establishing the corporation’s personal liability using 
vicarious liability is undoubtedly tedious. The aggregation doctrine provides a 
more logical approach whereby the act and knowledge of a corporate person 
are ascertained by combining the knowledge and acts of all or some of its 
employees. The corporate culture doctrine on its part focuses on the 
corporation’s policies and its collective capacity (including accepted practices, 
attitudes and systems) to prevent the commission of an offence by its agents.  
However, given that the acts and knowledge of agents have to be aggregated 
in order to determine what is a collective attitude or practice, it may be 
contended that aggregation (though not as elucidated via the aggregation 
doctrine) provides a justifiable medium to grapple with the sophistication 
required in criminal law to prosecute, convict and sanction corporate 
persons.155 However, as mentioned above, the process of aggregation may 
be marred by a daunting complexity since the intent, knowledge, acts and 
omissions of agents, as well as the policies, practices and systems existing 
within the corporation would have to be given additive or determinable value. 
Also, it may be important to determine whether there was a balance between 
the conforming and non-conforming acts.156 
With regard to the rules deduced from agency law (maverick agent, scope of 
employment and constructive knowledge), the alternative mechanisms were 
shown to be congruent. As such, if the notion of aggregation is upheld as the 
most realistic conception of corporate personality then it may be submitted 
that courts should aggregate only those acts that were performed by agents 
within their scope of employment. These exclude acts performed by maverick 
agents but include those that the corporation knew or ought to have known. In 
order to determine whether the corporation had constructive knowledge, 
aggregation would equally be required although the knowledge or omission of 
some agents would be given a higher value than those of others. These are 
                                                 
155The prosecution would have to aggregate policies, practices and systems (corporate 
culture), as well as the acts of those that were involved in the relevant transactions. Where 
the corporation’s act and knowledge are the same as those of its sole agent then aggregation 
would involve combining her acts and knowledge and the policies she formulated as the 
corporation’s sole member and imputing the sum to the corporation. 
156 An attempt is made to delineate the process of aggregation in Chapter 8. 
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the agents that were responsible for obtaining such information and/or 
controlling the relevant transactions. The importance of identifying such 
agents is demonstrated by the fact that uncertainty as regards the pattern and 
scope of aggregation will be reduced. Thus, the act or omission of the agent 
that had control is an indication of what was known or ought to have been 
known by a cross-section of the corporation’s agents given that she ought to 
have apprehended a full import by virtue of her position.157  
 
It may then be argued that the actus reus and mens rea of the offence in 
question has been proved against the corporation itself and not its agents. 
Nonetheless, this assertion has no basis in criminal law as there is no thing as 
corporate mens rea or actus reus. Thus, although there is no undue focus on 
the fault of one of the agents (derivative liability), the emphasis placed on the 
corporation’s fault (organisational liability) is not legitimate.158 Equally, 
although courts may convict large and organic corporate structures following 
this means, the question of the sophistication required to deal with such 
corporations should not be allowed to trump the question of fairness. As 
shown above, the most sophisticated mechanisms may facilitate the 
prosecution and conviction of corporations while undermining some 
fundamental principles of the criminal law and the rights of the accused 
corporation.159 On the other hand, the identification doctrine and vicarious 
liability are based on the proof of fault of an agent and the senior 
management failure test is also based on the proof of gross negligence of the 
senior management.160  These simple mechanisms reflect the fairness of 
convicting the corporation for a mens rea offence where the requisite mens 
rea is established simpliciter. However, the aggregation and the corporate 
                                                 
157 This may also modify the aggregation doctrine to suit the “internal point of view” of judges 
that is to the effect that a corporation is analogous to a body with a head and limbs. 
158 It is therefore important to determine whether a criminogenic culture may be said to 
constitute mens rea. 
159 In spite of the complexity of mechanisms such as aggregation and corporate culture, their 
application may nevertheless simply facilitate the prosecution of the accused corporations by 
converting crimes of intent into absolute liability offences. This ironically reflects the easy way 
out of vicarious liability and policy considerations adopted by courts to circumvent the rigidity 
of the identification doctrine. 
160 However, as shown in the Chapter 5, the senior management failure test relies heavily on 
the civil law concept of “reasonable standard” which is not always compatible with the stigma 
of criminal liability. 
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culture mechanisms seem to change the rules as regards what amounts to 
mens rea in order to hold the corporation liable. The conviction of the 
corporation for a number of ‘innocent’ acts and intents is no doubt unfair to the 
corporate person and may lead to the conclusion that these mechanisms are 
lopsided towards the policy goal of sanctioning the corporation and should not 
be used to enforce crimes of intent.  
 
Also important is the fact that none of the alternative mechanisms evaluated 
above may be said to reflect the normative perspective of judges described 
through metaphors. They may only be modified to suit this perspective if one 
agent is identified as the directing mind. However, as regards the secondary 
rules deduced from non-legal categories, all the mechanisms were shown to 
concur with the theories in one way or another and the question seems to be 
one of interpretation. The above notwithstanding, there are other secondary 
rules that may equally be important to the evaluation of the primary rules of 
mechanisms of imputation. In accordance with Hart’s conception, these other 
rules may be termed “rules of adjudication.” These are rules that govern the 
proof and deliberation stages of the legal process. As such, convincing the 
jury or judge would require more than a viable mechanism based on 
substantive law. An appropriate mechanism should enable the prosecution to 
establish that the corporation deserves to be convicted. Equally, the 
mechanism ought to inform the court about the most appropriate sanction to 
impose on the corporation. In the next Chapter, I will seek to determine which 
of the five mechanisms of imputation evaluated is the most suitable as 
regards prosecuting and sanctioning corporations or whether features of 
these mechanisms may be captured to build a comprehensive mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 7 EVALUATING THE MECHANISMS BY 
REFERENCE TO THE RULES OF ADJUDICATION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Procedural justice must not be sacrificed on the altar of substantive justice.”1 
 
The legal process involves three major stages namely the discovery, proof 
and deliberation stages.2  The discovery stage involves the investigation that 
precedes the trial and in the case of a corporation, the examination of the link 
between the corporation and the offence in accordance with the applicable 
mechanism of imputation. As such, it may be said that the evaluations of the 
mechanisms in Chapters 5 and 6 were geared toward determining which 
mechanism (or which aspect of the mechanism) is most appropriate for the 
discovery stage. It follows that it is also important to determine which 
mechanism is most appropriate for the proof and deliberation stages which 
comprise the trial (adduction of evidence) and the deliberation whether to 
convict and which sanction should be imposed. In line with Hart’s conception 
of legal rules, the proof and deliberation stages may be said to be governed 
by rules of adjudication.3 Questions about such rules are important because in 
light of the above-captioned statement by Fisse and Braithwaite, it would be 
counterproductive for the criminal law if procedural justice is expediently 
forfeited for the validation of substantive rules.  
The corporate maze presents a unique challenge to investigators and 
prosecutors who are required to adduce sufficient evidence of key elements of 
crimes in order to establish the corporation’s guilt. It is uncertain whether the 
corporate defender should be treated like an accused natural person or 
whether it is advisable to formulate rules of evidence and procedure that are 
                                                 
1 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 136. 
2 See Schum, 1986; and Jackson, 2004. 
3See Hart, 1994: 97-99. 
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tailored to the corporate entity4 in the same way as rules are tailored to minors 
and the mentally deficient. Also, as shown in Chapter 3, there are offences 
that are enforced against duty-holders in circumstances where Parliament has 
ordained that some of the rights of these duty-holders may be disregarded.5 
However, the enactment of tailor-made rules should not be motivated by the 
desire to circumvent procedural difficulties and make conviction easier. It 
would be wanton and foolhardy to ignore the fact that as a legal person a 
corporation has rights that must be protected and regard for those rights go a 
long way towards safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
Without a cogent argument positing the contrary it may therefore be advanced 
that courts are required to treat corporations in the same way as natural 
persons despite the nature of corporations.6 This means that the prosecution 
must adduce evidence before a jury of an accused corporation’s peers 
showing beyond reasonable doubt that the corporation perpetrated the 
offence charged or was art and part in its commission.  
 
Thus, this Chapter is focussed on the challenges of prosecuting and 
sanctioning corporations using the mechanisms of imputation evaluated in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The first part of will consider rules of adjudication that 
govern the prosecutorial decision-making process and the second part looks 
into the rules of adjudication guiding the court and/or criminal justice agency 
through the deliberation stage involving the decision to convict and the choice 
of sanction to be imposed. The objective is to determine which mechanism (or 
aspects of which mechanism) reflects these rules and guides the prosecution 
and the court and/or the criminal justice agency efficaciously.  
 
                                                 
4 See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 179-182. 
5 For example, the enforcement of absolute and strict liability offence requires the disregard of 
the right to be presumed innocent. Equally, the trial of cases in the Magistrate’s Court by a 
single magistrate or in the District Court by a single Justice of the Peace implies that the right 
to be tried by a jury of one’s peers is disregarded. However, it is difficult to argue that the 
same should apply to indictable crimes of intent or solemn cases. 
6 See section 46 of the Magistrate’s Court Act 1980. 
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7.2 RULES GOVERNING THE PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS 
 
The Codes for prosecutors in Scotland and England7 provide for a twofold 
process for assessing cases before prosecution. This comprises the evidential 
test and the public interest test.8 They require the prosecutor to determine on 
the one hand whether the accused committed the offence and there is a 
reasonable prospect of conviction and on the other hand, whether it is in the 
interest of the public to bring an action against the accused.9 This section is 
concerned with the congruence of the mechanisms of imputation evaluated in 
Chapters 5 and 6 with these tests. I will attempt to determine which 
mechanism provides the most cogent basis for the prosecutor to establish that 
an accused corporation ought to be prosecuted. 
 
7.2.1 The evidential test 
 
If evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible before a criminal law 
court the case will be dismissed or the accused acquitted irrespective of how 
persuasive and incriminating the evidence seems to be. As such, the 
evidential test does not rest actually on the question of sufficient evidence but 
on sufficient admissible evidence. This means that the prosecutor is required 
to examine the evidence available and decide whether such evidence is both 
admissible and sufficient.10 This may be quite problematic in cases involving 
corporations. As regards the sufficiency of evidence, the prosecutor is faced 
with the challenge of establishing key elements of the offence that point 
clearly to the corporate defender as the ‘person’ that committed the offence. 
Given that a corporation may only entertain the mens rea or perform the actus 
                                                 
7 Prosecution Code, 2001 and Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2004 respectively. 
8 The tests may also be used by criminal justice agencies that prosecute specific offences. 
Although there is no requirement that the tests must be applied to bring private prosecution 
(see Jackson, 2007: 777) their application may considerably enhance the chances of success 
and also help avert situations where the DPP requests the court to stop the prosecution 
because it is “vexatious.” 
9 The objective of elaborating these tests is to foster efficiency and consistency in 
prosecutorial decision-making. See Crisp and Moxon, 1994: 1. 
10 See Crisp and Moxon, 1994: 1-2; and Rogers, 2006: 777. 
241 
 
reus of an offence via the agency of natural persons, such evidence must 
show that the natural persons that entertained the mens rea or performed the 
actus reus are identifiable with the corporation. This implies that the evidence 
must not only establish the key elements of the offence against such natural 
persons but also point to the relationship between the natural persons and the 
accused corporation warranting the imputation of the former’s intents and acts 
to the latter. Where the identification doctrine or vicarious liability applies, a 
case cannot pass the evidential test if the evidence does not establish the key 
elements of the offence against a single senior officer or single employee of 
the corporation. The focus on individual actions is deplored in Chapters 5 and 
6 because in most cases the actus reus is the result of the combination of the 
acts of several agents while the mens rea is often reflected in the policies and 
practices adopted within the corporation. However, it is also unclear how a 
case will pass the evidential test where the applicable mechanism is based on 
collective liability (such as the senior management failure, aggregation and 
corporate culture). This is because there is no defined pattern on how to 
combine the acts and knowledge of the agents and how to impute the 
combined acts (that constitute the actus reus) and combined knowledge and 
intentions (that constitute the mens rea) to the corporate defender.11 This 
means that the case against a corporation may only pass the evidential test if 
the process of aggregation is delineated and standardised to such extent that 
the prosecutor may adduce evidence showing that the sum of the acts and 
knowledge of certain agents (which was the act and knowledge particular to 
the corporation) is equal to the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence 
charged. Thus, on the one hand, the simple mechanisms (identification 
doctrine and vicarious liability) pass the evidential test in straightforward 
cases (where the guilty agent may be identified) but are ineffective in complex 
cases (where the guilt is collective). On the other hand, the complex 
mechanisms (senior management failure, aggregation and corporate culture) 
are ineffective in both straightforward and complex cases although they may 
be modified to establish the corporate person’s guilt in both instances.  
 
                                                 
11 As noted in Chapter 5, the collective knowledge of senior managers may not necessarily 
represent the collective knowledge of all the agents of the corporation. 
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The discussion below is focussed on the question of admissibility of evidence 
and the challenge faced by prosecutors and courts as regards giving careful 
consideration to the rights enjoyed by the accused corporation. The rights 
examined below may render evidence inadmissible if they are violated and an 
appropriate mechanism of imputation ought to enable prosecutors and courts 
adduce sufficient evidence without encroaching upon these rights. 
 
7.2.1.1 The corporation’s right to silence12 
 
An accused in both England and Scotland is protected from incriminating 
herself by producing documents or providing answers that would make her 
accessible to a criminal charge. This is enshrined in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.13 In Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye 
Safety Glass Ltd,14 the court held that a corporation is entitled to such 
protection.15 However, where a corporation is on trial the bulk of the evidence 
comprises policy documents (usually from the hierarchy) as well as 
documents containing information on the division of labour, instructions from 
different departmental heads and reports of employees to their respective 
heads and from the latter to the hierarchy. If the corporation invokes the right 
to silence, it is difficult to see how the prosecutor may obtain any evidence 
whatsoever to sustain the charge16 and if the documents are obtained forcibly, 
the evidence will not be admissible.17  
                                                 
12 This right is treated here as identical to the privilege against self-incrimination although they 
are not altogether the same rights. See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 196, footnote n. 17. It is 
also treated as related to the legal professional privilege or confidentiality of communications 
since the end result is that the corporation or its lawyer cannot be compelled to disclose 
information. 
13 See Saunders v United Kingdom [1997] 23 EHRR 313. 
14 [1939] 2 KB 395. 
15 See also Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v Westinghouse Electric Corporation [1978] 1 All ER 
434. For arguments for and against the maintaining of such privilege, see Queensland Law 
Reform Committee Report, 2004: 23-30. For a brief analysis of the logical underpinning of the 
privilege against self-incrimination with regard to how it has developed in the United States, 
see Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 148; and Gobert and Punch, 2003: 196-199. For arguments 
for and against the extension of the legal professional privilege to corporate entities, see 
Higgins, 2008. 
16 Although sections 34 and 35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (applicable 
in both England and Scotland) provide that the jury or judge may draw adverse inferences 
where the right is invoked or where the accused declines to testify in her own trial, what is 
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As such, the prosecution of corporations may be more suitable where there is 
very little reliance on evidence that may be obtained from the corporation 
itself. This implies that where the corporation’s liability can be established by 
showing that the offence was perpetrated by one of its agents while acting 
within the scope of her employment, the case is likely to pass the evidential 
test since there is little need for evidence showing that the corporation’s 
hierarchy authorised or encouraged the act.18 Thus, if vicarious liability is the 
applicable mechanism, there is a higher probability of adducing sufficient 
admissible evidence. This may also be said to be the case with the 
identification doctrine although the prosecutor would be required to set out the 
corporation’s organigramme in order to show that the person guilty is of 
sufficient station to be identified with the corporation or the persons whom the 
senior officer directed acted within the scope of their employment.19 However, 
as stated above, there are several instances where no responsible agent may 
be identified although a causal link may be established between the offence 
and the corporation’s activities. In such cases, the corporation’s guilt may only 
be proved by evidence of the knowledge of certain agents of the risks of the 
activities or evidence of their indifference as to such risks. The prosecutor 
would then have to obtain documents that attest to the negligence of these 
agents and it is uncertain how this will be done if the corporation asserts its 
privilege against self-incrimination.  
 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has the power to compel witnesses to 
provide information but such information cannot be used against the person 
that provided them.20 This is no doubt a grey area as it is uncertain whether 
the HSE would use the information against a corporation where the evidence 
was provided by an agent that cannot be identified with it. Thus, where a 
corporation invokes the privilege against self-incrimination it is uncertain 
                                                                                                                                            
important to note here is that the right is recognised and protected in the United Kingdom and 
may be invoked by a corporation.  
17 See for example section 20(7) of the HSWA and section 69 of the Environmental Protection 
Act 1990 (EPA). 
18 It will be incumbent on the corporation to show that the agent was a maverick. 
19 See Edwards v Brooks (Milk Ltd) [1963] 3 All ER 62. 
20 See section 20(2)(j) of the HSWA.  
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whether it may be understood to mean that all senior officers are barred from 
providing evidence or that the prosecutor may not obtain evidence from any 
agent whatsoever. According to the identification doctrine, the corporation 
may only be identified with a single senior officer and the senior management 
failure test extends the frame to the collective of senior managers. Where 
both mechanisms apply (such as in the United Kingdom) it may be difficult to 
state that any information obtained from junior managers and operational staff 
was provided by the corporation. However, no mechanism has been applied 
with such consistency. Belmont established that where the corporation was 
the targeted victim the fraudulent senior manager is not the corporation and 
British Steel held the corporation liable for the acts of junior employees in 
breach of an absolute duty. As such, if it is posited that the identification 
doctrine applies for crimes committed by corporations (except absolute liability 
offences, corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide and instances where 
it was the targeted victim) then where a senior officer makes a statement 
against her corporate employer, such statement may not be used against the 
corporation since the senior officer for the purposes of the criminal law is the 
corporation.21 Nonetheless, courts have conveniently ignored the identification 
doctrine where corporations invoked the right to silence. They have 
maintained that only the person (senior officer) that makes the statement may 
be protected against self-incrimination and the information provided may be 
used to prosecute the corporation (as a separate person) for the commission 
of an offence.22 
 
These decisions are indicative of policy considerations and are quite innocent 
of principle. It is also unfortunate that the identification doctrine is still held out 
as the applicable mechanism in spite of its disregard in numerous instances. 
An officer cannot be treated as a person distinct from the corporation for the 
                                                 
21 It must be noted that in Saunders v United Kingdom, statements provided by Saunders, 
former chief executive officer of Guinness, under compulsion but in accordance with section 
432(2) of the Companies Act 1985 were used against him in a subsequent trial. He 
complained to the European Court of Human Rights and this Court held that his complaint 
was well founded. 
22 See Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1990] 3 All ER 303; Walkers Snack Foods Ltd v 
Coventry City Council [1998] 3 All ER 164; and R v Hertfordshire County Council ex parte 
Green Environmental Industries Ltd and another [2000] 1 All ER 773.  
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purpose of obtaining information from her and then identified with the same 
corporation for the purpose of imposing criminal liability on it. It is both unfair 
and incoherent. If this exception is added to that of absolute liability offences 
and instances where the corporation was the targeted victim then what is left 
for the observer is a patchwork of fitful applications of the law in the name of 
corporate criminal liability.  
 
It may nevertheless be argued that an individual may qualify as a 
corporation’s directing mind in one instance and not in another, the 
determining factor being whether the individual had plenary authority over the 
transaction under consideration.23 This would imply that where manager A 
does not exercise authority over the transaction under consideration but 
manager B does, a statement made by manager A incriminating both the 
company and manager B may be used against the latter two, the company 
being liable because it can only be identified in the circumstances with 
manager B. This means that the identification doctrine may only be effective 
where the manager or employee that provides the information is not the 
directing mind for the purpose of the offence that will be charged 
subsequently. Thus, the prosecution may compel junior managers or 
operational staff to make statements that may incriminate the senior 
managers and the corporation. However, where the evidence required are 
policy documents, minutes of board meetings, and deliberations at the senior 
management level, it is seldom that junior managers and operational 
employees would be privy to such information. Moreover, the argument of 
manager A and manager B does not always hold water because a decision to 
dispose of waste in violation of the law may be made by members of the 
board of directors with none of them in particular having plenary authority over 
waste disposal. Any statement made by any of the members would 
automatically incriminate both herself and the company and should not be 
admissible if the corporation invokes the right to silence. This shows that the 
identification doctrine breaks down when confronted with the corporation’s 
right to silence. 
                                                 
23 See Chapter 5. 
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Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether there is a better alternative. The senior 
management failure test is confronted with the same obstacles as the 
identification doctrine given that it is equally focused on the acts of senior 
managers. On the other hand, where vicarious liability, aggregation and 
corporate culture are applied the corporation may be liable for the acts of any 
of its employees. Thus, if the corporation invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination the investigators would naturally be prevented from obtaining 
information from any employee. If we agree that the argument that information 
incriminating a corporation may be obtained from any employee insofar as it 
does not incriminate the employee herself is not tenable in a court of logic 
then it may be difficult to find a defensible way of permitting the prosecutor to 
obtain information that may be crucial to its case where a corporation defiantly 
invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. This is because the privilege 
against self-incrimination ought to impose a code of silence on all its agents.  
 
However, the imposition of a code of silence on all agents may only be true 
with respect to vicarious liability. Under the aggregation and corporate culture 
mechanisms, a corporation is often the sum of the acts and knowledge of only 
some of its agents. This implies that in one instance the acts of manager A 
and the knowledge of manager B may be aggregated and imputed to the 
corporation while in another instance, the directives from manager A and the 
act of employee C may be aggregated and imputed to the corporation.24 Also, 
where no individual manager had plenary authority over the transaction under 
consideration, the acts of all agents (members of the board of directors for 
example) that had plenary authority may be aggregated. The sum should also 
include the policies and practices and the attitudes that motivated the actions 
of managers A and B and employee C. Thus, where a corporation invokes the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution or other investigator may 
obtain information from as many employees and managers but not from the 
managers and employees whose acts, knowledge and attitudes would be 
imputed subsequently to the corporation for the purpose of enforcing the 
                                                 
24 As submitted in Chapter 6, it is logical that the court should aggregate only the acts and 
knowledge of employees and managers concerned with the transaction under consideration. 
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offence charged against it. In other words, if the HSE is investigating a work-
related death in the furniture department of a corporation, it may compel 
manager A and employee C from another department to disclose information 
in spite of the fact that the corporation has invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination. However, this implies that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
or Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) cannot subsequently 
impute the acts and knowledge of manager A and employee C to the 
corporation. This is because the corporation would successfully object to the 
use of the information disclosed by them given that for the purpose of the 
enforcement of that crime the corporation is manager A and employee C. 
However, if the CPS or COPFS imputes only the acts of manager B and 
employee D to the corporation, then the latter cannot object to the use of the 
information disclosed by manager A and employee C.25  
 
In spite of the complexity of the above stance, it may be shown to accord not 
only with the principle of separate personality26 but also with the contention 
that a corporation as a legal person ought to be treated as a natural person 
while on trial. The corporation is not denied the right to silence in spite of its 
entitlement. Thus, it may be submitted that the aggregation and corporate 
culture mechanisms (as modified in this thesis) may provide a more logical 
alternative. This involves the corporation invoking the right to prevent the use 
of information only where such information was provided by the very agents 
whose acts and knowledge are aggregated and imputed to it.  
 
7.2.1.2 The observance of hearsay and bad character rules 
 
                                                 
25 It is important to reiterate the point made in Chapter 6 that the prosecutor cannot arbitrarily 
aggregate the acts of employees in a manner that should make conviction inevitable. This is 
how aggregation was carried out in the American cases cited in Chapter 6 and this was 
criticised as being tantamount to changing a mens rea offence into an absolute liability 
offence. The corporation should therefore be liable for the aggregated acts of its agents only 
where it is shown that their acts were motivated by a collective reason and they were 
consistently treated as the corporation through out the process of enforcing the offence 
charged. This is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
26 Contrary to the abovementioned position adopted by courts in order to expeditiously 
circumvent the difficulty of prosecuting and convicting a corporation that has invoked the right 
to silence. 
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Even where compelled statements made by employees or managers or 
documents begrudgingly disclosed are allowed, there are other factors that 
may affect the admissibility of such evidence. Where a corporation is on trial it 
is common that both oral evidence and physical evidence may overlap due to 
the fact that some employees or managers may be required to explicate what 
is written in some of the documents. Given that most of the documents may 
have been drafted by some person other than the manager or employee 
testifying or the latter may not have been present at the meetings which the 
documents describe, the bulk of evidence adduced against corporations may 
have to fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule in order to be allowed by 
the court. However, where the documentary evidence is allowed as exception 
to the hearsay rule, they may still be inadmissible if they constitute evidence 
of the corporation’s bad character adduced outside the framework set by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) for England and the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act 1995 (CJSA) for Scotland.  
 
The admissibility of hearsay evidence is governed by Chapter 2 of the CJA 
and sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the CJSA. Although there are still some 
misgivings about documentary evidence,27 as mentioned above, such 
evidence make up a large part of the proof adduced to support cases against 
corporations. Documents detailing transactions entered into by a corporation 
(normally by agents acting on its behalf) are more reliable than oral evidence 
especially in cases where the transactions spanned over a considerable 
period of time and even prior to the employment of the person giving 
testimony.28 Nonetheless, it is difficult to ascertain whether a corporation 
would be liable if material incriminating it is contained in a document drafted 
by a middle-level manager. The identification doctrine works to the effect that 
the middle-level manager in spite of her knowledge cannot be identified with 
                                                 
27Gobert and Punch (2003: 191-192) contend that this is as a result of the fact that the jury as 
trier of fact in erstwhile courts was largely composed of illiterates. However, they cite Morgan 
EM (1956) and McEwan (1998) as positing that these misgivings are a consequence of 
employing an adversarial system of trial. 
28 There are also instances where the drafters of incriminating documentary evidence are 
unavailable. See the argument of Gobert and Punch (2003: 192-193) and their discussion of 
Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001, as well as the lifting of restrictions by the Criminal Evidence 
Act 1965 (for England) and the recommendations of the Roskill Committee’s Report. 
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the corporation and is another person altogether. Thus, one agent cannot be 
said to have heard the corporation saying something since the middle-level 
manager does not speak as the corporation. This is also true of the senior 
management failure test that restricts the corporation’s knowledge and 
activities to the actions of the senior managers. However, section 117 of the 
CJA and section 17(1)(d)(ii) of the CJSA are to the effect that documentary 
evidence will be allowed provided that the person that supplied the 
information comprised in the document had or is reasonably expected to have 
had personal knowledge of the material discussed in the document and 
drafted the document or the part containing the relevant information while 
acting within the scope of her authority.29 This means that information 
supplied by a middle-level or junior manager would not be hearsay owing to 
the fact she had or was reasonably expected to have had personal knowledge 
of the material contained in the document. Just as in the cases of the right to 
silence, this shows that the restrictive mechanisms that are applicable in the 
United Kingdom and procedural rules are on a collision course which 
unfortunately often results in the further disregard of the corporate person’s 
right for the sake of expediency. The provisions of the CJA and the CJSA are 
however in concord with the dicta in Meridian and El Ajou (modifying the 
identification doctrine) that a corporation should be identified with any agent 
that was concerned with the transaction under consideration. This is because 
such agent is likely to have had personal knowledge of documents or 
statements made by other agents (especially the hierarchy) in relation to the 
transaction. The alternative mechanisms assessed in Chapter 6 (vicarious 
liability, aggregation and corporate culture) are therefore more progressive in 
this regard as they provide for the identification of any agent with the 
corporation depending on the circumstances.  
 
As stated above, information may still be inadmissible if it constitutes 
evidence of bad character. Evidence of a person’s bad character is defined as 
                                                 
29 Nevertheless, section 117(7) of the CJA may be said to give discretionary power to the 
court to exclude such evidence on the grounds of the dubiousness of the content, the source 
and the way in which it was obtained or the document drafted. Section 114(2) also empowers 
courts to consider the probative value and the likelihood of prejudice before admitting 
statements not made in oral evidence. 
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evidence that is not related to the offence charged or the investigation and 
prosecution of the offence and shows a disposition towards misconduct on the 
person’s part.30 Given that a corporation is a legal person that is entitled to the 
same rights as natural persons on trial it may be said to have a “bad 
character” that may not be revealed except in circumstances provided for by 
the law. However, given its amorphousness, the question of a corporation’s 
bad character may only be resolved by giving regard to how courts ascribe 
criminal liability to it (mechanism of imputation). Thus, showing that the acts of 
certain employees constitute the corporation’s character in accordance with 
the applicable mechanism ought to be a prerequisite for showing that the 
corporation was disposed towards misconduct (“bad character”). Following 
the evaluations in Chapters 5 and 6, it is fair to say that the identification 
doctrine and vicarious liability provide clearer propositions of what may 
constitute a corporation’s “character” and “bad character.” The moral action of 
a senior officer or any employee acting within the course of her employment 
represents the characteristic property that defines the corporation. However, 
bar the clarity and also the simplicity, these mechanisms do not reflect the 
factual accuracy of what may be considered a corporation’s character, which 
ought to be distinct from that of its agent. The mechanisms based on 
collective liability (senior management failure, aggregation and corporate 
culture) represent a fair attempt at conceptualising the character of the 
corporation as a collective unit although they are largely unfixed as regards 
the essential notions of such character. As shown in the Chapters 5 and 6, 
they are prone to pushing courts to grope among nebulous issues towards 
conclusions that are largely indefensible.  
 
7.2.1.3 The question of burden of proof 
 
This question may also determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of 
conviction. The prosecutor is required to prove criminal indictment beyond 
reasonable doubt. However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, where the accused is 
                                                 
30 Section 98 of the CJA. See also section 141 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 
as amended by section 24 of the CJSA. 
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a corporation the offence may be the result of a number of actions and 
omissions spanning over a period of time. The prosecutor is therefore 
required to adduce evidence of these actions and omissions and proving 
beyond reasonable doubt that they were connected to such extent that the 
corporation through one of the agents had or ought to have had knowledge of 
the full import of the nexus and foresaw or ought to have foreseen the result 
which was the offence charged. Although all corporate offences are not 
complicated,31 the task of establishing the elements of the offence charged 
beyond reasonable doubt is in contradiction with some of the underlying 
reasons for placing the burden of proof on the prosecutor, viz. to control and 
limit the power of the government to forcefully intervene in the lives of citizens 
using the criminal law32 and to avoid compelling the accused to prove her 
innocence. The prosecution often lacks the requisite expertise and resources 
to process complex crimes such as fraud committed by large and organic 
corporate entities33 and it has been argued that although it would be unfair to 
reverse the onus of proof, the standard of proof which is “beyond reasonable 
doubt” ought to be abandoned in favour of a less stringent standard of “clear 
and convincing evidence.”34 It is however difficult to distinguish between the 
“intermediate” standard of “clear and convincing evidence” recommended by 
Gobert and Punch and the applicable standard of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. If a reasonable doubt is that which would stop a reasonable person 
from arriving at a particular conclusion35 then it may be said that the 
reasonable person refrained from arriving at such a conclusion because the 
evidence was not “clear and convincing.” This demonstrates a pervasive 
dilemma in the subject of corporate criminal liability as regards either 
                                                 
31 There are small and medium-sized corporations that commit offences that are perpetrated 
only by the general manager or a couple of agents at the general manager’s direction. 
32 See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 201-202.  
33 The prosecution’s task may be further complicated by the successful invocation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination or undue restrictions on the adduction of evidence of the 
corporation’s “bad character” and hearsay evidence. See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 201-202. 
34 Gobert and Punch (2003: 202-204) discuss exceptions to the rule placing the burden on the 
prosecution such as where the defendant raises the common law defence of insanity and 
where statute specifically reverses the onus. They then assert that the defendant in such 
cases is not required to discharge the burden beyond reasonable doubt but by a balance of 
probabilities. 
35 See Denning LJ (as he then was) in Bater v Bater [1950] 2 All ER 458 at 459; and R v 
Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059 at 1060. 
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facilitating the prosecution of corporations36 or maintaining the integrity of the 
criminal law by protecting the rights of the accused (whether a natural or 
artificial person). It is submitted here that priority should still be maintained on 
the latter option else procedural justice would be sacrificed for purposes of 
expediency. This may be achieved by ascertaining the nature of the accused 
corporation, as well as the type of evidence required to establish its guilt. As 
shown in Chapters 2 and 4, there is a vast amount of literature on the nature 
and functioning of corporations and no particular paradigm can be held out as 
a tenet. Thus, for the purposes of the criminal law, it may be better to refer to 
mechanisms of imputation and enquire about how they enable the 
prosecution to successfully discharge this burden. 
 
If we refer to the mechanisms assessed in Chapters 5 and 6, it may be fair to 
say that those that are largely based on individualism (identification doctrine 
and vicarious liability) are less ambiguous and be may be used consistently. It 
is easier to prove a corporation’s bad character by adducing evidence of the 
general manager’s disposition to commit crime while acting to further the 
interests of the corporation and it is also easier for the prosecutor to lay hands 
on such specific evidence and prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
general manager committed the offence charged and consequently the 
corporation should be liable. However, where the crime was the result of a 
combination of several actions and omissions and/or a pervasive attitude 
existing within the corporation, the prosecution would terminate the case if the 
identification doctrine or vicarious liability was the applicable mechanism. The 
mechanisms based on collective liability (senior management failure, 
aggregation and corporate culture) require the prosecution to adduce 
evidence showing the confluence of actions and/or omissions that resulted in 
the offence. It may be an uphill task to present and explain documents to the 
effect that the senior management or a group of departmental heads 
encouraged or tolerated non-compliance if none of them was negligent in an 
individual capacity. However, as shown above, the prosecutor has the power 
to compel agents to provide information which they can use to prosecute a 
                                                 
36 Due to the fact that they can be very powerful and hold and control most of the evidence of 
the commission of the offence. 
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corporation.37 The prosecutor may also rely solely on documentary evidence 
irrespective of whether the drafters of the documents give oral evidence. 
These powers which would no doubt be described as unfettered if natural 
persons were at the receiving end certainly balances the prosecution’s lack of 
sufficient resources and the corporation’s possession of the bulk of 
evidence.38 The major challenge thus remains how to prosecute the 
corporation in light of a delineated mechanism of imputation. From the 
discussion above, the solution seems to lie in a mechanism that is based on 
collective liability but with the clarity and consistency of the mechanisms 
based on individual liability.   
 
7.2.1.4 The question of using a jury 
 
A jury is comprised of the defender’s fellow citizens randomly selected. This 
follows from the right of the accused to be tried by a jury of her peers founded 
on a provision in Chapter 29 of the English Magna Carta Libertatum or Great 
Charter of Freedoms.39  However, where a corporation is on trial, it may be 
difficult to determine who constitutes its “peers” or “fellow citizens.” It is 
uncertain whether this should be taken to mean other managers of other 
corporations or other employees of other corporations or simply other natural 
persons who are citizens. The uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the 
concept of corporation is not amenable to any precise definition40 in order to 
enable courts to determine whether the persons seated on the panel are of 
equal standing with the accused corporation.41 As mentioned above, courts 
may consider the applicable mechanism of imputation in such manner as to 
decide whether the corporation is a senior officer (directing mind), in which 
case the jury would be composed of senior officers that are directing minds of 
other corporations. However, where the corporation is the combination of 
                                                 
37 And the corporation cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. 
38 As such, the idea of reversing the onus of proof is largely unfounded. 
39 The practice of trial by jury is equally one of the oldest in Scotland. See Carruthers, 2001. 
40 The definition proposed in this thesis is intended to apply only for the enforcement of the 
offence charged and is largely based on the understanding that a corporation is foremost an 
abstract entity. 
41 Admitting only artificial persons as jurors would beg the question of whether they can swear 
or take an oath. 
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different agents at different levels, as well as their attitudes and the practices 
they have adopted, it may be difficult to have other corporations seated as the 
jury.42 That notwithstanding, the courts use natural persons selected randomly 
as jurors in cases where corporations are on trial43 and so there is apparently 
no difference between a jury of an artificial person’s peers and a jury of a 
natural person’s peers.  
 
Over the past four decades the practice of trial by jury underwent a critical 
appraisal.44 The focus was on the rationale of resting the credibility of the trial 
institution on the shoulders of laymen who were more susceptible to 
emotional judgements. The disquiet is especially strong in complex cases 
where the jurors are expected to process a chunk of information and establish 
the truth in a just and economical manner.45 The Roskill Committee46 noted 
that a randomly selected jury would struggle to understand difficult and 
complex fraud cases and recommended the institution of a judicial assembly 
with the requisite skill, the Fraud Trial Tribunal. Some sixteen years later, the 
Auld Committee echoed similar concerns.47 However, during the period 
between these publications, several commentators pointed out that empirical 
research does not support this stance.48 That notwithstanding, in 1983 the 
Government created the Fraud Trial Committee which was tasked with finding 
more effective means of tackling fraud using the criminal justice system. 
Equally, the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (as amended) created the Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) which investigates and prosecutes serious and complex 
                                                 
42 This further demonstrates the clarity and consistency of mechanisms based on individual 
liability although it also betrays their simplicity. 
43 The argument about whether such juries are legitimately constituted has received very little 
attention compared to concerns about the competence of lay jurors. 
44 See the Thomson and Roskill Committees’ Reports of 1975 and 1986 and the Auld Review 
of 2001. 
45 There is a substantial amount of literature on the desirability of the jury system. See 
particularly Frank, 1930 and 1973; Findlay and Duff, 1988; Darbyshire, Maughan, and 
Stewart, 2002; and Honess, Levi and Charman, 2003. Questions about the use of the jury 
have sometimes been linked with questions about the efficiency of the common law systems. 
See for example Murphy P, 2008. 
46 1985: para 1.6. 
47 2001: Chapter 11. 
48 See for example, Harding, 1988: 74-93; Levi, 1988: 95-111; Darbyshire, Maughan, and 
Stewart, 2002: 62; and Honess, Levi and Charman, 2003: 12-27. 
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fraud.49 To facilitate the prosecution, sections 43 and 44 of the CJA entitles 
the prosecution in England to apply for fraud cases to be conducted without a 
jury. Section 43(5) of this statute is particularly pertinent because it relates to 
trials that are protracted and may require the juror to sacrifice much time and 
carry out intensive examination of several documents in order to arrive at a 
fair and balanced conclusion.50 However, after discussing these English 
sections, Lord MacLean maintained that “in Scotland there is no empirical 
evidence that juries are unable to absorb and understand complex issues, 
whether or not they arise in long trials.”51 
 
As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, the enforcement of the criminal law against 
corporations is especially problematic where corporations are large and 
complex. These are almost always complex cases because they involve the 
adduction of thousands of documents, the calling of hundreds of witnesses to 
make statements in oral evidence and convoluted arguments about issues 
such as whether the agent that acted or obtained information was acting 
within the scope of her authority and is of sufficient station to be identified with 
the corporation.52 Thus, even where the offence charged is not fraud or does 
not involve complicated forensic evidence, it may very well be complex due to 
the difficulty of pinning blame on an artificial entity whose structure is 
labyrinthine.53 It may then be said that the problem of complex fraud cases is 
symptomatic of corporate cases and it is advisable that the right of the 
accused corporation to be tried by a jury of its peers is left to the discretion of 
the court.54  
 
                                                 
49 However, SFO’s jurisdiction does not extend to Scotland where frauds are prosecuted by 
the COPFS which has a Fraud and Specialist Services unit. 
50 Section 43 is not for the time being in force as amendments to this section will be made by 
the Fraud (Trial Without a Jury) Bill which is presently in the House of Lords. 
51 Transco at [5]. 
52 In Transco for example it was intimated that the prosecution provided a list of 262 
witnesses and submitted about 1450 documentary productions. 
53 See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 185. 
54 Some commentators that advance that the theory of jury incompetence is unfounded do 
however agree on the difficulty of maintaining a jury system for prolonged cases. See for 
example Honess, Levi and Charman, 2003: 26. 
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Nonetheless, the argument of overlooking the jury in some cases is not made 
here on the basis of the jury’s incompetence55 but on the inappropriateness of 
maintaining a jury system for trials that are relatively long in duration. Proving 
that a corporation is liable for an offence may involve the presentation of 
thousands of documents and the examination and cross-examination of 
hundreds of witnesses. If the applicable mechanism is based on individual 
liability (such as the identification doctrine or vicarious liability), the duration of 
the trial may be shorter (and less complex) given that the prosecution’s job 
would largely be restricted to showing that an agent of the corporation 
committed the offence while acting within the course of her employment, and 
she is of sufficient station to be identified with the corporation.56 However, 
evidence of the guilt of such agents may be hard to come by in large and 
complex corporations where they make decisions in committees and are often 
remote from operational staff. As shown in Chapter 5, the mechanisms that 
deal (or have the potential to deal) effectively with such cases are those 
based on collective liability.57 If they become applicable then the prosecution 
would be required to show that the actions and omissions of a number of 
agents together with practices, policies, systems and attitudes that prevailed 
within the corporation combined in different degrees to cause the result that 
completed the offence. This is no doubt an arduous task that requires not only 
a substantial amount of information but also a considerable period of time. In 
this light, a trial without a jury may be preferable although that would imply 
that the right of the accused to be tried by a jury of its peers has been 
disregarded due to the weakness of the criminal justice system.58 The 
                                                 
55 Some commentators have equally proffered evidence of the difficulty of lawyers and judges 
to present and control complex forensic evidence. Masters (2008: 116-117) for example says 
he visited the website of the Cambridgeshire Police and found out that formal education was 
not required to become a police constable. He therefore wondered how individuals with little 
formal education would trace assets and evidence through a maze of bank accounts. He 
however notes that there has been remarkable improvement in the enforcement of white 
collar crime with the enactment of more appropriate laws, the increase in government funding 
for the activities of specialist agencies and units and the use of more skilled investigators. 
56 The prosecution would even be reluctant to initiate proceedings if they are not satisfied that 
they have sufficient evidence against such senior officer. 
57 Aggregation and corporate culture in particular since senior management failure would only 
require evidence of gross negligence by the senior managers. 
58 If proponents of trial by jury can find a way around the time factor then there is no reason to 
suggest that the corporation should not be tried by a jury although the question of “peers” 
would also have to be resolved. From the discussion above, it seems the latter question may 
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question of whether the disregard of this right is tantamount to a denial of the 
right to a fair criminal trial is open to debate.59 It may therefore be concluded 
that just like the right to silence and the rules against adduction of hearsay 
evidence and evidence of bad character, the right to a trial by jury has been 
deemed incompatible with the ability of the prosecution to present a fair case 
against a corporation. This has led to the simplification of the prosecution of 
corporations. However, the consequence is that any incriminating evidence 
against the corporation almost automatically passes the evidential test. As 
such, the low incidence of convictions may only be blamed on the process of 
collecting the evidence and the use of such evidence in accordance with the 
rules governing the applicable mechanisms of imputation namely, the 
identification doctrine and the senior management failure test. 
 
7.2.2 The public interest test 
 
Prosecutorial decision-making is not only governed by questions of whether 
evidence obtained is admissible and founds a reasonable prospect of 
conviction. The question of whether the prosecution is in the interest of the 
public is just as important.60 The Codes for prosecutions for both Scotland and 
England61 set out a number of factors that may be taken into account in the 
public interest assessment. These factors include the seriousness or gravity 
of the offence, the impact on the victim and the circumstances of the accused. 
With regard to the seriousness or gravity of the offence, the prosecution is 
expected to consider whether initiating a proceeding is a proportionate 
response to the action of the accused.62 Where the accused is a corporation, 
the prosecutor may be concerned about the impact of the prosecution (and 
                                                                                                                                            
hardly be resolved where the applicable mechanisms of imputation are based on collective 
liability. 
59 See for example Carruthers’ (2001: 217-221) contention that both rights mean the same 
thing. 
60 Proceedings may be discontinued if this test is not passed. See for example, section 23 of 
the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. 
61 Prosecution Code, 2001: 06-08; Code for Crown Prosecutors, 2004: paras. 5.6-5.13. 
62 The prosecution will be indicated by things like the accused using violence to perpetrate the 
offence; whether she was in a position of trust vis-à-vis the victim; if the offence was 
preconceived; and whether the accused has previous convictions which are relevant to the 
offence considered amongst other things. 
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subsequent punishment) on the confidence of the community. Since 
corporations especially the large ones may cause widespread damage the 
institution of proceedings against them is almost always a strong message 
both to other corporations and the affected communities that corporate 
criminality will not be tolerated and the government is keeping watch.63 
Concerning the impact on the victim, although the prosecutor does not 
represent the former like an advocate would, it is important for the prosecutor 
to consider issues such as the injury suffered by the victim and the 
consequence of the prosecution on her. The victim’s views would therefore be 
important. Where the accused is a corporation it is more likely that the victim 
may have suffered great loss (financial, physical, psychological or otherwise) 
and would be eager to see punishment meted out to the corporation that is 
appropriate to the loss.64  
 
Nonetheless, the prosecutor ought to initiate proceedings because of the 
unshakable belief that the accused justly deserves to be punished. The 
guidance by the prosecution Codes mentioned above has been described as 
ambiguous because the considerations set out (especially as regards the 
“seriousness” of the offence) do not provide any clear directions as to why a 
particular course of action has to be adopted.65 Thus, Rogers notes that the 
prosecutor should limit her reflection to three things: the cost of the 
prosecution, the harms of the punishment and the harms that are ineluctably 
wrapped around the criminal trial, which he calls the “harms of prosecution.”66 
                                                 
63 This is not tantamount to the idea that the criminal law is the most appropriate instrument 
for regulating the activities of corporations. See Clough and Mulhern, 2000. 
64 A good example of the disappointment of victims and members of affected communities 
following the exoneration of the accused corporation is Ex parte Spooner where some victims 
and families of victims argued that the restriction of the scope of inquest greatly reduced the 
prospect of convicting the corporation (Townsend Thoresen and later on P&O European 
Ferries) that was investigated. 
65 See Rogers’ (2006: 775-803) criticisms of the English Code for Crown Prosecutors. He 
wonders which of these factors may justify the prosecution of a petty shoplifter and suggests 
that the factors should have been set out as guidance toward seeking to obtain a particular 
result via punishment. Thus, there may be a pressing need to prosecute a corporation that 
has committed an offence although the crime is not necessarily “serious” and the corporation 
is a first-time offender and there is no victim. He also deplores the Code’s silence on the 
question of cost-benefit analysis even though this constitutes a strong influence on the 
prosecutor when considering why she ought to seek the punishment of the accused. 
66 Rogers, 2006: 787-793. He was certainly inspired by Feeley’s (1979) exposition on the 
United States criminal justice system pointing out that the process of going through this 
system actually constitutes the punishment. Feeley (1979: 201) calls these harms of the trial 
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The cost of the prosecution and the harms of the punishment are incidental to 
any trial and are not as important as the harms of prosecution. This is 
especially true as regards corporate defenders. The institution of criminal 
proceedings often carries a stigma that may seldom be blotted out even by an 
acquittal and the publication of the judgment.67 As such, it is imperative for the 
prosecutor to consider whether the harms of prosecution that may be inflicted 
upon it are part and parcel of the just deserts for the accused corporation. 
However, if just deserts consist of the effects of the perpetration of an offence 
then including harms of prosecution suffered by a person whose guilt has not 
been proved (and is apparently innocent) would be incompatible with the 
moral philosophy of justice that underpins the criminal justice systems of both 
England and Scotland and the fact that the Codes are silent in the face of 
such unfairness is rightly a cause for concern.68 There may be claims in 
damages although these are severely restricted to cases where the harm of 
prosecution relates to the accused’s repute and the prosecution was 
malicious.69 Nonetheless, what is important to note is that where the accused 
is a corporation the prosecutor’s consideration of the harms of prosecution 
that would be visited on it may logically be based on her perception of the 
nature of the corporation.  
 
For example, if the prosecutor is required to conceive of the senior 
management as the embodiment of the corporation, then she would be less 
likely to think that the corporation would suffer from the prosecution of an 
offence allegedly committed by junior employees that acted in disregard of 
instructions from the diligent senior management.70 On the other hand, where 
                                                                                                                                            
“price tags.” It must however be noted that his argument was based on the fact that most of 
the convicted persons he observed were not as concerned about the stigma of criminal 
sanction as they were about the costs of the process.  
67 It may be difficult to argue that a fine of a few thousand pounds is a harsher penalty than 
the loss of reputation and customers due to the negative publicity of the prosecution. In his 
review of Feeley (1979), Atkins (1980: 822) noted that that latter failed to show evidence of 
the defendants’ perception in order to buttress his argument that the process is the 
punishment. 
68 Rogers (2006: 788, n. 65) gives the example of the consideration of the time the convicted 
person spent in custody during sentencing (as per sections 240-243 of the CJA) as an 
example of efforts to minimise the unfairness of the process. 
69 For discussions on malicious prosecutions see Glinski v McIver [1962] AC 726 at 766. 
70 In the United Kingdom this will most probably be a strict liability offence because 
corporations can only be prosecuted and sanctioned for crimes of intent (including corporate 
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the offence was allegedly committed by senior managers the prosecutor is 
more likely to think that the trial process would harm the corporation since the 
message conferred would be that the corporation is prosecuted as a result of 
pervasive negligence. Thus, where the aggregation and corporate culture 
mechanisms apply, the prosecutor (and the public) is more likely to perceive 
the trial as that of the corporation rather than that of a handful of greedy 
senior officers.71 Nonetheless, this implies that there is a feeling of just desert 
as regards whether there is reasonable ground for visiting the harms of the 
prosecution either on the greedy senior manager or on the accused 
corporation. As argued above, this runs counter to the moral philosophy of 
justice that underpins the criminal justice system. Rogers72 posits that the 
Scottish Code is more progressive on the issue because it directs the 
prosecutor to consider whether the effect of the prosecution may be 
disproportionate to the gravity or seriousness of the offence.73  
 
Finding an effective solution to this problem may prove impractical due to the 
fact that it is only incidental to the use of society’s most effective weapon to 
regulate the activities of its subjects. That notwithstanding, a noteworthy 
distinction between the harms of punishment and the harms of prosecution is 
that unlike the former the latter should not be intended.74 As such, the 
prosecutor should not label and discredit a corporation for the sake of making 
the whole process a deterrent especially where the maximum penalty is a 
small fine or where there is little prospect of conviction.75 It is imperative that 
                                                                                                                                            
manslaughter or corporate homicide) where a senior manager or the senior management is 
guilty or grossly negligent.  
71This is reflected in the empirical study by Zemba, Young and Morris (2006) that shows that 
observers tend to blame senior managers for corporate failures. 
72 2006: 790, n. 73. 
73 Prosecution Code, 2001: 08. This implies that the more serious the offence the more it is 
justifiable to tug the accused through the process. However, this does not only take us back 
to the problem of the ambiguity of the words “gravity” and “serious” (which Rogers deplores) 
but also to what may be seen as an “innocent” person being harmed by the criminal process 
on the ground that she is likely to have a committed a “serious” offence. 
74 Rogers, 2006: 792. 
75 P & O European Ferries and Transco are examples of prosecutors continuing proceedings 
in spite of the absence of evidence incriminating any senior officer (and consequently the 
corporation). The decisions to prosecute were popular since there were clamant calls to bring 
these corporations and its controllers to justice. However, the prosecutors were neither “fair, 
independent and objective” (as required by section 2.2 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, 
2004) nor did they exercise their duty without “fear, favour, or prejudice” (as required by the 
Prosecution Code, 2001: 01). 
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the effects of the prosecution are mitigated. Mechanisms that compel 
corporations to substitute for delinquent senior officers (identification doctrine 
and senior management failure test) seem to provide lesser prospects for 
mitigating these harms where a corporation is concerned. This is because the 
target is often thought to be the senior officer or senior management that the 
prosecutor (as well as the public) believes is responsible for the perpetration 
of the offence. In other words, it is thought that blaming the corporation is a 
convenient way of attributing the blame to the individuals that make up the 
group.76  
 
This implies that in addition to the disregard of fundamental rights of the 
accused corporation (right to silence, privilege against hearsay evidence and 
evidence of bad character, right to be presumed innocent and right of trial by 
jury) the trial process is further undermined by the unfair punishment inflicted 
upon it. The rules of adjudication are therefore largely ignored and this 
provides a strong motive to consider fairer means of regulating the 
corporation’s activities and reconciling the community with the corporation. 
Civil law may provide such an alternative, as well as reliance on specialised 
criminal justice agencies.77 This takes us to the question of restorative 
justice78 and a comprehensive model of restorative justice in corporate liability 
designed by Fisse and Braithwaite. It is called the “Accountability Model” and 
has been presented as a more effective approach to solving procedural 
problems of enforcing corporate crime in most commonwealth jurisdictions. In 
light of the above difficulties, it is important to consider whether there is good 
reason to reduce the frequency of or dispense away with initiating criminal 
proceedings via the CPS and COPFS in favour of the process suggested by 
the Accountability Model. This is important because if that is the case then 
this model will be deemed to comprise more effective rules of adjudication 
than those discussed above.  
                                                 
76 See the discussion in Chapter 2 on the bracket theory. 
77 The argument is that disciplinary and remedial sanctions imposed by regulatory agencies 
carry less stigma than both the prosecution and the subsequent imposition of criminal 
sanctions on corporations. See Masters’ (2008: 112) argument that supermarkets 
successfully minimise theft in their stores without initiating proceedings and that could be the 
same for the criminal justice system and corporations. 
78 Although the focus here is on procedural justice. 
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7.2.3 The Accountability Model or a silver bullet 
 
This model subscribes to three theoretical approaches of the nature and 
functioning of corporations, viz. individualism, collectivism and organisation 
theory. However, the legal focus is largely on individualism given that the 
architects of the model address the question of collectivism strictly from an 
economic standpoint (enterprise liability) while their analysis of organisation 
theory perspectives draws mostly from management. That notwithstanding 
the objective of devising a means of using the corporation as an instrument 
for ensuring compliance is commendable. This involves exploiting the 
corporation’s internal justice system to ensure that its members and agents 
comply with the law.79 Thus, this model favours the transfer of enforcement 
costs to the corporation and the use of civil law at the early stages of 
enforcement.  
 
Fisse and Braithwaite80 list a number of desiderata which they believe 
emerged from the attribution of responsibility to corporations for the purposes 
of enforcing the criminal law against them. They then proceed to show how 
the Accountability Model meets the objectives of these desiderata through a 
regulatory framework described as “pyramidal enforcement.”81 The pyramid 
comprises a series of disciplinary, remedial and punitive interventions that the 
criminal justice system may make against a corporation that is guilty of an 
offence. These interventions include the use of warnings and persuasion at 
the base of the pyramid; civil fines and voluntary accountability agreements 
(between the regulator and/or prosecutor and the corporation); accountability 
or remedial orders or punitive injunctions; and at the apex of the pyramid are 
criminal sanctions which include revoking the corporation’s licence. These 
                                                 
79 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 15-16. This was inspired by Coffee’s (1981: 431) proposal that 
probation and presentence reports could be used to foment corporations to use their internal 
disciplinary systems to sanction non-compliance. Earlier work on the model was done by 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). The underlying assumption is that corporations have a greater 
capacity to ensure compliance of their agents than the criminal justice system. 
80 1993: 135-138. 
81 For a description of the pyramid, see Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 141-153. 
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interventions therefore equally involve a number of proposed sanctions that 
may be imposed on the convicted corporation. However, the focus here is on 
the use of the model to overcome the procedural obstacles that have been 
shown to be impregnable to the mechanisms of imputation (in their present 
forms).82 Thus, I will seek to determine whether in a case where the evidence 
at the disposal of the prosecutor provides a realistic prospect of conviction 
and there are also good public interests grounds to prosecute the prosecutor 
may avoid going through a trial by adopting the measures of intervention 
discussed above.  
 
To begin with, it seems that the notion of the corporation as a legal person 
with rights that must be protected and respected will be circumvented in 
favour the notion of the corporation as a resourceful person with the capacity 
to effectively sanction and prevent corporate crime.83 This is because the 
prosecutor will be less concerned about how the law operates with regard to 
the accused corporation’s procedural rights than about her presence behind 
the corporation with an “axe that ultimately can deliver the sanction of 
corporate capital punishment.”84 It must nonetheless be noted that the 
seminal work of Fisse and Braithwaite has been cited by several 
commentators and has provided much impetus to the position that corporate 
compliance programmes ought to be used as a measure of a corporation’s 
guilt.85 It is also reflected in the operation of specific enforcement agencies 
created in the United Kingdom to regulate activities in certain industries.86  
 
However, the fact that the model may only be used where the corporation has 
committed the actus reus of an offence implies that it is only suitable for strict 
and absolute liability offences. This is because crimes of intent require more 
                                                 
82 The validity of these sanctions and a host of other sanctions proposed by other 
commentators, as well as the applicable sanctions in the United Kingdom are discussed 
below. 
83 Thus, if the corporation can harness its own resources to assure responsibility the problem 
of the economic inefficiency of enforcement of corporate crime may become history. 
84 Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 15. 
85 See for example Ashworth, 2000: 247-248. 
86 Many enforcement agencies can advise corporations, as well as impose fines and 
prosecute them (in England) for specific offences if they believe the offences are of sufficient 
gravity. 
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than just evidence of the commission of the actus reus before action can be 
taken against the corporation. They also require evidence of the intention to 
cause the result that completed the offence or of reckless action in disregard 
of the consequence of the commission of the actus reus.87 Moreover, this 
model is based on the assumption that it is possible to identify all the 
responsible actors within the corporate body.88 This is erroneous because as 
noted in Chapters 5 and 6 there are numerous occasions where the offence is 
the culmination of the confluence of different innocuous acts and omissions of 
different agents who sought to foster the interests of the corporation. Not even 
an internal investigation by the corporation itself would identify a responsible 
individual. Given the emphasis on individual responsibility, corporations may 
feel compelled to appoint a senior officer that should be responsible for 
detecting and reporting non-compliance and Fisse and Braithwaite89 admit 
that this would no doubt motivate scapegoating or the recruitment of “vice-
presidents in charge of going to jail.”90 Thus, the argument that individual 
responsibility is the bedrock of social control does not always justify the 
enforcement of corporate (collective) crime by targeting individuals.  
 
The starting point of the pyramidal enforcement is therefore problematic. It is 
unclear whether the first interventions should be made where a corporation’s 
guilt (for the commission of the actus reus) has been proved or where the 
prosecutor or regulator simply has sufficient evidence which in her opinion 
provides a realistic prospect of conviction. In the latter case, it is unclear how 
such guilt (for the commission of the actus reus) may be established. It is 
difficult to see how this may be done without reference to the applicable 
mechanism of imputation since to say that a corporation has committed the 
actus reus of an offence implies that a senior officer committed the actus reus 
or directed its commission (where the identification doctrine applies) or that 
                                                 
87 The adduction of evidence of an effective compliance programme which is similar to a 
credible remedial investigation and accountability report may only mitigate a corporation’s 
liability for such crimes. The argument that it should be an absolute defence defeats the 
purpose of justice because a crime was committed by the corporation after all and it is 
deserves to be punished. 
88 See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 135 and 140. 
89 1993: 132. 
90 This is may be one of the reasons why the CMCHA cannot be enforced against individual 
senior managers. 
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the way the senior management organised or managed the corporation’s 
activities was below acceptable standards and motivated the commission of 
the actus reus.91 Equally, it is unclear whether the commission of the actus 
reus will be established in a court and following a trial. This is because if it is 
not established in such manner then it cannot be said that the corporation has 
committed the actus reus of the offence but only that the prosecution believes 
it has sufficient evidence required to prove that the corporation committed the 
actus reus. As such, the objective of circumventing the procedural obstacles 
is not met.  
 
That notwithstanding, as mentioned above, the model is reflected in the 
operation of many criminal justice agencies created to help prevent the 
commission of certain offences. The HSE for example can make a number of 
interventions to ensure that a corporation complies with the relevant health 
and safety legislation. An HSE inspector may provide advice to a corporation 
and issue a warning in a situation where she believes there is a high 
propensity to breach the legislation.92 The HSE may also (in England and 
Wales) issue simple cautions,93 improvement and prohibition notices and it 
may vary and withdraw licence or other authorisations.94 The Financial 
Service Authority (FSA) may also impose financial penalties and prosecute 
corporations that carry out regulated activities without prior authorisation 
amongst other disciplinary and remedial interventions.95 The Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) may impose fines and disqualification orders and initiate 
                                                 
91 Unless we are not concerned with corporate crime but crime within the corporate context. It 
seems the Accountability Model is geared towards finding ways of preventing the latter and 
not the former. 
92 The policy statement (HSE, 2008: para. 3) however uses the words “that in the opinion of 
the inspector, they are failing to comply with the law.” Although this is not as problematic as 
saying that “a corporation having committed the actus reus,” it still leaves much uncertainty as 
regards what should motivate the issuing of a warning or providing of advice. It however 
seems the HSE inspector should decide based on whether she has sufficient evidence which 
in her opinion provides a realistic prospect of conviction for breach of the statute. And in a bid 
to avoid prosecution (because of some of the shortcomings discussed above) and prevent 
other breaches she would make the necessary disciplinary and remedial interventions. 
93 A simple caution follows an admission of guilt and although it is not synonymous to a 
conviction it forms part of the accused’s criminal record. Even the police issues cautions to 
about 38 percent of offenders. See Ashworth, 2000: 247. 
94 It is important to note that at the apex of the HSE pyramid is the power to prosecute in 
England and Wales or to refer a prosecution to the COFPS in Scotland. See the Legislative 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 and also the Regulators’ Compliance Code 2008. 
95 See the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). 
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criminal proceedings against corporations allegedly involved in anti-
competitive activities or that breach consumer protection laws.96 These are 
examples of criminal justice agencies that may enforce certain offences 
without necessarily going through the ‘tortuous’ channels of trials. They no 
doubt provide credence to the Accountability Model. As such, a number of 
offences which are commonly committed in certain industries may be 
effectively checked without the impression of the overbearing arm of the 
intervening prosecutor. That notwithstanding, if this were to become the norm 
in the area of corporate criminality there would be a specialised agency for 
each offence or set of related offences that can be committed by a 
corporation. Given that a corporation as a legal person can commit all 
possible offences either directly or as an accessory, such proposition hovers 
on fantasy.  
 
It is an alluring illusion that the law can be used in such manner. It is 
evocative of the Austinian contention that the law is a command of a 
sovereign that becomes effective because of the threat of the sanction 
accompanying the command.97 It is trite knowledge that the law owes its 
effectiveness to more reasons than envisaged by proponents of legal 
positivism.98 Even for the purposes of regulating the activities of corporations 
that may cause widespread damage it is not appropriate to expunge ideas of 
justice from the literature of enforcement.99 As such, the objective of reforming 
                                                 
96 See the Fair Trading Act 1973; Competition Act 1998; and Enterprise Act 2002. 
97 Although they would rather that the system instills a sense of responsibility and not fear, 
Fisse and Braithwaite (1993: 143) advance that the model is based on the theory that “actors, 
individual or corporate, are most likely to comply if they know that enforcement is backed by 
sanctions which can be escalated in response to any given level of non-compliance.” They 
(1993: 173-174) also cite with approval the consequentialist republican theory of “maximizing” 
the “dominion” put forward by Braithwaite and Pettit (1990) to justify the imposition of criminal 
sanctions even where there is no evidence of moral blameworthiness. However, it is shown in 
Chapter 2 that consequentialist or teleological enforcement is justifiable only for certain 
offences and seldom for crimes of intent which constitute the crux of the problem of corporate 
criminal liability. 
98 In fact one of the reasons for Hart’s (1994) exposition of primary rules and secondary rules 
was to free legal positivism from the insularity of the Austinian model. However, MacCormick 
(2008: 194-200) did not believe Hart achieved the objective. 
99 Ironically, justice (or natural justice) once a subject of apprehension to lawyers seeking to 
protect industry and commerce (Cohen MR, 1927: 237) may now become the pith of their 
argument. See Nijman, 2004. However, it must be reiterated that it is important to protect the 
civil liberties of corporate persons and safeguard the integrity of the criminal law. See the 
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all corporations by ensuring that they have effective internal audit and 
disciplinary teams is just as achievable as reforming all humans by ensuring 
that they have disciplinary consciences.100 It may be less costly to the state in 
certain instances101 but justice (whether restorative or not) cannot rest on the 
sole question of the economic efficiency of enforcement.102 Thus, although it 
is cheaper to rely on the internal disciplinary system of the corporation,103 the 
monitoring, imposition of different sanctions and (may be) subsequent 
prosecution may amount to a heavy financial burden on the different agencies 
and consequently the state104 and sometimes on the regulated.105 Moreover, 
the change brought about by the use of these criminal justice agencies may 
be questioned when one considers statistics showing that 41 percent of 
corporate frauds were detected by pure chance in 2007.106 Many corporations 
remain far too complex even for these specialist units or agencies and 
sometimes also for the corporations’ senior management.107 
 
What is important to note here is that even though criminal justice agencies 
are given such wide ranges of disciplinary and remedial power, in many cases 
they eventually prosecute or ask the COPFS or CPS to prosecute. These 
cases cannot be ignored for good measure. Thus, if questions of procedural 
rights have to be addressed invariably then the issue of the application of a 
mechanism of imputation would eventually resurface. Equally, a good number 
                                                                                                                                            
concerns expressed by Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 169-177. See also Ashworth, 2000: 249-
250. 
100 The argument that no legislation no matter how well drafted and implemented can stop 
corporate misconduct (Coburn, 2006: 366) is also true for human misconduct. 
101 See the ironic remark by Masters (2008: 118) that “[c]rime does pay! But not for the 
criminals” made because of huge financial returns registered by police forces after seizure 
and confiscation of assets. 
102 Cf Bayles 1990: 139 cited in Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 173. See also Masters, 2008: 
112. 
103 See Coburn, 2006: 349; and Masters, 1998: 118-119. 
104 It is important to determine for example whether the Jubilee fraud trial (R v Rayment and 
Others Central Criminal Court, 24 March 2005, Unreported) that collapsed after 18 months 
and more than £25 millions spent would have been handled in more cost effective manner by 
the Fraud Prosecution Service (FPS) of the CPS than the Casework Directorate that initially 
prosecuted serious fraud cases. The HMCPSI Report of June 2006 states that it is still early 
days. 
105 For example corporations regulated by the FSA are required to pay fees or levies. 
106 See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007: 10. See also Coburn (2006: 349) who notes that 
luck is the commonest “fraud detection tool.” 
107 One cannot be surprised that WorldCom’s senior management was bewildered by the 
pervasive fraudulent activities in the company. See Coburn, 2006: 349 and 364-365. 
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of the interventions within the framework of the Accountability Model 
constitute sanctions for the corporate offenders108  and in light of the foregoing 
discussion the effectiveness of any sanction or a combination of sanctions109 
would depend on the mechanism of imputation adopted. This is because the 
sanction may only be effective if it achieves the most desirable result 
(compliance) given the circumstances; and it will only achieve such result if it 
consists of a method of compelling the corporation to comply that is a function 
of the corporation’s nature.110 It may therefore be important to determine 
whether the types of sanctions pertaining to the operation of the 
Accountability Model, as well as other sanctions are appropriate and effective 
for the convicted corporation (as defined in this thesis) and which mechanism 
or aspects of which mechanism of imputation reflect these. This will complete 
the evaluation of the mechanisms of imputation. In Chapters 5 and 6 and the 
first part of this Chapter, they are evaluated in light of the substantive and 
procedural rules. They will be evaluated below in light of the sanctions that 
may be visited upon convicted corporations.  
 
7.3 SANCTIONING THE CORPORATE OFFENDER 
 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that a corporation can be punished because it can 
be deterred, incapacitated and rehabilitated. However, the question that 
follows is how to punish a corporation in order to achieve one or all of these 
goals. This question is often addressed from two perspectives: the economic 
and the purely legal. As mentioned above, given the limited supply of 
resources, the actual goal of these sanctions (from an economic perspective) 
is optimal compliance. Hence, the criminal justice system seeks to maximise 
the social benefits of compliance and minimise the social costs of both non-
                                                 
108 These include a mix of conventional criminal sanctions and civil or “administrative” 
penalties and are thought to be a suitable way of achieving optimal compliance. See Ogus 
and Abbot, 2002. 
109 In this case the combination involves a coordinated sequence of different sanctions 
whereby one is imposed accompanied by the threat of another. 
110 Thus, the best guidance as regards how the prosecution should conceive of the 
corporation is the mechanism of imputation. 
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compliance and enforcing compliance.111 However, beyond this outlook of 
cost/benefit calculus it is futile to talk of punishment if it cannot be served and 
if it does not (or is purported to) carry the stigma of a criminal sanction. As 
such, an imprisonment term cannot be imposed on a corporation which by its 
nature cannot be incarcerated and it is in my opinion oxymoronic to impose a 
civil or “administrative” penalty for a criminal offence. This implies that the 
legal question necessarily takes precedence over the economic one since the 
sanction’s legitimacy depends on whether it is conformable with legal 
principles and standards and not necessarily whether it is economically 
efficient.112 Equally, Coffee113 approves of Stone’s114 criticism of the “black 
box” (economic) approach treating corporations as morally neutral entities. 
Coffee115 distinguishes between the economic approach and what he called 
the “behavioral perspective”116 and advances that although an actor (in this 
case the corporate actor) cannot have perfect knowledge117 and cannot work 
out a perfect cost/benefit analysis (of all of the actions of its agents), what is 
important is whether the actor is a “risk preferrer” or a “risk averter.”118 
Although it is improbable that many agents (acting on behalf of the 
corporation) may be so rational that they would commit an offence either 
individually or collectively after balancing the probability of being apprehended 
against the benefit to be obtained from a particular activity,119 it is certain that 
the propensity to take risk may increase with the collectivisation of 
decisions.120  
 
                                                 
111 See Stigler, 1970: 526-536; Coffee, 1981: 411; and Ogus and Abbot, 2002: 289. 
112 Cf Byam, 1982. 
113 1981: 393. 
1141975: 35-37. 
115 1981: 394. 
116 In this thesis this is referred to as the purely legal perspective because it is (or ought to be) 
based on how the law defines a corporation and circumscribes its actions and knowledge. 
117 In this case perfect knowledge of the activities of all its agents. See also Schlegel, 1990: 
24-25. Some senior manager and middle-level or operational managers may have selfish and 
concealed agendas. 
118 This follows from Breit and Elzinger, 1973: 693-713. 
119 See Schlegel, 1990: 24. 
120 This assertion is certainly not backed by any empirical study carried out prior to writing this 
thesis. However, Laufer (2006) provides a good picture of the distinction between what senior 
managers think on individual bases and what they do while acting to further the interests of 
the corporation. This also accords with the assertion by Breit and Elzinger (1973: 704) that 
the average manager is averse to taking risk. 
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Given that this thesis is concerned primarily with the theoretical underpinning 
of the criminal rules applying to corporations, focus will naturally be on the 
legal perspective of sanctions.121 This implies that more emphasis will be 
placed on the subjective perception of the punishment by the corporation 
rather than on objective standards of imposing sanctions.122 Thus, the 
corporation is sanctioned on the basis that the aggregate of its agents may 
relate to the expression of disapproval embedded in the sanction. As 
mentioned above, this ought to be a function of the mechanism of imputation 
adopted. The mechanisms of imputation ought to enable the court to consider 
how the sanction to be imposed would discourage the adoption of the same 
course of action that resulted in the commission of the offence by the 
corporation and other corporations in similar circumstances. In this light, the 
discussion below is geared toward colligating sanctions123 and the 
mechanisms of imputation evaluated.  
7.3.1 Fine  
 
The traditional penalty for convicted corporations in the United Kingdom has 
been the fine. This follows from the idea that the single most important 
motivation of corporate activity is either to make profit124 or break-even.125 
However, the use of fines as an instrument of manipulation has hardly 
achieved the desired goals because of a number of reasons, prominent 
amongst which is the fact that the fines are often too low.126 The expedient 
solution would be to impose much higher fines in order to make the offence 
less desirable since the anticipated cost of the punishment would be higher 
than the anticipated gain of non-compliance.127 However, the imposition of 
                                                 
121 However, episodic references to the economic perspective will be appropriate to discuss 
the functional value of the sanctions. 
122 However, emphasis may be placed on objective standards where corporations are 
sanctioned to further the interests of the public (teleological facet of the criminal law). 
123 Applicable in the United Kingdom and those applicable in other jurisdictions and/or 
proposed by some commentators such as those listed above pertaining to the Accountability 
Model. 
124 See Braithwaite, 1984: 331; and Schlegel, 1990: 22. 
125 This may also be related to the happiness of the stakeholders. See McConvill, 2005: 44. 
126 See R v Howe and Sons (Engineers) Ltd [1999] 2 All ER 249. See also Wells, 2001: 33-
34. 
127 This utilitarian approach founds the economic perspective. See Posner (2001) extolling the 
virtues of the movement from Bentham to Becker. See also Becker, 1968; and Posner, 2003. 
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high fines is confronted by what Coffee described as the “deterrence trap.”128 
He proposed a way of imposing fines for serious offences that exploits the 
fears and interests of agents of the convicted corporation.129 This was based 
on some empirical data that showed two things: firstly, managers are scared 
of a hostile takeover of their corporation, the loss of their autonomy and the 
communication of their misconduct to the public; and secondly, the interests 
of managers and stockholders and the value of the corporation’s stock 
overlap. He then contended that the convenient way of imposing fines would 
be by appropriating part of the corporation’s common stock (in any form of 
equity security or debenture) and called this the “equity fine.”130  
 
His argument was that the “equity fine” would hardly affect other interest 
groups other than the stockholders131 and managers. As such, given that the 
“equity fine” would certainly materialise the fears of these two groups they 
would be spurred into putting in place better systems of control and exerting 
pressure on their subordinates to comply with the law. In spite of the fact this 
is a synecdochical representation of stockholders and managers,132 Coffee’s 
“equity fine” tells us two things:133 firstly, a corporation is essentially a device 
employed by senior managers to make profits for themselves and the 
stockholders; and secondly, the court or agency that imposes the sanction is 
less concerned with why the offence was committed by the convicted 
corporation than with the way in which the latter ought to be chastised as a 
                                                 
128 1981: 389-393. This was inspired by the “liquidity trap” and is to the effect that a 
corporation can only be deterred by a fine that it can pay. For the operation of this “deterrence 
trap” in the United States where the Sentencing Guidelines provide for the reduction of fines 
for corporations that have effective compliance programmes, see Bodapati, 1999. 
129Coffee, 1981: 413-424. 
130 It must however be noted that Coffee sought amongst other things to overcome the 
problem of externalities whereby the imposition of a fine on a corporation adversely affects 
employees and creditors. 
131 The justification for targeting stockholders is that since they benefit from the fall out of the 
crime they should naturally suffer from the impact of the sanction (Coffee, 1981: 417). By this 
same token it may be suggested that if the community benefits from lower prices of goods 
because after committing a cost-effective offence the corporation reduced its prices, a 
suitable fine or sanction would be one that extends the burden to the community. 
132 As stated in the previous Chapters, corporations come in different shapes and sizes and 
their constituent members have different motivations and dispositions. 
133 With regard to criticisms of the practical difficulty of valuing the stocks and determining 
their deterrent effect, see Schlegel, 1990: 32-33. And as regards criticism of the difficulty of 
influencing the conduct of senior managers, see Fisse, 1983: 1235-1236. 
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just desert.134 Concerning the first point, if the corporation is a device 
employed only by senior managers then it may only be identified with the 
senior managers. This implies that the “equity fine” accords only with the 
identification doctrine and the senior management failure test. However, 
corporate crime may be the result of the acts of several operational and 
middle-level employees and the senior management may even be unaware of 
these acts. In such cases, targeting the fears and interests of the senior 
managers and stockholders would be as good as administering migraine 
medication to a patient suffering from diarrhoea. With regard to the second 
point, the sanction of “equity fine” is not imposed on a corporation because 
the evidence adduced by the prosecutor shows that the senior management 
failed to install an effective internal control system that discouraged non-
compliance but because it is contended that the fine will incite the senior 
management to install such system.135 As such, the punishment is not actually 
being imposed because the corporation failed to meet the requisite subjective 
standard of a particular case but because the corporation (and other 
corporations) will supposedly be impelled to meet an objective standard in 
future.  
 
The deterrent objective of a fine, whether cash or equity, is the multiplier 
effect that it is expected to have at the different levels and in turn on the 
collective unit. Shareholders and senior management would exert pressure on 
the middle-level staff who would in turn exert pressure on the operational 
staff. However, it has been shown that while the senior managers of some 
corporations would fight to avoid the most basic of fines, the senior managers 
and shareholders of others would remain aloof.136 That is why Coffee’s 
representation is described above as synecdochical. Also, that is why it may 
                                                 
134 The idea being that if corporate criminals are punished appropriately then future non-
compliance would be checked. However, this is akin to the preposterous idea of punishing a 
convict by breaking her will and intimidating her and others. 
135 The evidence may show that the crime was caused by other failures such as the 
negligence of a few operational employees even though there was no control system in place. 
Forcing the corporation to install such a system may be a good thing for its governance but it 
is totally unrelated to the offence in question especially where the negligence of the few 
operational employees would still have gone undetected. 
136 This is because they are protected by limited liability and from bankruptcy. See Stone, 
1977: 58. 
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be submitted that providing specific fines for different corporations committing 
different offences is ill-conceived. Corporations have different objectives and 
act on different impulses and cannot be similarly influenced by a standard 
amount or standard range of amounts. The criticisms of the use of fines have 
been that they are either too low or too high. However, what these 
commentators and judges actually decry is the fact that these fines fail to 
deter neither the sanctioned corporations from recidivating nor other 
corporations in the industry. They either constitute a toll for indulging in 
crime137 or a blank cartridge because of the “deterrent-trap.” It may thus be 
advanced that the level of fine to be imposed must be a function of the 
evidence showing how the offence was committed and the corporation’s 
structure and mode of operation. We may look at some examples. Sections 
66 and 123 of the FSMA empower the FSA to impose financial penalties on 
corporations guilty of market abuse.138 The FSA however determines the 
appropriate level of the fine following a number of criteria set out in its 
Decision Procedure and Penalties Manual (DEPP)139 which include whether 
the fine would “promote high standards of regulatory and/or market conduct” 
by deterring the guilty corporation and other corporations in the same industry 
and demonstrate “the benefits of compliance business;” whether there were 
failures in the management and control systems within the corporation that 
affected the market and consumers; whether evidence shows that the breach 
was deliberate in relation to the corporate person’s knowledge of the risk and 
indifference as to the consequences of its action; the corporation’s ability to 
pay; the benefit derived by the breach; the difficulty of detecting such breach; 
the corporation’s conduct following the breach; and the corporation’s 
compliance history.  
 
What is important to note here is that although the FSA looks at failures of the 
management and control system, it neither seeks to dissect the system and 
locate the site of the problem nor impose a sanction that both punishes the 
                                                 
137 Schlegel, 1990: 22. 
138 That is failure of a corporation to meet reasonable standards of behaviour in relation to the 
market as prescribed by section 118 of the same Act. 
139 However, these criteria are not exhaustive. 
274 
 
corporation and fixes or eliminates the defective component.140 It is very 
unlikely that the drafters of the FSMA and the DEPP considered that 
corporations have different objectives and act on different impulses. The fact 
that the corporation is consistently referred to as the “person” and defined as 
“a body corporate constituted under the law of a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom”141 implies that the way in which the breach of the FSMA 
ought to be imputed to the corporation would naturally be in accordance with 
the applicable mechanism in the United Kingdom or other jurisdiction in which 
the corporation is registered. This implies that the financial penalty imposed 
by the FSA on corporations in the United Kingdom is actually intended to push 
the senior management (and possibly the shareholders) to exert pressure on 
the middle-level management and the operational staff to comply with the 
FSMA. As stated above, this would hardly have the desired effect because 
some senior managers and stockholders may be aloof for a number of 
reasons. The bone of contention here is that no link is made between the 
sanction, the offence and the nature of the guilty corporation (and the 
mechanism of imputation). Moreover, given that the applicable mechanism of 
imputation for such offences relates only to mechanistic structures where 
management is centralised, it is highly unlikely that the level of the fine 
deemed appropriate would deter or rehabilitate an organic corporation with a 
complex structure and devolved decision-making.142  
 
A heavier fine may then simply be a much higher toll for indulging in an 
offence.  There is no denying that there are instances where a low cash fine 
may be appropriate and instances where a heavy fine may effectively deter 
the corporation. Equally, there are instances where an equity fine may be 
appropriate and instances where a charge against the corporation’s turnover 
would be an effective deterrent. What I underscore is the importance of taking 
                                                 
140 Given the labyrinthine nature of many corporations and the cerebral approach of many 
corporate criminals it was probably thought that there may be great difficulty in detecting such 
offences and thus it was important to increase the level of the fine where the breach seemed 
more difficult to detect. 
141 Section 417(1) of the FSMA. 
142 This demonstrates the importance of a suitable mechanism of imputation. For another 
example of how enforcement agencies determine the appropriate amount of a penalty, see 
the OFT’s Guidelines (2004). 
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the structure of the corporate offender and the mechanism of imputation into 
consideration when determining the appropriate level and nature of the fine. If 
we take the example of the corporate offender that has diversified from 
manufacturing furniture to manufacturing cosmetic products and is less 
inclined to use central coordination because no synergies would be derived, 
where operational employees in the cosmetic department conjointly breach 
the law and supervision within the department was lax as compared to the 
furniture department, an appropriate fine should target this department and its 
criminogenic culture. Thus, if the applicable mechanism of imputation is 
corporate culture or aggregation, a fine may be imposed on the turnover of 
the cosmetic department with an order that any spillover (whether reduction of 
salaries or other benefits or loss of jobs) must be limited to that department.143 
The above notwithstanding, it is difficult not to admit that calculating the 
appropriate financial penalty will always prove to be a daunting task 
irrespective of the nature of the fine and the reason why it is imposed. Given 
that it may or may not prove to be an effective deterrent, it is important to 
consider other sanctions. 
 
7.3.2 Orders and injunctions 
 
The prosecution services as well as some criminal justice agencies may apply 
to a court to make a remedial order requiring the corporation to rectify any 
defects in its system or to amend its policies and practices.144 A community 
order can also be made requiring the guilty corporation to carry out some 
activity beneficial to society.145 The rationale for making these orders or 
                                                 
143 An example is the financial penalty of up to 10 percent of “relevant turnover” imposed by 
the OFT. “Relevant turnover” is defined in the Guidelines as “turnover of the undertaking in 
the relevant product market and relevant geographic market affected by the infringement in 
the undertaking’s last business year.” The fine is therefore restricted to the corporation’s 
benefits derived from buying or selling the specific group of products that constituted the 
focus of the enquiry. In the same light, a fine may be restricted to a specific department or 
group of employees that was the focus of investigation. 
144 See for example section 9 of the CMCHA and section 42 of the HSWA. 
145 See for example Part 12 of the CJA. A corporation may also be placed on “probation” if it 
fails to rectify the deficiency or perform the community service. See also Note, Yale Law 
Journal, 1980: 513; and Parker, 2002: 262. This is similar to a punitive injunction that requires 
the corporation to adopt proactive policies and develop new methods of detecting and 
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injunctions is that the corporation has the resources and the capacity to rectify 
the deficiency within its system and avoid future breach and these actions will 
improve relations between the corporation and the society.146 This implies that 
the use of fines in such situations would be futile since it is uncertain what 
level of fine would influence a corporation to such extent as to rectify 
deficiencies within its systems and participate in activities that are beneficial to 
society.147 However, it is unfortunate that where the corporation fails to 
comply with these orders or injunctions the criminal justice system finds 
recourse in financial sanctions to punish the failure or contempt.148 This 
implies that the threat of a fine (although larger) is the criminal justice 
system’s ultimate weapon to force corporations into reforming their 
management and control systems or to simply comply with the law. As such, 
the same problems faced by the use of fines discussed above will eventually 
resurface. Interestingly, Schlegel149 warns that probative injunctions or 
orders150 are unlikely to be successful unless those implementing them have 
a thorough understanding of how the corporate offender functions as a 
business entity. This is in line with the conclusion of the previous subsection 
that the imposition of a fine must be based on the systematic knowledge of 
how the corporate offender functions. However, it is hard to see how the court 
or agency would influence the corporation’s practices and policies by the use 
of orders or injunctions or fines if the applicable mechanism of imputation 
does not give them the requisite flexibility to amend the orders to suit each 
corporate offender. A restrictive mechanism such as the identification doctrine 
or the senior management failure test limits their oversight to the acts that the 
                                                                                                                                            
sanctioning non-compliance. See Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 42-44. However, unlike in the 
United States these options are seldom used in the United Kingdom. 
146 See Fisse, 1983: 1226; and Parker, 2002: 262. See also discussions on remedial 
investigations and accountability agreements within the pyramidal regulatory framework in 
Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993: 149-151. 
147 The problems of overspill and individual accountability encountered by the use of fines 
may also be overcome. See Note, Yale Law Journal, 1980: 537; and Fisse and Braithwaite, 
1993: 43. Also, unlike the fine, there is a higher likelihood that these orders or injunctions will 
be related to the actual cause of the breach and may actually deter the action or actions that 
caused the breach. 
148 See for example, section 33(2A) of the HSWA. The fact that the failure to comply with the 
order is a separate offence (Section 33(1) of the HSWA) is of little importance since the 
sanction that is imposed ultimately is a fine. 
149 1990: 37. 
150 See for example, section 183 of the CJSA. 
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senior management can reasonably perform given the circumstances.151 The 
above notwithstanding, since the same problems faced by the use of financial 
sanctions would resurface, it is important that courts or agencies are 
empowered to impose sanctions that are not in anyway related to the use of 
financial sanctions. A good number of such sanctions have been devised and 
are implemented in a number of jurisdictions including those of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
7.3.3 Incapacitation and capital punishment 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite152 contend that where criminal sanctions cannot reform 
the corporation it may be necessary to restrict or suspend or revoke its 
licence. There are several instances where agencies in the United Kingdom 
are empowered to impose such sanctions. The HSE/Asbestos Licensing Unit 
(ALU) is for example empowered to amend or revoke the licence of a 
corporation working with asbestos153 where there is evidence of sustained 
poor performance following enforcement or breach of licensing conditions or a 
very serious incident even though isolated.154 The Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) is also empowered to revoke the licence of a 
corporation where it deems that the latter’s activities in relation to the licence 
would cause pollution or endanger public health.155 An analogy may be made 
between the amendment and revocation of licences and the incapacitation 
and capital punishment of natural persons. The fact that where the licence is 
suspended or restricted the corporation is unable to engage in the activity that 
it was created to perform may be said to be incapacitation.156 Equally, where 
the licence is revoked the corporation’s right to engage in the activity is simply 
terminated. If the corporation was created with the sole or main objective of 
                                                 
151 This is because the corporation is the senior management for the purposes of the 
restrictive mechanisms. Thus, even though there may still be deficiencies in the system that 
may eventually cause a breach, the corporation cannot be liable for failing to comply with the 
order or injunction if its senior management has done all what may be reasonably expected of 
a senior management in the circumstances. 
152 1992: 35. 
153 See Control of Asbestos Regulation 2006. 
154 See para. B55 of Asbestos License Assessment Guide 2007 Revision 3. 
155 See section 7(4) of the Control of Pollution Act 1974. 
156 See Ogus and Abbot, 2002: 294. 
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performing such activity then the corporation will simply be dissolved. This no 
doubt is akin to capital punishment.  
 
The incapacitation and capital punishment of corporations, unlike the 
sanctions discussed in the previous subsection, are in no way related to the 
use of fines. Hence, the criminal justice system is unlikely to be caught in the 
“deterrence trap” if these forms of sanctions are used.157 The deterrence 
factor plays a very important role in the imposition of these sanctions given 
that the threat of removing the corporation from society (temporally or 
permanently) may likely push the senior management and middle-level and 
operational employees to refrain from engaging in parlous activities and to 
report non-compliant colleagues.158 However, Braithwaite159 posits that the 
deterrence factor hangs on questions of certainty and harshness of the 
sanction. If the question of harshness is adequately addressed by this 
sanction,160 the question of certainty remains very much open. This is 
especially true with large corporations that have the resources to challenge 
the prosecution or agency and are less likely to suffer from such sanction. 
Thus, they are less likely to be deterred since they know that punishment is 
far from certain.161 Although I have placed emphasis on the legal perspective 
of corporate sanctioning, (economic) questions of spillover cannot be ignored. 
They are certainly going to influence the court or enforcement agency 
because one of the main reasons why a corporation’s licence is amended or 
revoked is the detrimental effect of its activities on society.162 Thus, it would 
be counterproductive to impose a sanction that will achieve exactly what is 
                                                 
157 Ogus and Abbot, 2002: 294. 
158 Although it is stated above that some senior managers and shareholders may be aloof due 
to the fact they are protected from bankruptcy and the corporation’s limited liability, it must be 
noted that managers may be disqualified from acting as director or manager or taking part in 
the management of a corporation for up to 15 years if they are deemed “unfit.” They may be 
“unfit” where they fail to ensure compliance to such extent that may be considered grossly 
negligent. See section 6 of Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as amended by the 
Insolvency Act 2000 and the Enterprise Act 2002. See also Dillon J in Re Sevenoaks 
Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1990] BCC 765 at 780. Thus, the fear of this sanction (that affects 
them directly) may push managers to ensure that the corporation is compliant. 
159 1984: 329. 
160 Owing to the fact that the suspension and termination of licences will hugely impact on the 
economic and social life of the corporation and its members and employees. 
161 See Braithwaite, 1984: 329; and Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 35. 
162 See Shavell, 1993: 261-262. 
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being avoided: society suffering from indirect side-effects of the sanction 
through loss of jobs and development opportunities.163  
 
Ogus and Abbot164 however state that even if these sanctions are seldom 
used, the fact that they remain an option on the table implies that they will still 
threaten corporations to such extent as to be an effective deterrent. 
Nonetheless, they also agree with the contention that the uncertainty blunts 
the threat. As such, if suspension and revocation of licence would be 
counterproductive, it has been suggested that nationalisation (as a form of 
corporate capital punishment) of the corporation should be considered.165 
However, although it is certainly a way of positively restraining the 
corporation, it is quite similar to the sanction of “equity fines” proposed by 
Coffee. This implies that the same shortcomings of the “equity fines” 
discussed above are also true for nationalisation. That notwithstanding, in this 
year of the credit crunch the use of nationalisation has become an expedient 
tool for governments of certain afflicted countries including the United States 
and United Kingdom. Rather than sanction the corporations and their 
managers and employees for high risks investments and speculative financial 
schemes these governments have favoured intervening and averting 
situations where the entire system suffers from the consequences of the 
actions of these corporations. What this tells us is that different types of 
sanctions are appropriate for different corporations in different circumstances. 
As stated above, legislating on a specific sanction for all corporate offenders 
irrespective of the circumstances is ill-advised. Hence, questions about the 
incapacitation and “execution” of corporations must be addressed with that of 
the functioning of the corporate offender and the circumstances in which it 
breached the law. As mentioned above, the applicable mechanism of 
imputation ought to enable courts and enforcement agencies to link the 
                                                 
163 This is evocative of Pope Innocent’s criticism of the excommunication of corporations 
which although premised on the argument that corporations have no souls is interpreted by 
Weismann and Newman (2007: 419, footnote n. 14) as motivated by the fact that the 
excommunicated corporation had to move its assets outwith the Church’s jurisdiction. 
However, as noted in Chapter 2, that Weismann and Newman provide no justification (apart 
from a reference to Coffee, 1980: 3) for the plausible but cynical interpretation. 
164 2002: 295. 
165See Braithwaite, 1984: 328. 
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sanction to the corporate offender in order to ensure that the objective of 
imposing the sanction is achieved.  
 
Thus, the identification doctrine will restrict the suspension or revocation of a 
corporation’s licence to cases where a senior manager authorised or was 
indifferent to the sustained negligent or dangerous activities of other 
employees.166 On the other hand, vicarious liability would lead to the 
sanctioning of corporations for offences that may in no way be related to the 
way in which its activities were organised or managed. This is where a 
maverick employee or manager takes upon herself to dispose of the 
corporation’s waste and pollutes a river and the SEPA decides to suspend or 
restrict the corporation’s licence although there is little evidence that the 
sanction would prevent similar maverick actions in the future and deter other 
corporations. As such, the mechanisms based on collective liability seem 
more appropriate for the use of these sanctions. Where for example the 
breach was caused by a criminogenic culture existing within a department or 
by the confluence of the acts of the employees within that department, a 
sanction preventing the corporation from performing activities assigned to that 
department certainly incapacitates the corporation with regard to the 
dangerous activities. As regards the revocation of licences or nationalisation, 
the question of the mechanism of imputation is less important although it 
certainly directs the investigation and enables the court or agency to 
determine whether the problem is so pervasive that the corporation’s 
continuous existence or method of functioning poses a serious threat to 
society.167  
 
                                                 
166 This is equally the case with the senior management failure test although given that this 
mechanism applies only for the enforcement of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide 
and also that the governing statute, the CMCHA, does not provide for the suspension or 
revocation of licence or the nationalisation of the corporation, it is only meet that the 
mechanism is not be considered here. 
167 It must however be noted that the sanctions of suspension and revocation of licences are 
often used by agencies such as those cited above to enforce strict and absolute liability 
offences. Thus, the breach caused by any employee within the course of her employment 
automatically renders the corporation liable lest it shows that it exercised all due diligence (for 
strict liability). Courts in such cases are not concerned about whether and how the acts of the 
employees should be attributed to the corporation and this makes room for uncertainty since 
the pattern of attribution is distinct from cases where courts are enforcing crimes of intent. 
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A problem common with the sanctions that result in incapacitation or capital 
punishment is the uncertainty as regards the extent to which certain 
corporations will be deterred. The shortcomings of the mechanisms assessed 
in this thesis may seriously impede the ability of the courts and agencies to 
determine the prospective impact of the sanctions. Nonetheless, it must be 
pointed out that there are sanctions that may impact upon a corporation 
irrespective of the way it is structured and functions. Public censure is a good 
example.  
 
7.3.4 Public censure  
 
The interesting thing with the sanction of public censure is that it facilitates the 
deliberation process as courts or agencies do not have to consider how the 
sanction will coerce the corporate offender into altering its structure and 
functioning in order to be compliant. They may only consider whether the 
stigmatisation and loss of prestige are painful to such extent that they may be 
satisfied that the message has been hammered home. As such, discussion on 
the link between the use of public censure and the suitable mechanism of 
imputation is restricted to questions about whether the corporation deserves 
such sanction.  
 
Public censure in the form of adverse publicity order or other form is 
frequently employed in the United Kingdom. Section 10 of the CMCHA for 
example empowers the court to order a corporation convicted of corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide to publish a statement about its 
conviction, particulars of the offence and the amount of any fine if such 
sanction has also been imposed. Sections 66, 89, 123 and 205 of the FSMA 
also empower the FSA to publish statements about the contravention by 
corporations and/or individuals. These public statements impact upon the 
image of the corporate offender and unlike the fine they do not only target the 
corporation’s financial interests but also its prestige and influence.168 
However, given that there is nothing in statutes such as the CMCHA 
                                                 
168 Schlegel, 1990: 38. 
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proscribing counter publicity by the convicted corporation, the latter may 
simply engage in a sustained publicity campaign to reverse the effect of the 
sanction.169 Moreover, there is little evidence that the public would not 
interpret the adverse publicity perfunctorily as the same hackneyed criticisms 
of corporations and the censure would hardly actually hurt the image of the 
convicted corporation. And even when they do impact upon the corporation’s 
reputation they may also adversely affect ‘innocent’ stakeholders like 
employees, creditors and consumers in the same way as heavy fines.170 As 
such, the use of public censure may only have an advantage if it is shown to 
minimise externalities better than the other sanctions.171  
 
Nonetheless, this does not imply that the impact of an adverse publicity order 
can be measured easily prior to sanctioning. As mentioned earlier, public 
reaction can be very unpredictable and the court may be unable to determine 
whether the consumers will shun both the producer and the product.172 The 
court or enforcement agency thus uses this sanction primarily to inflict pain 
upon the corporate offender as a just desert for the commission of the 
offence. This means that if it is assumed that a corporation will suffer from 
loss of prestige as a result of an adverse publicity order then the most 
important question facing the court would be whether the convicted 
corporation deserves such penalty.173 As mentioned above, the court or 
agency should be guided through the deliberation process by the applicable 
mechanism of imputation.  
 
                                                 
169Coffee (1981: 426) even notes that a corporation has a constitutional right to comment on 
public issues. See also Schlegel, 1990: 39. 
170 Since the corporation may lose customers and be forced to cut production and manpower. 
See Coffee, 1981: 426-428. However, it seems that ‘innocent’ stakeholders may be adversely 
affected irrespective of the sanction imposed. Williams (1983) thus notes that third parties 
(such as families or creditors) are equally affected when natural persons are fined. 
171 It must be noted that this must be limited to the circumstances of each case and so must 
be a question of evidence adduced before the court or enforcement agency and not of an 
empirical study of a number of corporations in a given region. This is because corporations 
come in different sizes and shapes and react differently to contingencies. Thus, after a survey 
on officers of the environmental regulatory sectors, Prez (2000: 11) advances that naming 
and shaming of corporate offenders is successful in some cases and otiose in others. 
172 See Coffee, 1981: 429. 
173 It must be noted that the corporation already suffers from some degree of loss of prestige 
due to the harms of the indictment and prosecution. 
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As shown in Chapter 3, in the United Kingdom if the offence is not a strict or 
absolute liability offence or statute does not provide otherwise and the 
corporation was not the targeted victim, the applicable mechanism will be the 
identification doctrine. However, if the offence committed is corporate 
manslaughter or corporate homicide then the senior management failure test 
applies. The fact that these mechanisms fail to distinguish between instances 
where a maverick senior manager or a mercenary board of directors decides 
to further their own selfish interests and instances where agents simply further 
the corporation’s interests implies that the corporation may unjustly suffer 
from the penalty (intended to visit pain directly on it) in a number of cases.174 
Vicarious liability bodes even worse for corporations because they may suffer 
the loss of their reputation due to the non-compliant action of any agent acting 
within the literal course of her employment. The application of the 
mechanisms based on collective liability (aggregation and corporate culture) 
hardly provides better prospects although this may be due to the problem of 
poor (or lack of) delineation of these mechanisms. In their present forms, 
courts may hold corporations liable for the actions or omissions and 
knowledge of a couple of employees although the majority were compliant. As 
such, in these cases the punishment certainly does not fit the crime.175 Thus, 
given the ambiguity surrounding the use of public censure, it may be advised 
that the sanction be used sparingly and only where the court is satisfied that 
the corporation as a distinct entity perpetrated the offence and deserves to be 
punished. As shown above, the mechanisms of imputation assessed in this 
thesis do not provide the requisite flashlight to enable the courts to plod 
through this mire toward a cogent conclusion. 
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The applicable and alternative mechanisms of imputation were evaluated 
above by reference to another set of secondary rules called the rules of 
                                                 
174 This problem also stems from the nebulousness of the concept of ‘course of employment’ 
or ‘scope of authority.’ 
175 If the corporation (as a distinct person) may even be said to have “committed” the offence 
charged. 
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adjudication. These are rules that guide the court and criminal justice agency 
through the proof and deliberation stages of the legal process. Focus was on 
the procedural rules observed during the criminal trial and it was shown that 
although the legal personality of the accused corporation is recognised, the 
rights that are incidental to such status are not easily accommodated. This is 
largely due to the difficulty of grasping the nature of the corporation that is 
prosecuted, convicted (or acquitted) and sanctioned. It is submitted here that 
the most suitable compass is the applicable mechanism of imputation. The 
mechanism enables the prosecutor or enforcement agency to determine 
whether on the strength of evidence it would be fair to hold a corporate entity 
liable for perpetrating the offence. However, the mechanisms evaluated above 
are not sufficiently developed to enable the criminal justice system to protect 
and enforce the rights of the accused corporation during the proof and 
deliberation stages.  
 
Prior to initiating the proceeding, the prosecutor or enforcement agency ought 
to make a decision as regards whether the evidence collected passes both 
evidential and public interests tests. The evidence test requires the prosecutor 
to examine the evidence available and decide whether it is admissible and 
sufficient. Questions of admissibility and sufficiency were shown to be quite 
problematic in cases involving corporate defenders in the United Kingdom due 
to the nebulous nature of the corporation. However, the mechanisms that 
ought to provide clarity have consistently failed to do so. A number of rights 
normally enjoyed by accused persons including the right to silence, the right 
not be incriminated by hearsay evidence and evidence of bad character, the 
right to a trial by jury and the right to be presumed innocent appear 
incompatible with the ability of the prosecution to present a fair case against 
the corporate defender. This is largely due to the fact that the applicable 
mechanisms (identification doctrine and senior management failure test) 
seriously restrict the prosecutor’s scope of search and the likelihood of finding 
incriminating evidence. Where the prosecutor cannot find documents with 
incriminating information about senior officers the corporation will be 
acquitted. On the other hand, vicarious liability as an alternative mechanism is 
deemed too elastic as it operates to hold a corporation liable even in 
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circumstances where the evidence shows that a maverick employee 
committed the offence within the course of her employment. The mechanisms 
based on collective liability (aggregation and corporate culture) are shown to 
be closer to the reality of how corporations act and why they should be liable 
in certain instances and acquitted in others. However, they are largely 
undelineated and operate in practice to hold corporations vicariously liable for 
the aggregated acts and omissions of any employees. Apprehensive courts 
and Parliament have thus opted for the simplification of the prosecution of 
corporations with the consequence that any incriminating evidence against 
the corporation almost automatically passes the evidential test.176  
 
With regard to the public interest test, it was noted that the prosecutor’s major 
concern is the “gravity” or “seriousness” of the offence allegedly perpetrated 
by the corporation. However, since these words are ambiguous it was 
suggested that emphasis should be placed on the question of whether the 
prosecution is an appropriate response to the harm caused by the 
corporation. Thus, the prosecutor ought to consider the impact of the 
prosecution on the victims and their families and on the communities as a 
whole. Nonetheless, given that the prosecutor is equally accountable to the 
accused it was noted that she is required to consider the undue harm that the 
prosecution may visit on the accused irrespective of the outcome of the trial. 
This is especially true with corporate defenders whose image or prestige is 
often tarnished by indictment and prosecution. It was shown that the 
mechanism of imputation employed may determine the extent to which a 
corporation is harmed by the prosecution. Where such mechanism restricts 
corporate crime to the acts of senior managers (such as the identification 
doctrine and the senior management failure test) the likelihood of the 
corporation being adversely affected by the prosecution is low because of the 
understanding of the public that it is the greedy senior managers behind the 
corporation that are actually being targeted.177 Equally, where the mechanism 
                                                 
176 Procedural justice is thus forfeited for the validation of substantive corporate criminal 
liability. 
177 This is especially the case where the corporation is jointly prosecuted with the senior 
managers. It is for example difficult to hear people say Enron was cruel although such is often 
the view when describing Kenneth Lay’s actions. Also, AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 
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of imputation is based on collective liability (such as aggregation and 
corporate culture) the prosecution would likely harm the corporation due to the 
thought that there was pervasive negligence.  
 
Due to the difficulties of using procedural rules of the criminal trial as rules of 
adjudication it was suggested that it may be better to use the rules governing 
other means of assigning punishments to the corporations. In other words, if 
procedural justice cannot be achieved it may be better to focus on another 
theory of criminal justice such as restorative justice. As mentioned above, one 
way of achieving restorative justice is the use of civil and administrative 
penalties and threats of sanctions by enforcement agencies. Hence, focus 
was placed on a comprehensive model of restorative justice designed by 
Fisse and Braithwaite called the Accountability Model. The opportunity 
provided by this model to minimise the use of the criminal trial in regulating 
the activities of corporations is no doubt commendable. A number of 
examples of enforcement agencies based on a similar model were discussed. 
However, it was shown that not only is the model designed to avoid attribution 
(individuals are targeted) but also it is difficult to see how the criminal law can 
be enforced via this model without referring ultimately to the procedural rules 
of the criminal trial. This is because even where enforcement agencies are 
given wide ranges of disciplinary and remedial power in many cases they 
eventually prosecute or ask the COPFS or CPS to prosecute. This implies 
that questions of procedural rights may have to be addressed ultimately. As 
such, it is submitted that it is better to consider how the (primary) rules of 
mechanisms of imputation conform to procedural rules. From the discussion 
above, the primary rules of mechanisms focussed on collective liability are 
more adaptable to the procedural rules although they lack the clarity of the 
primary rules based on individual liability. Thus, an appropriate mechanism of 
imputation ought to be based on collective liability but that ought to be clearly 
delineated as mechanisms based on individual liability. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and Citi Bank have been in the news for a few months now although it is the senior managers 
of these corporations that are subjected to the contempt and wrath of the media. 
287 
 
Where the indictment has been proven beyond reasonable doubt and the 
accused corporation convicted the court has to impose an appropriate 
sanction. There is an initial problem with the available sanctions owing to the 
fact that there is much uncertainty as to whether they may effectively deter the 
corporate offender and other corporations in the same industry. Fines may be 
too low or too high or may simply constitute a toll for indulging in crime. The 
equity fine proposed by Coffee and nationalisation are based on the fears and 
interests of managers and stockholders and may seldom influence a 
corporation that commits offences via the agency of middle-level and junior 
employees. Remedial orders and punitive injunctions may produce good 
results but their effectiveness is hinged upon the threat of a fine if the 
corporate offender fails to comply. Suspension and revocation of licence may 
deter corporations in certain instances but they may have very severe 
consequences on the community that may have to deal with the loss of jobs 
and development opportunities. Public censure may also result in similar 
spillover and the extent to which the corporation’s image may be adversely 
affected by such censure is unknown.  
 
It must be noted that these sanctions are not necessarily ineffective or worse 
otiose. They may effectively be employed to deter, incapacitate and 
rehabilitate corporate offenders. However, the sanctioning authority ought to 
have a good grasp of how the corporate offender functions178 and ought to be 
able to yoke this knowledge and that of the nature of the prescribed sanction 
together.179 It is therefore submitted here that a satisfactory mechanism of 
imputation should be able to direct the courts or agencies in this regard. The 
notion that the corporate offender may only be deterred or rehabilitated if the 
interests of managers and stockholders are threatened should be discarded. 
This may be attributed to the fact that the identification doctrine and vicarious 
liability previously directed the thought processes of criminal law courts in 
both the United Kingdom and United States.180 If due regard is given to the 
                                                 
178 See Schlegel, 1990: 37. 
179 See Wells, 2001: 32. 
180 May be that is why Coffee (1981: 399-400) advances that corporations that have 
decoupled decision-making and implementation (including supervision) are “essentially 
undeterrable.” 
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alternative mechanisms of imputation, courts and enforcement agencies may 
easily dissect the corporate offender and determine where the defective 
component lies and impose a sanction aimed at rectifying or eliminating that 
defective component. As noted above, if operational employees in one 
department were to conjointly breach the law because of poor supervision 
within that department, an appropriate penalty, whether a fine or punitive 
order or suspension of licence, should target that department. However, this 
may only be possible if two things are accepted. The first is that a corporation 
is a changeable entity that may be identified with manager A and employee B 
in one instance and manager A and employee C in another instance. 
Secondly, the applicable mechanism of imputation ought to provide the court 
or agency the opportunity to combine the acts, knowledge and attitudes of 
employees involved in the transaction under consideration for the 
enforcement of an offence caused by such transaction.181 
 
This completes the evaluation of the mechanisms of imputation. Five 
mechanisms have been evaluated in light of the substantive and procedural 
rules and the sanctions that may be visited upon convicted corporations. In 
the next Chapter, I will show which of these mechanisms is the most 
appropriate. This mechanism should collate the different related rules and 
enable courts to interpret and implement statutes and precedent in a 
consistent and coherent manner. Thus, it will be proposed as an effective 
means of harmonising the ways in which criminal law courts impute acts and 
intents to corporations for the purposes of imposing liability and sanctions on 
them. However, given that no mechanism is shown above and in Chapters 5 
and 6 to be appropriate, what I will actually propose is the least inadequate 
mechanism or the mechanism that is most consonant with the secondary 
rules and has the potential of being modified into a model mechanism. 
 
                                                 
181 This follows from the same argument that where the corporation invokes the privilege 
against self-incrimination in the discovery and proof stage, the prosecutor should be able to 
obtain information from any agents whose acts or knowledge would not be aggregated 
subsequently and imputed to the corporation. This is because for the purpose of enforcing 
that offence the agents whose acts and knowledge are aggregated are the embodiment of the 
corporation. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis set out to achieve coherence and integrity in the way in which 
courts in the United Kingdom impute acts and intents (or causal relationships) 
to corporations for the purpose of imposing criminal liability on them. The idea 
that was tested was that the use of an appropriate mechanism of imputation is 
a viable prospect for this to happen. This followed from the contention that the 
ambiguity of the concept of corporation and the unsuitability of criminal law 
rules to deal with such singularity are the major causes of the incoherence of 
courts’ decisions and lack of integrity of corporate criminal liability. The 
methodology adopted was the internal approach or “interpretive legal theory.” 
However, due to the fact that it would be fallacious to prescribe novel 
measures based on an examination of only legal edicts, some non-legal 
knowledge was incorporated in the exposition but on the basis that they may 
be deemed to be pedigreed.  
 
Hence, it was suggested in Chapter 1 that the first step toward achieving 
coherence and integrity is ascertaining the meaning of the concept of 
‘corporation.’ Nonetheless, given that the concept is not amenable to a 
precise definition an attempt was made in Chapter 2 to depict the profile of the 
corporate offender by abstracting from principles and theories used by 
criminal law courts, legislators and some commentators. Equally, the 
adaptability of the criminal law in dealing with corporate defenders was 
examined in Chapter 3. I was then able to build a framework of rules 
(mechanism of imputation) to guide courts in the process of imputing acts and 
intents of agents to corporations. A number of substantive parameters were 
generated to this effect and the applicable mechanisms in the United Kingdom 
and some alternative mechanisms were evaluated with reference to these 
parameters in Chapters 5 and 6. The mechanisms were evaluated further by 
reference to adjectival rules guiding the proof and deliberation stages of the 
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legal process in Chapter 7. These evaluations have shown that just as no 
single theory best describes the structure and functioning of corporations, no 
single mechanism of imputation may enable courts to impute acts and intents 
of different agents to different types of corporations acting in different 
circumstances on a coherent and consistent basis. However, it was also 
noted that the panacea is not what has been done in some jurisdictions such 
as Australia whereby the prosecutor has been provided with a chest of 
different mechanisms. Such a system may only exacerbate the lack of 
coherence and integrity because it allows courts to arbitrarily establish the 
corporation’s guilt negating the extension of the privilege of legal personality 
to corporations and the rights incidental thereto. Thus, at the end of Chapter 
7, it was submitted that given that no mechanism is appropriate, the goal of 
this thesis will be achieved by using a single mechanism that is identified as 
the least inadequate mechanism and modifying such mechanism into a model 
mechanism.  
 
This Chapter is focused on showing which mechanism may be deemed the 
least inadequate and how it may be modified. It begins by highlighting the 
shortcomings of the mechanisms evaluated and suggests ways in which they 
may be overcome. Then it identifies the least inadequate mechanism and 
proposes steps that courts may follow in order to establish the corporate 
defender’s guilt when using this mechanism. Hence, the rules of this 
mechanism may serve as common principles guiding courts and prosecutors. 
However, due to the fact that corporate criminal liability cuts across a number 
of legal disciplines, internal incoherence may not be completely eliminated 
(the principles of these disciplines may conflict), although it may be 
minimised. Finally, I will discuss the implication of the study and put forward 
recommendations.  
 
 8.2 DETERMINING THE LEAST INADEQUATE MECHANISM 
 
The evaluations of the mechanisms of imputation in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 were 
based on the description of the corporation in Chapter 2, the explanation of 
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how the criminal law ought to be used against such entities in Chapter 3 and 
the parameters set out in Chapter 4. Thus, it was established that a 
corporation is a changeable entity recognised by a court or Parliament as a 
corporation due to its independence of thought and action and criminal liability 
may be imposed upon it either directly or as an accessory. The parameters 
generated from the operation of corporate criminal law include substantive 
secondary rules (corporate personality, agency and culpability and 
responsibility) and adjectival secondary rules (that govern the deliberation and 
proof stages of the criminal trial). As such, it was submitted that the 
mechanism that courts ought to use to impose criminal liability and sanctions 
on corporations should have a primary rule of attribution that corresponds with 
these secondary rules. Given that all the five mechanisms evaluated were 
shown to have shortcomings in this regard, I will actually seek to ascertain the 
least inadequate mechanism and show how its loopholes may be filled with 
properties abstracted from the other mechanisms.  
 
8.2.1 Least inadequate mechanism from a substantive perspective (rules 
of recognition) 
 
In Chapter 5, following the substantive evaluation of the applicable 
mechanisms of imputation (identification doctrine and senior management 
failure test) it was advanced that both mechanisms are conformable (to a 
certain extent) with related legal principles such as scope of employment and 
constructive knowledge and the criminal law component of mens rea. Equally, 
they were shown to be conformable to the normative outlook of judges. 
However, they were not congruent with the principle of corporate personality 
and the external viewpoint of some non-legal commentators. Hence, they are 
not suited for the imposition of liability directly on corporations and the 
enforcement of crimes against organic and complex corporate structures. 
Nonetheless, it was noted that the identification doctrine has been modified by 
some courts1 and this leaves a door ajar for the effective use of the 
mechanism in cases where the accused corporation had adopted an organic 
                                                 
1 Meridian and El Ajou. See also Png, 2001: 156-157; and Wells, 2001: 155-156. 
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management system and the agents that acted were sufficiently empowered 
middle-level or operational managers.2 This notwithstanding, even if the 
identification doctrine is modified as per these cases, the corporation would 
still be compelled to substitute for a guilty agent. Thus, the fact that only acts 
of the directing mind and the senior management are imputable to the 
corporation under both regimes and also that it cannot be liable where such 
agent or collective of agents is not shown to be liable or grossly negligent 
raises the question of whether the courts actually distinguish the corporation’s 
independence of thought and action from those of the directing mind or senior 
management. As such, these mechanisms may rightly be described as 
restrictive forms of vicarious liability. 
 
Describing the applicable mechanisms as variants of vicarious liability may no 
doubt be deemed dyslogistic although vicarious liability is the applicable 
mechanism in some influential jurisdictions such as the United States and 
South Africa. It may be deemed dyslogistic because vicarious liability, as 
shown in Chapter 6, is a mechanism that is largely based on policy 
considerations rather than the reality of the defender’s guilt. The corporation is 
compelled to substitute for any of its agents that breached the law while acting 
within the scope of her employment irrespective of whether the corporation as 
a separate entity conceived of the mens rea of the offence or performed the 
actus reus or aided the guilty agent.3 Unlike the applicable mechanisms that 
are unnecessarily restrictive, vicarious liability is unnecessarily broad. 
Nonetheless, it provides a more holistic perspective to preventing and 
punishing crime in the corporate context given that the corporation may be 
held to account for all crimes committed to further its interests. This is 
important because corporations are amorphous and may change their 
structures to suit contingencies and may therefore act through agent X in one 
instance and agent Y or both agents in another. Thus, it is important to give 
courts the flexibility to impute the acts of either or both agents to the 
                                                 
2 It is uncertain whether the senior management failure test may be modified in this light since 
the CMCHA’s definition of senior management is quite concise and restrictive. 
3 However, it was shown that vicarious liability may be used to target the corporation directly 
in instances where the corporation was in a special relationship with the victim and harm was 
inflicted on the latter by the former’s agent. Nonetheless, this pattern is sinuous in its present 
form and requires further development. 
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corporation in different circumstances. However, it was submitted that for the 
purposes of coherence and integrity such imputation ought to be governed by 
the obligation of courts to distinguish instances where the independent 
corporation used ‘innocent’ agent X or Y to perpetrate the offence or 
encouraged guilty agent X or Y and instances where agent X and Y acted on 
their own accord.4 Vicarious liability does not provide any cogent basis to 
achieve this. The fact that policy considerations determine the rationality of 
courts’ decisions implies that coherence may seldom be the objective of any 
law providing for vicarious criminal liability. Likewise the identification doctrine, 
vicarious liability requires the court to impute the agent’s act to the corporation 
only where the act amounts to the offence charged and gives little regard to 
the corporation’s culpability and responsibility per se.  
 
The aggregation and corporate culture mechanisms are attempts to focus on 
the corporation’s culpability and responsibility. The aggregation doctrine 
operates to hold a corporation liable for the sum of the acts and/or intents of 
its agents that amount to the mens rea and actus reus of the offence charged 
and the corporate culture doctrine operates to hold a corporation liable for the 
existence of a culture (policies, practices, attitudes and systems) that 
encouraged or tolerated non-compliance by its agents. Both mechanisms may 
enable the court to impose liability on corporations for the acts of ‘innocent’ 
agents that amount to collective fault and also on the basis of the corporations 
being art and part in the commission of crimes by their agents. Nonetheless, 
although these mechanisms were shown to be congruent (to a certain extent) 
with related legal principles of company law and agency law, this is not 
actually the case with the criminal law principles of culpability and 
responsibility. This is because it is uncertain whether the sum of innocent acts 
may be said to be equal to a guilty act and whether the existence of policies 
and practices that may motivate some agents to breach the law is sufficiently 
culpable to be deserving of criminal punishment. It must be noted that the 
aggregation doctrine was rejected outright by Bingham J (as he then was) on 
the ground that “[a] case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by 
                                                 
4 The invocation of innocent agency also solves the “problem of many hands” where the 
prosecution or court is unable to identify any guilty agent. 
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evidence against another defendant. The case against a corporation can only 
be made by evidence properly addressed to showing guilt on the part of the 
corporation as such.”5 However, Bingham J surprisingly agreed with the 
coroner that the identification doctrine was the appropriate way of making a 
case against a corporation even though this doctrine simply identifies the 
corporation with a named senior manager that is culpable, while aggregation 
seeks to distinguish acts that are particular to the culpable corporation and 
those that are particular to its innocent agents.6  
The blameworthiness of the existence of a criminogenic culture may also be 
good ground to reject the corporate culture mechanism, especially where the 
offence charged requires proof of subjective intent or malice. The offence of 
corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide created by the CMCHA that 
relies in part on corporate culture is based on an objective test of the way the 
senior management organised or managed the activities of the corporation in 
light of the test established in Prentice and Adomako. Thus, it is unlikely that 
such a test may be used satisfactorily in cases where the offence charged 
requires proof of subjective intent.7 It is therefore difficult to show how both 
aggregation and corporate culture mechanisms may be used to prove the 
corporation’s subjective intent. This is compounded by the fact that there is no 
clear pattern by which the acts and intents of agents or the existing policies 
and practices ought to be combined in order to establish the mens rea and 
actus reus against the corporation. Equally, no distinction is made between 
the acts and knowledge of agents that act as the “brain” and agents that act 
as the “hands.”8  
 
Nevertheless, these mechanisms were shown to be congruent with related 
legal principles of company law such as corporate personality (the personal 
                                                 
5 Ex parte Spooner at 16-17. 
6 See Gobert and Punch, 2003: 82-83. Subsequent judges did not seek to justify the rejection 
of aggregation. In Great Western Trains, Scott-Baker J rejected the doctrine on the ground 
that it was not a pedigreed rule and he was not persuaded by the logic. Similarly, Lord 
Osborne in Transco at 51 described it as “illegitimate” because of the lack of precedent. 
7 See Wells (1993: 553-558) on the inappropriateness of such an objective test in P &O 
European Ferries. 
8 It was noted in Chapter 6 that although the acts of all agents ought to be imputable to the 
corporation, some ought to carry more weight than others due to the responsibilities of the 
actors. 
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liability of the corporation is addressed) and agency law such as scope of 
employment (the actions of all but maverick agents are imputable). Unlike the 
applicable mechanisms, aggregation and corporate culture were also shown 
to be conformable with the external viewpoint of non-legal commentators as 
both mechanistic and organic corporations may be convicted using both 
mechanisms. It was however noted that these mechanisms are not a fair 
reflection of the internal viewpoint or normative outlook of judges as 
expressed through the framework of enforcement-generated metaphors. This 
is because the mechanisms do not lay stress on the agent that acted as the 
corporation’s “brain” or “nerve centre” or “head.” The corporation is treated as 
a body with no “soul” but also with no “head” although judges have made an 
analogy between the corporation and the human body in order to underscore 
the fact that a corporation comprises agents that control it as the “brain” 
controls the human body and agents that merely follow instructions from 
above as the “hands” of the human body. As such, when considering what 
constitutes a corporation’s action, it is important to consider the act of the 
agent that represents its “brain” because her knowledge and intentions are a 
reflection of the corporation’s intent or culpability. This does not mean that the 
corporation ought to be liable because the “brain” is liable (identification 
doctrine) but that the corporation ought to be liable because the “brain” 
formulated the intention or encouraged another agent to commit the offence 
or failed to assess the risk of the actions of other agents.9  
 
Hence, it may be posited that the aggregation and corporate culture 
mechanisms are less inadequate than the other mechanisms, namely the 
identification doctrine, the senior management failure test and vicarious 
liability. This is because they provide more logical avenues of achieving 
coherence in the way in which the criminal liability of corporations is 
established. They do so by targeting the corporation and not its agents and 
they give criminal law courts the flexibility to impute the acts and intents of 
                                                 
9 Equally, unlike the identification doctrine (as modified in Meridian and El Ajou) the “brain” 
may not be a single agent but a collective of agents (board of directors or committee of 
managers) and unlike the senior management failure test, the corporation is not identified 
only with the “brain” (senior management) but with both the “brain” and the “hands” (middle 
and low-level employees). 
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different agents to corporations of different sizes and shapes in different 
circumstances. As such, the aggregation and corporate culture mechanisms 
may be used consistently to impose liability on corporations in such way that 
where the agent is innocent the corporation’s liability will be established via 
the doctrine of innocent agency and where the agent is guilty the corporation’s 
liability will be accessorial.  
 
A major flaw common to both mechanisms is the risk that such flexibility may 
translate into arbitrariness to the point where the corporation’s liability for all 
criminal offences would be absolute. This is because the court would be able 
to aggregate the act of one agent and the knowledge of any other agent (even 
though their actions and knowledge are not related) in order to get the 
requisite actus reus and mens rea of the offence charged. Nonetheless, if the 
process of aggregating acts and intents or policies and practices to 
corporations is sufficiently delineated, the absolutism of the criminal law may 
be avoided.  
 
It may then be submitted that although all five mechanisms assessed have 
serious shortcomings from a substantive perspective, the aggregation and 
corporate culture mechanisms have the most potential of being able to meet 
the standards of the appropriate mechanism of imputation. This means that if 
modified they may be fully conformable with the rules of recognition. However, 
corporate culture falls within the scope of aggregation given that if corporate 
culture has to subsist on its own as an independent mechanism,10 courts 
would have to aggregate several acts of different agents in order to determine 
whether there was a policy or practice adopted at a given level that 
encouraged or tolerated non-compliance. As such, the aggregation 
mechanism may be deemed the least inadequate mechanism from a 
substantive perspective. I will now seek to determine the least inadequate 
mechanism for applying adjectival law.  
 
                                                 
10 In Australia and under the CMCHA it applies together with the identification doctrine and 
vicarious liability and the senior management failure test respectively. 
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8.2.2 Inadequate from an adjectival perspective (rules of adjudication) 
 
In Chapter 7, emphasis was placed on how the primary rules of the 
mechanisms of imputation conform to the rules of adjudication. These rules 
were deemed to be the procedural rules governing the proof and deliberation 
stages of the criminal trial. However, a brief examination of the procedural 
rules showed that the nature of the accused corporation posed a formidable 
obstacle to their enforcement and Parliament and courts have in many 
instances introduced tailor-made rules that disregard the accused 
corporation’s rights and facilitate the prosecution and conviction of 
corporations. Hence, the ability of the prosecutor to adduce sufficient 
admissible evidence is hampered by the accused corporation’s right to silence 
or privilege against self-incrimination (as well as legal professional privilege or 
confidentiality of communications). This is because the right may translate into 
an impermeable firewall when invoked by the accused corporation since the 
prosecutor often relies on evidence (documentary and oral) obtained from the 
corporation itself.11 However, courts have held that only the agent that 
provides the information may be protected against self-incrimination and the 
information may be used to prosecute the corporation (as a separate person) 
for the commission of an offence. As such, a senior officer may be treated as 
a person distinct from the corporation for the purpose of obtaining information 
from her and then identified with the same corporation for the purpose of 
imposing criminal liability on it. This no doubt impacts on the integrity of the 
criminal law. It was suggested that a fair and just solution lies in requiring the 
court to seek guidance from the applicable mechanism of imputation. Thus, 
the extent to which a mechanism enables the court to apply the rules of 
adjudication bespeaks its appropriateness.  
 
As such, an appropriate mechanism may compel courts to recognise the 
accused corporation’s right to silence and consider as admissible any 
incriminating statement provided by an agent that will not be identified with the 
corporation subsequently. This is because for the purpose of imposing liability 
                                                 
11 This will be far more than the proponents of the human rights conventions bargained for 
and with human beings in mind. 
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on a corporation the agent that is identified with it is the corporation. Thus, 
given that a corporation will be identified with agents involved in the relevant 
transaction, where the corporation invokes the right to silence, any statement 
provided by an agent that was not involved in the transaction may be 
admissible because it cannot be said that the corporation provided the 
information since for the purposes of enforcing the offence charged the 
corporation will not be the agent that provided the information. The 
identification doctrine and the senior management failure test do not provide 
the opportunity for courts to recognise the corporation’s right to silence in this 
light given that a corporation is identified with an agent because of her station 
or position and a corporation would be untouched behind the firewall if its right 
to silence is recognised by the court.12 Vicarious liability, aggregation and 
corporate culture have the potential to be modified to direct the prosecutor in 
such manner as to obtain incriminating information from agents that will not be 
identified with the corporation subsequently.13  
 
It was also noted that where the documents may have been drafted by some 
agent other than the one that testified or supplied the information, the 
evidence may have to fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule in order to 
be allowed by the court. Parliament (section 117 of the CJA and section 17 of 
the CJSA) has however ordained that the information supplied will be allowed 
where the person that supplied it had or was reasonably expected to have 
had personal knowledge of the material contained in the document. It is 
difficult to ascertain whether in the United Kingdom this exception may even 
be considered if the relevant document was drafted by a front line or middle-
level manager. This is because the corporation may only speak through 
senior managers (identification doctrine and senior management failure test) 
and where the document was drafted by a junior manager, the hearsay 
testimony cannot be said to be based on what the witness heard the 
corporation say. Once again the alternative mechanisms assessed in Chapter 
                                                 
12 The constraint imposed by the identification doctrine may have pushed courts to establish 
that the right to silence only protects agents that provide the information and not the 
corporation. 
13 However, where vicarious liability applies, the corporation may only be identified with the 
agent that is guilty of the offence charged. 
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6 (vicarious liability, aggregation and corporate culture) are more progressive 
as they provide for the attribution of the act of any agent with the corporation 
depending on the circumstance. However, where the evidence is that of the 
corporation’s bad character, these alternative mechanisms (excepting 
vicarious liability) do not provide a clear proposition of how the acts of agents 
would be aggregated to show that a corporation had a bad character, unlike 
the applicable mechanisms that direct courts toward the disposition of the 
senior manager or management. Nonetheless, it was noted in Chapter 7 that 
considering only the disposition of the senior manager or management is 
tantamount to vicarious liability as the corporation substitutes for a delinquent 
agent or unit. Thus, it was advanced that an appropriate mechanism ought to 
exhibit the clarity (though not the simplicity) of the applicable mechanisms 
(and vicarious liability) and the flexibility of the aggregation and corporate 
culture mechanisms. However, it may be difficult to change the patterns 
embedded in the applicable mechanisms to such an extent that the essential 
notions of the corporation’s character are ascertained by referring to the acts 
of all agents involved in the relevant transaction. 
 
Emphasis was also placed on the accused corporation’s right to be tried by a 
jury of its peers. It was noted that although unjustified, there is no difference 
between a jury of a corporate person’s peers and a jury of a natural person’s 
peers. However, if a distinction were to be made, regard would be had only to 
mechanisms based on individual liability such as the identification doctrine 
and vicarious liability since it would be impossible to sit an aggregate of 
corporate agents or policies and practices on the panel. Also, proving that a 
corporation is liable may involve the presentation of thousands of documents 
and the examination and cross-examination of hundreds of witnesses and the 
mechanisms based on individual liability may help shorten the duration of the 
trial and make it less complex since the prosecutor’s job would be restricted to 
showing that an agent of the corporation committed the offence while acting 
within the course of her employment and she was of sufficient station to be 
identified with the corporation. Nevertheless, since corporate cases are often 
protracted and complex, it was suggested that a trial without jury (in light of 
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sections of 43 and 44 of the CJA) may be preferable although this would imply 
that the right of the accused to be tried by a jury of its peers be disregarded.14  
 
It is important to note that criminal proceedings are not only initiated because 
the evidence is sufficient and admissible. The prosecutor must also be 
satisfied that the proceeding would be in the interest of the public. Hence, the 
prosecutor ought to consider the impact of the prosecution on the victims, 
their families, the community and the accused. The latter’s interest is also 
considered because it may be harmed by the prosecution such as where the 
accused corporation losses prestige due to the publicity of the indictment and 
prosecution. It was shown in Chapter 7 that the mechanism employed in the 
jurisdiction may either increase or reduce the prospect of the accused 
corporation being harmed. Where the corporation may only be identified with 
senior managers (identification doctrine, senior management failure test and 
to a certain extent vicarious liability) the understanding of the public would be 
that it is the greedy senior managers behind the corporation that are actually 
being targeted15 and where the corporation may be identified with an 
aggregate of agents or defective control systems or practices (aggregation 
and corporate culture) the understanding of the public would be that it is the 
corporation and not any individual that is targeted. 
 
In light of the above, it may be said that none of the five mechanisms 
assessed fits the bill to such an extent that it may be said to be the 
appropriate option. However, the aggregation doctrine and corporate culture 
are closest to what is required given that they are based on collective liability 
and have the property of being adaptable. Thus, they may be modified to such 
an extent that they may be used consistently by prosecutors and criminal law 
courts in a clear manner. As noted above, given that the corporate culture 
doctrine may be considered an abstract part of the aggregation doctrine, the 
least inadequate mechanism with the potential of being modified to suit the 
                                                 
14 As noted in Chapter 7, this right is already disregarded where the trial is brought in a 
Magistrates Court (England) or District Court and sometimes in the Sherriff Court (Scotland) 
where only one Justice of Peace or one Sherriff sits. 
15 See Zemba, Young and Morris, 2006. 
301 
 
nature of the corporation and principles of the criminal law and other related 
legal rules is the aggregation doctrine. 
 
8.3 MODIFYING THE LEAST INADEQUATE MECHANISM 
 
The aggregation mechanism is based on the computation of innocent acts 
and states of mind of different agents to produce a criminal act and state of 
mind in situations where no single agent could have understood the full import 
of the acts and states of mind in order to foresee and prevent the perpetration 
of the offence. The rationale is that the corporation represents the collective 
identity that emanates from the actions of these agents.16 As such, many 
people may perform innocent acts in order to achieve a set objective and in 
the process collectively breach the criminal law. The sum of their innocent 
acts is no doubt a criminal act although none of them may be shown to have 
intentionally perpetrated the offence. Thus, the aggregation mechanism 
enables the court to distinguish between the individual acts and the collective 
act. The appeal of this mechanism is that it targets the corporate entity directly 
and may be used justifiably to enforce different crimes against different types 
of corporations on a consistent basis. 
 
As shown above and in Chapters 6 and 7, this mechanism has a number of 
flaws both from the substantive and adjectival perspectives. The absence of a 
delineated pattern of imputation creates a state of absolutism whereby any 
corporation prosecuted will be convicted. Also, the fact that the aggregate of 
innocent intents and acts of agents is deemed to amount to the requisite 
mens rea and actus reus may lead to the conclusion that aggregation is not a 
credible criminal law tool and may bring the subject into disrepute. An 
expedient solution to this problem may be to distinguish between the mens 
rea of natural persons and that of corporate entities and describe the latter as 
the aggregated knowledge and intentions of agents, as well as policies 
                                                 
16 See Bottomley, 1997: 288; and Orts, 1993: 1576. 
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existing with the corporation.17 The unfairness of this solution is conspicuous 
owing to the fact that there was no intention whatsoever to perpetrate the 
offence. However, the CMCHA operates to hold corporations liable for 
corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide on the ground that the way in 
which their activities were managed or organised by the senior management 
was below acceptable standards. As mentioned above, this is an objective 
assessment of the corporation’s fault and this statute may be said to provide 
that the grossly negligent act of the collective of senior managers is 
(objectively) blameworthy. As such, it may also be said that the aggregate of 
acts and intentions of many agents may be grossly negligent and (objectively) 
blameworthy. Whether such aggregate may be subjectively blameworthy is 
very much open to debate.18 It is submitted here that this may be possible 
especially given the porous boundaries between subjective and objective 
tests in some instances.19 
 
This means that the court may aggregate the act of one agent and the 
knowledge of any other agent (where their actions and knowledge are related) 
to get the requisite actus reus and mens rea of the offence charged. However, 
Gobert’s contention that a corporation’s knowledge may be determined in line 
with a University Challenge quiz team was questioned in Chapter 6 on the 
ground that where there is no consensus, several members of the team may 
suggest different answers to the umpire and the team will not be said to know 
the correct answer even though one of the answers suggested is the correct 
answer. This is because in the absence of consensus it is impossible to 
determine the team’s position. Referring to any one member’s opinion would 
be a metonymic description of the team and combining the opinions of all 
                                                 
17 See Clarkson, 1998. However, he equally wondered if such “corporate mens rea” may be 
sufficiently blameworthy. 
18 Many of the commentators cited in Chapter 6 that devised mechanisms that are cognate 
with the corporate culture advance that corporations require separate criminal law rules since 
conventional criminal law was not configured to deal with artificial legal persons. However, 
given that it was noted in Chapter 1 that the criminal law was not configured to deal only with 
natural persons, this line of argument may be abandoned. 
19 Scottish criminal courts for example sometimes employ objective standards to establish 
subjective mens rea or subjective tests to establish objective standards. See Gough, 2000: 
730-731. See also Schedule 3, para. 3 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 that 
provides that it is not necessary to show that an offence was committed “maliciously” and 
“wilfully” as they will be implied. For an analysis of the overlap between objective and 
subjective tests in corporate criminal law, see Wells, 1993. 
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members may be not be feasible given that some opinions may conflict. This 
shows the difficulty of aggregating acts and intents of agents where there is 
no delineated pattern. Where employee A had knowledge of a faulty safety 
mechanism but employee B was unaware of the faulty safety mechanism it is 
uncertain whether the corporation may be said to have been aware that the 
safety mechanism was faulty and why. However, if the intention, knowledge, 
acts and omissions of agents are given measurable or determinable values 
then employee A’s knowledge may be said to be more representative of the 
corporation’s knowledge than employee B if the latter’s knowledge had a 
lower measurable value.20  
 
As such, it is important that courts give measurable or determinable values to 
the intention, knowledge, acts and omissions of agents and determine 
whether there is a balance between conforming acts and non-conforming acts 
and which way the balance tilts.21 Hence, where manager A was responsible 
for the relevant transaction and employee B was under manager A’s 
supervision, it is only natural that manager A’s knowledge would be weightier 
than employee B’s.22 It may then be said that manager A is the brain or 
directing mind and employee B is the hand. Thus, the scope of the 
aggregation mechanism is modified to enable it cover the ambit of the 
                                                 
20 The measurable value is a function of the agreements and management system adopted 
by the corporation. Thus, where A is given more powers than B, the former’s act will have a 
higher measurable value than B’s. This reflects the idea of consensus in the quiz team: where 
the members of the group accept that the team will deliberate and A will act as spokesperson 
and give the answer then the umpire will consider A’s answer as representing the team’s 
position. However, given that a judge has more time and resources than the umpire of a quiz, 
it is important that the judge examines the deliberation in order to determine whether A’s 
answer truly represents the collective position. The judge will be satisfied if the ideas of all 
members are aggregated and the balance tilts towards A’s answer. 
21 The idea of determining whether there is a balance is based on the fact that there is an 
interdependent relationship between the acts, omissions, knowledge and intents of agents 
and no dimension of one agent’s action, omission, knowledge and intent (within the scope of 
her employment) may be understood in isolation. This is also congruent with the contention 
that it is the causal relationship between the acts and intents of agents and the offence that is 
actually imputed to the corporation and not the acts and intents per se. 
22 This is because other agents are more likely to act upon manager A’s knowledge. However, 
as noted in Chapter 4, the court ought to consider the management system adopted by the 
corporation. Thus, if on the one hand it was a mechanistic system, a manager may be said to 
be the directing mind (with weightier knowledge) if she was sufficiently high in the hierarchy 
(as in Nattrass). On the other hand, if it was an organic structure, the manager may be the 
directing mind if she was in charge of the transaction (as in El Ajou and Meridian). 
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identification doctrine.23 Nonetheless, it may be difficult to avoid the problem 
of ‘anachronistic aggregation’ as courts may deem it important to include 
information obtained by manager A’s predecessors several years before the 
offence was perpetrated. It is submitted here that the question of the 
relevance of such evidence should be one of fact to be decided by the jury or 
judge.  
 
However, where the action of the directing mind causes the balance to tilt 
towards liability, it may be difficult to say that the corporation is liable if the 
directing mind was a rogue agent furthering her own selfish interests or 
defrauding the corporation. The offence would be shown to be a product of 
collectivisation although the agent whose act has the highest measurable 
value was not furthering the corporation’s interests. Belmont directs courts to 
refrain from imputing fraudulent acts to the corporate victim due to the 
apparent unfairness. Thus, in the process of aggregation the court ought not 
only give measurable values to the actions of agents in accordance to their 
relative positions and responsibilities but also consider whether the actions 
were geared toward furthering the interests of the corporation.24 In other 
words, the actions of agents that are aggregated ought to represent the 
collective position. However, the question whether there was an intention to 
further the interests of the corporation is itself problematic. This is because it 
ought to include tasks that were performed in compliance with instructions or 
policies, as well as modes of performing such tasks adopted by agents to 
perform such acts.25  
 
From the above, it may be contended that the collectivised action that was 
intended to further the corporation’s interest is the hypothetical distinct action 
of the corporate person. The court will ascertain such collectivised action by 
                                                 
23 However, it is not the guilt of the directing mind that is imputed to the corporation but her 
act or what her act caused. 
24 Under the French Code Pénal of 1992 for example, the act of the senior management 
cannot be imputed to the corporation if such act was not performed with the intention to 
further the interests of the corporation. The same may be said to obtain in the United 
Kingdom given that the concept of scope of employment has been widely interpreted to 
include the furtherance of the principal’s interests. 
25 The use of the concept of scope of liability in vicarious liability case law (see Chapter 6) 
may help in this regard. 
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aggregating the acts and intentions (including knowledge) of all agents 
involved in the relevant transaction. The aggregation will involve a number of 
steps. Firstly, the court will give measurable values to the acts of these agents 
in accordance to their responsibilities and the management system adopted 
by the corporation. Secondly, the court will determine whether the acts that 
are compliant carry more weight than those that are not. Finally, the court will 
consider the deliberation or decision-making process that preceded the 
performance of the relevant activity in order to determine whether the acts 
that are aggregated (especially the directing mind’s act) were within the scope 
of the agents’ authority and truly represent the corporation’s position.26 The 
aggregation doctrine may thus be modified in light of the above steps in order 
to ensure that courts impute acts and intents to corporations on a consistent 
basis.  
 
8.4 THE MODIFIED AGGREGATION MECHANISM AS THE 
APPROPRIATE MECHANISM 
 
The modified aggregation mechanism may stand out as a guide to criminal 
justice institutions if we refer to the description of the term ‘corporation’ in 
Chapter 2, as well as the proposal of how the criminal law may be employed 
to regulate corporations in Chapter 3 and the parameters for evaluation 
established in Chapters 4 and 7. The corporation was described in Chapter 2 
as a changeable entity that is recognised by the court or Parliament as a 
corporation because of its independence of thought and action and ability to 
relate to the consequences of such thought and action. The fact that it is 
changeable implies that in one instance it may be identified with the 
aggregated acts of manager A and employee B while in another instance it 
may be identified with the aggregated acts of manager C and employee D. In 
both instances, the collective act (aggregated acts) is distinct from the act of 
                                                 
26 As mentioned above, where there is consensus in a quiz team that A will be the captain 
and provide answers to the umpire, the latter (if in a court of law) ought to give priority to A’s 
answer but also consider whether it truly reflects the deliberation that preceded A giving the 
answer. This is because A could be a maverick that disregarded the collective position and 
sought to further her own interests. 
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any individual manager or employee and the fact that criminal sanction may 
incite these agents to collectively comply with the law may be said to imply 
that the corporation related to the consequence of its offence. In Chapter 3, it 
was submitted that courts may on the one hand employ the doctrine of 
innocent agency to target corporations directly where no agent is guilty and on 
the other hand use the principle of secondary or accessorial liability to hold a 
corporation liable as an accessory to an agent shown to be guilty. In the first 
instance, the aggregation doctrine operates to hold corporations liable for the 
acts of agents that collectively resulted in the breach of criminal law 
standards. Hence, the agents may be ‘innocent’ and the collective unit (the 
corporation) guilty. In the second instance, the aggregation doctrine may be 
modified to such an extent that the acts, omissions, knowledge and intents of 
agents are aggregated in order to show that there was an existing 
criminogenic corporate culture (policies, practices, systems and attitudes) that 
encouraged or tolerated (assisted) an agent shown to be guilty. 
 
As regards the parameters for evaluation, the modified aggregation 
mechanism has a clear primary rule which compels courts to impose liability 
directly on the corporation where the ‘innocent’ acts and states of mind of its 
agents collectively amount to a criminal act and state of mind. This primary 
rule may be shown to be congruent with relevant secondary rules (rules of 
recognition and rules of adjudication). As regards the rules of recognition, it is 
consonant with the principle of corporate personality because the corporation 
is targeted directly and not forced to substitute for its delinquent agent. It is 
also consonant with the principles of the scope of employment/maverick agent 
and constructive knowledge because all the acts of all agents performed 
within the scope of their employment are imputable to the corporation. 
However, in order to avoid the unfairness of vicarious criminal liability, only 
the acts of agents that were involved in the relevant transaction are imputed 
to the corporation. This modified version of the mechanism is also congruent 
with the normative outlook of judges as the corporation is treated as a body 
that is analogous to the human body. There is a “head” or “brain” (agent 
responsible for the relevant transaction) that directs the “hands” or “cogs” 
(other agents involved in the relevant transaction) to perform the wrongful act. 
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Equally, this mechanism is congruent with the external viewpoint of some 
non-legal categories (contingency approach) given that the corporation may 
be prosecuted and convicted justifiably irrespective of the management 
system (mechanistic or organic) adopted. 
 
As regards the adjectival rules, the court will recognise the corporation’s right 
to silence if it is invoked because the court will refrain from admitting 
incriminating evidence provided by any of the agents with whom the 
corporation will be subsequently identified. These agents will include those 
concerned with the relevant transactions. Equally, the testimony given by one 
agent will fall under the exceptions to hearsay if the person quoted is an agent 
that will be subsequently identified with the corporation. There will also be little 
need to consider reversing the onus of proof and disregarding the 
corporation’s right to be presumed innocent because the prosecutor will be 
able to compel agents that will not be subsequently identified with the 
corporation to provide information. Concerning the corporation’s right to be 
tried by a jury of the corporation’s peers, it was noted that since many cases 
against corporations are protracted and complex it may be convenient to have 
no-jury trials. However, there could be a possibility of using persons in the 
same station in society as those that will be identified with the accused 
corporation as jurors. Thus, if the accused corporation had adopted a 
mechanistic system the jury will comprise senior managers of other 
mechanistic structures and if the accused corporation had adopted an organic 
structure the jury will comprise persons that manage transactions similar to 
the relevant transactions in the case. 
 
The modified aggregation mechanism may also provide a good opportunity for 
increasing the efficaciousness of sanctions. If the courts focus on the 
individuals or department that were concerned with the relevant transaction, 
the chances of deterring the convicted corporation (preventing it from 
committing the same offence) will be higher. The courts will focus on these 
individuals and department because for the purposes of enforcing the offence 
charged they represent the corporation. Thus, if the sanction targets them 
they are more likely to be discouraged from indulging in wrongful acts or 
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motivated to exercise due diligence. However, this does not imply that a fine 
may for example be imposed upon the individuals and not the corporation.27 
The court may simply ensure that any spillover affects only the individuals that 
collectively violated the law or the department that sustained the criminogenic 
culture. In the same light, the court may make a remedial order requiring the 
corporation to rectify any defects in the department concerned or to amend its 
criminogenic policies and practices.28 Equally, the amendment or revocation 
of licence ought to be directed at the department concerned unless it was a 
pervasive problem in a mechanistic structure.29 As noted in Chapter 7, the 
publicity generated by the imposition of these sanctions, as well the imposition 
of public censure will be a just desert for the corporation given that the offence 
was perpetrated qua corporation and not qua agent.30 
 
Despite the fact that the modified aggregation mechanism stands out as the 
appropriate mechanism of imputation the uncertainty of how it may actually be 
employed by courts remains. It is mentioned above that courts will ascertain 
the accused corporation’s distinct act by aggregating the acts of all agents 
involved in the relevant transaction and the aggregation will involve giving 
measurable values to the acts of these agents and determining whether the 
acts that are compliant carry more weight than those that are not. The 
practicality of such a proposition may be questioned owing to the fact that acts 
and intentions are not interchangeable variables that may be readily 
quantified. The thought of assigning values to the acts and intentions of 
hundreds of agents involved in a relevant transaction may also dissuade 
many jurists due to the cumbersomeness of the task. However, although 
further research is required there may be few better avenues for establishing 
a link between the conception of a corporation as a distinct but changeable 
                                                 
27 As shown in Chapter 7, there are laws that already impose sanctions on such individuals. 
An example is section 6 of Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 as amended by the 
Insolvency Act 2000 and the Enterprise Act 2002. 
28 This is consonant with Schlegel’s (1990: 37) statement that prohibitive injunctions or orders 
may only be effective if the court understands how the accused corporation functions. 
29 Focusing on the relevant department may mitigate the harshness of the sanction of 
suspension or revocation of licence. 
30 However, it may be difficult to justify the harms of prosecution suffered by the corporation. 
The fact that it is prosecuted for the aggregated acts of its agents (collective failure) may be 
interpreted as implying that the corporation is generally corrupt. 
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entity and the principles of agency requiring the acts of all agents to be 
imputable to the corporation and the rules of the criminal law requiring the 
elements of the offence to proved against the accused and not her 
representative or alter ego. As regards the practicality of the proposition 
above, it was noted that courts ought to consider the decision-making process 
that preceded the performance of the relevant activity in order to determine 
whether the acts that are given highest measurable values or acts that cause 
the balance to tilt to one side truly represent the corporation’s position or the 
collective rationality that guided the decision-making process within the 
corporation. It is submitted here that courts may establish a link between the 
preceding deliberations and the acts and intentions given highest measurable 
values by using the theory of the “discursive dilemma”31 that has been 
developed as a means of establishing the distinct personality of 
organisations.32  
 
8.4.1 Using the discursive dilemma to establish a link between acts 
given highest measurable values and the corporation’s position  
 
The discursive dilemma is a modification of the “doctrinal paradox” first 
identified by Kornhauser and Sager33 as a conflict between two procedures 
facing a panel of more than two judges in the deliberation stage of the legal 
process. The procedures are the conclusion-centred procedure and the 
premise-centred procedure. Thus, where three judges are for example 
required to make a decision by aggregating their views on the conclusions 
(conclusion-centred procedure) the decision may often be different from that 
made where they aggregate their views on the individual premises (premise-
centred procedure). Pettit generalises this analysis beyond the panel of more 
than three judges to all instances where groups are required to make 
decisions via competing procedures. He prefers to talk of discursive dilemma 
                                                 
31 See Pettit, 2003; and 2007. See also List and Pettit, 2005. 
32 The discursive dilemma was also used by Rock (2005) to explain how the collective 
rationality of corporate actions prevents the dilemma. Several other commentators have also 
developed the theory to explain a large number of problems as regards choices made by 
groups. 
331986 and 1993. 
310 
 
because the views of some individuals would have to be disregarded 
irrespective of the procedure adopted. As such, the collective goal or interest 
is prioritised eventually and not the goal or interest of any individual.34 
According to Pettit, the furtherance of the collective interest is guided by 
collective reasoning which demonstrates a faculty of reason or mind 
belonging to the group and not to any individual member.35 Rock also 
contends that the corporation epitomises what Pettit describes as “groups with 
minds of their own” or “social integrates” and the corporation’s response to the 
discursive dilemma helps us understand two things: firstly, that the 
corporation is not reducible to an aggregation of choices of shareholders or 
members of the board of directors; and secondly, that certain actions are 
guided by collective rationality and these actions are particular to the group 
and not the members of the group.36  
 
An attempt was made in Chapter 2 to endorse these propositions in order to 
provide content to the corporation’s legal personality and they may also be 
used to guide criminal law courts toward ascertaining the corporation’s distinct 
action on a consistent basis. However, it must be noted that the concept of 
discursive dilemma has been subjected to varied criticisms due to its 
expansiveness; and an account of the theory requires a lot more space than 
is allowed here. Thus, the discussion here is limited to a basic description of 
the theory and how its underpinning logic may serve the criminal law courts. 
As such, this theory can be used to show how criminal law courts may refer to 
deliberations prior to the commission of an offence in order to ascertain the 
corporation’s position. The theory can be used to such effect because it 
advises that the process of a corporation’s reasoning may be captured by the 
reaction of its members or agents to the discursive dilemma that arises when 
they have to make a decision collectively. This means that when confronted 
with a discursive dilemma the members or agents would seek to further the 
interests of the corporation by referring to the collective intentionality or 
                                                 
34 Nonetheless, there are instances where the collective interests and individual interests may 
overlap. 
35 See Pettit, 2007: 192. See also Pekka, 2007: 458. 
36 2005: 8 and 24-25.  
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rationality.37 The collective intentionality or rationality represents the 
corporation’s independent thought process. We may consider the example of 
an instance where a corporation was charged and convicted in order to 
determine how the court could have used the discursive dilemma and the 
aggregation doctrine as modified above.  
 
In Gateway Foodmarkets, a corporation38 employed a firm of lift contractors to 
provide maintenance to all its stores on a regular basis. However, contrary to 
instructions and without the knowledge of the senior management, the 
managers of one of its stores refrained from calling out the lift contractors to 
repair the persistent jamming of its lift and made it a regular practice to rectify 
the problem manually. This resulted in a section manager (taking his turn as 
the duty manager in the absence of the store manager) falling to his death in 
the lift shaft. The corporation was charged under section 2(1) of the HSWA 
which provides for strict liability because the prosecution is not required to 
show the corporation’s proof of intent to commit the offence and the latter 
bears the onus of showing that it had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the 
health and safety of its workers. The court was thus required to establish 
whether the corporation exercised the requisite level of due diligence and the 
store manager and duty manager of one of its branches were not identifiable 
with the corporation. If the aggregation mechanism as modified above was 
employed, the court would have examined the acts and knowledge of the 
agents involved in the relevant transaction in order to determine whether their 
acts and intents could be aggregated and imputed to the corporation. The 
agents involved were the duty manager, the store manager and officers that 
constituted the senior management.  
 
The first thing the court would have done is to identify the directing mind in 
order to give the highest measurable value to his acts and knowledge. As 
mentioned above, this ought to be a function of the responsibilities of the 
                                                 
37 Although it is important to give concise definitions to terms such as rationality and 
intentionality, it may be pragmatic to refer to their literary meaning at this point because an 
attempt to define such terms would no doubt shove one into an ideological and metaphysical 
battle that is unwarranted here. 
38 Later on became known as Somerfield Stores. 
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agents and the management system adopted by the corporation. Proponents 
of the discursive dilemma talk of hierarchical collectivities39 and summative 
collectivities.40 Thus, if the corporation was a hierarchical collectivity then the 
acts of the senior management would have been given the highest 
measurable value and the balance would have tilted toward due diligence 
since the senior management had hired lift contractors and given clear 
instructions that all the stores should call out the lift contractors when the 
need arose.41 On the other hand, if the corporation was a summative 
hierarchy or had adopted an organic management system the store manager 
would have been considered the directing mind. The acts and knowledge of 
the store manager would have been given a higher measurable value than 
those of the senior management and duty manager. However, the court would 
have had to ensure that the criminogenic practice adopted by the store 
manager (and duty manager) represented the corporation’s position.42  As 
suggested above, the question of whether the aggregated acts and 
knowledge represent the corporation’s position may be answered by referring 
to the collective rationality that guided the decision-making process that 
preceded the performance of the actus reus. In other words, the court would 
have to look at the way in which the senior management (in a hierarchical 
collectivity) or the store managers (in a summative hierarchy) responded to 
the discursive dilemma that arose when they had to make a decision about 
the hiring of lift repairers. 
                                                 
39 These are similar to mechanistic structures as discussed in Chapter 4. 
40 These are similar to organic structures discussed in Chapter 4. See Goldman, 2004. 
41Unless there was evidence that the senior management had constructive knowledge of the 
criminogenic practice adopted in one of its stores. 
42 If no link is established between the acts that are most likely to cause the balance to tilt and 
the distinct interests of the corporation then the latter’s liability would be said to be absolute. 
Khanna (1999: 375, footnote n. 120) for example discusses the case of United States v 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 882 F2d 656 (2d Cir 1989) where it was held that the 
existence of a compliance programme cannot exculpate a corporation from the wrongful act 
(even contrary to the programme) performed by an agent within the course of her duty. 
Although this equally points to vicarious liability, the court held that once the amount of 
information obtained by a corporation’s agent is equal to the requisite knowledge or mens rea 
of the offence, the corporation’s liability becomes strict. As said earlier, strict liability and mens 
rea are not bedfellows. Thus, this is tantamount to jumbling different types of offences and 
criminal law components (strict liability implies the absence of mens rea). It cannot be said 
that there is no need to show mens rea where the agents hold a sufficient amount of 
information (including that of the illegality of an omission) given that the process of showing 
that the agents hold a sufficient amount of information is tantamount to the prosecution 
discharging its onus of proving mens rea. 
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In order to show how the principle of discursive dilemma may have been 
employed to examine the process through which the decision to hire the lift 
contractors was taken, a number of assumptions may be made. Firstly, the 
corporation had adopted a mechanistic system or was a hierarchical 
collectivity and three officers at the level of the senior management, A, B and 
C, deliberated on the question of hiring lift contracts. Secondly, these officers 
deliberated on a number of related questions including whether the 
corporation should allocate £5000 to the maintenance of the lifts of its stores, 
whether it should do so by hiring a specialist company and whether it should 
hire company X. If each of them expressed a view with the objective of 
furthering the interests of the corporation43 and their views were consistent 
over a period of time during which three meetings were held, then it may have 
been shown that a discursive dilemma arose in the following instance:44 
 
     Allocate £5000 to lift maintenance    Hire a specialist company     Hire company X 
A No     Yes    No 
B Yes      No    No 
C Yes     Yes    Yes 
 
With regard to the first meeting, the question of allocating £5000 to the 
maintenance of the corporation’s lifts was posed and a majority answered in 
the affirmative. In the second meeting a year later, the question was asked 
whether a specialist company should be hired to provide maintenance and 
repair lifts and a majority answered in the affirmative. However, in the third 
meeting the question was asked whether the company should hire company X 
and a majority objected. If the panel customarily made decisions using a 
conclusion-based rule then the corporation would not have hired company X. 
On the other hand, if the panel made decisions using a premise-based rule 
then company X would have been hired since the majority accepted both 
premises. As such, the panel would have been confronted with a conflict 
between the previous endorsements of two similar issues by the majority 
(premise-based procedure) and the rejection of the ensuing decision by 
                                                 
43 In other words, they had homogenous interests. See Rock, 2005:11. 
44 This follows from the expositions of Kornhauser and Sager (1992) and Pettit (2003) of the 
origin of the “doctrinal paradox” and “discursive dilemma.”  
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another majority (conclusion-based procedure). Pettit advances that for the 
purposes of coherence and credibility the corporation would adopt the 
majority view on the premises (premise-centred procedure).45 This is because 
a corporation that behaves coherently is more credible in business.46 As such, 
a corporation tends to respond to discursive dilemmas in a manner that 
enables its actions to be coherent and predictable to investors and the 
response is the adoption of the majority view on the premises. Thus, it would 
have been established that the corporation favoured hiring a specialist 
company. 
 
Given that the corporation was a hierarchical collectivity, the court would have 
assigned a higher measurable value to the acts or decisions of the senior 
management than the store manager and duty manager who had adopted a 
practice of repairing the persistent jamming of their store’s lift manually. If for 
example, the court assigned a value of 20 to the senior management and a 
value of 5 to both the store manager and the duty manager then the balance 
would tilt towards the exercise of due diligence by the senior management 
that hired a specialist company and instructed all the stores to call out this 
specialist company when the need arose. However, one may not simply 
assume that the senior management’s decision truly represented the 
corporation’s position or had sought to further the corporation’s interests.47 
Nonetheless, the deliberation prior to the senior management’s decision 
shown in the table above demonstrates that the senior management’s 
decision represented the collective rationality that governed the decision-
making process and thus represented the corporation’s position. As such, the 
corporation would have been acquitted. However, if the senior management 
was shown to have had constructive knowledge of the practice and the risk 
involved,48 the court would have had to consider other prior deliberations such 
as discussions on the need for the senior management to make such 
                                                 
45 2003: 173. 
46 See Rock, 2005: 9-10. 
47 The senior managers could have been furthering their own selfish interests by 
recommending the hiring of a friend’s company when none was actually needed. 
48 That is the senior management’s omission to make an enquiry was reckless. See Lord 
Denning in Compania Maritima at 68. 
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enquiries in order to ensure that the senior management’s failure to proscribe 
the practice represented the corporation’s position.  
 
If on the other hand the corporation was a summative collectivity or had 
adopted an organic management structure, the court would have given the 
store manager’s acts a higher measurable value than those of the senior 
management. However, in light of the deliberations shown in the table above, 
the court would have held that the criminogenic practice adopted by the store 
manager and duty manager did not represent the corporation’s position and 
despite the fact that the balance would have tilted towards the criminogenic 
practice (given that the store manager would have been the directing mind), 
the corporation would have been acquitted because the practice did not 
represent the collective rationality that governed decision-making in the 
corporation. However, it must be noted that there are instances where the 
prosecution or the court may be unable to find evidence of such prior 
deliberation that relate to the relevant transaction.49 It is submitted here that in 
such instances the court should assume that the way the balance tilts 
represents the corporation’s position. 
 
I have thus attempted to show how the court may aggregate the acts of 
agents and practices existing within the corporation and believe that this is a 
more cogent approach than that adopted by the Court of Appeal in Gateway 
Foodmarkets. Evans LJ first of all raised the concept of vicarious liability and 
sought to establish that section 2(1) of the HSWA imposes vicarious liability on 
the employer for the criminal acts of all its employees owing to the fact that 
both concepts of strict liability and vicarious liability overlap. However, 
referring to Lord Hoffmann’s statement in Associated Octel, he dismissed the 
relevance of vicarious liability on the ground that section 2(1) of the HSWA 
imposed a duty directly on the corporate employer and not on the individual 
employees. The only available option was thus the mechanism for imposing 
liability directly on corporations in the United Kingdom, the identification 
                                                 
49 However, the prosecution has the power to compel agents to provide information. Also, in 
cases where the offence charged is a strict liability offence, the onus of proof is on the 
corporation and it is less likely that the corporation will withhold information that may 
exculpate it. 
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doctrine. Counsel for the appellant company had submitted that the company 
could not be liable because neither the duty manager nor the store manager 
were of sufficient standing to be identified with the company and the facts of 
the case showed that the head office or senior management had conducted 
their undertaking in such way as to ensure the safety of workers and did not 
know of the practice (contrary to their instructions) adopted in that store, 
which was only one of the company’s many stores. 
 
Evans LJ however turned to the purpose of the legislation and posited that it 
was axiomatic that Parliament intended to impose liability on the employer 
whenever the event, in this case failure to ensure health and safety of 
employees, occurred.50 He cited British Steel and concluded that the question 
whether an employer should be liable for the criminal acts of even a maverick 
junior employee would depend on the construction of the applicable statutory 
provision. He then contended that the statutory defence of due diligence is 
available to the employer only when reasonable precautions have been taken 
at all levels and the failure was due to the act of a maverick employee. It is no 
doubt splitting hairs to argue that there is a distinction between vicarious 
criminal liability and Evans LJ’s interpretation of section 2(1) of the HSWA. 
Although he dismissed vicarious liability, he eventually admitted that its 
principles may apply in certain circumstances given that Lord Hoffmann in 
Associated Octel had interpreted section 3(1) of the HSWA as extending the 
employer’s liability to include work performed by an independent contractor 
that forms part of the employer’s undertaking.51 Evans LJ’s decision is 
therefore illustrative of the lack of coherence in the way judges impose 
criminal liability on corporations in the United Kingdom. Although it is 
important to consider the equity or spirit of the statute, where the judge clearly 
disregards express provisions, it is difficult to say that the objective of the 
statute was achieved. The statute clearly provides for a defence of due 
diligence and the precedent (Nattrass) dictates that a corporation would 
successfully invoke this defence if the negligent agent was not of sufficient 
station to be identified with the corporation. Thus, like Lord Hoffmann in 
                                                 
50 Gateway Foodmarkets at 83. 
51 See Associated Octel at 850. 
317 
 
Meridian, Evans LJ simply avoided the perceived unduly restricted form of the 
rule in Nattrass and the unfair consequences of rigorously applying it. So he 
equally fashioned a “special rule” that should apply only when interpreting that 
particular statutory provision in the circumstances of that case. As such, 
although he dismissed the relevance of vicarious liability he applied it anyway 
because it gave him the result Parliament supposedly intended to achieve.52 
  
As shown in this thesis, coherence and integrity may be achieved by giving 
regard to a cogent theory linking the conception of a corporation as a distinct 
but changeable entity to the principles of agency requiring the acts of all 
agents to be imputable to the corporation and the rules of the criminal law 
requiring the elements of the offence to be proved against the accused and 
not her representative or alter ego. The modified aggregation mechanism 
described above provides a good opportunity. Internal incoherence will be 
avoided as the related legal rules are harmonised. It is true that there are 
instances where the equity of the relevant statute may provide “second-order 
reasons” that may discount the “first-order reason” of the primary rule of a 
mechanism.53 However, where Parliament’s intention is clearly stated as in 
the cases cited above, an apprehensive judge may neither discount such 
clear provisions nor the primary rule that ought to apply.  
 
8.5 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY 
 
This thesis proposes an approach to harmonise the imputation of acts and 
intents (or causal relationships) to corporations by criminal law courts. Such 
harmonisation requires establishing common ways of interpreting rules of 
statutes and precedent through a mechanism designed to collate the relevant 
rules. This mechanism comprises a number of rules that directs courts to 
aggregate the acts, omissions, intents and knowledge of all agents involved in 
                                                 
52 See also Alphacell where the House of Lords relied heavily on the literal meaning of the 
words used in the provision and what they inferred as the purpose of the legislation and also 
Alfred McAlpine where Simon Brown LJ understood their Lordships’ statements in Alphacell 
as implying vicarious liability (because nothing else could make legal sense) and so held the 
corporate defendant vicariously liable. 
53 See Perry (1989) on the weighting of decisions according to “second-order reasons.” 
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a relevant transaction and determining whether the aggregate is consistent 
with the collective rationality that governed the decision-making process in the 
corporation prior to the performance of the actus reus of the offence charged. 
It is submitted that if courts seek direction from this mechanism when 
enforcing criminal laws against corporations their decisions will be fairly 
coherent and predictable. 
 
In the process of explaining this approach a number of propositions were 
offered. Given the current uncertainty as regards what criminal law courts 
mean when they talk of a ‘corporation,’ this term was defined as any 
changeable entity (existing in the legal world) that is recognised either by the 
legislator or the court as a corporation because of its independence of thought 
and action and ability to relate to the consequences of such thought and 
action. The independence of thought and action and ability to relate to their 
consequences justify the ascription of responsibility and the imposition of 
punishments on corporations whether for deontological or teleological 
purposes. However, since criminal responsibility and punishability do not 
presuppose amenability to the criminal law it was noted that the rules of the 
criminal law ought to be adaptable to deal with the peculiarity of the corporate 
defender.54 It was therefore submitted that a corporation’s liability ought to be 
either direct (non-derivative) where its agents are ‘innocent’ or its liability 
ought to be accessorial (derivative) where one or many of its agents are 
shown to be guilty. This may resolve the quandary created by the facts that 
where the offence requires proof of intent, criminal law courts compel 
corporations to substitute for guilty senior managers (a restrictive form of 
vicarious liability); where the offence is a strict or absolute liability offence, 
criminal law courts hold corporations liable for the act of any agent;55 and 
where the corporation was the targeted victim of the agent’s fraud, some 
                                                 
54 This is especially true in the United Kingdom where vicarious liability is shunned and the 
defender may only be directly or personally liable in criminal law. 
55 The enforcement of strict and absolute liability offences is consonant with the principle of 
innocent agency because no agent may be guilty of such offences given that the corporation 
as the duty holder is the only person that can be liable in the event of the breach of the duty. 
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criminal law courts have declined to impute the fraud to the corporation in 
spite of the agent’s station.56  
 
Hence, coherence and integrity may be achieved if the imputation of acts and 
intents to corporations and the use of criminal law rules are guided by the 
truth of the corporation’s nature. In other words, if a corporation is agent X 
acting within the scope of her employment, whenever an offence is 
perpetrated by agent X within such scope the court ought to say that the 
offence was perpetrated by the corporation. However, there are several 
patterns that a corporation may employ to act through its agents and in some 
instances the agent may be guilty while in others she may be an innocent 
instrument. Thus, the conception that a corporation is agent X acting within 
the scope of her employment is only partially true and may be false 
sometimes because the corporate defender may comprise the innocent acts 
of agent X and the innocent knowledge of agent Y. Also, the corporation may 
comprise the innocent act of agent X and the guilty act of agent Y, where 
agent Y would not have been able to commit the offence without the 
opportunity provided by the corporation for agent Y to work with agent X. This 
shows that the corporation and its agent are two separate persons with 
distinct impulses.57 As such, there are instances where the agent may use the 
corporation as a front to perpetrate an offence58 and there are instances 
where the corporation may use the agent to perpetrate an offence.59 In the 
first instance, the agent ought to be liable in her personal capacity and if there 
is any evidence that the corporation aided or abetted the guilty agent either 
acting through another agent or because of the existence of a criminogenic 
                                                 
56 Treating the corporation as an accessory in cases where one or many agents are shown to 
be guilty automatically discounts the imputation of fraud to the corporation in cases where the 
corporation was the targeted victim. This is because it may not be said that the corporation 
encouraged or assisted an agent in swindling its own assets. 
57 It also shows that what is actually imputed to the corporation is not agent X’s act but the 
causal relationship between agent X’s act (and may be agent Y’s knowledge) and the offence. 
In other words, the prosecutor’s job is to show that the corporation used either agent X or 
both agents X and Y to cause the result that completed the offence. 
58 Thus, the corporation has been described as the agent’s ego. See Note, Harvard Law 
Review, 1982: 853-871. See also Gencor v Dalby [2000] 2 BCLC 734. This may be good 
ground for the court to lift the corporate veil in order to punish the agent behind the veil. See 
Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Home. 
59 It is submitted here that such instances should be governed by the principle of innocent 
agency which is related to the defence of “employee necessity” and the concept of “member-
responsibility.” 
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culture, then the guilty agent ought to be liable as the principal offender while 
the corporation ought to be liable as an accessory.60 This is a more 
predictable and cogent basis for the imposition of criminal liability on 
corporations. However, such coherence may be maintained only if courts are 
guided by a set of rules directing the imputation of the acts and intents of 
certain agents to corporations in certain circumstances. The consistent 
relation of the rules that courts invoke to impute acts and intents to 
corporations is described as a mechanism of imputation.  
 
It is submitted that the rules of the appropriate mechanism of imputation ought 
to provide a pattern of attribution that is both predictable and legally 
acceptable. The conditions of predictability and legal acceptability require an 
observer to anticipate (within the specified bounds of the criminal law) what 
courts will do. However, given that the understanding of the conception of 
rules of attribution is confounded by a confused usage of terminologies 
(primary rules, secondary rules, general rules), I believe that for the purposes 
of orderly continuity (and therefore predictability) it may be better to adopt the 
usage of terminologies by Hart and to a certain extent Dworkin.61 As such, the 
rules of attribution that emanate from statute or precedent may be referred to 
as the primary rules.62 Equally, since corporations may act (via their agents) in 
more ways than can possibly be envisaged by legislators and judges, the 
application of these primary rules ought to be directed by other rules that 
include related legal principles and factual considerations or explanations of 
the corporate phenomena. These other rules enable the court to arrive at the 
“best constructive interpretation” of the primary rule and may be called 
secondary rules.63 Factual considerations were deemed to be governed by 
                                                 
60 However, the acts of the other agent that aids and abets the principal offender, as well as 
the culture must represent the collective rationality that governed decision-making prior to the 
commission of the offence. 
61 The probability of achieving the goal of predictability is increased by the shift from Lord 
Hoffmann’s conception to Hart’s because unlike the former, the latter does not seek to further 
judicial activism (the making of “special rules” by judges) which is a source of incoherence. 
62 This is because the rules of attribution embedded in a statutory provision or precedent 
constitute the “first-order” or “formal” reason why courts impute the acts of certain agents to 
corporations in given circumstances. 
63 As noted in Chapter 4, the secondary rules are restricted to rules of recognition (governing 
the discovery stage of the legal process) and rules of adjudication (governing the proof and 
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common sense because secondary rules that are strictly legal (“pedigree-
based test”) do not always explain the meaning of a word used in expressing 
the primary rule. Such common sense may therefore involve the use of a 
“content-based test” with “non-pedigreed” rules including prescriptions of non-
legal categories. However, given that from a positivist perspective, courts will 
not give regard to non-pedigreed rules (they are not legally binding), it was 
suggested that reference to non-legal prescriptions ought to be restricted to 
theories invoked in the obiter dicta of criminal law courts. This will limit the 
scope of interpretation of primary rules, avoid judicial activism and enhance 
predictability and integrity.  
 
Thus, the primary rule of a mechanism of imputation ought to emanate from a 
statute or precedent (rationes decidendi) but it ought to be consonant with 
secondary rules that set standards which are essential for the use of the 
criminal law against corporations. The first types of secondary rules, rules of 
recognition (substantive corporate criminal liability) include related legal 
principles deduced from company law such as corporate personality; 
principles of scope of employment/maverick employee and constructive 
knowledge deduced from agency law; and principles of responsibility and 
culpability deduced from the criminal law. The rules of recognition also include 
the patterns of attribution that may be deduced from the outlook of judges 
(internal point of view) expressed in the obiter dicta of their judgements and 
the factual propositions of non-participants in legal practice equally alluded to 
by judges in the obiter dicta of their judgements but described here as the 
external point of view.  
 
The internal point of view is restricted further to the metaphors (enforcement-
generated metaphors) employed by judges to describe how acts and intents 
ought to be imputed to corporations. The external point of view is also limited 
to organisation theories on the restructuring of corporations to suit 
contingencies in light of allusions by judges to the fact that courts should 
consider the systems of management and control adopted by accused 
                                                                                                                                            
deliberation stages). Rules of change are not discussed because they do not direct courts on 
how to interpret and apply primary rules but on how to change them. 
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corporations. The external viewpoint is restricted further to two major theories 
of management systems regularly used in contingency thinking: the 
mechanistic and organic theories. These theories are said to explain the 
agent’s commitment to the corporation with regard to her function and 
responsibility and the mode she adopts to perform her function or further the 
corporation’s interests. As such, if emphasis is placed on the transaction 
under consideration by the court (that allegedly breached the law) and the 
motivations or objectives of the various agents that were involved, where the 
evidence shows that the corporation had adopted a mechanistic system, the 
act (and not necessarily the guilty act) of any senior manager involved ought 
to be assigned a higher measurable value when combining the acts of all the 
agents involved.64 Equally, where the evidence shows that the corporation 
had adopted an organic system, the act of any agent that had control over the 
transaction under consideration would be assigned a higher measurable 
value.  
 
It was also noted that the existence of so many constructs is indicative of the 
diverseness of corporations and the different ways in which they use their 
agents to perform defined actions and breach the law. As such, where the 
constructs have been standardised and developed as a set of legal rules 
(mechanism of imputation), it has been difficult to use the same mechanism to 
regulate corporations that are different in terms of structure and functioning 
from those envisaged by the court or Parliament. As shown in Chapters 3, 5 
and 7, the identification doctrine and senior management failure test were 
premised on the assumption that corporations are mechanistic structures and 
so it is difficult to prosecute organic structures successfully using these 
mechanisms. Thus, an appropriate mechanism ought to be flexible to such 
extent that it could be used to impute the acts and omissions of different 
agents to different corporations in different circumstances. Equally, the 
mechanism ought to enable the court to distinguish between actions and 
intentions that must be blamed on the corporate person and those that cannot 
be blamed on it due to the fact that they fall outside the scope of such 
                                                 
64 Thus, if the senior manager of a mechanistic system was reckless, there is a high 
probability that the corporation will also be deemed reckless. 
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corporate person’s legal responsibility. In other words, it ought to ensure that 
a corporation is punished only for crimes committed qua corporation. Although 
all five mechanisms evaluated are shown to have serious flaws, the 
aggregation doctrine is deemed to be the least inadequate because it is 
closest to the paradigm of what may be described as the appropriate 
mechanism of imputation. It is shown above how it may be modified to suit 
this paradigm. 
 
8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
There is still more work to be done than has been achieved so far. This thesis 
discusses the major points of a comprehensive approach to achieve 
coherence and integrity in the way courts impose criminal liability on 
corporations. In Chapter 1, it was noted that previous commentators have 
deplored corporate criminal law’s lack of a cogent theoretical base. Hence, 
the analysis carried out in this thesis was geared towards finding that common 
thread in the different interpretations and explanations of statutes and 
precedent, which in light of Allan’s logic65 would imply that there is some 
coherence after all. Thus, although I started with a bias (following a literature 
review) that the subject was marred by incoherence, my analysis confirms this 
bias. However, it seems courts and legislators that have adjudicated and 
legislated on criminal cases involving corporations must not be the only ones 
to bear the brunt of the blame.  
 
I must admit that it was very difficult choosing a particular methodology. There 
is hardly any clear legal methodology and some commentators even contend 
that there is none truly.66 One of the reasons of this uncertainty is the feeling 
that incorporating non-legal (including moral) precepts into legal doctrinal 
analysis dilutes legal scholarship and seriously impacts upon its practical 
                                                 
65 The common thread would justify the way in which judges have interpreted and applied the 
law. See Allan, 2004: 709-711. 
66 See generally Cheffins, 1997; Greeen, 2005; McCrudden, 2006; and Siems, 2008. 
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utility.67 Thus, I chose the “internal approach” or “interpretive legal theory” that 
would restrict the analysis to features of the law. This typifies the standard 
positivist view although “inclusive” positivists argue that non-legal norms (non-
pedigreed) may also be relevant in such analysis.68 Logic also surmises that 
explaining legal edicts and recommending changes following an analysis 
based solely on legal rules will be fallacious and will create an is-ought 
problem. Nonetheless, it is uncertain how non-legal knowledge and non-
pedigreed rules may be used without increasing the number of contradictions 
exponentially. As such, it is not only the “messy work product of judges and 
legislators” that requires tidying up69 but also that of commentators. In order to 
import non-legal knowledge and yet avoid a deluge, I submit that the use of 
such knowledge should be restricted only to instances where it has been 
alluded to by judges in their obiter dicta. This is because obiter dicta by their 
very nature guide other courts on how to enforce certain laws in certain 
peculiar instances and their relevance cannot be readily dismissed as there 
are instances where it may be difficult to distinguish between the ratio 
decidendi and a very persuasive obiter dictum.70 It is however important to 
carry out further research on the means of allowing a controlled use of non-
legal and non-pedigreed rules. Equally, research on this proposal would be 
incidental to that geared towards distinguishing ratio decidendi and obiter 
dictum in clear and practical terms. 
 
In a bid to achieve coherence and integrity, I circumscribed the nature of the 
corporation within criminal law discourse. The definition provided may be 
deemed too broad, neutral and thus superfluous.71 However, the different 
ways in which the term has been used by courts and commentators throw 
light on an independence of thought and action and the ability to relate to the 
consequences of such thought and action. This implies that there is on the 
one hand consensus on the need to distinguish between collective (corporate) 
                                                 
67 See Edwards, 1997; and Cheffins, 1999. 
68 For the “exclusivist” positivist view, see Raz, 1979; Shapiro, 2000; and Marmor, 2001. For 
the “inclusivist” positivist view, see Waluchow, 1994; and Coleman, 2001. 
69 Posner, 2007: 437. 
70 See Cross R and Harris, 1991: 77. 
71 See Hart (1983: 24-25) on the futility of premising such study with a definition of the term 
‘corporation.’ 
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and individual actions and objectives and on the other hand, the idea that the 
collective may be held to account has substantial appeal. Nonetheless, the 
debate about whether collectivisation within purposive groups is a standard 
for identity will continue for a long time,72 although I believe that (irrespective 
of the position endorsed) this is not a valid reason for refraining from 
attempting to define the term ‘corporation.’73 It is important that everyone 
understands what a judge means when she talks of a ‘corporation’ because 
this certainly facilitates the understanding of why she thinks the (corporate) 
defender could not have committed the offence charged or cannot be 
sanctioned with the penalty required by the law.74 Further research may 
therefore be carried out on the essence of the corporation within criminal law 
discourse analysing more cases and statutes than I have in this thesis. 
 
Equally, the idea of invoking the doctrine of innocent agency (employee 
necessity or member-responsibility) in cases where the offence was caused 
by collective failure and to use secondary or accessorial liability where one or 
many agents are guilty also requires further research. However, note must be 
taken of the fact that both innocent agency and (especially) accessorial 
liability are complex and problematic75 and to use these as the bases for 
establishing a corporation’s criminal liability may leave jurors perplexed. 
Nonetheless, given that corporations always act through their agents, the 
mandatory use of mechanisms of imputation in defined circumstances may 
reduce such complexity. This is also what is proposed in this thesis as the 
solution to the lack of coherence and integrity. Thus, an appropriate 
mechanism of imputation (with a prescribed pattern as its primary rule) may 
be identified by an observer as a common thread linking the different 
decisions of different judges addressing different facts but involving corporate 
defendants.  
 
                                                 
72 See Hart, 1983; French, 1984 and 1995; and Pettit, 1997 and 2007. 
73 Cf Orts, 1993: 1574. 
74 That is why Coke in Sutton’s Hospital, Lord Reid in Nattrass and Lord Hoffmann in Meridian 
premised their decisions on assertions about the fictitious nature of corporations. 
75 See Law Commission No 300, 2006; and Law Commission No 305, 2007. See also Wilson, 
2008. 
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However, it would be presumptuous to claim that the proposition of using the 
aggregation mechanism as modified above eliminates internal incoherence as 
regards the imputation of acts and intents to corporations by criminal law 
courts. This is because there is truly no outer limit to legal rules that may be 
invoked as secondary rules. This may engender conflict as principles of other 
legal branches such as agency and contract and tort may contradict those of 
the criminal law. For example, a corporate principal may not be criminally 
liable for all the wrongs committed by its agents within the scope of the 
agency. Equally, the criminal law court may not be prepared to enforce 
principles such as ex turpi causa non oritur actio and volenti non fit injuria.76 
Nonetheless, I have used the term ‘related legal principles’ suggesting that 
the legal rule invoked as a secondary rule must have a bearing on the case 
before the court. It is however important that further research be carried out to 
clearly distinguish between primary rules and secondary rules in the light of 
Hart’s use of these terminologies. Equally, the outlook of judges and the 
perspectives of non-legal theorists ought to be developed further by reference 
to more cases and texts. Given that the integrity of the criminal law is 
threatened by the inclination to circumvent the procedural rules in order to 
facilitate the prosecution and/or conviction of corporations, it is important to 
ensure that a corporation’s procedural rights are not simply disregarded. This 
thesis has undertaken to show how these rights may be recognised. However, 
there is need for further research into the implications of recognising these 
rights and how they may be enforced. 
 
Given that the aggregation mechanism as modified above may fit well within 
the theoretical framework built here for evaluating mechanisms of imputation 
and yet have little practical utility, I have proposed that courts may use the 
theory of the discursive dilemma. Despite some strong criticisms, this theory 
has maintained its appeal and some commentators like Pettit and Rock cited 
above have used it to explain how the distinct identity of corporations may be 
established.77 I have sought on a previous occasion to demonstrate how this 
theory may be used to establish a link between the accused corporation and a 
                                                 
76 See for example section 2(6)(a) and (b) of the CMCHA. 
77 See especially, Rock, 2005; and Pettit, 2007. 
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criminogenic practice.78 As such, it is submitted here that the use of this 
theory may be the last step of the aggregation process whereby the court 
seeks to determine whether the combined acts reflect the collective rationality 
that governed deliberations prior to the commission of the offence. The 
discursive dilemma is a certainly a very rich and complex theory that may 
offer much to corporate criminal law scholarship and further research on how 
it may be used by judges is necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 See Nana, 2009. This paper was described by Pettit as developing a “terrifically interesting 
idea.” 
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